CAMBRAI AND AFTER (I): NOVEMBER 20TH TO 22ND, 1917
The year 1917 had drawn to its close leaving unfulfilled most of the
high hopes that had buoyed men's spirits in the opening months. Some,
at least, of the causes of their downfall were far away from the
Western Front, and beyond the control of Generals Nivelle, Pétain,
and Sir Douglas Haig. Russia, that strong-armed but weak-headed
and weak-legged giant, had collapsed, leaving Roumania to its
fate--complete overthrow. At Carporetto the Italians had been heavily
defeated by the Austro-German armies, and France and England had
been forced to send divisions to Italy to act as rallying points
of resistance. In France the Champagne offensive had left a legacy
of doubt and exasperation among soldiers as well as civilians, and
it had taken all the fostering skill and care of General Pétain
to restore his troops to the standard at which they had begun
the year. The Flanders offensive, vitally necessary, crippling
to Ludendorff, as he has admitted in his book, had been unduly
prolonged in conditions far more dreadful even than when the 36th
Division had taken part in it. Not men only but horses were drowned
in the shell-holes ere it was over, and by the time Poelcappelle and
Passchendaele had been reached the evacuation of wounded had become
all but impossible. The heights were won, indeed, on the southern
flank, though at Westroosebeke the enemy still had the best ground,
but, broadly speaking, the strategical value of the advance was _nil_.
Passchendaele, indeed, had resolved itself into a terrible
object-lesson. Here was the point to which a mechanical conception of
warfare had led us. Was there not, the keenest minds in every army
were asking, was there not some outlet? Were men to be forever at the
mercy of the munition factory and the mud of its making, the roll of
barbed wire, the slab of reinforced concrete? Was the real genius of
the soldier never to have the chance to display itself outside this
war of fortifications? Often one heard the question, academic enough,
but of extraordinary interest: "Could supreme genius, could the
greatest captain that ever lived, could Napoleon have freed his hands
from the deadlock?" The greatest soldier of this war has revealed,
in the incomparable language that is his gift, that he also had
asked himself that question, and answered it unhesitatingly in the
affirmative.[43] As affairs were now marching, it did indeed appear
as though we were reverting to the mere tactics of the battering-ram,
as though, metaphorically speaking,
"Elephants
And barbèd horses might as well prevail
As the most subtle stratagems of war."
And a way out from mechanism was found, as might have been expected,
in mechanism.
Whose the credit for the conception of the surprise tank assault,
whether General Tudor's or General Ellis's, or another's, it is not
here pertinent to speculate. The germ of the idea was inherent in the
tank itself, and must have been present, vaguely or clearly, in the
minds of all who contributed to its design and organization. Here, at
any rate, had been found an ideal testing-ground for the scheme, good
ground, obstacles which it would have, at that date, been madness to
attack in the conventional manner, the prospect of inflicting upon
the enemy a swift and signal defeat. Moreover, a blow that would
prevent the massing of more German divisions on the Italian front,
where every German division put new life and dash into at least two
Austrian, was urgently needed. The striking of the blow was entrusted
to General Byng's Third Army.
The plan was simple. The tanks were to roll out gaps in the wire
of the Hindenburg System, through which the infantry columns could
push. The aim was to overcome the enemy holding the line between
the Canal du Nord and the Canal de l'Escaut, which runs parallel
with it at a distance of from six to eight miles further east; to
secure possession of the area bounded by these Canals on east and
west, and by the marshes of the Sensée River to the north; and, as
a consequence, to clear the whole area west of the Canal du Nord of
hostile forces. It must be remembered that the German line, running
north from Havrincourt to Mœuvres, there turned west by north. Had
the British, pressing northward, reached Oisy-le-Verger and the
banks of the Sensée River, they would have been ten miles behind the
German front line at that latitude. A precipitate retreat would have
been certain, and a very large haul, if not of prisoners, at least
of material, almost equally so. Even if the advance to the north
accomplished no more than the consolidation of the high ground round
Bourlon Wood, the Germans would have to abandon the Drocourt-Quéant
Switch, a very strong position. The battle was to have three stages:
the first, a surprise infantry attack assisted by tanks and an
unregistered artillery barrage to capture the crossings of the Canal
de l'Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, and a German trench east of
them known as the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line; the second, the advance
of the Cavalry Corps to isolate the city of Cambrai, and seize the
crossings of the Sensée River, while the troops of the IV. Corps
captured Bourlon Wood; and the third, the clearance of the area and
of Cambrai itself. The attack was to be carried out by the III.
