CAMBRAI AND AFTER (II): NOVEMBER 23RD TO DECEMBER 31ST, 1917
The conditions under which the attack was continued were difficult
in the extreme. From the 23rd of November onward the enemy artillery
fire increased enormously, while the ground appeared to be powdered
with machine-guns skilfully and tenaciously fought. The troops of the
36th Division were weary. Even such battalions as had not already
been in action were suffering from the long exposure to bad weather.
And the weather was worsening. Hitherto it had been wet, but, for
November, not cold, though the nights were trying enough for troops
in fighting kit and with small shelter. Now it began to appear as
though the rain would turn to snow. The most formidable difficulty
of all was that of communications. The light railways, of which
so much had been hoped, were useful certainly, but had not come
up to expectation. The roads were bad beyond expression. The main
communication of the 36th Division was the Hermies-Graincourt Road.
Over the greater part of its length it was sunken, as were those
from Hermies to Demicourt, and from Demicourt to Graincourt. Being
sunken, it was impossible to widen these mere country lanes, nor was
there anything approaching a sufficiency of metal to sustain the huge
volume of traffic upon them. On the Hermies-Graincourt Road there
were frequent serious blocks in the traffic during the early days,
when a limber broke a pole or a cooker lost a wheel. Eventually the
road itself ceased to be used at all, traffic proceeding on either
side of the banks, and chalk being hastily tumbled into the holes
which it speedily made.
The plans of the IV. Corps for November the 23rd were ambitious
enough, yet more modest than those of the preceding day. On the right
the 51st Division was to retake Fontaine, and secure the high ground
east of Bourlon Wood. The 40th Division, which had relieved the 62nd,
was to take Bourlon village. The 36th and 56th Divisions were to
advance up the Canal and roll up the Hindenburg Support System. Tanks
were to assist the attack of the 36th Division for the first time
during the operations.
The advance of the 36th Division was again to bestride the Canal du
Nord. The 107th Brigade was to attack on the east side, the 108th
Brigade on the west. The former was to be supported by the 93rd
Army Field Artillery Brigade and a Siege Battery; the latter by the
Division's own Artillery Brigades. The sixteen tanks available were
allotted to the 107th Brigade. General Withycombe held a conference
of commanding officers and officers of the Tank Battalion at his
headquarters near Graincourt. The attack was to have two phases:
the first, the capture of the Hindenburg trenches: up to the Canal,
of Round Trench and Lock 5; the second, an advance northward to
Hobart Street from the Canal to the north corner of Quarry Wood,
the northern and eastern skirts of which were to be held. To the
first phase eleven tanks were allotted; to the second five, with any
survivors of the first. An hour and a half was considered sufficient
for the carrying through of the first phase; after which there was to
be an hour's pause before the opening of the second.
West of the Canal the capture of Mœuvres was to coincide with the
first phase. The second was to be the capture of the trench running
westward from Lock 4 to the Hindenburg Support System. Zero for the
first phase was fixed at 10-30 a.m., the earliest moment possible,
seeing that General Withycombe had not been able to issue his orders
till 8-30, owing to the difficulty in collecting the tank officers.
One company commander in the 107th Brigade has informed the writer
that he had less than fifteen minutes to assemble his men and explain
the attack to his officers.
The task of the 15th Rifles was the rolling up of the Hindenburg
Support System to the Canal, and on the success of that battalion the
whole scheme of the 107th Brigade depended. It was nothing less than
a calamity that of the two tanks that should have led the troops, one
broke down, while the other turned off to the right and left them. As
they went forward they met overwhelming machine-gun fire. One company
made an advance of some hundred yards, while one of its platoons
most gallantly rushed an enemy crater-post in the road running north
from the factory. But the company was inadequately supported, being
neither reinforced nor supplied with ammunition and rifle grenades,
and, far from being able to improve its position, had eventually to
abandon some of the ground won. The 8th Rifles, assisted by a tank,
captured and consolidated Round Trench, also Lock 5, where a few
prisoners were taken. A frontal attack upon the Hindenburg System was
here out of the question, and these minor successes represented all
the ground gained. It is doubtful whether more than two tanks out
of the eleven ever crossed the Hindenburg Support System, the rest
having either broken down or been put out of action by the German
artillery fire, now very heavy. Without them, advance was all but
impossible. It was the more unfortunate since the 40th Division had
made a very fine attack and captured Bourlon, while the 51st again
took Fontaine. Repeated and heavy counter-attacks drove the 40th
from Bourlon, but the Germans could never penetrate the wood. The
51st were also driven out of Fontaine, and the line of the 40th was
represented by a very dangerous salient.
