THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I): JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918
Snowbound as they were, the troops of the 36th Division passed
several days in the most agreeable conditions. One day there might
be snow-fall; the next might succeed with keen frost, but there was
no lack of timber for fuel, and the amenities of civilization were
very welcome to men who for five months had dwelt amid devastation.
Training was practically impossible owing to the depth of the snow in
the fields, but some musketry was carried out on a good rifle-range
near Lucheux. The Artillery, having been relieved by that of the
63rd Division on Christmas Day, got no further than the Beaulencourt
staging area, where it remained hemmed in by drifts.
The rest was, as usual, all too short, particularly in view of the
exhausted condition of the troops. Immediately after Christmas the
Division was again on the move, to the area Corbie-Boves-Moreuil.
Brigade groups went by rail, the transport by road, staging at
Puchevillers and Contay. The latter met with difficulties equal to
those following the relief. Many lorries were stuck in drifts. In
some cases the trains even were considerably delayed.
The British Army was extending its flank, taking over from the French
a front far greater than it had ever held, even at the time of the
German retirement of 1917, when its right had been on the Amiens-St.
Quentin Road. This is not the place to discuss the wisdom of that
extension, or supposing, as few will deny, that it was in itself
reasonable, of its magnitude. Suffice it to say that Sir Douglas
Haig now found himself seriously short of reserves. The relief of
successive French divisions was being slowly effected, and the
progress of the 36th Division was leisurely. It remained five days at
rest in the Corbie area, where it was joined by its Artillery. Then
it went slowly forward, _via_ Harbonnières, to the area of Nesle, a
town left undamaged by the Germans in their retirement, into which
they had herded civilians, old men, women, and children, from other
towns and villages destroyed by them. Here Divisional Headquarters
were established on January the 12th. That night the 107th Brigade
relieved a regiment of the 6th French Infantry Division astride the
Somme before St. Quentin, remaining under the orders of the French
Divisional Commander. The night following the 109th Brigade relieved
the other French regiment in line, command passing to General Nugent
at 10 a.m. on the 14th, when Headquarters took over from those of
the 6th French Division at Ollézy. The 108th Brigade was billeted in
villages on the Ham-St. Quentin Road, with headquarters at Dury. The
Divisional Artillery had been joined by the 14th Army Field Artillery
Brigade. The relief of the French artillery was not complete till the
15th.
Reliefs of French by British formations always presented great
difficulties, owing to the fact that reserves of munitions of every
sort had to be transferred, instead of being simply handed over as
when Briton relieved Briton. Differences of language and of method
were scarcely less important. Yet it often happened that reliefs on
such occasions were the most satisfactory of all. Each side was on
its mettle. Staff work was meticulously careful, reconnaissances
were thorough, guides of proved intelligence chosen. This case was
no exception. There is hardly a diary of the formations and units
of the 36th Division in which is not expressed high appreciation of
the arrangements made by the French, and of the kindness with which
advance parties were treated by them. One officer writes of his own
reception by a French regimental commander: "The most amazing dinner
I ever did have in the line! We had course after course of wonderful
things, with suitable wines, till it was hard to think that the Huns
could be only a thousand yards distant, but that was all they were."
And not the officers only were entertained, for his men informed him
that "the _poilus_ made them eat the whole time and absolutely bathed
them in coffee."
The front taken over ran from Sphinx Wood, some twelve hundred
yards west of the village of Itancourt, to a point on the St.
Quentin-Roisel Railway a thousand yards west of Rocourt Station.
Rocourt is a suburb of the city of St. Quentin, at the gates of
which the British Armies now sat. The position and its defences
will have to be described later in some detail. Here it need only
be said that the latter were already considerable, but that, the
relief taking place in the midst of a thaw following upon weeks of
snow and frost, the 36th Division succeeded to a legacy of fallen-in
trenches and mud. For the rest, it was on the whole a quiet front and
not uncomfortable. The destruction of the villages behind our lines
did not appear to be as complete as before Cambrai. A few French
civilians had trickled back to villages such as Ollézy and Douchy,
while the town of Ham, where were the Headquarters of the XVIII.
Corps, was intact and was full of them.
The Germans, who had excellent observation, were, of course, quickly
aware of the relief, and evidently received orders to obtain
identifications of the new troops in front of them. After several
fruitless attempts they succeeded in obtaining them. On the night
of January the 22nd they entered our outpost line on the front of
both Brigades, capturing in each case a wounded prisoner. A small
patrol of the 10th Rifles was also waylaid by superior numbers, and
an officer and sergeant taken. This appeared to content them, and
thereafter, for a considerable time, the front became of a placidity
such as the troops of the 36th Division had seldom known.
For the moment--a fleeting moment, indeed--the enemy had second place
in the minds of officers and men of the Division. Its first concern
was with its reorganization. The shortage of man-power had been
talked of long enough. Its fruits had now to be plucked, and bitter
they were. The whole British Army was now cutting down its divisions
to nine infantry battalions, and its brigades to three. From the
tactical point of view, apart from the fact that it entailed a loss
of some hundred and seventy-five battalions, the change had serious
inconveniences. The brigade of four battalions was the traditional
British formation, just as the regiment of three was the Continental.
It was the formation which British commanders had handled in training
and practice, upon which their conceptions of infantry in war were
based. The moral loss was no less great, particularly in divisions
and brigades with strong territorial associations and sentiment.
It meant that battalions in every division disappeared, and that
either their personnel was transferred to others, or that they became
"Entrenching Battalions," pitiful, nameless ghosts, robbed of their
pride and their traditions. Such changes could not be without their
effect upon moral, working through the loss of _esprit-de-corps_, the
very life's blood of a combatant unit.
