In the next place let us direct our attention to the Parmenides of
Plato, and see how in that most theological dialogue the mundane
Gods are characterized. In the first hypothesis therefore of that
dialogue, in which all the divine orders are denied of _the one_,
Parmenides characterizes the mundane Gods by the equal and the unequal
as follows: “But since _the one_ is such, it will neither be equal
nor unequal either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal,
indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is
equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or less than the things
with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the
less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those
to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will
consist of less; and with respect to the other of greater measures. How
should it not? Is it not therefore impossible that a thing which does
not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit
any thing in any respect the same? It is impossible. It will therefore
neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of
the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists
of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are
measures; and so again, it will no longer be _the one_, but as many as
there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would
become equal to that measure. It has, however, appeared that _the one_
cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. _The one_, therefore,
neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor
(since it in no respect participates of _same_) can it ever, as it
appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or less
either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.”
As the commentary of Proclus on the second hypothesis of the
Parmenides, in which the equal and the unequal are affirmed of _the
one_, is lost, and in which I have no doubt, the properties of the
mundane Gods were most fully unfolded, I shall present the reader with
the following extract from his commentary on the above passage in the
Parmenides of Plato. The peculiarity of the mundane Gods is the equal
and the unequal, the former of these indicating their fulness, and
their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that
which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the
latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which
they contain. For in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences
of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to
ancient theologists, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus also
constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily
presubsist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls. And as all
analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the
peculiarity of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he
now rightly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal
and the unequal from _sameness and the many_, and not from _the
similar and the dissimilar_, though immediately before he spoke of
these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and
the first multitude which he denies of _the one_.
Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things of which
demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars
about which Parmenides discourses; so that _the equal_ and _the
unequal_, so far as they proceed from _the one_, and subsist through
_sameness_ and _the many_, so far through these they are denied of
_the one_. Hence, Plato thus begins his discussion of them:--“But
since it (viz. _the one_) is such,” i.e. not as we have just now
demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, that it neither receives
_same_ nor _different_, and is _without multitude_,--being such, it is
neither equal nor unequal, neither to itself, nor to others. For again,
there are here twofold conclusions, in the same manner as concerning
the similar and the dissimilar, and the same and the different. But
that _the equal_ and _the unequal_ are suspended from the twofold
co-ordinations of divine natures is not immanifest. For _the equal_ is
arranged under _the similar_, and _the same, subsistence in another,
the round, and the whole_; but _the unequal_, under _the dissimilar_,
_the different_, _subsistence in itself_, _the straight_, and _the
possession of parts_. And again, of these the former are suspended from
_bound_, but the latter from infinity. Plato also appears to produce
the discourse through certain oppositions, as it were, that he may show
that _the one_ is above all opposition. For _the one_ cannot be the
worse of the two opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be
the better of the two, since in this case it would not be the cause
of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse,
but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly
its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference,
nor permanency to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the
better to the worse.
It is, however, by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of
_the equal_ and _the unequal_, which are here assumed as symbols of
mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals,
to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual
forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations
should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary
natures, that they may show that _the one_ of the Gods is exempt from
intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All such
axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal and
unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, as it contains
many powers, some of which are co-ordinate with each other, and extend
themselves to the self-perfect and _the good_, but others differ
according to transcendency and subjection--the former must be said to
be characterized by _equality_, but the latter by _inequality_. For
_the good_ is the measure of every thing: and hence such things as are
united by the same good are measured by the same measure, and are equal
to each other. But things which are unco-ordinated with each other make
their progression according to the unequal.
Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others
incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to
divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods,
through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them,
and participate of the whole of more excellent beings. For thus, in
things commensurate, the less is willing to have a common measure
with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But
incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things
subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent
natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable
through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them.
For the communion proceeding from first to partial and multifarious
natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, _the equal_ and
_the unequal_ are symbols of the mundane Gods, _the commensurate_
and _the incommensurate_ are here very properly introduced. For in
things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition has no place, all
things being there effable; but where there is a material subject,
and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of
commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are
proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and matter, a division
appears in them, according to _the equal_ and _the unequal_.