COL. PHILLIMORE: D-864. My Lord, it should be GB-457. My Lord, I am very
sorry. I was not advised, but I got it.
THE PRESIDENT: And all the others you have given numbers to?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is there any other cross-examination? Then,
does Dr. Kranzbühler wish to re-examine? Dr. Kranzbühler, I see it is
nearly half-past eleven, so perhaps we had better adjourn for ten
minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Before Dr. Kranzbühler goes on with his re-examination, I
shall announce the Tribunal’s decisions with reference to the
applications which were made recently in court.
The first application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach was for a
witness Hans Marsalek to be produced for cross-examination, and that
application is granted.
The second application was for interrogatories to a witness Kaufmann,
and that is granted.
The next matter was an application on behalf of the Defendant Hess for
five documents; and as to that, the Tribunal orders that two of the
documents applied for under Heads B and D in Dr. Seidl’s application
have already been published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and one of them
is already in evidence, and they will, therefore, be admitted.
The Tribunal considers that the documents applied for under Heads C and
E of Dr. Seidl’s application are unsatisfactory and have no evidential
value; and since it does not appear from Dr. Seidl’s application and the
matters referred to therein that the alleged copies are copies of any
original documents, the application is denied in respect thereof. But
leave is granted to Dr. Seidl to file a further affidavit by Gaus
covering his recollection of what was in the alleged agreements.
The application on behalf of the Defendant Funk for an affidavit by a
witness called Kallus is granted.
The application on behalf of the Defendant Streicher is denied. The
application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel firstly for a witness
named Biedermann is granted, and secondly for four documents; that
application is also granted.
The application on behalf of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for an
interrogatory to Dr. Stuckart is granted.
The application on behalf of the Defendant Frick is granted for an
interrogatory to a witness, Dr. Konrad.
The application on behalf of the Defendant Göring with reference to two
witnesses is granted in the sense that the witnesses are to be alerted.
The application on behalf of the Defendants Hess and Frank for official
information from the ministry of war of the United States of America is
denied.
That is all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I would like to put another question to you
on the subject of the Commando Order.
Did the Naval Operations Staff have any part in introducing this order?
WAGNER: No, no part at all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, did the Naval Operations Staff have
the possibility, either before or during the drafting of the order, of
investigating the correctness of the particulars mentioned in Paragraph
1 of the order?
WAGNER: No, such a possibility did not exist.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The treatment of a man who had attacked the
_Tirpitz_ with a two-man torpedo in October 1942 has just been discussed
here. Did you know that a year later, in the autumn of 1943, there was a
renewed attack on the _Tirpitz_ with two-man torpedoes, and that the
British sailors who were captured at that time were treated in
accordance with the Geneva Convention by the Navy, who had captured
them?
WAGNER: The second attack on the _Tirpitz_ is known to me. I do not
remember the treatment of the prisoners.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned that the Naval Operations
Staff possibly received reports on the statements made by men of
Commando units. From what aspect did those reports interest the Naval
Operations Staff? Did operational questions interest you, or the
personal fate of these people?
WAGNER: Naturally we were interested in the tactical and operational
problems so that we could gather experiences and draw our conclusions
from them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you actually remember seeing such a
report?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just now a document was shown to you dealing
with the treatment of a Commando unit captured in a Norwegian fjord. It
is Number 526-PS. Do you still have that document?
WAGNER: Possibly, some documents are still lying here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you have a look at that document. I am
having the document handed to you. In the third paragraph you will find
a reference to the fact that this Commando unit was carrying 1,000
kilograms of explosives. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you understand my question?
WAGNER: I answered “yes.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am sorry, I did not hear you.
In the fifth paragraph you will find that the Commando unit had orders
to carry out sabotage against strong points, battery positions, troop
barracks, and bridges, and to organize a system for the purpose of
further sabotage. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these assignments have anything to do
with the Navy?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you see any indication in the whole
document which would suggest that the Navy had anything at all to do
with the capture or the treatment of this Commando unit?
WAGNER: No, the document does not contain an indication of that sort.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were asked this morning about the case
of the _Monte Corbea_. In connection with a court-martial ruling against
the commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, sent
a wireless message at that time to all commanders. This radiogram is
recorded in Document Dönitz-78 in the document book, Volume IV, Page
230. I shall read that wireless message to you:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly
renewed his instructions that all U-boat commanders must adhere
strictly to the orders regarding the treatment of neutral ships.
Any infringement of these orders has incalculable political
consequences. This order is to be communicated to all commanders
immediately.”
