Is it by a mere play on words that life, intelligence and ideas are
called good? Does the good constitute their being, or is each good
taken in its totality? Good could not constitute the being of each
of them. Are they then parts of the Good? The Good, however, is
indivisible. The things that are beneath it are good for different
reasons. The primary actualization (that proceeds from the Good) is
good; likewise, the determination it receives is good, and the totality
of both things is good. The actualization is good because it proceeds
from the Good; the determination, because it is a perfection that
has emanated from the Good; and the combination of actualization and
determination because it is their totality. All these things thus are
derived from one and the same principle, but nevertheless they are
different. Thus (in a choric ballet) the voice and the step proceed
from one and the same person, in that they are all perfectly regulated.
Now they are well regulated because they contain order and rhythm.
What then is the content in the above-mentioned things that would make
them good? But perhaps it may be objected that if the voice and step
are well regulated, each one of them entirely owes it to some external
principle, since the order is here applied to the things that differ
from each other. On the contrary, the things of which we speak are each
of them good in itself. And why are they good? It does not suffice to
say that they are good because they proceed from the Good. Doubtless we
shall have to grant that they are precious from the moment that they
proceed from the Good, but reason demands that we shall determine that
of which their goodness consists.