1. 717-731 _S_ughd 11, _T_ukhāristān 5, Bukhārā 2, Arabs 4.
2. 732-740 ” none ” 2 ” none ” 1 (733).
3. 741-747 ” 4 ” 3 ” 1 ” 4
4. 750-755 ” 4 ” 2 ” 3 ” 6
These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the
fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania.
In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the
Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the
accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs
of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the
following year they restored the deposed king of Farghāna. In 716, on
the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes
of the Türgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu
established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The
princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments
to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent
to China by _T_ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, and the king
of Chaghāniān. The first three presented petitions for aid against the
Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ _Documents_. _T_ughshāda
asked that the Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak
related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayāna
complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked
that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing
taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, acting for his
suzerain, the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, did not compromise himself by
joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took
no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite
of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected
suzerain.
The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account.
Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the _S_ughdians
was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign
of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from
the weak ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym. For a moment the situation seemed
to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna”
(102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant
Shuʿba b. _Z_uhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shuʿba was recalled,
perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that
the _S_ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu,
unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly
seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small
Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by _T_abarī Kūr_s_ūl)[75]
to make common cause with the _S_ughdian rebels in the following
spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke to find the whole country in arms, a
Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few
exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on
their levies and a small garrison at Qa_s_r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only
with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force
of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in
_T_abarī. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the
Turkish forces. Kūr_s_ūl continued his advance through _S_ughd without
opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by public
reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which
he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the
neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake
a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little
more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition.
As the Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as
Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of _S_ughd. Ghūrak appears to
have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and
doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged.
From the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, in close
proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported
the Arabs.
But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand
idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness
shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects,
were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-_H_arashī,
a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer
may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first
act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and
merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect
no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke,
prepared to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost to persuade
them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect
the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in _T_abarī’s
account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards
Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of
ʿI_s_ām. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other
parties actually entered Farghāna, and one body at least occupied a
fortified position on the Zarafshān. Al-_H_arashī followed up his demands
by marching into _S_ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, where he was with
difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On
advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who,
outwardly professing to assist the _S_ughdians, had secretly decided to
rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-_H_arashī
eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the
allegiance of Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by
their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided
to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king
of Farghāna. But when Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they
realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly
easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a
camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from
Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the
nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred,
only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. _T_abarī’s account very
thinly veils al-_H_arashī’s responsibility for this wanton act of
atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the
whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian _T_abarī
(Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in
none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took
refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, where they formed a regiment
(no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly
distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76].
The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of
722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and
indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of
the fortresses in _S_ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series
of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of
the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The
first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of
the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān b.
Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhārā,
Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded
the dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-_H_arashī, who at first
treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of
Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The
most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-_H_arashī’s
perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī still held out in the
fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force,
Al-_H_arashī sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī,
to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to
death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ʿOmar b.
Hubayra.
The whole of _S_ughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The
nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, had remained loyal and the Oxus
basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it
peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-_H_arashī found
that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse
for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by
Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came
of a house long familiar with Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of
revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied
the Arab government during all this period. Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned
the too-influential _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī on suspicion of rousing the
Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Ba_s_ra
may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your
chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact,
favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials
acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, being appointed
Marzubān of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives
and could not materially affect the growing discontent in _S_ughd and
_T_ukhāristān. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the
narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on
Farghāna in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river
but was met and pushed back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly
escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again
assisted by Türgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however,
before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at
Afshīna, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded Yazīd II as
Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced,
was recalled in favour of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The
transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account
places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into
Farghāna, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through
dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall.
Na_s_r b. Sayyār was sent with a Mu_d_arite force to use compulsion;
the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly joined
the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghāniān fought alongside
Na_s_r in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that
he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue
his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of
withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by _S_ughdian levies, marched
into Farghāna, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting
down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought
that Khāqān was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a
retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of
the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they
crossed the Wādī Sabū_h_, closely pursued by the Türgesh; a detachment,
largely composed of mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and
suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being amongst the killed.