[Illustration: VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE 36^{th} (Ulster)
DIVISION--1917 and 1918.
The late 2/Lt. E. DE WIND
15^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.
The late Corp. E. SEAMAN
2^{nd} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2/Lt. C. L. KNOX
Royal Engineers.
Pte. N. HARVEY
1^{st} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.]
The 36th Division, it will be remembered, had already received two
regular battalions, the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles and the 1st Royal
Irish Fusiliers. It was now joined by three more, the 1st and 2nd
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, from the 29th and 32nd Divisions
respectively, and the 1st Royal Irish Rifles, from the 8th Division.
To make place for them, the 10th and 11th Inniskillings, the 8th/9th,
10th, and 11th/13th Rifles had to disappear. Three Entrenching
Battalions, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, were formed from the disbanded
battalions after the remainder, including the newcomers, had been
brought up to strength. The 2nd Rifles in the 108th Brigade, and the
1st Irish Fusiliers in the 107th, were exchanged. The infantry of the
Division was now as follows:
107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
1st Royal Irish Rifles.
2nd Royal Irish Rifles.
15th Royal Irish Rifles.
108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
12th Royal Irish Rifles.
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
9th Royal Irish Fusiliers.
109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
The new arrivals were all regular battalions of Ulster regiments, but
the characteristics of the Ulster Division were entirely changed. Its
infantry, formed originally from the U.V.F., had now Ulster-Scot and
Celt intermingled, and received English recruits as well.
At the same time the 16th Rifles (Pioneers) was reduced, with other
Pioneer battalions in France, to three companies. One accretion of
strength the Division received, as some small compensation. The 266th
Machine-Gun Company arrived from England on January the 18th, and was
formed, with the three existing Machine-Gun Companies, into the 36th
Machine-Gun Battalion. The tendency had been for the machine-guns
of a Division to come more and more directly under the control of
the Divisional Commander during active operations. A Divisional
Machine-Gun Officer had long been employed, but he was rather an
_attaché_ to the staff than a commander. Under the new system there
was a lieutenant-colonel commanding the battalion who received his
orders from the staff of the Division.
On February the 22nd the 30th Division, hitherto the reserve of the
XVIII. Corps, was interposed between the 36th and 61st, taking over
the front held by the 36th Division north of the Somme, in the
Forward System. In the second position, or Battle Zone, the 36th
Division continued to be responsible for a sector north of the Somme,
behind the village of Fontaine-les-Clercs.[48] The frontage was thus
reduced to about six thousand yards. The relief of French troops by
British had meanwhile extended further south, and the 36th Division
had on its right the 14th Division of the III. Corps.
The Battle of Cambrai had been the last fling of the Allies for the
time being. They were now definitely upon the defensive, awaiting a
great attack in some uncertainty as to the precise point at which it
should be launched. The victories of the Central Powers upon other
fronts, above all the collapse of Russia, had freed German troops
which, if not for the most part of high quality, would be able to
man defences while attack was delivered elsewhere by the superior
troops they relieved. Not a week passed without the announcement of
the arrival of new divisions from Russia or Italy. Between November
the 1st, 1917, and March the 20th, 1918, the number of German
divisions in the Western theatre had increased from one hundred and
forty-six to one hundred and ninety-two.[49] The total continued to
grow for some time after the launching of the offensive. The heavy
artillery had also been greatly increased, while a number of Austrian
artillery regiments had come to the aid of their allies. The forces
of the Allies were now considerably outnumbered, though not nearly
to the extent which many writers, then and since, have pretended.
Moreover, they were without unity of command, and there was among
them divided opinion as to the point at which they would have to meet
the onslaught, though Sir Henry Wilson had insisted that it would be
at the junction of British and French. There had been preparations
for an advance in Flanders. The French had apprehensions of one in
Champagne. On both these fronts there came, indeed, great attacks
at subsequent dates. Even if the attack were to come, as seemed
most probable, on the front of General Gough's Fifth and General
Byng's Third Armies, its exact scope was uncertain. The final opinion
appeared to be that, while the opening assault would extend further
south, the main weight of the attack would be north of the Somme,
along which would be formed a defensive flank. There is little doubt,
from the writings of German staff officers since published, that such
was the original intention, and that only unexpectedly great success
south of the Somme induced Ludendorff to modify it. It appears also
that the Crown Prince, in whose Group of Armies were the forces in
the left of the German advance, urged him to adhere to his first plan
even after the battle had been several days in progress.
Lord Haig in his Despatches has revealed that, not being able to hold
all his extended front in adequate strength, having to take risks
somewhere, he took them on the front of the Fifth Army, where there
was most elbow-room, and where loss of ground was likely to have
least serious effects. It had become more and more apparent that
defence in depth offered the best means of checking and breaking up
an advance, and it had been laid down by G.H.Q. that all preparations
must be based upon that system. Unfortunately, with the slender
forces at the disposal of General Gough, defence in adequate depth
implied a very shadowy defence in breadth.
The system of defence of divisions in line comprised a Forward
Zone and a Battle Zone. The object of the former was to withstand
a minor attack, and to check and, so far as might be, disorganize
and disintegrate a major one. On the Battle Zone the Army Commander
was to oppose the enemy's advance with all the forces at his
disposal. The Forward Zone comprised a front and intermediate system;
the former consisting of outpost line, line of resistance, and
counter-attack companies; the latter of a system of isolated forts,
wired all round, known as the Line of Redoubts. The Battle Zone
likewise consisted of two main lines of defence, organized internally
with counter-attack units and wired-in redoubts. The description
of these defences may sound formidable till it is explained that
there was but one battalion for the defence of each of them to two
thousand yards on the front of the 36th Division, and even less
density further south. There were likewise Rear Zone defences,
notably behind the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la Somme. Here
it may be added that confusion has been caused in the minds of many
by the fashion in which the names "Somme River," "Somme Canal," "St.