Corps on the right and the IV. Corps on the left, with the V. Corps
in reserve. The right flank of the attack lay upon the great spur,
crowned by the Bois Lateau and the hamlet of Le Pave, running from
Gonnelieu to the Canal de l'Escaut at Crèvecœur; the left roughly
upon the Canal du Nord. There was to be a subsidiary attack to the
north upon the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. If one were to search
for a key-word to define the general idea of the offensive, that
key-word would probably be "exploitation." It was not intended merely
to break through the enemy's defences, to strike him a heavy blow; it
was designed to exploit a preliminary success, to clear a great tract
of country of hostile troops, to turn a flank; for, be it remembered,
the advance to the Sensée marshes would have involved not merely a
headlong retreat or wholesale capture for the German troops south of
them, but an eventual retirement of several miles at least to the
north. The Drocourt-Quéant Switch, the main Hindenburg Lines, would
be gone. Cambrai was, for the Western Front, a small battle, but
great events hung upon it.
In the previous accounts of battles it has not been necessary, for
the purpose of writing the History of the 36th Division, to do more
than glance at the progress of the Divisions fighting upon its
flanks. In this battle, on the contrary, if any adequate conception
is to be reached from the account, the plan and the action of the IV.
Corps, that is, of the two Divisions on the right of the 36th, and
the 56th Division, which was under the orders of the IV. Corps for
the greater part of the action, must be studied in some detail. The
right boundary of the IV. Corps was the Trescault-Ribécourt Road;
thence north of Noyelles. It was to attack with three Divisions, the
51st on the right, the 62nd in the centre, and the 36th on the left.
The 51st and 62nd Divisions, the left of the latter on the Canal du
Nord, were to advance north from the skirts of Havrincourt Wood. The
normal northern objective of the first day was the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road. If, however, there was little opposition, the 51st and 62nd
Divisions were to press on and take the high ground crowned by
Bourlon Wood and village, or take them over from the Cavalry if the
latter had occupied them, while the 107th and 108th Brigades of the
36th Division moved parallel with them east of the Canal, formed a
flank-guard facing west, and seized the passages of the Canal at
Mœuvres and Inchy-en-Artois. In the event of serious opposition this
later programme was to be that of the next day. The primary task of
the 36th Division was to capture the German trenches west of the
Canal du Nord and south of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. For this it
was to employ one Brigade, the 109th, one of its Field Artillery
Brigades, the 173rd, together with the 280th Brigade and the 93rd
Army Brigade R.F.A. Its other Artillery Brigade, the 153rd, was at
the disposal of the 62nd Division, to take part in its preliminary
barrage. The plans were entrusted to General Ricardo, who worked them
out with his Artillery Group Commander, Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Simpson,
D.S.O., and had thus an almost unique opportunity for a Brigadier
on the Western Front of fighting his own battle in his own fashion.
Communication across the Canal was to be established by the erection
of a bridge on the Demicourt-Flesquières Road, to take wagons and
field guns, at the earliest possible moment. Materials for this were,
of course, prepared in advance, as were some for a minor bridge, for
infantry and pack transport, to be thrown across at a suitable point
some fifteen hundred yards further south.
A glance at the map[44] will show that the German defences west of
the Canal began at the northern spoil heap, consisted for the greater
part of their length up to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road of two main
lines, and at their greatest depth, on a frontage of fifteen hundred
yards, of three. No tanks were allotted to the 36th Division, so a
frontal attack without artillery preparation was out of the question.