After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light
Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the
value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day,
they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh and Farghāna, together
with the _S_ughdians who had escaped from Saʿīd al-_H_arashī, but the
desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, cut
their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At
length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān
b. Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, and made good his
retreat to Samarqand.
This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in
the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive
expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of
much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige.
The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves
on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district
across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of
Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to
the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by
Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of
Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his
Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities.
The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in _S_ughd but in
_T_ukhāristān and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude
of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed
active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time,
if not before, the subject princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents
of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent
entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle.
We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by
the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long
cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs;
in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not
obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be
destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan
has given this order to the Kagan of the Türgesh: To you I delegate the
affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out
the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the
ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is
understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration,
it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the
people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies,
there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best
interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue
could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as
far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by
alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its
supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents.
But though the situation was steadily deteriorating the decisive moment
had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. ʿAbdullah, seems to have
seen something of the danger though factional feeling was running so
high that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. He
tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by appointing agents
of known probity. Tawba b. Abī Usayd, a mawlā who had been intendant
for Muslim, and who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily
accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained their supplies,”
he persuaded to remain in office under him. Hāniʾ b. Hāniʾ, the financial
intendant at Samarqand, was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-_H_asan
b. Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the mawālī,
appointed in his place. With him was associated Thābit Qu_t_na, who had
been a leader of some repute under Saʿīd Khudhayna, “gallant warrior,
distinguished poet, confidant of Yazīd b. Muhallab, and universally
popular”[80]. Still more significant is the fact that one of Asad’s
earliest actions was to renew the practice, neglected since the days
of ʿOmar II, of sending an embassy to the Chinese court. As before,
however, the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, and the
military weakness of Ibn Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a roused them to open anger.
Strong Turkish forces, probably guerilla bands swollen by refugees
and malcontents from the wasted districts, spread over the country
and appeared even before Samarqand. The governor made some show of
opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, thus intensifying his
unpopularity.
Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and more isolated, but no
assistance could be given from Khurāsān. During his three years of office
Asad’s attention was wholly engaged with the situation in _T_ukhāristān
and the South. Even here his constant expeditions, to Gharjistān,
Khuttal, and elsewhere, met with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he
found his forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khāqān with his Türgesh. The
princes of _T_ukhāristān had taken to heart the lessons of the “Day of
Thirst”, and the powerful chief who had already all but driven the Arabs
out of Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the Oxus basin as
well. Asad visited his failure on the Mu_d_arites, whom he may have
suspected of treachery, but the indignation called out by his treatment
of such men as Na_s_r b. Sayyār, ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym, Sawra b.
Al-_H_urr, and Al-Bakhtarī, made his recall inevitable. Nor had his
measures removed the distrust and hatred of the subject peoples. The land
was wasted and desolate[81], the crushing taxation was not lightened, and
all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; many of them were
but too ready to rival their Arab rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may
have gained the friendship of many dihqāns[82], but that was an easier
matter than to placate the population. In such an atmosphere it was only
to be expected that Shīʿite and ʿAbbāsid propaganda, though actively
combated by the administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim
converts in Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān, and was already beginning
to undermine the whole fabric of Arab government.
For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy entertained by the
mawālī and the clearer-sighted Arabs were raised to the highest pitch by
the appointment (in 109) of Ashras b. ʿAbdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by
the separation of Khurāsān from Khālid al-Qasrī’s province of ʿIrāq. It
is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching concessions by which
he hoped to secure, and actually did for a time secure the allegiance of
the _S_ughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, especially
Ghūrak, succeeded in checking the movement[83]. It is generally assumed
that the hostility of Ghūrak was due to the serious fall in revenue
which would result. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and
accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghūrak’s
aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors
but to recover his independence. If once the people became “Arabs” all
hope of success must have been lost. It was a game with high stakes and
Ghūrak won. It must not be overlooked, however, that the account as we
have it is traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence of
cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the measures adopted by
Ashras is more probably to be explained by pressure from above, not from
below, and our tradition may really present only the popular view of
the Caliph Hishām’s reorganization of the financial administration[84].