In the attack on Mœuvres, the 12th Rifles, with the 9th Irish
Fusiliers on the right, made small progress till the fresher 2nd
Rifles was thrown in to support them. Stubborn village fighting
lasted all day. By dusk three-quarters of the village had been
cleared, and four machine-guns captured by the 2nd Rifles. But while
the Hindenburg trenches either side of the village remained untaken,
consolidation was impossible. At dusk the troops were withdrawn to
the southern houses. Before the next dawn the 108th Brigade was
relieved by the 109th.
That day's fighting represented the last attack made by the 36th
Division. The 107th Brigade was to have made on the morrow another
attempt to advance, and would doubtless this time have captured
at least the Hindenburg Support System, since it was to have had
the co-operation of practically all the IV. Corps Heavy Artillery.
The day began, however, with a violent German assault on Bourlon
Wood, which drove the troops of the 40th Division back to a general
line about half-way through it. The artillery was in consequence
switched right to put down a barrage against this attack, and later
to support the highly successful counter-attack of the 40th Division
and some dismounted cavalry squadrons, which more than restored the
original line. The attack of the 107th Brigade, without the necessary
artillery assistance, could have achieved no more than that of the
previous day. Colonel Clements, commanding the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
took the responsibility of ordering his men not to advance, in which
he was entirely justified. During the counter-attack, a body of sixty
Germans which essayed to advance down the Hindenburg Line was almost
annihilated by the fire of machine-guns and the Lewis guns of the
15th Rifles. A machine-gun was captured here by this battalion. West
of the Canal, Germans debouching from Inchy, apparently to launch a
counter-attack here also, were dispersed by artillery fire.
In the afternoon Bourlon village was taken once more. The IV. Corps
had cancelled the attack, owing to the shortage of tanks. But
communication between the 40th Division and its 121st Brigade having
broken down, the latter attacked and took Bourlon with the twelve
tanks at its disposal. On the front of the Guards' Division, which
had relieved the 51st the previous night, there was no fighting of
importance.
The 25th was an eventless day for the troops of the 36th Division,
but for heavy shelling, particularly of its batteries. On the right
the Germans again attacked Bourlon, as it was inevitable they should,
while they had a battalion to go forward or artillery to cover its
advance. After hard fighting they retook it, but could not penetrate
the wood, which was in fact now almost impassable, owing to the haze
of the gas with which it had been drenched among the trees. The 40th
Division had suffered heavy casualties, and was relieved at night by
the 62nd. On the following night the 36th Division was to have taken
over a wider front, extending its line to within a thousand yards
of the western edge of Bourlon Wood. The 107th Brigade had suffered
appreciable casualties and its troops were jaded, so the 108th
Brigade was to relieve it. At the last moment, however, these orders
were cancelled. The Commander of the IV. Corps decided to relieve the
36th Division by the 2nd, which had been put at his disposal, and
ordered that the relief should take place that night. The Artillery,
Engineers, and Pioneers were to remain at the disposal of the 2nd
Division. The machine-guns were to be relieved twenty-four hours
later.
The night of November the 26th will remain an unpleasant memory
to the survivors of the troops who were then relieved. The snow
had come now, and swept almost horizontally before a wind that
rose at times to tempestuous force. The relief took a very long
time. When it was over, and the men staggered through the blizzard
to the very indifferent havens that were to be their lodgings
for the night--Beaumetz for the 108th Brigade, Doignies for the
109th, Hermies and the trenches about it for the 107th--they found
this shelter, such as it was, packed with odd units. Doignies, in
particular, had scarce a corner, being full of details of another
Division. The besetting sin of the British Army, the accumulation
of what might almost be described as camp followers, was on such
occasions as these a curse. A good many men spent what was left of
the night in the open, in the snow.
