19. Shall the decision of what is good be entrusted to the desire
of the soul?[110] If we are to trust this affection of the soul, we
shall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good; but
we would not be seeking why the Good is desired. Thus, while we use
demonstrations to explain the nature of every entity, we would be
trusting to desire for the determination of the Good. Such a proceeding
would land us in several absurdities. First, the Good would only be an
attribute. Then, since our soul has several desires, and each of the
latter has different objects, we would not be able to decide which
of these objects would be the best, according to desire. It would be
impossible to decide what would be better before we know what is good.
NO NEED TO SEEK THE CAUSE OF GOOD AS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE THE CAUSE
COINCIDES WITH THE NATURE.
Shall we then define the good as the virtue characteristic of each
being (as say the Stoics)? In this case, by strictly following (the
course of dialectics) we would reduce the Good to being a form and a
reason. But, having arrived there, what should we answer if we were
asked on what grounds these things themselves are good? In imperfect
things, it seems easy to distinguish the good, even though it be not
pure; but in intelligible things we may not immediately succeed in
discovering the Good by comparison with the inferior things. As there
is no evil on high (in the intelligible world), and as excellent
things exist in themselves, we find ourselves embarrassed. Perhaps we
are embarrassed only because we seek the cause ("whyness") (of the
good), whereas the cause ("whyness") is here identical with the nature
("whatness"), as intelligible entities are good in themselves. Nor
would we have solved the problem if we were to assign some other cause
(of the Good), such as the divinity, to which our reason has not yet
forced us to repair. However, we cannot retire, and we must seek to
arrive by some other road to something satisfactory.