The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to wring the taxes from the new
converts, and with incredible blindness selected the dihqāns for
special indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhī’s story of the
martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhārā is connected with this event,
though there are many other possible explanations, such as, for example,
an attempted _H_ārithite movement (see below, p. 76 f.) The reaction
swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqāns and peasantry alike,
into open rebellion. The first small party of emigrants who quitted
Samarqand, although supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender
and return[85], but within a few months the dreaded Khāqān with his
Türgesh had joined forces with the rebels and swept the Arabs across the
Oxus. Even Bukhārā was lost[86] and only Samarqand with two minor posts
on the Zarafshān, Kamarja and Dabūsia, held out. Ghūrak, however, still
supported the Arabs, as Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been
in no danger, while his son Mukhtār, doubtless to keep a footing in the
opposite camp, joined with the Türgesh.
The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily united all parties
and factions. The army was concentrated at Āmul but for three months was
unable to cross the river in the face of the combined native and Türgesh
armies. A small body under Qa_t_an b. Qutayba which had already crossed
and fortified itself before the arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The
Turkish cavalry even made raids on Khurāsān with an excess of boldness
which was punished by a mounted force under Thābit Qu_t_na. At length
Ashras got his forces across and, joining with Qa_t_an b. Qutayba,
advanced on Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had it not
been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of _H_ārith b. Surayj, Thābit
Qu_t_na, and their companions, an even greater and more irretrievable
“Day of Thirst” had resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qa_t_an and the
cavalry of Qays and Tamīm charged the enemy and forced them back, so that
Ashras was able to continue his advance towards Bukhārā. In the heavy
fighting the Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qa_t_an gave each
other up for lost, and Ghūrak judged that the time had come to throw in
his lot with the Turks. Two days later, however, the armies were reunited
and on the retiral of the Turks encamped at Bawādara outside the walls of
Bukhārā, whence they prepared to besiege the city. Ghūrak also retrieved
his error and rejoined Ashras. The Khāqān withdrew towards Samarqand,
but sat down before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few
days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events are confused in
several places, which has given rise to many incorrect statements, such
as that Ghūrak was beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the
garrison consisted of Qa_t_an and his forces. Kamarja was not in the
neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen states, but a few farsakhs west
of Samarqand[87]. When the garrison would not yield to assault Khāqān
tried other methods. Accompanying his expedition was Khusrū the son of
Pērōz and grandson of Yazdigird, heir of the Sāsānid kings. This prince
was sent to parley with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration
of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not surprising that
the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. Nor would the appearance of a
Sāsānid prince evoke much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania.
As the Sāsānid house had taken refuge in China, however, the presence of
Khusrū might be taken as an indication that the rebels were receiving
encouragement from China also, though the Chinese records are silent on
this expedition. Khāqān’s second proposal, that he should hire the Arabs
as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively as the first. The siege was
then pressed with renewed vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and
hostages to death, but after fifty-eight days Khāqān, on the advice of
the son of Ghūrak and the other _S_ughdian princes, allowed the garrison
to transfer either to Samarqand or Dabūsia. On their choosing the latter,
the terms were faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages.
The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and wide, but it brought
little relief to the pressure on the Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwārizm
was affected by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of open
rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, probably Arabs settled
in the district, with the aid of a small force despatched by Ashras.
The reference made in _T_abarī to assistance given to the rebels by the
Turks is probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athīr. It is of
course quite possible that the movement was instigated by the Türgesh,
though no such explanation is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged
they were probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have remained
before Bukhārā during the winter, possibly in Paykand; the Türgesh
probably withdrew towards Shāsh and Farghāna.
In the following year, 730/111-112[88], the attacks on the army of
Ashras were renewed. The course of events can only be gathered from the
accounts given of the difficulties experienced by the new governor,
Junayd b. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān al-Murrī, in joining the army before Bukhārā.