Do you see any suggestion here that the order is restricted to Spanish
ships?
WAGNER: No, there is no such suggestion in this order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I submit to you a document which was used
yesterday, D-807. It deals with notes to the Norwegian Government on the
sinking of several steamers and contains the drafts of these notes of
the High Command of the Navy. Does this document yield any indication at
all that the notes were actually sent, or is it impossible to tell from
the drafts that the notes themselves were ever dispatched?
WAGNER: Since there are no initials or signatures on either of these
letters; they may be drafts. At any rate, proof that they were actually
sent is not apparent from this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the page number of it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It was submitted yesterday, Mr. President.
It is not in any document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now read to you the first sentence from
another document which was put to you yesterday. Its number is D-846 and
it concerns a discussion with the German Minister to Denmark,
Renthe-Fink, on 26 September 1939. I shall read the first sentence to
you:
“Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines have
caused considerable concern here on account of the Danish food
transports to Great Britain.”
Does this report give any indication that these sinkings took place
without warning, or were these ships sunk because contraband was
captured on them in the course of a legitimate search?
WAGNER: The sentence which you have just read does not show how these
ships were sunk. As far as I remember the document from yesterday, it
does not contain any reference to the way in which these ships were
sunk, so that it must be assumed as a matter of course that they were
sunk in accordance with the Prize Ordinance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were asked yesterday whether you
considered the German note to the neutral countries of 24 November 1939
a fair warning against entering certain waters and you answered the
question in the affirmative. Is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And then you were asked whether we had
deceived the neutrals, and you answered that question with “no.” Did
this negative answer apply to the previous question on the warning
against sailing in certain waters, or did it refer to all the political
measures with regard to neutral states which the German Government took
in order to conceal their own political intentions?
WAGNER: The answer in that context referred to the previous questions
which had been asked about warning the neutrals promptly of the measures
which we adopted for the war at sea.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I want to make this point quite clear. Do
you have any doubt whatever that the pretense of minefields in the
operational zones around the British Coast served not only the purpose
of deceiving the enemy defense, but also the political purpose of
concealing from the neutrals the weapons which we employed in the war at
sea?
WAGNER: Yes, I expressly confirm this two-fold purpose.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The two-fold purpose of secrecy?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you have any doubt whatever that the
German Government denied to neutral governments that certain ships were
sunk by U-boats, although they had in fact been sunk by U-boats?
WAGNER: Yes. Or rather, no. I have no doubt that the denials were
formulated in that way, as a generally accepted political measure
adopted wherever indicated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yesterday you admitted the possibility that
Admiral Dönitz, as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats, may have received
knowledge from the Naval Operations Staff of the handling of political
incidents caused by U-boats. Can you, after careful recollection, name a
single instance when he did in fact receive from the SKL information on
the political measures adopted?
WAGNER: No, I do not remember such an instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have explained the basis of the Commando
Order, as far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, by referring
to Hitler’s definite assertions that he had in his possession enemy
orders saying that prisoners were to be killed. In connection with this
Commando Order Colonel Phillimore dealt with the case of the British
sailor Evans in great detail. In my opinion that case has not so far
been clarified. Colonel Phillimore spoke of the murder of a soldier. I
think that in spite of the soundness of the documents the Prosecution is
mistaken about the facts, also in a legal respect. Will you once more
look at both documents, Document D-864...
Mr. President, that is Exhibit GB-457, discussed by Colonel Phillimore
this morning.
This is an affidavit by Gerhard Flesch. The Prosecution quoted the
sentence which states that the Commanding Admiral of the Northern Coast
of Norway had interrogated Evans personally. Admiral Wagner, does that
sentence show that Evans was a prisoner of the Navy?
WAGNER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the situation according to the Flesch affidavit?
Will you please clarify it?
WAGNER: According to the second paragraph of that affidavit, Evans must
have been in the hands of the SD.
DR. SIEMERS: That is right.
And, Mr. President, may I add that at the beginning of the affidavit
Flesch states that he was the commander of the Security Police. The
Security Police had captured Evans; he was therefore a prisoner of the
SD.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, therefore, that the British
sailor Evans was available to the German admiral in Norway for the sole
purpose of being interrogated?
WAGNER: Undoubtedly.
DR. SIEMERS: And the admiral was interested in interrogating him merely
to obtain purely factual information on the attack on the _Tirpitz_. Is
that correct?