The following day the Division, less Artillery, Engineers, and
Pioneers, moved to the area Barastre-Rocquigny-Beaulencourt, where
the men had at least some comfort and the chance to sleep. A day
was spent here in the usual tasks of cleaning, refitting, and
reorganization.
The Division, to which the 121st Field Company had now been returned,
was transferred on November the 29th from the IV. to the XVII.
Corps, which was holding the line east of Arras. It was to move to
the area round Fosseux by tactical trains from Ytres and Bapaume,
the transport moving by road, staging on the night of the 29th at
Gomiecourt, Achiet-le-Petit, and Courcelles-le-Comte, ruined villages
of the Somme area, in which some shelter for men and animals had been
constructed. An agreeable prospect was held out by Staff Officers of
the XVII. Corps of some weeks at least out of the line. How far it
was realized will shortly appear. For the explanation we must turn
once more to the line at Cambrai.
The IV. Corps made another attempt upon Bourlon, the morning after
the relief of the 36th Division. Aided by tanks the 62nd Division
captured half the village, but could not hold it against powerful
German counter-attacks. It clung still, however, to the eastern
houses and to the wood. Three battalions of the Guards' Division
penetrated Fontaine, but were unsupported and had to be withdrawn at
dusk. The resources of the Third Army permitted no further attack. On
the evening of the 29th the IV. Corps relieved the Guards' Division
by the 59th and the 62nd by the 47th. It had thus in line on the 30th
three comparatively fresh Divisions.
On the morning of the 30th was launched the great German
counter-offensive. It is called counter-offensive advisedly. It was,
in effect, the greatest attack made by German forces on the Western
Front since Verdun had died down, more than eighteen months before.
Counter-attacks on a large scale had been expected, and preparation
made to meet them, but this was something far more serious. It was
a deliberately prepared attempt, supported by a great weight of
artillery, to apply pincers north and south to the large salient
formed by our recent advance. Its effect was curious, since on the
south it was completely successful, while on the north it gained
scarce a yard.
Of the northern blow the weight fell mainly from Bourlon Wood
westward, upon the 47th, the 2nd, and 56th Divisions. The resistance
of these, one an "Old Army" Division, the others London Territorials,
stands high among the achievements of the British Army in the war.
Here and there a section of trench was lost, a portion of a line
slightly withdrawn, a position temporarily abandoned, but, broadly
speaking, the great assault, launched in eight or ten successive
waves, followed by columns in artillery formation, preceded by a
whirlwind bombardment of all calibres, with gas and smoke, was
a total failure. Repeated attacks throughout the day met a like
fate. And not since the early days of the war had our artillery and
machine-guns seen such targets. The fact that the IV. Corps Heavy
Artillery had not been moved into the German lines, but was about
Doignies and Demicourt, was now of incalculable value. It took the
advancing host in enfilade. The field artillery likewise did enormous
execution. The Left Group covering the 2nd Division consisted of the
153rd and 173rd Brigades, under the command of Colonel Simpson, who
was with the Infantry Brigadier in the old headquarters in "Scotch
Street." The 153rd Brigade alone fired ten thousand rounds that day.
Many large parties of the enemy were caught in the open by its fire.
Enemy batteries were seen following up the attack, unlimbering and
coming into action. Several sections of 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers
of the 173rd Brigade were run up on to the crest of the Demicourt
Ridge, whence they annihilated these batteries with direct fire. Ere
nightfall a situation which had had critical moments was restored.
But, as all the world knows, no such rebuff met the southern arm
of the pincer. Here the Germans broke through the British lines;
Masnières, defended by a brigade of the 29th Division, held out, but
to the extreme south of the original advance the front collapsed.
La Vacquerie was retaken by the enemy. Further south he bit deeply
even into our old line, taking Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu, and
Gouzeaucourt, all of which had been ours before November the 20th,
and the last-named of which had then been over two thousand yards
from our front line. The prisoners captured by the enemy ran into
many thousands, and the guns into hundreds. It was a woeful affair,
of which the main causes were the lack of an organized defence in
depth, and that of training in junior officers and men.
