The nature of dæmons, therefore, remains in the next place to be
more fully disclosed; for the reader has been already presented with
some very important information concerning them, in the discussion
of the sublunary Gods. As there is no vacuum then in corporeal, so
neither in incorporeal natures. Hence, between divine essences which
are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which
are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must
necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may
be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form
an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the
summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according
to a two-fold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of
which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to,
divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth.
Hence, whatever is ineffable and occult in the Gods, dæmons and heroes
express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the
sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each
other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours
to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are
unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause
of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in
common with the subjects of their providential energies. And these
characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power
and energy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls
are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the
Gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to
mingle together all things in itself, and through itself. And these
characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and
energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we
shall find that those of dæmons are to contain in themselves the gifts
of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the Gods,
but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures,
under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives
of deity characterize and absorb as it were by their powerful light,
whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence, they are
multiplied indeed but unitedly; mingled, but yet so that the unmingled
predominates; and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary,
heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under
the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives
of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of
superior natures, yet so as never to induce a cessation of energy
about, or oblivion of, divinity. In short, dæmons and heroes are
composed of the properties of the two extremes--Gods and partial souls;
but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the
human nature.
Having premised thus much, I shall next present the reader with all
the information I have been able to collect from the most genuine
Platonists, and especially from Proclus, on the nature of this middle
order of beings. In the first place, therefore, what follows on this
subject is derived from the MS. Commentary of Proclus On the First
Alcibiades, in which extract also the nature of the dæmon of Socrates
is unfolded, about which modern wit has been so much puzzled, and so
egregiously mistaken.
Let us now speak first, concerning dæmons in general; secondly,
concerning those that are allotted us in common; and thirdly,
concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that
demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed
from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is
natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons, therefore, deriving
their first subsistence from the vivific Goddess [Juno], and flowing
from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence
characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is
more intellectual, and more perfect according to hyparxis; in those
of a middle order it is more rational; and in those which rank in the
third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the dæmoniacal
order, it is various, more irrational, and more material. Possessing,
therefore, an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction
with the Gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence,
they are in one way subservient to the liberated Gods, who are the
leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane
Gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there
is one division of dæmons according to the twelve supercelestial Gods,
and another according to all the peculiarities of the mundane Gods.
For every mundane God is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order,
to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic
God, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power;
if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities,
there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified
with the same appellations as their leading Gods. Hence, they rejoice
when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c.
as expressing the peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these,
mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals
and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different Gods; dæmons
proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders.
But the Gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons; and
through this last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the
representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of
things that are last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle
genera, too, of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of
which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the Gods, but
participated by mortal natures. He, therefore, will not err who asserts
that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of
the universe in dæmons; since Diotima also assigns them this order,
viz. that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing
supernal streams, elevating all secondary natures to the Gods, and
giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium.
Hence, we must not assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are
the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not
proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature _according to habitude_, as
the same with a nature essentially dæmoniacal; nor to assert that the
perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant
with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the
same, connecting the mundane wholes. But soul does not always thus
retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at
different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who
make certain of the Gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic Gods, [i.e.
the planets] according to Amelius. But we are persuaded by Plato, who
calls the Gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the
herds of dæmons. And we shall every where preserve the doctrine of
Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal
natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception
respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.