It was decided, therefore, to capture the northern spoil heap, wire
in front of which had been cut over a long period by artillery and
a 6-inch trench mortar with instantaneous fuse--the latter the best
wire-cutter the 36th Division ever discovered--and work up the
trenches from south to north. It appeared that this sixty-foot pile
would enable machine and Lewis guns to cover the infantry in their
advance. On paper the task of working up these trenches, traversed
at frequent intervals by rays of wire, appeared of well-nigh
insuperable difficulty. And, indeed, no planning and no gallantry in
execution could have accomplished it had not the enemy troops been
much demoralized by the advance of the tanks behind them east of the
Canal, as it was intended they should be. The attack of the 36th
Division was, therefore, not to take place till the main attack had
drawn level with its point of departure. Zero for the former was at
6-20 a.m.; for the 36th Division at 8-35 a.m.
The attack carried out by the 109th Brigade has been officially
described as a "bombing action," and such, doubtless, to a great
extent it was. But there was no fear more constantly present with
General Nugent and General Ricardo than that of its developing into
the conventional bombing action, which progressed at snail's pace at
best, at worst reached an early deadlock, and always required bombs
by the dozen for every yard of ground gained. In this case four
thousand yards, covered by two or three parallel lines of trenches,
with numerous communication trenches at right angles to the attack,
had to be taken. And speed was essential; for, much as the attack
depended upon the advance east of the Canal, that in its turn could
have been taken in flank by machine-gunners on the west had not the
109th Brigade kept pace with it. And so the order was--no bombing
till other methods failed. At the head of the platoon columns to
move up the trenches was to be not a bomber, but a Lewis gunner. A
Lewis gun could be used by a man of large physique--and of these
the Ulster Division still possessed plenty, if not such numbers as
a year back--with a sling over the left shoulder, the gun resting
above the right hip. It was heavy and clumsy, but its tremendous
moral effect in such broad trenches as those of the Hindenburg System
can readily be imagined. It was to be the spear-head of the attack
along each line of trenches. General Ricardo had learnt the idea from
the Canadians, who had employed it at Vimy. Moreover, when it was
found possible, riflemen were to move on top, outside the trench.
The question of artillery support was not easy, since no preliminary
registration, here, or on any other part of the front of attack, was
possible. Colonel Simpson, who took up his position with General
Ricardo at a command post in the sunken Demicourt-Havrincourt Road,
just short of the British front line, planned and controlled the
artillery support in most brilliant fashion, well worthy the fame
he was winning as one of the most scientific and least conventional
junior artillery commanders in the British Army. It must not be
supposed that the part played here, or on the whole front, by
artillery was negligible, nor that the barrage was inconsiderable. On
the contrary, the artillery support for the main attack was of vast
weight. In Havrincourt Wood, along the rides, guns stood almost wheel
to wheel. But these guns had not registered. Consequently the barrage
might be expected to be somewhat ragged, and was to keep considerably
further in front of the tanks and infantry than would otherwise have
been the case. Still, a barrage does not cut wire. It was the tanks
which were to accomplish this. Had they failed, the whole scheme
would have collapsed. During the night of November the 19th, the
whole line of tanks on the front of the III. and IV. Corps moved to
a general distance of a thousand yards from the German outpost line.
The noise of their advance was covered by long bursts of machine-gun
fire.
At 6-20 a.m. the great assault was launched. The tanks went forward
behind the barrage, followed by their infantry columns. From the
first moment it was evident that the calculations of the British
staffs had been correct. The surprise was complete, showing that
the Germans had learnt nothing of importance from their prisoners.
The advance had the precision of clock-work, the infantry following
the tanks without difficulty through gaps in the most formidable
wire entanglements in the world. It was 7-15 ere observers of the
36th Division upon the ridge east of Hermies could penetrate the
mist and smother of smoke. Then they saw the tanks going forward
over the ridge north of Havrincourt, well up to the barrage and
waiting for each lift, the columns of the 62nd Division behind
them, meeting with small opposition and suffering few casualties.