It is pleasanter to turn to the very fine counter-attack by troops
of the Guards' Division, fortunately out of the line and still in
the neighbourhood. It was made at mid-day, and drove the Germans
headlong through Gouzeaucourt and a thousand yards east of it.
Further attempts were made that night and the following day to
retake Gonnelieu and La Vacquerie, but without success. The enemy
maintained his foothold in these villages and upon the edge of the
Welsh Ridge. How far precisely the German advance progressed it is
not easy to determine. It is certain at least that it was far east
of Gouzeaucourt, and that the main communication of the IV. Corps,
the Trescault-Metz Road, was seriously threatened at a time when that
Corps' own troops were maintaining their positions. That calamity was
averted by the action of the Guards' Division.[46]
It was at mid-day, while staffs were reconnoitring camps in the
neighbourhood of Arras, that news reached the 36th Division of the
break-through. Accompanying the news came orders that it should
instantly retrace its steps. There was no time now to provide
trains upon the congested railways. The troops were to march back
through the devastated area, Brigade Groups staging the night at
Achiet-le-Petit, Courcelles, and Gomiecourt. They were on the move by
half-past two that afternoon, cyclists having been sent out to meet
the transport and turn it back. The following night saw the Division
in the area Lechelle-Bancourt-Rocquigny. The men were very fatigued
after ten days of what was practically open warfare, followed by
marching and counter-marching. As for the transport horses, they too
were feeling the strain of dragging heavy loads over atrocious roads,
and had in many cases not been unhitched before their heads were
turned south again. Moreover, the accommodation for men and animals
in the Lechelle area was of the scantiest.
At 4 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd, the III. Corps informed the
36th Division that the latter had been placed at its disposal from
noon on the following day. Officers from the 108th Brigade were
ordered to reconnoitre the area then held by the 88th Brigade of the
29th Division, and from the 109th Brigade part of the area held by
troops of the 61st Division on its right. Later in the day, after the
reconnaissance had been carried out and invaluable lives lost in its
course, these orders were modified. The Germans made a fresh attack
at Gonnelieu. For a time the situation on the VII. Corps front was
highly critical, but the attack died down after the enemy had made
a certain advance. The 108th Brigade was put at the disposal of the
61st Division, and ordered to send up a battalion to hold an old
British trench near Beaucamp. Later in the afternoon the whole of the
Brigade was moved up to the neighbourhood of this village.
On December the 4th the 107th and 109th Brigades moved up from
Lechelle and Bertincourt, halting in Havrincourt Wood for dinners
_en route_. The 107th Brigade was disposed in old British trenches
between Beaucamp and Villers-Plouich, the 109th in the old German
front line north of the former, where it was in reserve to the 6th
Division. The two Field Companies left behind, and the Pioneers,
rejoined the Division, moving to a camp near Dessart Wood.
Headquarters of the Division were established in an infantry camp at
Sorel-le-Grand. That night the 108th Brigade relieved the 88th in
the line, in the Couillet Valley. The next night the 109th Brigade
followed, taking over the important plateau known as Welsh Ridge from
the 182nd Brigade of the 61st Division.
On this night G.H.Q. carried out a grave but inevitable decision.
The success of the German attack on the southern face of the
Bourlon-Noyelles-Masnières Salient had made that salient so narrow
in proportion to its depth that its maintenance would be a constant
source of attrition. A considerable portion of the ground here,
including Bourlon Wood, Cantaing, Noyelles, Graincourt, and Marcoing,
was evacuated, all dug-outs within the area being systematically
destroyed. This withdrawal was to have an effect upon the relief to
be carried out by the 36th Division.
