In another part, likewise, of the same admirable Commentary, Proclus
presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions
concerning Love; and these are as follow:
Love is neither to be placed in the first, nor among the last of
beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to
Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love.
It is requisite, therefore, that love should be established between the
object of Love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the
beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does
it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and
with what monads does it leap forth?
There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and
occult Gods. And the first, indeed, is characterized by _the good_,
understanding _the good itself_, and residing in that place where
according to the oracle the paternal monad abides. But the second is
characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes.
And the third by the beautiful, where, as Timæus says, the most
beautiful of intelligibles abides. There are, however, three monads
according to these intelligible causes, subsisting uniformly and
causally in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into light
in the ineffable order of the Gods,[181] I mean Faith, Truth, and
Love. And Faith indeed establishes all things in good; but Truth
unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly, Love converts all
things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This
triad, indeed, thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods,
and imparts to all things, by its light, a union with intelligible
itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every
where combining its powers with the peculiarities of the Gods. And
among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically;
but among others, as the cause of connecting and binding; and among
others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again, it
subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner entirely
motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating;
there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to
a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends
from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards to
divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all
things with knowledge. And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe,
establishing all things unically in good. Hence the Chaldæan oracles
assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on
this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity
through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require
the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where
there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For
it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to
itself; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating
and perfecting case of imperfect natures.
The Chaldæan oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing
in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates
us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls
Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between
desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of
Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in
the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle
situation between each, congregating and collecting together that
which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from
better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites
intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain
life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks
[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says,
In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Love.[182]
But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination
an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is
a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account
the Chaldæan oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a
copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all
following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins
all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it
conjoins us both with Gods and dæmons. In the Gods indeed it has a
primary subsistence; in dæmons a secondary one; and in partial souls
a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles.
Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods
is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence;
and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears
similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as
imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as
participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a
better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which
is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect
Tamæus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods
must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this
is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its
nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect;
for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner
as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the
third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and
which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we
consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in
intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence.
And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to
cause. It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible
intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great dæmon, was
himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly,
therefore, does Diotima call it a great demon. And Socrates conjoins
the discourse about Love with that concerning dæmons. For as every
thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise
the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that
concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the
object of Love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and
divinity.