It was a very impressive sight. To the Germans it must have been
appalling, this line of great engines rushing through their
magnificent defences as they had been of paper, checking an instant
to put down huge brushwood-bound bundles to enable them to cross the
wide trenches, then moving steadily and remorselessly on. Here and
there a stout-hearted officer organized momentary resistance, but
for the most part the affair was on one side a rout, on the other a
procession. German barrage there was none; only some desultory and
ineffective shelling. By eight o'clock the first objective, which
included the villages of Havrincourt and Ribécourt, and Couillet
Wood, and, of course, the front system of the Hindenburg defences,
was in our hands all along the line. In Havrincourt and its château
park fighting continued till ten o'clock or later, but it was without
importance.
Upon the first objective there was a pause to allow troops for the
next to pass through. At 8-35 a.m. the new advance began. Here
again all went well--save at one point. The 62nd Division swept
on unchecking; on the front of the III. Corps all resistance was
easily overcome. But the 51st Division had no such fortune. The
Highlanders were baffled by the village of Flesquières, perched upon
its hill-top. Field-guns, dragged from their pits on the north side
of the village, came into action as the tanks approached, firing over
open sights, at point-blank range, crumpling them up, one after the
other. The front line of the Hindenburg Support System was pierced;
but as the tanks could not cut the wire of the second line, the
infantry could not penetrate it. For the moment there was deadlock
here. We must turn to our more immediate problem, the attack of the
109th Brigade, launched simultaneously with the general advance from
the first objective.
For the assault upon the spoil heap a battery of four-inch Stokes
mortars to fire "thermit" shell, which had been used with effect
at Messines, had been procured. For four minutes these mortars and
the covering artillery bombarded its south-west side. Then the
10th Inniskillings charged home and took it. There was no serious
fighting here. The effect of the "thermit" shell was terrific
morally. The defenders ran northwards up the trenches. A number were,
however, killed by machine-gun fire, while seventy prisoners and two
machine-guns were taken. The prisoners belonged to the 20th Landwehr
Division, which had not been identified, and had come into line but
two days before. This discovery was of good augury for the attack,
since by this period of the war Landwehr troops were not of high
quality.
The necessary point of entry into the German trenches having been
won, the 10th Inniskillings pushed up them according to plan,
behind their barrage. A second doorway was forced when, directly
the barrage lifted from it, a company of the 14th Rifles, attached
to the 10th Inniskillings, entered the communication trench on the
Demicourt-Flesquières Road, fifteen hundred yards north of the first
one. The clearing of the captured trenches was carried out most
systematically. The leading platoons dropped a man at the entrance to
each deep dug-out, to be picked up by the fourth section following in
rear, which was allotted the duty of "mopping up." As each dug-out
was cleared, a notice-board was set up at entrance bearing the
significant inscription "Mopped"! When the leading platoon exhausted
its men, another moved through to the front, the first reorganizing
behind it. A single flag with the battalion colours was carried by
the leading platoon, and never displayed save at the head of the
advance. The 10th Inniskillings reached their objective just north of
the Demicourt-Flesquières Road at 9-30 a.m., or a few minutes behind
schedule time. This, however, was of no significance, since the
line now held was part of the general second objective of the whole
attack, and there was a pause upon it of twenty-five minutes. The
second objective had been reached upon the whole front, save only at
Flesquières.
Meanwhile, the 9th Inniskillings, responsible for the next phase
of the attack after the 10th had captured Hill 90, had moved in.