WAGNER: Quite correct.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you to look at the next paragraph of the
Affidavit D-864? There it mentions Evans’ clothes, and says:
“It is not known to me that Evans wore a uniform. As far as I can
remember, he was wearing blue overalls.”
Does this mean that Evans was not recognizable as a soldier?
WAGNER: No, probably not.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you now pass on to the Document UK-57 submitted by
Colonel Phillimore?
Mr. President, this is Exhibit GB-164 and should be in the original
Document Book Keitel, but I think it was newly submitted today.
[_Turning to the witness._] You have a photostat copy, have you not?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you, please, turn to the fourth page. First, a
question: Is it possible that this document was known to the Naval
Operations Staff? Does the document indicate that it was sent to the
Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: These are informal conference notes of the OKW which were
apparently not sent to the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. SIEMERS: If I understand it correctly then, this is a document of
the Intelligence Service of the OKW, is it not?
WAGNER: Yes. That is correct.
DR. SIEMERS: Under Figure 2 it says “attempted attack on the battleship
_Tirpitz_.” The first part was read by Colonel Phillimore:
“Three Englishmen and two Norwegians were held up at the Swedish
frontier.”
Can one, on the strength of this, say that they were presumably
apprehended by the Police and not by the Wehrmacht?
WAGNER: Presumably, yes. Certainly not by the Navy; but probably by the
Police, who controlled the frontiers, so far as I know.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you not think, Admiral, that this is not only probable
but certain if you think back to the affidavit of 14 November 1945 by
Flesch, the commander of the Security Police, who brought Evans from the
frontier to Oslo?
WAGNER: If you take the two together, then in my opinion it is certain;
I do not think there is any doubt about it.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you then look at the following sentence?
Mr. President, that is under Figure 2, the last sentence of the first
paragraph. I quote:
“It was possible to take only the civilian-clothed British
sailor Robert Paul Evans”—born on such and such a date—“into
arrest. The others escaped into Sweden.”
Therefore, I think we may assume with certainty that Evans was not
recognizable as a soldier.
WAGNER: Yes, no doubt.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, will you look at the following sentence. There it
says—I quote:
“Evans had a pistol holster used for carrying weapons under the
arm-pit, and he had a knuckle duster.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it says nothing about civilian clothes
in the English copy. I do not want to make a bad point, but it is not in
my copy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I do not have the document before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the English copy that I have simply
has, “However, only the British seaman, Robert Paul Evans, born 14
January 1922, at London, could be arrested. The others escaped into
Sweden.”
My Lord, I think it can be checked afterwards.
THE PRESIDENT: Exact reference to the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was Document UK-57, and it is a
report of the OKW, Office for Ausland Abwehr, of 4 January 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Did Colonel Phillimore put it in this morning?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it in, My Lord, I think it was—certainly
in cross-examining the Defendant Keitel. It has been in before, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, it has already been put in with this lot.
DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if the mistake were
rectified in the English translation. In the German original text the
photostat copy is included, therefore the wording “civilian-clothed”
must be correct.
Witness, we were discussing the sentence—I quote:
“Evans had a pistol holster used for carrying weapons under the
arm-pit, and he had a knuckle duster.”
How does this bear on the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes?
WAGNER: It shows that he...
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David would like me to read the next sentence too:
“Acts of force contrary to international law could not be proved
against him. Evans made detailed statements regarding the action
and, on 19 January 1943, in accordance with the Führer Order, he
was shot.”
How does this bear on the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes?
Does this show that he did not act as a soldier in enemy territory
should act?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The Tribunal considers that that is a
question of law which the Tribunal has got to decide, and not a question
for the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall forego the answer.
May I ask you to turn to the next page of the document and to come back
to the Bordeaux case, a similar case which has already been discussed.
You have already explained the Bordeaux case insofar as you said that
the Naval Operations Staff was not informed about it. I now draw your
attention to the sentence at the bottom of Page 3:
“After carrying out the explosions, they sank the boats and
tried, with the help of the French civilian population, to
escape into Spain.”
Thus did the men concerned in this operation also not act like soldiers?
WAGNER: That, according to this document, is perfectly clear.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. And now one last question. At the end of his
examination Colonel Phillimore asked you whether you considered
Grossadmiral Raeder and Grossadmiral Dönitz guilty in the cases which
have just been discussed, guilty of these murders as he termed them? Now
that I have further clarified these cases I should like you to answer
the question again.
WAGNER: I consider that both admirals are not guilty in these two cases.