His guide advised him to levy a force from Zamm and the neighbouring
districts before crossing the Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find
himself after crossing put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a
bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster on its way to
meet Junayd and fought a second severe engagement on the return journey
before reaching Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men of
Bukhārā and _S_ughd” and “Turks and _S_ughdians”; it may therefore be
assumed that they were the same forces against whom Ashras had fought the
previous year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that Ashras
was practically beleaguered, though not in Bukhārā. The recapture of this
city and the retiral of Khāqān took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival,
in circumstances which are not described[89]. The attitude of Tugshāda
during this episode is not recorded. It is practically certain, however,
that he remained in Bukhārā, and after the reconquest was able to make
his peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of _force majeure_. At
all events he retained his position, possibly because Junayd thought it
impolitic in the face of the situation to victimise the nobles in the
reconquered territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance in
the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have followed up the Turks
towards Samarqand, probably to relieve the garrison; the two armies met
again at Zarmān, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the Arabs claimed
a success, one of their prisoners being a nephew of Khāqān. From _S_ughd
the army marched to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the
friendly atmosphere of Chaghāniān before returning to Merv. His intention
was no doubt to make arrangements for the pacification or reconquest of
_T_ukhāristān and Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually
engaged in this direction when the Türgesh invasion of _S_ughd forced him
to change his plans. Balādhurī quotes Abū ʿUbayda for the statement that
Junayd reconquered certain districts in _T_ukhāristān which had revolted.
How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering was shown after the
return of the army, when the Bāhilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate
on Na_s_r b. Sayyār for their discomfiture at Barūqān. Though Junayd was
prompt to punish the offending governor, the incident throws a strong
light on one cause of the weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns.
Early in 731/112-113, the Türgesh and _S_ughdians gathered their forces
for the investment of Samarqand. Ghūrak now openly joined the Khāqān.
Sawra b. Al-_H_urr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy
in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for assistance. The
governor hastily recalled his troops, but crossed the river without
waiting for them against the advice of his generals. “No governor of
Khurāsān,” said al-Mujashshar b. Muzā_h_im, one of the ablest of the Arab
commanders, “should cross the river with less than fifty thousand men.”
Accompanied only by a small force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised
some local levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy in the
meantime, after blocking up the water supplies on his road, interposed
their forces between Samarqand and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon
decided to follow the direct route across the Shāwdār mountains in
the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only four farsakhs from
Samarqand was surprised in the defiles by Khāqān. The advance-guard
was driven in and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which
both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in on all sides,
were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, and baggage, collected
near Kish, were attacked by a detachment of Turks and severely handled.
Khāqān renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but overwhelming
Junayd, and settled down thereafter to beleaguer him. In this predicament
there was only one course open to Junayd. Had his force perished,
Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two disasters taken
the place of one. He therefore adopted the more prudent, if unheroic,
course of ordering Sawra to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and
march out to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took the short
cut across the mountains, and was actually within four miles of Junayd,
when the Turkish forces bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat
of the day, when the Turks, on Ghūrak’s advice it is said, having first
set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut Sawra off from the water.
Maddened by heat and thirst, the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their
ranks, only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims together.
The scattered remnants were pursued by the Turkish cavalry and of twelve
thousand men scarcely a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged
with Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position in the
defiles, though not without severe fighting, and completed his march to
Samarqand. _T_abarī gives also a variant account of the “Battle of the
Pass,” the main difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the
side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, it
is improbable that the Jabghu, even if he was present personally, which
is doubtful, was accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian _T_abarī
also contains an entirely different version of the Battle of the Pass and
the fate of Sawra. The original version is amply attested by contemporary
poets, who show no mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained
in this battle is reflected on Na_s_r b. Sayyār and the mawālī. Junayd
remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating his forces, while
couriers were sent to Hishām with the news of the disaster. The Caliph
immediately ordered twenty thousand reinforcements from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa
to be sent to Khurāsān, together with a large number of weapons and a
draft on the treasury, at the same time giving Junayd a free hand in
enlistment.
The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, withdrew to
Bukhārā, where they laid siege to Qa_t_an b. Qutayba. Here they were also
on the natural lines of communication between Samarqand and Khurāsān.
Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either to remain in
Samarqand and await reinforcements, or to retire on Khurāsān _via_ Kish
and Zamm, or to attack the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the
Arabs was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for Samarqand
was scraped together only by granting a considerable increase in their
pay, while the troops openly regarded the decision to face Khāqān and
the Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. Junayd now
marched with the utmost circumspection, however, and easily defeated a
small body of the enemy in a skirmish near Karmīnīa. The following day
Khāqān attacked his rearguard near _T_awāwīs (on the edge of the oasis
of Bukhārā), but the attack had been foreseen and was beaten off. As it
was now well into November, the Türgesh were compelled to withdraw from
Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhārā in triumph on the festival of
Mihrjān. In Chaghāniān he was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent
on to Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to their winter
quarters.
Junayd seems to have been content with saving Samarqand and Bukhārā. As
no further expeditions are recorded of his two remaining years of office
it must be assumed that the situation in _S_ughd remained unchanged and
that the Türgesh irruptions also were suspended. Though the Arabs still
held Samarqand and the territories of Bukhārā and Kish, they were in
all probability confined to these, while in the southern basin their
authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghāniān. Both sides may
have awaited the first move by the other, but were surprised by the
appearance of a new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab
sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any external danger. It
is noteworthy that in his last year of office (115/733) Junayd resumed
relations with the Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the
embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the ambassadors were
actually Arabs, but that the governor had commissioned some dignitaries
from the subject states to represent the Arab government. The only
embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, came from
Khuttal. In the same year Khurāsān was visited by a severe drought
and famine, and to provide for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered
supplies from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the military
disasters of the last few years and the insinuations of Shīʿite
propaganda, provoked open discontent in the district which had hitherto
been outwardly faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of Lower
_T_ukhāristān. The leader of the malcontents was Al-_H_ārith b. Surayj,
who was flogged in consequence by the governor of Balkh. The discontent
flared into open revolt on the death of Junayd in Mu_h_arram 716 (Feb.
734). _H_ārith, assisted by the princes and people of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, and
_T_ālaqān, marched on Balkh and captured it from Na_s_r b. Sayyār. The
versions leave it uncertain whether _H_ārith defeated Na_s_r and then
captured the city or whether he entered the city first and beat off an
attempt at recapture by Na_s_r. (Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is
due to his so misunderstanding the “river of Balkh” in _T_ab. 1560. 2.
That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is clear from the
distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs
from Balkh) as well as from the mention of the bridge of ʿA_t_ā.) From
Balkh he moved against the new governor ʿĀ_s_im b. ʿAbdullah al-Hilālī,
at Merv, capturing Merv-Rūdh on the way. ʿĀ_s_im found a large section
of the inhabitants in league with _H_ārith, but on his threatening to
evacuate Merv and to call for Syrian troops, the local forces rallied
round him. At the first reverse, the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān
deserted _H_ārith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to three thousand.
He was thus reduced to making terms with ʿĀsim, but early in the
following year renewed his revolt. ʿĀsim, hearing that Asad b. ʿAbdullah
was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with _H_ārith against
him. The plan miscarried, however; _H_ārith seized the governor and held
him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession
of all Eastern Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and from
the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym towards Merv
Rūdh to keep _H_ārith’s main body in check, he marched himself against
the rebel forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of
Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter,
continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile _H_ārith seems to have retreated
before ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he
laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower _T_ukhāristān returned to its allegiance;
on the other hand _H_ārith was now supported not only by the kings of
Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu
of _T_ukhāristān. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus
in the face of _H_ārith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was
well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while _H_ārith,
after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into
_T_ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā b. Khāzim at Tirmidh,
he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshān.
The motives of _H_ārith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated.
In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering
on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic
and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government
officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in
the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his
small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of
the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in
Khurāsān. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary
followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further
evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by
_T_abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition into _S_ughd. Except for the
scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding
the effects of the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania.
Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on _T_abarī 1890. 6) that
“_H_ārith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last
year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at
all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the
_H_ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to the administration.
That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against _H_ārith
follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to
(_T_ab. 1585. 6-16).
“Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when
he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, one of
_H_ārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm),
saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only
their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ...
_nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand_.
Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God
that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall
have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and
those with you....” So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the
condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned
him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave
them double pay.”
The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. That the
whole of _S_ughd was lost to the Arabs is clear from the fact that Asad
found it necessary to take provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā.
He was not successful in recapturing the city, however, and attempted no
more than the damming of the canal sluices at Waraghsar.