Those only who have seen the Hindenburg trenches can realize how
comparatively easy it was to pass one body of troops through
another in them. In ordinary trenches such methods would have
resulted in hopeless congestion. Here all went smoothly owing to
the great breadth of the trenches. The 9th Inniskillings had one
platoon moving along the bed of the Canal, here dry. Craters on
the Demicourt-Graincourt Road, defended by machine-guns, caused
trouble, but the right companies pushed on, and gradually the
situation cleared. The 11th Inniskillings, for the final stage of
the attack, had now moved in. This battalion met with somewhat
stronger resistance. On the right some determined German bombers
held up the advance for a while, the Lewis gunner not being able to
see them. Here, as was generally the case, the Germans with their
stick bombs outranged our men with the Mills, but the Mills rifle
grenade more than restored the balance, and the Germans were driven
steadily back. This company of the 11th Inniskillings was also able
to give material assistance to the men of the 186th Brigade, across
the Canal, by its Lewis-gun fire. Lock 6 was the last centre of
strong resistance. Eventually the garrison fled across the Canal,
though few of them reached the other side. About half-past three
the Inniskillings crossed the Cambrai-Bapaume Road, and were soon
afterward consolidating their position, with their outpost three or
four hundred yards north of it. The bridge across the Canal here,
it may be added, had been blown up hours earlier. It had never been
doubted by the British that the enemy had prepared it for demolition.
On the left of the 109th Brigade the 56th Division now prolonged the
line along the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. On its right the 62nd Division,
working up the Hindenburg Support System and over open country, had
met with complete success. Graincourt had been reached and taken at
1-30, and the long communication trench north of the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road was consolidated at the same time as the final objective of the
36th. On the III. Corps front Noyelles had been reached. But the
failure of the 51st Division to capture Flesquières constituted a
serious menace to the whole scheme of the attack. It would have been
greater had the village been strongly held by the Germans, for then
the troops of the 62nd Division could never have advanced past it
as they did. The fact seems to be that it was the supreme gallantry
of one German officer, aided by the merest handful of men, that
withstood the attack. The attack was renewed with fresh tanks during
the afternoon without success, that one heroic officer, it is said,
firing his last gun with deadly effect with his own hands upon the
tanks, the wreckage of which, horribly twisted and maimed, strewed
the steep slope at nightfall. A patrol of King Edward's Horse,
attached to the 62nd Division, had early in the afternoon ridden into
the village from the north-west, and reported it clear as far as the
Marcoing Road. An attack from this direction by quite a small force
would probably have overcome what opposition there was.
The fact that Flesquières remained untaken caused some alteration
in the employment of the cavalry. The 1st Cavalry Division was to
have been passed through Marcoing, but at 4-30 p.m. the 2nd Cavalry
Brigade was ordered instead to occupy Cantaing, which should have
been already captured had all proceeded according to plan. But the
village was strongly held and the cavalrymen were beaten off. The
Brigade therefore remained that night in Noyelles. Just before dusk a
company of the 186th Brigade[45] and two squadrons of King Edward's
Horse made an attack upon Anneux, but were unsuccessful, owing to
wire about the village and machine-gun fire from within it.
At 1-30 the 107th and 108th Brigades moved forward, the former to
the northern slope of the Grand Ravin about Square Copse, the latter
to Yorkshire Bank and the old British trenches south of it. It had
now begun to rain heavily, and these troops, particularly those of
the 107th Brigade, which were without any shelter, were drenched to
the skin. At 8 o'clock the 107th Brigade was ordered across into
Havrincourt and the trenches and dug-outs about it. The men were
not finally settled with an opportunity for rest till 3 a.m. the
following morning. The 10th Inniskillings of the 109th Brigade,
which had carried out the first stages of its attack, was moved
across the Canal to Kangaroo Alley, south of and parallel with the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Patrols pushed forward on the west side by the
11th Inniskillings got within five hundred yards of the southern
outskirts of Mœuvres, where they encountered resistance enough to
compel them to withdraw. There is no reason, however, to suppose
that Mœuvres was at this time strongly held, or that a determined
attack would have failed to take it. The progress east of the Canal
did not appear to warrant such an attack. The Engineers meanwhile
had progressed excellently with their bridge-making. By 4 p.m. their
bridge for infantry and pack transport, about a thousand yards north
of the Hermies-Havrincourt railway line, was available. Half an hour
later a still more important task had been accomplished; the existing
causeway on the Demicourt-Flesquières Road having been repaired to
enable field-guns and wagons to cross. The 36th Division would have
been glad to have had at this stage its Pioneer Battalion to work
upon its own roads, now being churned up by heavy traffic, but it
was employed upon a similar task between Havrincourt and Ribécourt.