Quentin Canal," and "Crozat Canal" have been used by various writers
in their descriptions of the battle; because the canalized Somme,
giving birth to different canals at different parts of its course,
was also the main obstacle in two successive lines of defence. The
Somme runs south-west from St. Quentin to St. Simon, west for nine
miles to Voyennes, then more or less due north to Peronne. Over the
first of these three sections it is canalized under the name of the
Canal de St. Quentin; over the second two, under that of the Canal de
la Somme. Where confusion is apt to arise is in the fact that at St.
Simon the Canal de St. Quentin leaves its parent river and runs down
to the Oise at Terguier. In the account that follows, the river, a
winding, branching stream, will be disregarded, and the Canals, which
formed the real obstacles, alluded to always as the Canal de St.
Quentin and Canal de la Somme.[50]
The front held by the 36th Division was in its natural features not
ill adapted for defence. It was crossed by a series of ridges and
valleys running east and west, parallel to the front line. Behind
the front-line system, which was on the same ridge as the German
outposts and on its reverse slope, was a deep valley known as Grugies
Valley, from Grugies to the St. Quentin-La Fère Road, north of
Urvillers, thence curving northward into "No Man's Land," towards
Neuville-St. Amand. Grugies Valley had therefore its advantages and
its dangers. On the one hand it afforded good masked positions for
machine-guns; on the other, it was a conduit, from the north-eastern
end of which attack might flow down behind the line of resistance
of the Forward Zone. Behind it was another ridge, upon which was the
Line of Redoubts. Behind this again the ground sloped away gradually,
rising to a slighter ridge, along which ran the Essigny-Contescourt
Road. Upon the forward and reverse slopes of this last ridge were
the positions of the two southern sectors of the Battle Zone, four
thousand five hundred yards behind the front line. The northern
sector, as has been explained, was north of the St. Quentin Canal.
These positions were good, but they had one great failing. The front
line of the 36th Division ran roughly from west to east to Sphinx
Wood, while thence the line of the 14th Division ran more nearly
north and south. The right flank was therefore very insecure. Should
Urvillers fall, the right of the 36th Division's Forward System would
undoubtedly crumple, while should such a calamity as the capture of
Essigny occur, the defences of the Battle Zone would be turned.
The night of February the 22nd, which saw the entry into line of the
30th Division, saw also a reorganization of the system of defence.
All three Brigades now entered the line, the 108th on the right,
107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each had one battalion
in the Forward Zone, one as garrison for the Battle Zone, and one in
reserve. In each case the Forward Zone battalion had two companies
in the line of resistance, finding their own outposts, one company
for counter-attack in the front system, and one "passive resistance"
company, with battalion headquarters, in a large fort in the Line of
Redoubts. This unfortunate description implied that the last-named
company was not allowed to counter-attack to retake ground lost in
the front system. The Battle Zone battalions were billeted close
to their battle stations, that of the 108th Brigade in dug-outs at
Essigny Station, along the railway cutting, of the 107th Brigade in
quarries near Grand Séraucourt, and of the 109th at Le Hamel, on
the other side of the St. Quentin Canal. The artillery was disposed
in two groups covering the Forward Zone, with one of the three
Brigades, the 153rd, in reserve as supporting brigade. On February
the 28th, when XVIII. Corps announced a "state of preparation," the
batteries of this brigade took up positions south-east of Grand
Séraucourt to cover the Battle Zone, with a section per battery
pushed forward to temporary positions covering the Line of Redoubts.
Upon these positions a vast amount of work had to be accomplished, an
amount so vast that it permitted of very scanty time being allotted
for training. The Battle Zone had practically to be created. The
lines had been merely sited by the French, and a little wire put up.
Work was concentrated first of all upon this; secondly, upon the
fortresses which were to contain battalion headquarters and "the
passive resistance" company in the Line of Redoubts--known, from
right to left, as "Jeanne d'Arc," "Racecourse," and "Boadicea"; and
lastly, upon making good the main communication trenches, and making
wired-in platoon keeps in the Forward Zone. There was shortage of
wire in February and the early part of March, and bad indeed would
have been the state of the defences but for the large dumps left
behind by the French, for which the countryside was scoured. As it
was, no-one in the 36th Division can be said to have been satisfied
with the state of the Battle Zone by mid-March. Most of the trenches
were no more than eighteen inches deep, it having been ruled that
there would be time to dig them out when it became necessary to
occupy them.
Uncanny work it was awaiting, in the silence of quietest of quiet
lines, a mighty attack of which for very long there was scarce
an indication. In the earlier days, save for reports from higher
formations of aerodromes, hospitals, and railways far behind the
German lines, the sole warning sign was in the large numbers of
officers, maps in hand, observing day by day the British trenches
and the country behind them. There was no great increase of movement
on forward roads till about the 12th of March. Aeroplane photographs
taken about this date showed that a large number of shell-holes a few
hundred yards from the outpost line had been worked upon. It was
surmised that these were being prepared for trench mortars, for the
destruction of the British front-line system, as that of the Russians
had been destroyed before the last great German advance at Riga.
Significant also, in this connection, was the fact that Oskar von
Hutier, who had carried out that attack, was now in line opposite, in
command of Eighteenth Army. His known character and antecedents were
food for reflection.
New military roads were also discovered behind Itancourt. But it was
a few clear mornings and evenings, from the 15th of March onwards,
that brought most conclusive evidence of what was impending. From the
dovecote in Essigny, the best observation post on the XVIII. Corps
front, which was manned by the 36th Division's excellent observers,
an enormous amount of traffic could now be observed. Along the main
road from Guise-Mont d'Origny to St. Quentin, in particular, huge
convoys of lorries and horse transport were seen, as dusk drew
in, moving towards the last-named city. Small place for doubt now
remained.