The new line, of which General Nugent assumed command on the relief
of the 182nd Brigade, was curious and somewhat indeterminate as to
exact position. It represented an acute salient, of which the nose
pointed due east. Behind this ran, from south-west to north-east,
the deep, densely-wooded Couillet Valley. At the south-west end was
the ruined village of Villers-Plouich, at the north-east the little
damaged village of Marcoing, captured by the British in the Cambrai
battle, but now again in German hands. On either side of the Couillet
Valley were the two ridges destined to become famous, Welsh Ridge
on the south-east, and Highland Ridge on the north-west. Across
these, at right angles to the Couillet Valley, ran the two Hindenburg
Systems, which on Welsh Ridge drew to within two hundred yards of
each other, forming a single system of defence. That fact proved how
highly the men who had sited those trenches rated the importance
of Welsh Ridge. To the British at this moment it was well-nigh as
valuable as it had been to the enemy.
It will be remembered that the evacuation of Marcoing had taken
place on the night of the 4th. There was still some uncertainty
as to the position of the British outpost line. There was more
before the relief was complete. The 9th Inniskillings of the 109th
Brigade sent its No. 3 Company in advance up on to the Welsh Ridge
in the afternoon. This company arrived in the midst of a tremendous
bombardment, amid which the bursts of captured English 18-pounder
high explosive were only too apparent to the experienced eye. It
was greeted by the unpleasant news that the Germans were bombing
up the Hindenburg Support Systems, had already made considerable
headway, and that the troops awaiting relief, demoralized by utter
weariness and exposure, and by the bombardment which had reduced
them to a handful, were at that moment retreating only too fast.
The company, as was natural in such a bombardment, was spread out
with very long intervals between the platoons. The leading platoon
was at once pushed along the front line. It had few bombs and no
artillery support, so had to rely upon rifle fire. But it stopped
the German advance. Three times the enemy pressed up the trench,
and thrice was driven back. Moreover, on the report that the enemy
was advancing also up the second line, two sections, perhaps ten
men, were despatched to the assistance of the troops in that trench.
Here likewise the German bombers were checked. The remainder of the
battalion moved up, and the whole line was taken over. The night
passed fairly quietly.
The heroism of this action is not to be measured by ordinary
standards, since the men were in a state of fatigue and depression
when it started. It was surpassed on the morrow, when the
9th Inniskillings, assisted by a platoon of the 14th Rifles,
counter-attacked to restore the ground won by the enemy before their
arrival. They were enabled to carry this out by the action of the
Brigade transport officer, Lieutenant Vaughan, who had brought up,
in the course of the night, by the road through Villers-Plouich,
officially reported impracticable for any transport, fourteen
limber-loads of ammunition, grenades, and Stokes mortar bombs. The
attack was at first successful, winning back most of the lost ground
and capturing nine prisoners, but the Inniskillings followed the
retiring enemy too far, and parties of Germans, pushing down a sunken
road which had been overlooked, cut off and captured the leading men,
as well as a section of the 109th Machine-Gun Company, and drove
the attack back to its starting point. Of what followed, a graphic
account is given by Captain (then Lieutenant) Densmore Walker, of the
109th Machine-Gun Company, who had heard that his guns had been lost
and had come forward with the company commander to investigate.
"We went up the main front Hindenburg Line. This really was a filthy
place. Corpses were touching, laid along the fire-step, all men of
the 61st Division. I expect the _strafe_ of the afternoon previous
accounted for a great many.... On and on we went and then cut to
the left, where we found an officer called Emerson, of the 9th
Inniskillings. Emerson said we couldn't get further as the Hun was
thirty yards away bombing down the trench. Poor fellow, he thought
his whole company was wiped out, and he had been hit on the head by
a bomb. There was a hole in the top of his tin hat.... He was right
about the Huns. Moore said we were still one hundred and fifty yards
from the machine-gun positions. Some stick bombs fell around us,
several on top of the parapet and one or two in front of us in the
trench. We had about six men slowly falling back--they had no bombs.
One was hit while I was there. I took a squint over the top and saw
the Huns throwing many bombs. They had a light machine-gun in case we
attacked over the open. We threw our few bombs, and that stopped them
for a few minutes. When we stopped throwing they came on again. They
can throw their stick bombs further than a Mills can be chucked by a
normal man. We went on retreating quite slowly. We could have stopped
them all right with bombs. Mulholland[47] ran off to get some, and
finally some reinforcements of the 14th Rifles came up and held the
cross trench, the Hindenburg Line. Here we could easily hold the
Boche as we were right across his front. As there was nothing to do
here, we decided to try to get to the machine-gun positions from the
left flank, the right being effectually closed to us. Just as we were
pushing off, Emerson gathered some men together, got out on top, and
chased the Huns back up the trenches. It was uphill."