The Signal Service, admirably organized by Major Vigers, who on this
occasion excelled, if that were possible, his successes at Messines,
had opened up telephone communication, utilising the Canal bed to lay
its wires. So good was this that it was a matter of no difficulty to
speak from Divisional Headquarters, which still remained at Ytres, to
Lock 6, just south of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road.
When dusk came down to bring operations to a halt, the situation
was as follows. The 36th Division held a general line five hundred
yards north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, in touch with the 56th on
its left. East of the Canal the 62nd Division held the trench north
of the road and the factory. Thence their line curved down just west
of Anneux, with a long flank running east of Graincourt to the west
of Flesquières. The line of the III. Corps ran well to the north of
Noyelles. This left, as will be seen from the line roughly marked
on the map, an extraordinary little German salient, in the midst of
which there were still apparently German guns in action in Orival
Wood.
During the night there was great movement of guns. Most of the
heavy artillery of the IV. Corps, since it was difficult to move it
through Havrincourt, and would have been harder to feed it, took up
positions about Hermies and Demicourt, with the heaviest pieces back
at Doignies. Here it could easily be served with ammunition, and
here it proved invaluable in the days that were to come. The 153rd
Brigade had a very long march. After covering the advance of the 62nd
Division from Havrincourt Wood, the guns were withdrawn at midnight
and moved, _via_ Ruyalcourt, Hermies, and Demicourt, to positions
in the old "No Man's Land," east of the last-named village. The
batteries of the 173rd Brigade also moved to this neighbourhood, to
be prepared to cover a further advance. The bad, narrow roads were,
as may readily be imagined, in a state of much congestion. Batteries
of the 153rd Brigade were not in action till 7-30 a.m. on the 21st.
In the course of the day's fighting the IV. Corps had taken over two
thousand prisoners, of which the share of the 109th Brigade was five
hundred and nine. The latter had also taken a great deal of booty,
particularly at Lock 6, which had been used as a general store-house
for the forward area.
So ended the first day's fighting. The cavalry action on a grand
scale had been a complete failure. Whatever chances of success it
may have had were extinguished by the failure to take Flesquières.
For the rest, all had gone according to plan. The Bourlon Ridge had
not, it is true, been taken. That, however, was really, except in the
case of unexpectedly sweeping good fortune, to be the second day's
objective. Hopes still stood high.
At dawn on the 21st the German salient was eaten up in a flash.
The 51st Division, advancing through Flesquières, swept up to the
Graincourt-Marcoing Road, upon which it was established by 11 a.m.
A number of guns in Orival Wood were captured. Cantaing, too, fell,
after stiff fighting, before the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, assisted
by battalions of the 51st Division. Late in the afternoon the
Highlanders, who made tremendous efforts to atone for the failure
of the previous day, stormed Fontaine-Notre-Dame, on the road from
Bapaume to Cambrai, a mere two and a half miles from the latter city.
The right flank of the 62nd Division also did well. Anneux was taken,
and, after heavy fighting, Anneux Chapel, on the skirts of Bourlon
Wood. But the attack on Bourlon Wood was a failure. The troops went
round the western slopes in gallant fashion, but were woefully
thinned out by machine-gun fire and unable to hold their ground. They
advanced, however, to the south-west corner.
West of the Canal the attack was pushed forward by the 109th
Brigade, with the 9th Inniskillings, who reached the point where
the Hindenburg trenches swung west, a thousand yards north of the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Here the battalion was held up by heavy
machine-gun fire from Lock 5 and east of the Canal. At noon the
14th Rifles and 10th Inniskillings resumed the attack. In face of
steadily-increasing opposition they penetrated to the outskirts
of Mœuvres, but could not maintain their position under withering
machine-gun fire from the village and the Hindenburg trenches west of
it. The day's advance was one of less than a thousand yards, after
considerably heavier casualties than those of the 20th.