On March the 4th occurred a curious incident. The Germans had
apparently come to the conclusion that the British front line had
been abandoned; and, indeed, it was held lightly enough by isolated
sections. Strong patrols, amounting in general to a platoon, suddenly
issued from the German trenches all along the 36th Division's front,
in broad daylight. The outposts might be weak, but they could resist
an attempt of this sort. Under the fire of Lewis guns all the patrols
were stopped and dispersed with heavy loss. Patrols sent out in turn
from the outpost companies captured in all one officer and ten other
ranks. It was a sharp lesson, and thereafter, till the opening of the
attack, was no move by the German infantry.
From March the 12th onward was instituted a series of nightly
bombardments, in which the now considerable heavy artillery at the
disposal of the XVIII. Corps took part, of valleys and dead ground
forming probable assembly positions. Tests of the action to follow
the preconcerted Corps message, "Man Battle Stations," were carried
out. Bridges had long been prepared for demolition and allotted to
particular sections of the Field Companies. Small mine-fields had
been constructed in case of the employment of tanks by the enemy.
Grugies Valley was starred with machine-guns, to sweep its length
with zones of flanking fire. It was felt by officers and men of the
Division that what the limited means at its disposal permitted had
been accomplished. The worst misgivings were with regard to the gaps
between keeps and redoubts in the Forward Zone, owing to the paucity
of numbers available for its defence. There was no touch between the
battalion headquarters forts in the Line of Redoubts; they were in no
sense mutually supporting. There was little to prevent the enemy from
breaking through in the intervals, pushing forward his main advance
almost unembarrassed by them, while special detachments swallowed
them at leisure.
Much noise of enemy traffic was heard at night from the 17th onward.
On the evening of the 18th two Germans entered our lines on the front
of the 107th Brigade to give themselves up. They declared they had
deserted to avoid the coming battle, which would not now be long
delayed. They confirmed the suspicions of massed trench mortars on
the front. They had seen great numbers of troops, particularly of
artillery. St. Quentin, they said, was packed with men. On the night
of the 20th a raid was carried out by the 61st Division, resulting
in the capture of prisoners who stated that the attack was to be
launched the following morning. A special bombardment was therefore
carried out from 2-30 to 3 a.m., with heavy rolling barrages on
likely positions of assembly.
The great moment, for which, it is scarce exaggeration to say, men
were waiting all the world over, came at 4-35 a.m. on the morning of
March the 21st. The infantry of the 36th Division was then disposed
as follows:
RIGHT BRIGADE: 108TH BRIGADE.
Forward Zone: 12th Rifles.
Battle Zone: 1st Irish Fusiliers.
Divisional Reserve: 9th Irish Fusiliers.
CENTRE BRIGADE: 107TH BRIGADE.
Forward Zone: 15th Rifles.
Battle Zone: 1st Rifles.
Divisional Reserve: 2nd Rifles.
LEFT BRIGADE: 109TH BRIGADE.
Forward Zone: 2nd Inniskillings.
Battle Zone: 1st Inniskillings.
Divisional Reserve: 9th Inniskillings.
The artillery had begun moving a large proportion of its guns to new
positions on the night of the 17th, having taken a hint from the fate
of batteries on the front of the Third Army, which had just been
subjected to the heaviest "mustard" gas bombardments experienced in
the whole course of the war. The moves of batteries of the 173rd
Brigade were actually not complete till a few hours prior to the
launching of the attack. The dispositions were then as follows:
RIGHT GROUP. (Covering front of 108th and 107th Infantry Brigades.)[51]
Headquarters, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A.
"A," "B," "C," and "D" Batteries, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A.
462nd Battery, R.F.A.
464th Battery, R.F.A.
LEFT GROUP. (Covering front of 109th Infantry Brigade.)
Headquarters, 179th Army Brigade, R.F.A.
383rd Battery, R.F.A.
463rd Battery, R.F.A.
"D" Battery, 232nd Brigade, R.F.A.
BATTLE ZONE GROUP.
Headquarters, 153rd Brigade, R.F.A.
"A," "B," "C," and "D" Batteries, 153rd Brigade, R.F.A.
With one great crash there opened a tremendous bombardment, of trench
mortars by the hundred and every calibre of artillery save the 77-mm.
field gun. Its continuous roar was punctuated, to those a little
distance from the line, by the explosions of huge single shells
upon objectives in rear. So far as can be ascertained the German
programme consisted of a concentration mainly of trench mortars on
the front system; a bombardment with high explosive and phosgene
gas of the Line of Redoubts, the valley in rear of it, the trenches
of the Battle Zone, and Battery Valley, which ran behind its ridge;
for which 105, 150, and 210-mm. howitzers were employed; and fire on
villages in rear, and upon the crossings of the Canal de St. Quentin,
with the largest howitzers and high-velocity guns. Particularly
heavy fire was directed upon the redoubts and battery positions. The
proportion of lethal shell to high-explosive gradually decreased,
till the barrages were composed entirely of the latter. There was,
according to the reports of artillerymen, a remarkable absence of
77-mm. shell and of instantaneous fuses.
Five minutes after the opening of the bombardment the order, "Man
Battle Stations," was sent out by the General Staff. Dawn had broken
in a dense mist. Morning mists at this season and in this district
are the rule rather than the exception, but this was far thicker than
the ordinary. It was at five o'clock impossible to see more than ten
yards ahead, and visibility increased very slowly till the afternoon.