This heroic young officer, who had led his company in the original
attack that morning and captured four hundred yards of trench, had,
as Captain Walker remarks, been severely wounded in the head. For
three hours he had rallied the remnants of his company to withstand
the German bombers. He had made a previous attack over the open and
captured six prisoners. On this last occasion of which Captain Walker
speaks, having driven back the Germans at least a hundred yards, he
fell, mortally wounded. He was awarded the posthumous honour of the
Victoria Cross.
It may be added that Major Mulholland and Captain Walker, working
their way round to the left flank, found two of their gun teams
intact, though two men had been killed and thirteen captured by the
enemy. The guns had been posted where no machine-guns should ever
have been, in an outpost line very lightly held by isolated infantry
sections, owing to the previous troops not having realized exactly
how the land lay. The men had taken over their positions in the
dark, no reconnaissance having been possible, not realizing whither
they were being led by their guides, and had suffered the inevitable
consequences when the German bombers attacked them. A Vickers
machine-gun in a crooked trench is an indifferent weapon with which
to repel an attack along that trench.
It was found necessary to relieve the 9th Inniskillings after
twenty-four hours, so heavily had the battalion suffered. It had
lost all four company commanders. The 11th took its place. Stokes
mortars and rifle grenades had now been brought up, and at 6 a.m. on
the 7th the new battalion made a very fine bombing attack, clearing
three hundred yards of trenches on a front of two hundred yards,
straightening out the line, and driving the Germans off the crest
of Welsh Ridge. It avoided the mistake of the 9th in going too far.
Two local counter-attacks upon the Inniskillings, within four hours
of their establishing themselves upon their objectives, were beaten
off. The trenches were blocked and Stokes mortars put in position to
cover the obstructions. Germans massing for a further assault were
dispersed by a concentration of artillery. The achievement of the
109th Brigade, when the condition of its troops and the state of the
trenches are taken into consideration, must be held to rank high
among the exploits of its career. Weary and sorely tried handfuls
of men had made a most stout-hearted resistance to well-organized
and determined attacks, and the bombing counter-offensives had been
carried out with a dash that fresher troops could not have excelled.
Welsh Ridge had been denied to the enemy.
The position was even slightly improved by the 107th Brigade, which
took over the sector on the night of the 8th, and won some further
ground in the first Hindenburg Line the following morning. The 107th
Brigade also constructed new blocks. This work was carried out by
the permanent Brigade Works Party, under the command of Lieutenant
Haigh, who had earned the _sobriquet_ of "Sandbags" by many similar
achievements. The defence, an affair of makeshift at first, was now
thoroughly organized, with machine-gun batteries linked by telephone
to the Brigade Headquarters in Couillet Wood and on Highland Ridge.
On the front of the 108th Brigade there were fewer alarums and
excursions. In the Couillet Valley its troops had even room for
movement, the Germans contenting themselves with the establishment
of posts in the sunken roads leading from Marcoing. Two prisoners
were captured by the 2nd Rifles, and one by the 9th Irish Fusiliers.
One post on the higher ground, at the very nose of the salient, was
driven in by the enemy, but promptly re-established. One of the
German prisoners reported that an attack was to be launched at dawn
on the 14th. All troops and reserves "stood to," and an hour before
dawn a great bombardment was opened by all the artillery on the III.
Corps front. If attack were contemplated it did not develop. Until
two days before its final relief the Division's front was covered by
the 17th Artillery Brigade of the 6th Division, and three Army Field
Artillery Brigades, under the command of General Brock. On the 14th
the personnel of its own Artillery came in, taking over the guns _in
situ_ of two of these Brigades.
Welsh Ridge was safe now from anything but a "full dress" attack.
But that was precisely what appeared to be coming. The Germans were
plainly in aggressive mood. Their aeroplanes swept continually
down upon our front-line trenches, firing upon the men in them.
