Having therefore discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial and
sublunary Gods, it now remains that we ascend to the summit or monad
of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus, in whose divinity they all subsist
and are rooted, similarly to the fixed stars in the inerratic sphere.
For after this manner, every monad analogously contains its co-ordinate
multitude.
Bacchus therefore, is the mundane intellect, from which the soul and
body of the world are suspended. With respect however, to intellect
it is necessary to observe that one kind is imparticipable and total;
another is participable indeed but essentially so; and a third is
participable, and subsists as a habit. All intellects unconnected
with soul belong to the first kind. The mundane intellect, and the
intellects of all the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, rank in the
second division. And to the third class such intellects as ours belong.
This deity also is the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators
of things, by whom he is said in divine fables to have been torn in
pieces; because the mundane soul which participates of this divinity,
and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans,
and through them distributed into every part of the universe. Plato
in the Cratylus says of this divinity “that he is the giver of wine;
and that οινος _wine_ may most justly be denominated οιονους because
it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it
before.” On which words Proclus in his MS Scholia on that dialogue
observes as follows: “The young man Cratylus appears to inquire about
our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small
importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates.[164] And
he does not indeed pay attention to the occult, but only to the last
and mundane progressions of the Gods.” These indeed, the wise man
venerates, though as he says, they are sports, through these Gods
[Bacchus and Venus] being lovers of sport. For as he says of the
terminations of the other Gods, that they are terrible, and that they
avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as for instance,
that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that
this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and
who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who
mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, till she has entirely
subverted them, their houses and cities;--in like manner, he venerates
the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκυθυμια
_sweetness of sensation_; every where purifying our conceptions
concerning the Gods, and preparing us to understand that all things
look to the best end, whatever it may be. For because the terminations
of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and
alleviate corporeal molestation, on this account the Gods the causes
of these things, are φιλοπαιγμονες lovers of sport. Hence, of statues,
they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation,
but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously
to the mundane allotments of the Gods.
But theologists frequently call Bacchus _wine_, from the last of his
gifts, as for instance, Orpheus,
Οινου παντα μελη κοσμῳ λαβε, και μοι ενεικε.
i.e. “Take all the members of _Wine_ [that are distributed] in the
world, and bring them to me.” If however the God is thus denominated,
certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well
as his last; so that Socrates now looking to this calls the God
διδοινυσος, beginning from wine, which as we have said manifests all
the powers of Bacchus. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls Love in
common _great_, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover
of body. By this epithet _wine_ therefore, we must understand that the
peculiarity of a partial intellect, is in common presented to our view.
For the word οιουν _such as_, is nothing else than intellectual form
separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming
participated, particular and _alone_. For an all-perfect intellect
is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable
sameness: but a partial and participated intellect, is indeed all
things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or
mercurial form. This therefore, the peculiarity of which is to be
separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect _such
as_, and _particular_. (σημαινων τον οιον και τινα νουν)
Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is suspended from the
Dionysiacal or Bacchic monad, which distributes participated mundane
intellects from total intellect, (or that intellect which ranks as a
whole) many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their
proper wholenesses; on this account theologists call both this God
and all his fabrications _wine_. For all these are the progeny of
intellect. And some things participate of the partial distribution
of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine
therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them;
in body indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false
opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an
intellectual energy and fabrication. For in the laceration of Bacchus
by the Titans, the _heart_ of the God is said to have alone remained
undistributed, i.e. _the indivisible_ or impartible _essence of
intellect_.
With respect to the mundane soul which is the immediate participant
of this Bacchic intellect, the composition of it is most accurately
delivered by Plato in the Timæus, and admirably unfolded by Proclus
in his Commentaries on that dialogue. For full information therefore
on this subject I refer the reader to those works; and shall only
summarily observe at present that there are five genera of being, from
which all things after the first being are composed; viz. _essence_,
_permanency_, _motion_, _sameness_, and _difference_. For every thing
must possess _essence_; must _abide_ in its cause, from which also
it must _proceed_, and to which it must be _converted_; must be the
_same_ with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time
different from others, and distinguished in itself. But Plato for the
sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of
the mundane soul, viz. _essence, sameness, and difference_; for the
other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. When
therefore Plato says, “that from an essence impartible, and always
subsisting according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible
about bodies, the demiurgus mingled from both a third form of essence,
having a middle subsistence between the two,”--by the impartible
essence he means intellect, and by the nature which is divisible about
bodies, a corporeal life. Hence the mundane soul is a medium between
the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the
world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul
is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible
natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal
substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul
is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each,
and yet a participant of each. In short, the intellect participated by
soul, is called by Plato impartible; but the nature which is divisible
about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane
soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is
analogous to the sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a
divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light.
Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they are
conformable to the Orphic traditions. “For, says he,[165] Orpheus does
not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual
order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this
appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names.
For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where,
therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible,
in order that we may understand the divine conception of Plato? Orpheus
therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication,
analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and
from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number
of souls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed
(i.e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround
him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that
all his other fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods
whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone
was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For
since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls
and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and
distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible,
being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in one
intellection;--this being the case, he says that the intellectual
essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva.
For says he,
The intellectual heart alone was left,
directly calling it intellectual.
If therefore the impartible heart is intellectual, it will evidently
be intellect and an intellectual number; not indeed every intellect,
but the mundane; for this is the impartible heart, since the divided
God was also the fabricator of this. Orpheus therefore calls the
impartible essence of Bacchus intellect. But he denominates the life
which is divisible about body, which is physical, and pregnant with
seeds, the genitals of the God. And he says that Diana who presides
over all the generation in nature, and is the midwife of physical
productive principles, extends these genitals, distributing as far as
to subterranean natures, the prolific power of the God. But all the
remaining body of Bacchus was, he says, the psychical essence, this
also being divided into seven parts. For they divided all the seven
parts of the boy, says the theologist, speaking of the Titans; just as
Timæus divides the soul into seven parts. And perhaps Timæus, when he
says that soul is extended through the whole world, will remind the
followers of Orpheus of the Titannic division, through which soul is
not only spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended
through it. Very properly therefore, does Plato call the essence which
is proximately above soul, an impartible essence. And in short, he thus
denominates the intellect which is participated by soul, following the
Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were an interpreter of what is
said in the mysteries.” And thus much concerning Bacchus, or the monad
of the mundane Gods.