All the battalions in the Battle Zone appear to have reached their
stations, upon ground thoroughly known to officers and men, in good
time, but, as communications were constantly cut and runners were
slow amidst the fog and the shelling, reports were long in coming
to hand. This loss of telephone communication rendered it almost
impossible to issue barrage orders to the artillery.
The German infantry attack was launched at 8-30 a.m. That the enemy
attacked the major part of the line of the 36th Division frontally
is disproved by the reports of survivors and returned prisoners. The
main assault of the Germans, it must be remembered, was due west,
almost parallel to the 36th Division's outpost line from Sphinx
Wood to Gauchy. The advance must have swept straight up the Grugies
Valley. There is evidence that Racecourse Redoubt, which contained
the battalion headquarters and one company of the 15th Rifles, was
attacked before the companies in the front system. Hopeless indeed
was the position of the men in this front system, outnumbered three
or four times, taken in rear by parties which came upon them without
warning. The case of the machine-gunners, from whom, in the defence
of the valley, much had been hoped, was equally desperate. The
Germans swept on them, as it were, out of nothingness. Few can have
had opportunity to fire a shot ere they were rushed.
It was believed at the time that all troops in the front system
had been speedily overwhelmed. The evidence of returned prisoners,
however, has established that there was at least one magnificent
defence in this area, which, though then unknown, must have had
invaluable results. The three companies of the 12th Rifles in the
front system of the 108th Brigade were, as will be seen from the
map, astride the national road running from St. Quentin to La Fère,
which for several miles south of this point ran roughly parallel
with the British front line. Captain L. J. Johnston, who commanded
"C," the counter-attack company, states that though the preliminary
bombardment smashed up their trenches and cut huge lanes in their
wire, though owing to the mist and the fumes of gas-shell it was
impossible to see more than a few feet ahead, the casualties were
relatively light. Though all communication to rear was cut, the
telephone line held as far back as Le Pontchu Quarry, "C" company's
headquarters. Captain Johnston thus received word when the attack
was launched, and began to move his company into Foucard Trench. In
its progress up the communication trench it met a small party of
Germans, who were shot or bayoneted. The fact was, however, thus made
unpleasantly apparent that the enemy had broken through the line of
resistance. The keeps held by "A" and "D" companies, farther forward,
were still resisting, but by 11 a.m. were completely surrounded, and
finally overwhelmed by weight of numbers. For four hours constant
bombing attacks were launched on Foucard Trench. On several occasions
parties of Germans entered the trench, but in savage hand-to-hand
fighting were ejected. About thirty prisoners were taken and sent
back under escort to Le Pontchu Quarry. About noon a most determined
assault was carried out with _flammenwerfer_, to be bloodily repulsed.
An hour later the fog suddenly lifted. It was then clear to "C"
company what progress the enemy had made. More than a mile to rear
the Germans could be seen swarming about Jeanne d'Arc Redoubt, which
held the battalion headquarters and "B" company. On the front of the
14th Division German cavalry could be seen advancing, and, what was
even more astonishing, a column of transport, three hundred yards
long, moving down the main St. Quentin-La Fère Road, about four
hundred yards to the right of "C" company's position. Lewis-gun fire
opened upon this body in a few seconds killed or wounded every man
and horse in it, leaving the whole column in a welter of confusion.
By now, however, the company was being attacked from both flanks,
and a withdrawal to Lejeune Trench, five hundred yards in rear, was
ordered. The enemy followed up the withdrawal fiercely and with
the greatest gallantry, a rather pathetic incident occurring when a
single German with bayonet fixed charged the whole line! The incident
is instructive, as it reveals the high state of training in the
offensive spirit of the attacking troops, and helps to account for
some of their successes in later days, when our men were wearied out.
"C" company, reinforced by the forward headquarters, which had been
in Le Pontchu Quarry, now numbered nearly a hundred and twenty men. A
further magnificent stand was here made.
About 3 p.m. a company of the enemy, evidently believing they had
to deal with but a handful, was seen marching up in fours from the
rear. The men held their fire till the Germans reached point-blank
range. Then such a blast burst forth as brought the whole body to the
ground. Captain Johnston believes that not a man escaped.
The position, however, was now hopeless. All thought of cutting a way
through was out of the question, so thick were the enemy to rear.
The end came at 4 p.m. A German tank came down the main road, firing
into the trench in enfilade. At the same moment a whole battalion
advanced from the front. There were about a hundred men only alive,
many of them wounded. There was no course open but surrender. As the
prisoners were marched back toward St. Quentin they had the grim
satisfaction of seeing the column of transport they had annihilated
still strewn in indescribable confusion about the road.
This most valorous defence was, as has been stated, unknown at the
time. After the Armistice one Military Cross, two Distinguished
Conduct Medals, and four Military Medals were awarded to the
survivors of the company. The defence of "C" company of the 12th
Rifles, against hopeless odds, when all seemed melting about them,
must be held to rank with the very finest episodes of that month
of March, the blackness of which is gilded with so many deeds of
imperishable courage and fortitude.
The front system pierced, the enemy wasted no time upon the Line of
Redoubts. The leading battalions pushed through the gaps between
them, leaving it to their successors to attack them deliberately,
with the aid of trench mortars and _flammenwerfer_. At 11-45
a.m. a report was received from the 30th Division, on the left,
that the enemy had broken through on either side of the Epine de
Dallon Redoubt, and that the special "redoubt barrage" was being
put down. At 12-10 p.m. the "redoubt barrage" was ordered on the
36th Division's front also. That the enemy had passed through the
Line of Redoubts before the barrage was put down is now certain.