The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been passed over in
silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in Asad’s reference to the
capture of Muslim women. Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops
or with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted that he had
taken advantage of the dissensions in Khurāsān to realise his ambition
and at last drive the Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests
of Qutayba beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps Kish
alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory detail is the cessation of
_S_ughdian embassies to China between 731 and 740: now that independence
(even if under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was no need
to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence of the same kind is afforded
by the absence of any Arab embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs
been in possession of _S_ughd, it is practically certain that Asad,
as he had done before, would have renewed relations with the Chinese
court. Against this view may be set the statement in _T_ab. 1613. 5 that
Khāqān was preparing an army to invest Samarqand at the time of his
assassination. This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy,
and is contradicted by the presence of the king of _S_ughd with
_S_ughdian troops in the Türgesh army in 119/737 as well as by Na_s_r b.
Sayyār’s expedition to Samarqand two years later. _S_ughd thus enjoyed
once more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 Ghūrak died and
his kingdom was divided amongst his heirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand
by his son Tu-ho (? _T_arkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another son
Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, while the king of
Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo who may perhaps be identified
with Ghūrak’s brother Afarūn[91].
The year after the campaigns against _H_ārith, 118/736, was devoted by
Asad to the re-organisation of his province, including a measure which,
it seems, he had already projected in his first term of office. This was
the removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh[92]. Since no
other governor of Khurāsān followed his example we must seek the motive
for the innovation either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān
and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations based on the
former are not hard to find. Asad, on taking office, had been faced with
a serious situation both in Lower _T_ukhāristān and across the river. He
had obviously to establish a strong point _d’appui_. The loyalty of the
garrison at Merv was not above suspicion but the garrison at Balkh was
composed of Syrian troops, who could be trusted to the uttermost[93].
Merv was also less convenient for reaching _T_ukhāristān, which was at
the moment the main area of operations. More important still, perhaps,
Balkh was the centre from which all disturbances spread in Eastern
Khurāsān, as in the revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt of _H_ārith.
As the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall Nēzak, it is
possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would be in a position to check
all similar movements at the beginning. Other considerations may also
have disposed him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital
and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern
Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, had always been the capital of the
foreigners, of the Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship
with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into the moral effect
which would follow from the transference of the administration to the
centre of the national life. Still greater would this effect be when the
rebuilding was carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own
people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary priest-ruler
of the ancient shrine. Quite apart from this, however, the rebuilding
of Balkh was an event of the greatest significance, and once restored
it soon equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and
importance. While the new city was being built, the army was employed in
expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, for the most part under the command of
Judayʿ al-Karmānī, who achieved some successes against the followers of
_H_ārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress in Badakhshān.
Other raids were undertaken by the governor himself, but without results
of military importance.
Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against Khuttal, partly in
retaliation for the assistance given to _H_ārith, partly, it may be, to
wipe off an old score. The chronology presents some difficulties at this
point. _T_abarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same year
119/737, both from the same source, but that which is undoubtedly the
earlier is dated towards the close of the year (Rama_d_ān = September).
Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by referring this expedition to 118,
reckoning back from the appointment of Na_s_r b. Sayyār, the data
for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem the obvious
solution were it not that the date given in the Chinese records for
the assassination of Su-Lu, 738[94], agrees perfectly with _T_abarī’s
dating of the Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad
on the second expedition would then hang together with the “somewhat
legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān feast. There seems reason, therefore,
for dating this expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been
despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied by him. _T_abarī
fortunately preserves also a short notice of the situation in Khuttal.
The heir of as-Sabal, whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the
Chinese transcription Lo-kin-tsie[95], had fled to China, possibly on
account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed as-Sabal appointed a
regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern the country until Al-Hanash could be
restored. The moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition and
Asad at first carried all before him. On his first appearance, however,
Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid to Su-Lu, who was at his capital
Nawākath (on the Chu). The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including
the _S_ughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, on the Chu)
to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find Asad, warned of his approach
by the regent, who was endeavouring to play both sides off against each
other, in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been despatched in
advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀ_s_im with a guard of Arabs and native troops
from Chaghāniān but the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was
crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, considering himself
safe with the river between his army and the enemy, encamped and sent
orders to Ibrāhīm to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however,
were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful assault on Asad’s
camp, they hastened to overtake the richer prize while the governor’s
troops were too worn out to protect it. By sending a party under cover
to fall on the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself
attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into Ibrāhīm’s camp.
Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, himself fell with the greater part
of his forces but the remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely
arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the Arabs were allowed
to withdraw to Balkh without further serious fighting. A variant account
given by _T_abarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on
Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of the Baggage,” which
happened to be the feast of Fi_t_r (1st October 737). On the retiral of
the Arabs, the Khāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the
honours of the day, remained in _T_ukhāristān.
Here he was joined by _H_ārith, who advised him to undertake a winter
raid into Lower _T_ukhāristān while the Arab troops were disbanded,
undoubtedly in the expectation that the local princes would again unite
with him against Asad. The governor retained his army at Balkh until
the winter had set in, and in the meantime the Khāqān summoned forces
to join him from _S_ughd and the territories subject to _T_ukhāristān.
The enumeration which _T_abarī gives of the troops accompanying the
Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely Arab rule in
Transoxania and the Oxus basin had been supplanted by that of the Turks.
We are told that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops and _H_ārith
with his followers there were present the Jabghu, the king of _S_ughd,
the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is
fairly certain, of course, that the list is exaggerated in so far as the
actual presence of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially
contradicted in other parts of the narrative), but it can scarcely be
doubted that forces from some, if not all, of these principalities
were engaged. On the evening of the 9th Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (7th Dec.) news
reached Balkh that the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some
30,000, were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and with the
Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops he could muster from
the district marched out against them. The governor of Khulm sent in a
second report that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the
town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the neighbourhood of
Balkh. From this point the enemy, avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and
occupied the capital[96]. Instead of continuing his advance immediately,
the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding parties of cavalry in all
directions, an action which put it beyond doubt that the immediate object
of the expedition was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of Lower
_T_ukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary to _H_ārith’s expectations,
however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the Arabs, who marched towards
Shubūrqān by way of Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives
in _T_abarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in the neighbourhood
of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment when his available forces amounted only
to 4,000. A furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of the
Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, on the initiative of the
king of Jūzjān. It is in connection with the battle, which he describes
as if it were a set engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces
were engaged, that _T_abarī gives his list of the combatants. But as only
4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the Khāqān were involved,
the list is obviously out of place and the whole narrative shows the
marks of rehandling. The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the
Khāqān and _H_ārith, having narrowly escaped capture in the confusion,
were closely followed by Asad as far as Jazza, when a storm of rain and
snow prevented further pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu
in _T_ukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding parties, whose
retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, and of whom only a
single band of _S_ughdians made good their escape.
On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, hung the fate of
Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but possibly even in Khurāsān, at
least for the immediate future. Though the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān
fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt that a
victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to the side of _H_ārith
and the Turks, who would then have been in a position to follow up
their attacks with the advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported
by the Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were saved only by
Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection of Balkh as his residence. The
account given of Hishām’s incredulity on hearing the report shows how
very serious the outlook had been and the extent to which the name of
the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān was not only the
turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs in Central Asia, but gave the
signal for the downfall of the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the
personal prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of _T_ukhāristān and Transoxania
found it expedient to treat him with respect as he was returning to
Nawākath, but in his own country the dissensions long fomented in secret
by the Chinese broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan
(Kūr_s_ūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks split up and began to
raid one another,” and the _coup de grâce_ of the Khanate was delivered
at Sūyāb in 739 by the faction of Kūr_s_ūl, supported by the Chinese
and with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from Shāsh and
Farghāna[97][98]. With the collapse of the Türgesh kingdom disappeared
the last great Turkish confederation in Western Asia for more than two
centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured the supremacy of
the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but it could not have attained
the richness of its full development there unless all danger from the
steppes had been removed. That this security was attained was due not
to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by breaking down the
greatest external obstacle to the Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia,
brought itself face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have been
realised at once, however, by the Arab government, whose immediate task
was to restore its lost authority in Transoxania.