Areas in rear, about Metz especially, were bombed night and day.
Their artillery was very active. Havrincourt Wood was rendered
uninhabitable by its constant shelling. And it was increasingly plain
that the infantry and machine-gunners of the 36th Division were in no
fit state to withstand a new offensive in force.
Never since it landed in France had the troops of the 36th Division
been reduced to a physical ebb so low. The men became indescribably
dirty; lungs, throats, and hearts were affected. High as were battle
casualties, the sick wastage was higher still, which had not been the
case even at Ypres in August, because then the weather, if wet, was
warm. The troops had, in fact, been exposed to three weeks of winter
in the open, with almost continuous fighting, while it is doubtful if
those of the 36th Division had fully recovered from the effects of
the Ypres episode, three months earlier. The great captains of old
times, who decided that long spells of open warfare in winter were
impossible, were not fools. Man born of woman cannot withstand for
long that combined strain and exposure without appalling physical and
moral deterioration. Morally the infantry had survived far better
than the authority which left them in line had right to expect. The
men kept surprisingly good hearts. Walking round these much-harassed
outposts one was still greeted with a grin when one inquired how many
"pine-apples" had come over in the last twenty-four hours from the
German blocks a little further down the trenches. But physically they
were wrecks. They were living on their nerves.
A strong report as to the condition of the troops, sent up through
the chain of the medical services, added weight to General Nugent's
representations, which, realizing the embarrassments of the Higher
Command, he had not made till they were absolutely necessary. Relief
came at last. On the night of the 14th it began, the 189th Brigade
of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division relieving the 107th Brigade on
the right. Two battalions of this latter Brigade had been exchanged
with two of the 108th, which had endured a continuous spell in
the line, though not in its worst portion. The following night
it also was relieved. Ere they came out, the 9th Irish Fusiliers
bombed an enemy machine-gun post, killing one man, driving off the
others, and bringing in the gun. This parting fling was, in all the
circumstances, it will be admitted, a _beau geste_.
Rest had come at last, but it had to be won after a last battle with
the elements. The Division was to concentrate in the area round the
delightful little village of Lucheux, near Doullens. It was now
that there swept over Northern France--indeed over much of Northern
Europe--a blizzard of snow that may almost be called historic.
Dismounted personnel moved by train, and reached its destinations
after long delays. Most of the lorries allotted to formations were,
however, "snowed up," and did not arrive for two or three days. The
transport struggled through in face of extraordinary difficulties.
The snow banked itself up on the hedgeless roads. In those which
were sunken it lay frequently six feet and more in depth. Units were
obliged to march miles out of their courses, bringing the vehicles
through drifts in relays with double teams, trace horses being sent
back for a second batch when the first was upon firmer ground. Some
of the country tracks off the Doullens-Arras Road simply could not
be found. One staging area had been allotted to two Divisions at
once. The mounted personnel of the Signal Company, turned out by
newcomers, marched fifty miles in these conditions.
Finally all troops reached their quarters and settled down, the
chief work being the clearance of the roads and the making of tracks
past the most formidable drifts where this was impracticable. By
Christmas the men were in fair comfort, and, good cheer being easily
procurable, a pleasant enough Christmas was celebrated. The troops
had reason to congratulate themselves when they learned the fate
they had narrowly missed. On December the 30th the Germans launched
a heavy attack upon Welsh Ridge, and drove the 63rd Division off a
great part of it.
General Ricardo returned at this time to England. The strain of the
Battle of Cambrai and the counter-offensive had told severely upon
his health. Except for a few weeks when he commanded another Brigade,
he had been with the 36th Division from the beginning, had indeed,
as has been elsewhere recorded, assisted at its birth. His brilliant
powers of organization and his concentration upon the whole aspect of
any problem presented to him, made him an ideal Brigadier in what has
been described as a war of material. He was succeeded by his friend
and brother-officer of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, Brigadier-General
W. F. Hessey, D.S.O. General Hessey also had been one of the original
commanding officers of the 109th Brigade, and had come to France with
the 11th Inniskillings, leaving that battalion to command a brigade
before the opening of the Somme battle. General Ricardo's organizing
abilities were not lost to the British Army. He ended the war as
Commandant of the large base of Dieppe.
