In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three
things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks
as a dæmon, but also as a God. For in the First Alcibiades Socrates
clearly says, “I have long been of opinion that the God did not as
yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.” He calls the same
power therefore a dæmon and a God. And in the Apology he more clearly
evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered
as ranking in a dæmoniacal order. And this is what we before said, that
the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and
elevating life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal
genus, and being the first participants of the Gods. For, as is a dæmon
among Gods, such also is a God among dæmons. Among the divinities
however the hyparxis is divine; but in dæmons on the contrary, the
peculiarity of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they
bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account
of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons they frequently
appear as Gods. With great propriety therefore, does Socrates call his
dæmon a God; for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence
Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power,
and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his
life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of
Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice
proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the Theætetus
and in the Phædrus. This voice also is the signal from the dæmon,
which he speaks of in the Theages. And again in the Phædrus, when he
was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal
from the dæmon. What then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions,
and what was the voice through which he says the dæmon signified to him
his will?
In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic
power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon,
who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in
the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential
attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of
his dæmon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in
his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in
his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself
through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is
evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy
differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is
moved by the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did
not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal
inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing
itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which
was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the
illuminations of good dæmons and the Gods.
In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of
Socrates; for it never exhorted, bet perpetually recalled him. This
also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a
property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of
the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent
and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude
with respect to the communication of good, did not require the
exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was
ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But
since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit
of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon
restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a
good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally
well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence
of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the
spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness
to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling
than an exciting dæmon. For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for
the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal
discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by
this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being
naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his
unseasonable impulses.
But farther still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted
a purifying and undefiled power; others a perfective; and others a
demiurgic power. And in short, they are divided according to the
characteristic peculiarities of the Gods, and the powers under which
they are arranged. Each likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites
the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them
moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining
us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears
therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity,
viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged
under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of
purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the
vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into
the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures.
And hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For, what
else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward
energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification?
Indeed, it appears to me, that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad
over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titannic
multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the
dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey,
and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is
analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates
to Bacchus; for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this
divinity.