Twenty minutes later the 107th Brigade received a message from
its Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Cumming, whose work in
reconnaissance was extremely gallant and useful, that the attack
upon the Battle Zone was developing. At 12-15 p.m. Artillery Groups
were warned to be prepared to withdraw their batteries to the Battle
Zone positions. The personnel of the 18-pounder batteries of the
173rd Brigade was, however, obliged to withdraw from its guns,
being attacked at close quarters by riflemen and machine-guns.
Breech blocks and sights were carried away by the gunners in their
retirement. The most serious report of all came from the 107th
Brigade. The enemy was in Contescourt, in the section of the Battle
Zone held by the 1st Rifles. It appears that the platoon of this
battalion told off to defend the northern part of the village, was
almost destroyed by a shell on the way up. A company of the 2nd
Battalion moved forward in an attempt to eject him, but suffered
heavily from machine-gun fire and failed to achieve its purpose.
The position was now very dangerous, but not irretrievable. Save at
Contescourt, where the enemy made no further progress, the Battle
Zone was intact. So, likewise, was that of the 30th Division on the
left, and of the 61st Division further north, save at one point. At
noon all three battalion headquarters on the Line of Redoubts were
most manfully holding out, beating off attack after attack. General
Nugent had refused to allow more than one company from a reserve
battalion on the 107th Brigade's front to reinforce that holding the
Battle Zone. He had still, therefore, with his Pioneer Battalion,
reserves to fill a gap. Moreover, there was in rear the 61st Brigade
of the 20th Division, allotted to the support of the 36th Division's
front, though not yet at General Nugent's disposal. Up till now it
might be said that, their superiority in numbers and their advantage
from the mist having been taken into consideration, the Germans had
been held as effectively as could have been expected. The mist was
now clearing, and machine-gunners in positions of the Battle Zone
were beginning to cause loss to the enemy.
But from the right there came news most disquieting. The Germans had
captured Manufacture Farm, in the front line of the 14th Division's
Battle Zone; soon afterwards they were in Essigny. It is difficult
to ascertain precisely at what moment this important point, on
dominating ground, was occupied by the enemy. The reports of the
108th Brigade would seem to put it about noon. On the other hand,
an air report to the 14th Division stated that at 1-30 p.m. all
the roads south of Urvillers were "teeming" with Germans, and that
batteries were in action in the open south-west of the village. Now,
in an attack, roads do not begin to "teem" with troops until supports
and reinforcements move up, some time after the leading waves.
Moreover, the detachments of two guns of the Machine-Gun Battalion,
with positions near Essigny, state positively that there were Germans
in that village considerably earlier, and that they themselves were
in action against parties advancing upon the railway station from it.
One gun dispersed an important attack with great loss before it was
destroyed by artillery fire. The second covered the railway cutting,
up which the enemy presently began to press from the _south_. Later
it was withdrawn to a point fifty yards west of the cutting, whence
it continued to engage the enemy advancing from Essigny. It remained
in action till ordered to withdraw at night.
At whatever hour precisely the enemy penetrated Essigny, it is
certain that by one o'clock, whilst all along the front the Germans
were attacking the Battle Zone, the right of the 108th Brigade
was completely turned. At this time the telephone line to Station
Redoubt, wherein were the headquarters of the 1st Irish Fusiliers,
which had been cut long before, was repaired, and General Griffith
learnt that fierce fighting was in progress here in the front line
of the Battle Zone, and that the 41st Brigade on the right had
been driven back. By 2-30 p.m. the enemy was in Fay Farm, south of
Essigny, three thousand yards behind the front line of the 14th
Division's Battle Zone. On the front of the 1st Irish Fusiliers the
enemy forced an entry at the railway cutting, but every attempt to
advance was defeated by the Lewis-gun fire of the garrison. General
Griffith now moved up the 9th Irish Fusiliers to form a defensive
flank. A veritable break-through had occurred on the right, extending
a considerable distance south over the front of the III. Corps. The
general situation, from being menacing, was become suddenly desperate.
At 4-5 p.m. General Nugent ordered the 108th Brigade to form a flank
along the railway line, half-way to the village of Lizerolles, to
which it should be prolonged by the 14th Division. On the left flank
of the 36th the 1st Inniskillings was holding stoutly. General Nugent
therefore put at General Griffith's disposal the 9th Inniskillings,
the reserve battalion from the 109th Brigade. This battalion was
swung across the front. Colonel Peacocke, its commanding officer,
reported, however, that the troops of the 41st Brigade were now
holding on, and that he had accordingly taken up a position behind
the 9th Irish Fusiliers. So the position remained, more or less,
till dusk began to draw on. The enemy was in Contescourt, but the
1st Rifles clung to the cross-roads south-east of the village. The
right company of the same battalion maintained its position in
desperate fighting. Enemy troops massing along the canal bank between
Dallon and Fontaine-les-Clercs, for the attack upon the Battle Zone
positions of the 1st Inniskillings north of the canal, were heavily
engaged by the batteries of the Left Group. The fire was observed
and controlled from Ararat Observation Post, on the high ground
north-west of Quarry Redoubt, with which telephone communication was
maintained. At length the Germans succeeded in running a forward gun
into Fontaine, but all efforts to serve it were frustrated by the
fire of the 463rd Battery R.F.A.
Up forward, meanwhile, the three Redoubts of the Forward Zone,
hopelessly beleaguered, completely surrounded by the enemy, had
fought a battle that may be described as epic. The enemy pounded
their trenches with trench mortars, attacked, was beaten off,
bombarded once again, again attacked. Jeanne d'Arc, on the right,
was the first to fall, about noon. The other two fought on, in
the hopes of effecting a break-through after dusk. But it was out
of the question, so thick was the enemy now in their rear. Trench
after trench was taken by the enemy in Racecourse Redoubt, till at
last only a corner round the railway cutting remained. Attacks with
_flammenwerfer_ were repulsed, largely through the skill with the
rifle grenade of Captain Stewart, the Adjutant. Such a battle against
incredible odds could not continue for ever. At half-past five,
almost simultaneously, though they had of course no communication
with one another, Colonel Cole-Hamilton, commanding the 15th Rifles,
and Lord Farnham, commanding the 2nd Inniskillings, decided that
further resistance was impossible. Both were highly complimented upon
their resistance by the German officers who took over the forts.