The ground won appeared considerable on paper, but the day had
not been successful. The advance had fallen very far short of the
programme. It had been intended that the 62nd and 51st Divisions
should reach Bourlon, while the 1st Cavalry Division followed
through and seized the Canal crossings from Sains-lez-Marquion
northward. The two reserve brigades of the 36th Division were to
have pressed up on the east side of the Canal, and held its line
from Mœuvres to Sains-lez-Marquion. All this had gone by the board.
The 40th Division from the V. Corps had moved forward to the area
Beaumetz-Doignies-Boursies, to be ready to take over Bourlon Wood
when captured, and resume the advance. It did not come into action
that day any more than the 107th and 108th Brigades.
The orders for the 22nd were for the 51st and 62nd Divisions to
improve and consolidate their positions, while the 36th and 56th
gained ground on their left. The 109th Brigade had now shot its bolt,
having accomplished its task with every credit. In the early hours of
the morning the 108th moved up to relieve it, and by 7 a.m. the 12th
Rifles had taken over its advanced positions, the 9th Irish Fusiliers
being closed up behind the leading battalion in the trenches about
the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. The relieved Brigade withdrew to the old
British trenches about Hermies.
East of the Canal the _rôle_ of the 107th Brigade was to clear the
first and second lines of the Hindenburg Support System up to the
Canal, while the 108th took Mœuvres. This task was allotted to the
15th Rifles. A second battalion, the 10th Rifles, was then to pass
through and continue the attack along what was known as the Canal
du Nord Line to Lock 4, opposite Inchy. General Withycombe moved up
to a German dug-out west of Graincourt. Eight guns of the 107th
Machine-Gun Company were to assist in covering these attacks east of
the Canal. The general rate of the barrage was to be fifty yards in
five minutes east of the Canal, and fifty yards in seven and a half
minutes west of it. The attack was further to be supported by four
Siege and one Heavy Battery, and one 9.2-inch howitzer. It was to be
launched at 11 a.m.
It was anticipated by the enemy. At 9-20 he counter-attacked upon the
front of the 51st and 62nd Divisions. The latter lost no ground on
its right, but its extreme left flank fell back for a short time on
to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, subsequently reoccupying its position.
Worse fortune met the British further east, where the 51st Division
lost Fontaine. During the counter-attack there occurred one very
remarkable incident. A battery of machine-guns of the 36th Division
was in action in the open, pushed forward much too far, half-way
between Lock 5 and the factory on the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, when
it was attacked at close quarters by a company of the enemy. The
officer and section sergeant were killed and the guns surrounded. Two
guns of another battery were brought into action by Major Miller,
the Divisional Machine-Gun Officer, at little over a hundred yards'
range. The effect was withering, the Germans melting away before the
fire, saving themselves by jumping into trenches or crouching in
shell-holes. When quiet had supervened, a machine-gun officer counted
forty-two dead Germans about the recaptured position.
The attack of the 36th Division was launched at 11 a.m., after a
forty minutes' bombardment. On the right the leading company of the
15th Rifles reached its objective, gaining upwards of five hundred
yards of the Hindenburg trenches. The companies which passed through
it had a more difficult task. The trenches of the second line were
here but half dug, and this, seeing that the attack was working
up along them, was to the advantage of the defenders. The Germans
established a block above a length of trench about a foot deep, and
beat off every attempt by machine-gun fire. At dusk the 10th Rifles
made an attempt to rush the machine-guns, but could not get near
them, losing six officers in trying to do so.
West of the Canal things went better at the opening. The 12th
Rifles attacked Mœuvres with three companies in line. The two on
the left penetrated the village, but the right company was held
up by machine-guns in the Hindenburg Support System. On the left,
troops of the 56th Division, bombing up the Hindenburg Front System,
captured Tadpole Copse. Colonel Goodwin, commanding the 12th Rifles,
now handled his battalion with great skill. He ordered his right
company to bomb its way up the trench leading from the sunken
Mœuvres-Graincourt Road to the Hindenburg Support System, while the
other companies exploited their semi-success in the village. The
right company did succeed in reaching the front trench of the Support
System, and in clearing it, but the second line was full of Germans
and could never be reached. Meanwhile the centre and western side of
the village had been cleared, many Germans being killed in dug-outs
and cellars. Pushing on through the village, the Riflemen took the
trench on the western edge, fringing the cemetery, and began to
consolidate it. Then came the counter-attack.
