IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.[74]

The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the

Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise

the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first

to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance

of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery

of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted

by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was

tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation

was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death

other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the

complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of

Ghūrak, king of _S_ughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient

indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance

between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom

misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his

troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable

in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the

subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were

despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were

truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character

can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the

authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In

the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs

are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no

connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be

duplicated, and those from the minor states:

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