When the third life (the sense-power) which constitutes the third
man, is separated from the body, if the life that precedes it (the
discursive reason) accompany it without nevertheless being separated
from the intelligible world, then one may say that the second is
everywhere the third is. It might seem surprising that the latter, when
passing into the body of a brute, should drag along that part which
is the being of man. This being was all beings (potentially); only, at
different times, it acts through different faculties. So far as it is
pure, and is not yet depraved, it wishes to constitute a man, and it
is indeed a man that it constitutes; for to form a man is better (than
to form a brute), and it does what is best. It also forms guardians
of the superior order, but such as are still conformable to the being
constituent of manhood. The (intellectual) Man, who is anterior to this
being, is of a nature still more like that of the guardians, or rather,
he is already a divinity. The guardian attached to a divinity is an
image of him, as the sense-man is the image of the intellectual man
from whom he depends; for the principle to which man directly attaches
himself must not be considered as his divinity. There is a difference
here, similar to that existing between the souls, though they all
belong to the same order.[86] Besides, those guardians whom Plato
simply calls "guardians" (demons), should be called guardian-like, or
"demonic" beings.[87] Last, when the superior Soul accompanies the
inferior soul which has chosen the condition of a brute, the inferior
soul which was bound to the superior soul--even when she constituted
a man--develops the ("seminal) reason" of the animal (whose condition
she has chosen); for she possesses that "reason" in herself; it is her
inferior actualization.
ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL'S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO
THE SOUL HERSELF.
7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a
brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally
destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the ("seminal) reason" of
the horse, as well as the horse itself, will be contrary to the nature
(of the soul). No: they are inferior to her nature, but they are not
contrary to her. From her very origin, the soul was (potentially) the
("seminal) reason" of a horse or a dog. When permitted, the soul which
was to beget an animal, produces something better; when hindered, she
(only) produces what accords with the circumstances. She resembles the
artists who, knowing how to produce several figures, create either
the one they have received the order to create, or the one that is
most suited to the material at hand. What hinders the (natural and
generative) power of the universal Soul, in her quality of universal
("seminal) Reason," from sketching out the outlines of the body, before
the soul powers (or, individual souls) should descend from her into
matter? What hinders this sketch from being a kind of preliminary
illumination of matter? What would hinder the individual soul from
finishing (fashioning the body sketched by the universal Soul),
following the lines already traced, and organizing the members pictured
by them, and becoming that which she approached by giving herself some
particular figure, just as, in a choric ballet, the dancer confines
himself to the part assigned to him?
THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ARE CONNECTED BY THE
MANIFOLD TRIPLE NATURE OF MAN.
Such considerations have been arrived at merely as result of
scrutiny of the consequences of the principles laid down. Our
purpose was to discover how sensibility occurs in the man himself,
without intelligible things falling into generation. We recognized
and demonstrated that intelligible things do not incline towards
sense-things, but that, on the contrary, it is the latter that aspire
and rise to the former, and imitate them; that the sense-man derives
from the intellectual man the power of contemplating intelligible
entities, though the sense-man remain united to sense-things, as the
intellectual man remains united to the intelligible entities. Indeed,
intelligible things are in some respects sensual; and we may call them
such because (ideally) they are Bodies, but they are perceived in a
manner different from bodies. Likewise, our sensations are less clear
than the perception which occurs in the intelligible world, and that
we also call Sensation, because it refers to Bodies (which exist on
high only in an ideal manner). Consequently, we call the man here below
sensual because he perceives less well things which themselves are less
good; that is, which are only images of intelligible things. We might
therefore say that sensations here below are obscure thoughts, and that
the Thoughts on high are distinct Sensations. Such are our views about
sensibility.
INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY
ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE.
8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it
happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained
in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here below
(by generating them)? Doubtless, to beget a horse, or any other animal
here below, divine Intelligence must hold its conception; nevertheless
it must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing
the horse, and only later its conception. Evidently, it could not have
wished to produce the horse, but because it already had the conception
thereof; and it could not have had the conception thereof but because
it had to produce the horse. Consequently, the Horse who was not
begotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten. Since the
first Horse has been anterior to all generation, and was not conceived
to be begotten, it is not because the divine Intelligence inclines
towards the things here below, nor because it produces them, that it
contains the intelligible Horse and the other beings. The intelligible
entities existed already in Intelligence (before it begat) and the
sense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence; for it was
impossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles. Who
indeed could have stopped this power of the (Intelligence) which is
capable of simultaneous procession, and of remaining within itself?
IRRATIONAL ANIMALS MUST EXIST WITHIN INTELLIGENCE, UNLESS MAN ALONE WAS
TO EXIST.
But why should these Animals (devoid of reason) exist in the divine
Intelligence? We might understand that animals endowed with reason
might be found within it; but does this multitude of irrational animals
seem at all admirable? Does it not rather seem something unworthy of
the divine Intelligence? Evidently the essence which is one must be
also manifold, since it is posterior to the Unity which is absolutely
simple; otherwise, instead of being inferior to it, it would fuse
with it. Being posterior to that Unity, it could not be more simple,
and must therefore be less so. Now as the unity was the One who is
excellent, essence had to be less unitary, since multiplicity is the
characteristic of inferiority. But why should essence not be merely
the "pair" (instead of the manifold)? Neither of the elements of the
Pair could any longer be absolutely one, and each would itself become a
further pair; and we might point out the same thing of each of the new
elements (in which each element of the primary Pair would have split
up). Besides, the first Pair contains both movement and stability; it
is also intelligence and perfect life. The character of Intelligence
is not to be one, but to be universal; it therefore contains all the
particular intelligences; it is all the intelligences, and at the
same time it is something greater than all. It possesses life not as
a single soul, but as a universal Soul, having the superior power of
producing individual souls. It is besides the universal living Organism
(or, Animal); consequently, it should not contain man alone (but also
all the other kinds of animals); otherwise, man alone would exist upon
the earth.