At 4 p.m. the enemy was seen assembling in great force in Hobart
Street, half-way between Mœuvres and Inchy, and in the Hindenburg
Support System north-west of the former village. Messages were sent
back for support and for an artillery barrage. Both were procured,
the former in the shape of a company of the 9th Irish Fusiliers,
but, unfortunately, neither of them in time. The counter-attack,
launched just before dusk, appeared to be made by two battalions,
one working parallel with the Hindenburg Support System and one down
the Canal, in several waves. The company in the trench east of the
cemetery was forced to withdraw to avoid being surrounded. Our men
fell back from position to position, in orderly fashion, taking toll
of the enemy with their Lewis guns. There was no trace of fluster,
still less of panic. It took the Germans, in fact, an hour and forty
minutes from the launching of their attack to drive the 12th Rifles
to the southern outskirts of the village. It was a piece of evil
fortune after a fine achievement in village fighting. It must be
remembered that there was a heavy German barrage south of Mœuvres and
machine-gun fire from either flank, which delayed the supports of the
9th Irish Fusiliers.
The action once again demonstrated the disadvantages inherent in
attacks on narrow fronts. The Hindenburg trenches west of Mœuvres,
on higher ground, overlooked the village and permitted intense
machine-gun fire to be concentrated upon it. They were outside the
area of operations. In the same way, from the Hindenburg trenches
east of the Canal, heavy machine-gun fire was kept up on the village
and its approaches. This ground also was, for practical purposes,
outside the area of operations, since it could not be taken without
artillery preparation or tanks. There had been no artillery
preparation, and no tanks were available.
The close of this rather unsatisfactory day may fittingly mark
the end of a chapter. After wonderful initial success the action
had not continued as planned. Little has been said of the extreme
right flank because space does not permit. Nor does it in any way
concern the 36th Division. But here also, though Masnières, across
the Canal de l'Escaut, had been taken, the great cavalry "drive"
had been a failure. Henceforth the battle was to be fought in other
circumstances. Fresh German troops were up now, and resistance all
along the line was fierce. Every yard of ground had to be won by hard
fighting. The idea of exploitation to the Sensée River must have
faded from the mind of the Commander of the Third Army. Indeed, he
permitted a Division intended for that purpose, the 40th, to relieve
the 62nd, now very weary. But much had been won. It was of the
highest importance now to take the Bourlon Ridge. While it remained
in German hands all our positions were overlooked, and could have
been made in time almost untenable. In our hands, on the contrary,
it would have been a veritable thorn in the side of the Germans, and
would soon have compelled an important retirement to the north, if
neither so swift nor so great as that which would have been involved
by our reaching Oisy-le-Verger.
A new phase was opening, of powerful forces on either side battling
fiercely for position. And the crown of battle, looming up above the
combatants, was the great circular mass of the Bois de Bourlon.
FOOTNOTES:
[43] Aux moments sombres de la guerre, nous nous sommes souvent
demandés: "Si Napoléon sortait de son tombeau aux Invalides, que nous
dirait-il, que ferait-il de nos armées actuelles?"
Il nous aurait dit: "Vous avez des millions d'hommes; je ne les
ai jamais eus. Vous avez les chemins-de-fer, le télégraphe, la
télégraphie sans fil, les avions, l'artillerie à longue portée, les
gazs asphyxiants; je n'avais rien de tout cela. Et vous n'en tirez
point parti? Vous allez voir!"
Et, dans un mois ou deux, il aurait tout renversé, réorganisé, mis en
œuvre de quelque façon nouvelle, et culbuté l'ennemi désorienté.
MARSHAL FOCH: _The Times_ (Napoleon Supplement),
Thursday, May 5th, 1921.
[44] Map IV.
[45] 62nd Division.