The lessons of the Battle of Cambrai are clear enough, though some
of its aspects will remain mysterious till all the secrets of the
war are revealed. The piercing of the Hindenburg fortifications
was to a certain extent a gamble, since no such operation had yet
been attempted in such manner. The very fact that its surprise was
complete was perhaps the most remarkable feat of all. It was a
triumphant success, though it must be remembered that the Germans
were ill equipped with either armour-piercing ammunition or anti-tank
guns to oppose it. But, if the break-through was wonderfully
achieved, the ensuing exploitation was not. The resistance of
Flesquières and a broken bridge at Masnières checked the cavalry in
its eastward thrust, but, after all, the Canal de l'Escaut was won,
and exploitation east of it, including the capture of Cambrai, was
of less importance than the northern advance to the Sensée marshes.
"Cambrai," the writer heard a distinguished soldier say, "was either
a surprise or it was not. It opened as a surprise, but it was not
continued as a surprise should be." It appears probable to-day that
had two fresh Divisions been passed through after the troops had
reached their objectives--disregarding Flesquières, which actually
did very little harm--they could have been firmly consolidated on the
Bourlon Ridge by next morning, and possibly reached the outskirts of
Cambrai. Mœuvres likewise would probably not have been a hard nut
for the teeth of one of the reserve Brigades of the 36th Division
that afternoon. As it was, these troops on that first day sat in the
rain and were not employed. The supreme difficulty, which was not
surmounted, was the passing through of new formations in a fresh
state. This difficulty was due to the scanty accommodation in the
forward area, which could not be largely augmented without robbing
the attack of one of its most essential features--surprise. It was
probably this cause which kept the Divisions in the V. Corps so far
back. This question of accommodation was as important as any tactical
problem. There was no rest for troops in reserve; they were scarcely
better off than those in the fighting. The organization of billeting
during reliefs broke down. No provision was made for surplus
personnel of incoming Divisions. As a result, each area became
congested with their details, and other Divisions, when allotted such
areas, found no accommodation left. Another great difficulty was the
lack of tolerable roads. The work done upon the roads before and
during the battle was insufficient to preserve them, but it had the
effect of wearying the front-line troops. The preliminary work, the
exposure, cold, dirt, lack of rest and hot food, told very speedily
upon the health of the infantry engaged, and diminished its fighting
value.
The tanks were magnificent. They accomplished all that their
commanders had promised. But their employment after the first
day caused a tremendous strain upon their teams, which, when not
fighting, were greasing and "tuning up." It is possible--though this
is pure speculation--that the number used on November the 20th might
have been reduced by a third, which would have left a really large
reserve for subsequent operations. As it was, many tanks in the later
stages of the battle broke down before reaching their starting line.
And once more, in conclusion, we must pay our meed of praise to
the German machine-gunner. Machine-gun battalions were reported by
airmen to have detrained at Cambrai on the evening of the 20th. If
so, these picked troops were doubtless in action all along the front
the following day. It was machine-gun fire alone that delayed the
British advance till fresh troops were on the ground to bring it to
a halt. Of the German machine-gunners General Nugent wrote: "It is
not too much to say that the failure of our offensive to achieve the
objectives laid down, was entirely due to the devotion and fighting
spirit of these troops of the enemy, practically unsupported by their
own infantry and artillery, during the first forty-eight hours."
This fact proved, if proof were needed, that no troops, however
devoted, could, without mechanical assistance, face machine-guns
being handled by really determined defenders.
[Illustration: Map IV
The Battle of Cambrai, 1917.]
FOOTNOTES:
[46] On the return of the 36th Division to the Cambrai area, the
writer was informed that there was a dead German in Dessart Wood.
The wood being ten thousand yards from the German line before the
counter-attack, he found this hard to credit, and rode over to see.
He could find no German. There were, however, undoubtedly some in
Gouzeaucourt Wood, half-way between Metz and Gouzeaucourt.
[47] O.C. 109th Machine-Gun Company.