But how could we admit (the existence of) a nature without feeling
or consciousness of itself? We might answer this, What consciousness
of self can (the divinity) have? Can He say, "I am?" But (in the
above-mentioned sense), He is not. Can He say, "I am the Good"? Then
He would still be saying of Himself "I am" (whereas we have just
explained that this He cannot do[150]). What then will He add (to
his simplicity) by limiting Himself to saying, "The Good"? For it is
possible to think "the Good" apart from "He is" so long as the Good
is not, as an attribute, applied to some other being. But whoever
thinks himself good will surely say "I am the good"; if not, he will
think the predicate "good," but he will not be enabled to think that
he is so himself. Thus, the thought of good will imply this thought,
"I am the good." If this thought itself be the Good, it will not be
the thought of Him, but of the good, and he will not be the Good, but
the thought.[151] If the thought of good is different from the Good
itself, the Good will be prior to the thought of the good. If the Good
be self-sufficient before the thought, it suffices to itself to be the
Good; and in this respect has no need of the thought that it is the
Good.