As to the distinction drawn between primary and secondary being,[376]
it must be admitted that some particular fire, and the universal Fire
differ from each other in this, that the one is individual, and the
other universal; but the difference between them does not seem to
be essential. Indeed, does the genus of quality contain both White,
and a particular white; or Grammar, and some particular grammatical
science? How far does Grammatical science then have less reality than
some particular grammatical science, and Science, than some particular
science? Grammatical science is not posterior to some particular
grammatical science; Grammatical science must already have existed
before the existence of the grammatical science in you, since the
latter is some grammatical science because it is found in you; it is
besides identical with universal Grammatical science. Likewise, it
is not Socrates that caused him who was not a man to become a man;
it is rather the universal Man who enabled Socrates to be a man; for
the individual man is man by participation in the universal Man. What
then is Socrates, if not some man? In what does such a man contribute
to render "being" more "being"? If the answer be that he contributes
thereto by the fact that the universal Man is only a form, while a
particular man is a form in matter, the result will only be that a
particular man will be less of a man; for reason (that is, essence) is
weaker when it is in matter. If the universal Man consist not only in
form itself, but is also in matter, in what will he be inferior to the
form of the man who is in matter, since it will be the reason of the
man which is in matter? By its nature the universal is anterior, and
consequently the form is anterior to the individual. Now that which
by its nature is anterior is an absolute anterior. How then would the
universal be less in being? Doubtless the individual, being better
known to us, is anterior for us; but no difference in the things
themselves results.[377] Besides, if we were to admit the distinction
between primary and secondary beings, the definition of "being" would
no longer be one; for that which is first and that which is second are
not comprised under one single definition, and do not form a single and
same genus.