39. Consequently, the Good does not think itself either as good, nor
as anything else; for it possesses nothing different from itself. It
only has "a simple perception of itself in respect to itself"; but as
there is no distance or difference in this perception it has of itself,
what could this perception be but itself? That is why it perceives a
difference where being and intelligence appear. In order to think,
intelligence must admit identity and difference simultaneously. On the
one hand, without the relation between the Intelligible and itself,
the (mind) will not distinguish itself from (the intelligible); and on
the other, without the arising of an "otherness" which would enable
it to be everything, it would not contemplate all (earthly) entities.
(Without this difference), intelligence would not even be a "pair."
Then, since intelligence thinks, if it think really, it will not think
itself alone, for why should it not think all things? (Would it not do
so) because it was impotent to do so? In short, the principle which
thinks itself ceases to be simple, because in thinking itself it must
think itself as something different, which is the necessary condition
of thinking itself.[152] We have already said that intelligence cannot
think itself without contemplating itself as something different.
Now in thinking, intelligence becomes manifold (that is, fourfold):
intelligible object (thing thought) and intelligent subject (thinker);
movement (or, moved[153]), and everything else that belongs to
intelligence. Besides, it must be noticed, as we have pointed out
elsewhere, that, to be thought, any thought, must offer variety[154];
but (in the divinity) this movement is so simple and identical that
it may be compared to some sort of touch, and partakes in nothing of
intellectual actualization (therefore, thought cannot be attributed
to the divinity). What? Will (the divinity) know neither others nor
Himself, and will He remain immovable in His majesty? (Surely). All
things are posterior to Him; He was what He is before them. The thought
of these things is adventitious, changeable, and does not apply to
permanent objects. Even if it did apply to permanent objects, it would
still be multiple, for we could not grant that in inferior beings
thought was joined to being, while the thoughts of intelligence would
be empty notions. The existence of Providence is sufficiently accounted
for by its being that from which proceed all (beings). How then (in
regard to all the beings that refer to Him) could (the divinity) think
them, since He does not even think Himself, but remains immovable in
His majesty? That is why Plato,[149] speaking of "being," says that it
doubtless thinks, but that it does not remain immovable in its majesty.
By that he means that, no doubt, "being" thinks, but that that which
does not think remains immovable in its majesty; using this expression
for lack of a better one. Thus Plato considers the Principle which is
superior to thought as possessing more majesty, nay, sovereign majesty.
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO THOUGHT AS THE FIRST ACTUALIZATION OF A
HYPOSTASIS.
40. That thought is incompatible with the first Principle is something
well known by all those who have (in ecstasy) risen to Him.[155] To
what we have already said, we shall however add several arguments, if
indeed we succeed in expressing thought comprehensibly; for conviction
should be fortified by demonstration.[156] In the first place, observe
that all thought exists within a subject, and proceeds from some
object. Thought that is connected with the object from which it is
derived, has the being to which it belongs, as subject. It inheres in
him because it is his actualization, and completes his potentiality,
without, itself, producing anything; for it belongs exclusively to the
subject whose complement it is. Thought that is hypostatically united
with "being," and which underlies its existence, could not inhere in
the object from which it proceeds; for, had it remained in him, it
would not have produced anything. Now, having the potentiality of
producing, it produced within itself; its actualization was "being,"
and it was united thereto. Thus thought is not something different
from "being"; so far as this nature thinks itself, it does not think
itself as being something different; for the only multiplicity therein
is that which results from the logical distinction of intelligent
subject (thinker) and intelligible object (the being thought), as we
have often pointed out. That is the first actualization which produced
a hypostasis (or, form of existence), while constituting "being";
and this actualization is the image of a Principle so great that
itself has become "being." If thought belonged to the Good, instead
of proceeding therefrom, it would be no more than an attribute; it
would not, in itself, be a hypostatic form of existence. Being the
first actualization and the first thought, this thought has neither
actualization nor thought above it. Therefore, by rising above this
"being" and this thought, neither further "being" nor thought will be
met with; we would arrive to the Principle superior to "being," and
thought, an admirable principle, which contains neither thought nor
being, which in solitary guise dwells within itself, and which has no
need of the things which proceed from Him. He did not first act, and
then produce an actualization (he did not begin by thinking in order
later to produce thought); otherwise, he would have thought before
thought was born. In short, thought, being the thought of good, is
beneath Him, and consequently does not belong to Him. I say: "does not
belong to Him," not denying that the Good can be thought (for this, I
admit); but because thought could not exist in the Good; otherwise, the
Good and that which is beneath it--namely, the thought of Good--would
fuse. Now, if the good be something inferior, it will simultaneously be
thought and being; if, on the contrary, good be superior to thought, it
must likewise belong to the Intelligible.[157]