Colonel Cole-Hamilton was told that a battalion had been attacking
him all morning, and that a second had been brought up during the
afternoon. He himself had about thirty men unwounded. In the case
of the headquarters of the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Germans
released two pigeons in Boadicea Redoubt with messages announcing its
capture. The messages were received by the Headquarters of the 36th
Division. The resistance of Racecourse and Boadicea Redoubts affords
a rare example of that "cold courage," unsupported by the ardour and
excitement of an advance or the hope of ultimate victory, which has
been so often displayed by soldiers of British race in all periods of
the history of British arms.
At 4-15 p.m. the 61st Brigade of the 20th Division, placed at the
disposal of the 36th Division, was ordered to man the St. Simon
defences, an arc covering the hairpin bend in the Canal de St.
Quentin, and including the villages of Avesne and the Pont de Tugny.
General Cochrane, commanding the Brigade, established headquarters at
St. Simon.
The position on the right flank grew still more serious toward
evening. Finally the Commander of the Fifth Army decided to withdraw
the III. Corps behind the Canal de St. Quentin, in conformity with
which move it was necessary for the 36th Division to be swung back
also, pivoting upon the 1st Inniskillings, which battalion still
clung to its Battle Zone. The 61st Brigade was ordered to withdraw
across the Canal, obtaining touch on the right with the troops of
the 14th Division, east of Avesne. From its left, half-way between
Tugny and Artemps, the 108th Brigade was to hold up to the cemetery
at Happencourt. Thence, up to and inclusive of Le Hamel, was to come
the 107th Brigade. Then the 9th Inniskillings was to prolong the
line to the Battle Zone defences of the 1st Inniskillings. The 61st
Brigade was not to withdraw from the arc of the St. Simon bridgehead
till the troops of the other Brigades had completed their retirement.
When this had been effected, the 61st Brigade was to be in touch not
only with the 108th, along the Canal, but with the 60th Brigade of
its own Division, now at the disposal of the 30th Division, which had
outposts on a line from the Canal south of Happencourt to Vaux, north
of the Ham-St. Quentin Road.
The retirement began at 10-30 p.m., being covered by small
rearguards. In the darkness the troops were not seriously pressed
by the Germans. Long before dawn all battalions were established
in their new positions, the three Brigade Headquarters of the 36th
Division being at Lavesne, and that of the 61st Brigade in the old
Divisional Headquarters at Ollézy. General Nugent had meanwhile
transferred his headquarters to Estouilly, north of Ham. It must be
remembered that each Brigade had by now had one battalion almost
completely destroyed, and that the Battle Zone battalions were at an
average strength of about two hundred and fifty men. There was an
accretion in artillery strength. Two batteries, A/91st and C/91st, of
the 20th Divisional Artillery, together with the 232nd Siege Battery,
were put at the disposal of the 36th Division, and remained with it
throughout the retreat, though there were constant changes in the
formation of Groups. The Siege Battery was later transferred to a
special Heavy Artillery Group, with two others, directly under the
orders of the 36th Divisional Artillery.
The destruction of bridges and pontoons allotted to the Engineers of
the 36th Division was carried through without hitch. Shortly after
noon the pontoon and foot-bridge at Fontaine were destroyed by the
121st Field Company, which in the small hours of the 22nd of March
blew up the whole group of bridges between Grand Séraucourt and
Le Hamel. Later, in daylight, the 150th Field Company blew up the
Artemps Group. The Tugny and St. Simon bridges had been allotted
to other sections of the company. Lieutenants C. L. Knox and J. B.
Stapylton-Smith were each responsible for twelve bridges. The first
warning received by the former was when the débris of the Artemps
bridges floated down-stream. He at once commenced his task. Several
of the bridges were destroyed under machine-gun fire. At Tugny,
the Germans were advancing on the main steel-girder bridge when
the time-fuse failed. The night dew or the mist had spoiled it. As
Lieutenant Knox rushed forward the foremost of the enemy were upon
the bridge, a long one. He tore away the useless time-fuse, clambered
under the frame-work of the bridge, and lit the instantaneous fuse.
The bridge was destroyed, and, by some miracle, Lieutenant Knox was
uninjured. He received the Victoria Cross. Among many heroic actions
performed by officers and men of the Division in the course of the
war it would be difficult to point to one of finer calibre. At St.
Simon, Lieutenant Stapylton-Smith blew up a large number of the enemy
with one of the three main bridges.
The early hours of March the 22nd, which dawned in thick mist like
the day before, passed fairly quietly. For the moment, the right
flank of the Division and the III. Corps on its right being behind
the barrier of the Canal de St. Quentin, the greater pressure was
shifted to the north. In bitter fighting the troops of the 1st
Inniskillings held their ground in the forward positions of the
Battle Zone, till 2 p.m., when, completely outflanked, they were
ordered to withdraw to Ricardo Redoubt, the headquarters redoubt
in the Battle Zone, upon which attack after attack was launched,
to be beaten off with heavy losses by the defenders. The Germans
across the Canal were meanwhile far in their rear, having batteries
in Artemps by now. Finally, Ricardo Redoubt was surrounded, the 9th
Inniskillings being compelled to fight a rearguard action back to the
Happencourt-Fluquières Line, upon which, as has been recorded, were
troops of the 60th Brigade. On the right the Canal Line held, though
the enemy had brought up batteries, trench mortars, and machine-guns
under cover of the mist, and was bombarding it heavily.
