9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the
ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas
of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should
consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since it
is to these faculties that those who possess them owe their nobility.
It is doubtless difficult to understand how things devoid of reason
and intelligence can exist in the divine Intelligence, in which are
all beings, and from which they all proceed. But before beginning the
discussion of this question, let us assume the following verities as
granted: Man here below is not what is man in the divine Intelligence,
any more than the other animals. Like them, in a higher form, he dwells
within (the divine Intelligence); besides, no being called reasonable
may be found within it, for it is only here below that reason is
employed; on high the only acts are those superior to discursive
reason.[88]
Why then is man here below the only animal who makes use of reason?
Because the intelligence of Man, in the intelligible world, is
different from that of other animals, and so his reason here below must
differ from their reason; for it can be seen that many actions of other
animals imply the use of judgment.
(In reply, it might be asked) why are not all animals equally
rational? And why are not all men also equally rational? Let us
reflect: all these lives, which represent as many movements; all
these intelligences, which form a plurality; could not be identical.
Therefore they had to differ among each other, and their difference
had to consist in manifesting more or less clearly life and
intelligence; those that occupy the first rank are distinguished by
primary differences; those that occupy the second rank, by secondary
differences; and so forth. Thus, amidst intelligences, some constitute
the divinities, others the beings placed in the second rank, and
gifted with reason; further, other beings that we here call deprived
of reason and intelligence really were reason and intelligence in the
intelligible world. Indeed, he who thinks the intelligible Horse, for
instance, is Intelligence, just as is the very thought of the horse.
If nothing but thought existed, there would be nothing absurd in that
this thought, while being intellectual, might, as object, have a being
devoid of intelligence. But since thought and the object thought fuse,
how could thought be intellectual unless the object thought were so
likewise? To effect this, Intelligence would, so to speak, have to
render itself unintelligent. But it is not so. The thing thought is
a determinate intelligence, just as it is a determinate life. Now,
just as no life, whatever it be, can be deprived of vitality, so no
determinate intelligence can be deprived of intellectuality. The very
intelligence which is proper to an animal, such as, for instance, man,
does not cease being intelligence of all things; whichever of its
parts you choose to consider, it is all things, only in a different
manner; while it is a single thing in actualization, it is all things
in potentiality. However, in any one particular thing, we grasp only
what it is in actualization. Now what is in actualization (that is, a
particular thing), occupies the last rank. Such, in Intelligence, for
instance, is the idea of the Horse. In its procession, Intelligence
continues towards a less perfect life, and at a certain degree
constitutes a horse, and at some inferior degree, constitutes some
animal still inferior; for the greater the development of the powers of
Intelligence, the more imperfect these become. At each degree in their
procession they lose something; and as it is a lower degree of essence
that constitutes some particular animal, its inferiority is redeemed
by something new. Thus, in the measure that life is less complete in
the animal, appear nails, claws, or horns, or teeth. Everywhere that
Intelligence diminishes on one side, it rises on another side by the
fulness of its nature, and it finds in itself the resources by which to
compensate for whatever it may lack.