CHAPTER XLI.

In another part, likewise, of the same admirable Commentary, Proclus

presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions

concerning Love; and these are as follow:

Love is neither to be placed in the first, nor among the last of

beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to

Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love.

It is requisite, therefore, that love should be established between the

object of Love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the

beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does

it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and

with what monads does it leap forth?

There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and

occult Gods. And the first, indeed, is characterized by _the good_,

understanding _the good itself_, and residing in that place where

according to the oracle the paternal monad abides. But the second is

characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes.

And the third by the beautiful, where, as Timæus says, the most

beautiful of intelligibles abides. There are, however, three monads

according to these intelligible causes, subsisting uniformly and

causally in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into light

in the ineffable order of the Gods,[181] I mean Faith, Truth, and

Love. And Faith indeed establishes all things in good; but Truth

unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly, Love converts all

things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This

triad, indeed, thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods,

and imparts to all things, by its light, a union with intelligible

itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every

where combining its powers with the peculiarities of the Gods. And

among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically;

but among others, as the cause of connecting and binding; and among

others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again, it

subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner entirely

motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating;

there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to

a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends

from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards to

divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all

things with knowledge. And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe,

establishing all things unically in good. Hence the Chaldæan oracles

assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on

this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity

through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require

the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where

there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For

it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to

itself; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating

and perfecting case of imperfect natures.

The Chaldæan oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing

in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates

us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls

Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between

desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of

Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in

the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle

situation between each, congregating and collecting together that

which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from

better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites

intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain

life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks

[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says,

In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Love.[182]

But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination

an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is

a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account

the Chaldæan oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a

copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all

following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins

all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it

conjoins us both with Gods and dæmons. In the Gods indeed it has a

primary subsistence; in dæmons a secondary one; and in partial souls

a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles.

Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods

is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence;

and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears

similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as

imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as

participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a

better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which

is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect

Tamæus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods

must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this

is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its

nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect;

for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner

as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the

third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and

which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we

consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in

intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence.

And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to

cause. It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible

intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great dæmon, was

himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly,

therefore, does Diotima call it a great demon. And Socrates conjoins

the discourse about Love with that concerning dæmons. For as every

thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise

the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that

concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the

object of Love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and

divinity.

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) · 第 41 / 56 章