At noon General Nugent was informed that, in consequence of the
decision of the Higher Command to hold the line of the Canal de la
Somme and its continuation southward, the Canal de St. Quentin, a
further withdrawal was necessary. The 36th Division, with the 61st
Brigade attached, was now to hold this position from the present
right flank of that Brigade to Sommette-Eaucourt. The 61st Brigade
had already a battalion, the 7th D.C.L.I., holding from the Canal
junction to a point west of the Dury-Ollézy Road, less one company,
which had been moved down to the right flank to fill a gap between
its right battalion, the 7th Somerset L.I., and the troops of the
14th Division. Its other battalion, the 12th King's, was driven out
of Tugny at dusk by the advance of the enemy north of the Canal de
St. Quentin, crossed the Canal de la Somme at Dury, and was withdrawn
through the 7th D.C.L.I. to support on the railway behind that
battalion. The withdrawal of the Brigades of the 36th Division was
complete at 11 p.m., when the last troops passed through Pithon. The
108th Brigade took over the defence of the Canal bank from the left
of the 7th D.C.L.I. to Sommette-Eaucourt. The 107th Brigade moved
to Eaucourt and Cugny, the 109th to Brouchy in support. As no touch
could be obtained with the 30th Division, which was to have prolonged
the line westward, by the 108th Brigade, the 21st Entrenching
Battalion, which had now come under General Nugent's orders, was put
in on the left of the Brigade.
Ricardo Redoubt, in which the heroic resistance of Colonel Crawford's
1st Inniskillings continued all day, was now, of course, completely
isolated. At three o'clock the commanding officer sent away a
detachment, some men of which succeeded in making their way back to
our lines. The remainder fought to the end. Finally driven to the
north-western corner of the Redoubt, they ejected the enemy bombers
who had now a footing there. Two men alone, Privates Bailey and
Conway, drove out one group of the German bombers. Trench mortars
pounded them from all sides, which they could not reach. A mere
handful was taken prisoner with Colonel Crawford about 6 p.m. It is
difficult to overestimate the value of this magnificent stand against
overwhelming odds.
The position at two o'clock on the morning of March the 23rd may be
summarized for the sake of clarity. The 36th Division, with attached
troops, held the line of the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la
Somme from a mile and a half north-west of Jussy to a mile west of
Sommette-Eaucourt. Upon this line it had, from right to left, the
61st Brigade (7th Somerset L.I. on right, 7th D.C.L.I. on left, 12th
King's in support); the 108th Brigade (9th Irish Fusiliers on right,
1st Irish Fusiliers on left; with a composite battalion of details
and men returned from courses finding the outposts, to allow some
rest to the other battalions); 21st Entrenching Battalion. The length
of the front was upwards of five miles. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers)
was at Sommette-Eaucourt, where the battalion had been working
since before noon on a line of strong points. The 109th Brigade,
consisting now of the 9th Inniskillings, was at Brouchy, in reserve.
The 107th Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Irish Rifles were at
Cugny. The other battalion of this Brigade, the 1st Rifles, now very
weak, was at Eaucourt. Divisional Headquarters were at Fréniches.
The artillery position is somewhat complicated, owing to early losses
and subsequent changes. The Potter Group (A/153rd Brigade R.F.A.;
B/153rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/91st Brigade
R.F.A.; and 383rd Battery R.F.A.) had been ordered to join the 20th
Division. It was in action in Bacquencourt during the day, rejoining
the 36th Division in the afternoon after a big march. The front was
now covered by the Erskine Group (A/91st and C/91st Brigade R.F.A.;
and D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.) on the right, in positions in and around
Aubigny; and the Eley Group (463rd and 464th Batteries R.F.A.;
C/153rd and D/153rd Brigade R.F.A,; B/91st Brigade R.F.A.; and two
howitzers of B/232nd Army F.A. Brigade) on the left, in positions
near Brouchy. The Heavy Artillery Group was out of touch, and could
no longer cover the divisional front.
The Machine-Gun Battalion had disappeared as a unit, but there were
still detachments with each of the Brigades, acting as a rule under
the orders of the battalion commander on the spot.
During the afternoon the Engineers of the 36th Division had taken
over from the XVIII. Corps the destruction of bridges in Ham and
along the river and canal to Ollézy. They were all effectively
destroyed, save the main railway bridge at Pithon, which was found
not to have been prepared. French railway troops, working in haste
and with insufficient explosives, did all the damage in their power
to it, but it is believed to have been swiftly repaired by the enemy.
[Illustration: Map V.
The Position before the German Attack, March 21st, 1918.]
The battle had been till now an attack with great superiority of
numbers upon partially-prepared positions, or naturally formidable
obstacles, such as the canals and the marshy bed of the Somme. From
the morning of the 23rd open warfare developed, from the moment
the enemy, as happened early, had driven the 14th Division back from
the Canal de St. Quentin at Jussy. That accomplished, the Canal de la
Somme at this point formed no real obstacle to the German advance,
because, from St. Simon to Voyennes, it was parallel with it. For the
36th Division there were no more defences till the front line of 1916
was reached. It had to fight its battle of the 23rd and 24th of March
in open country. The account of that battle and of the remainder of
the retreat must occupy a chapter to itself.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] Map V.
[49] Lord Haig's Despatches.
[50] Map VI.
[51] Four of the six batteries of this Group moved on the night of
the 20th. It is reported that their evacuated positions were assailed
with destructive fire so heavy that they would have been completely
neutralized from the first had they remained in them.