DR. SIEMERS: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, during cross-examination you explained your
views on the Commando Order. I wanted to ask you: Were your views
possibly based on the assumption that the order was examined by a
superior authority as to its justification before international law?
WAGNER: Yes. I assumed that the justification for the order was examined
by my superiors.
DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, during cross-examination you stated your
conception of what happened when a man was handed over to the SD. I
wanted to ask you: Did you have this conception already at that time, or
has it taken form now that a great deal of material has become known to
you?
WAGNER: There is no question that this conception was considerably
influenced by knowledge of a great deal of material.
DR. LATERNSER: You did not, therefore, at that time have the definite
conception that the handing over of a man to the SD meant certain death?
WAGNER: No, I did not have that conception.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, a few questions regarding the equipment of the
Commando units. Do you not know that automatic arms were found on some
members of these units and that, in particular, pistols were carried in
such a manner that if, in the event of capture, the man raised his arms,
that movement would automatically cause a shot to be fired which would
hit the person standing opposite the man with raised arms? Do you know
anything about that?
WAGNER: I have heard of it.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you not see pictures of it?
WAGNER: At the moment I cannot remember seeing such pictures.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Germans also undertake sabotage operations in
enemy countries?
THE PRESIDENT: What has it got to do with that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to ascertain by means of this question whether
the witness had knowledge of German sabotage operations, and
furthermore, whether he had received reports about the treatment of such
sabotage units.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very thing which we have already ruled cannot
be put.
You are not suggesting that these actions were taken by way of reprisal
for the way in which German sabotage units were treated? We are not
trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international
law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether
these defendants have.
The Tribunal has ruled that such questions cannot be put.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not know what answer the witness is
going to give. I merely wanted, in case, which I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to know why you were putting the question. You
said you were putting the question in order to ascertain whether German
sabotage units had been treated in a way which was contrary to
international law, or words to that effect, and that is a matter which
is irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, it would show at least that doubt
existed about the interpretation of international law with regard to
such operations and that would be of importance for the application of
the law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the question is inadmissible.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you also stated during your cross-examination
that until 1944 you were chief of the Operational Department of the
Naval Operations Staff. Can you give information on whether there were
strong German naval forces or naval transport ships in the Black Sea?
WAGNER: The strength of naval forces and transport ships in the Black
Sea was very slight.
DR. LATERNSER: For what were they mostly needed?
WAGNER: For our own replacements and their protection.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, how does this arise out of the
cross-examination? You are re-examining now, and you are only entitled
to ask questions which arise out of the cross-examination. There have
been no questions put with reference to the Black Sea.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I learned during the examination that for
a long time the witness was chief of the Operational Department; and I
concluded that he was one of the few witnesses who could give me
information regarding the facts of a very serious accusation raised by
the Russian Prosecution, namely, the accusation that 144,000 people had
been loaded on to German ships, that at Sebastopol those ships had gone
to sea and had then been blown up, and that the prisoners of war on the
ships were drowned. The witness could clarify this matter to some
extent.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you knew, directly this witness began his
evidence, what his position was; and you, therefore, could have
cross-examined him yourself at the proper time. You are now
re-examining; you are only entitled—because we cannot have the time of
the Court wasted—you are only entitled to ask him questions which arise
out of the cross-examination. In the opinion of the Tribunal this
question does not arise out of the cross-examination.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, please, would you, as an exception, admit
this question?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has given you a great
latitude and we cannot continue to do so.
The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: You have finished, have you not, Dr. Kranzbühler, with
this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And now I should like to call my next
witness, Admiral Godt.
[_The witness Godt took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
EBERHARD GODT (Witness): My name is Eberhard Godt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, when did you enter the Navy as
an officer cadet?
GODT: On 1 July, 1918.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long have you been working with Admiral
Dönitz, and in what position?
GODT: Since January 1938; first of all as First Naval Staff Officer
attached to the Commander, U-boats, and immediately after the beginning
of the war as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Chief of the Operations Department with the
Chief of Submarines?
GODT: Yes, attached to the Chief of Submarines, later Flag Officer,
U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you collaborate since 1938 in the
drafting of all operational orders worked out by the staff of the Flag
Officer, U-boats?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many officers were on this staff at the
beginning of the war?
GODT: At the beginning of the war there were four officers, one chief
engineer, and two administrative officers on that staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-83 of the
Prosecution’s document book Page 16, which is a letter from Commander
U-boats, dated 9 October 1939. It refers to bases in Norway. How did
this letter originate?
GODT: At that time I was visiting the Naval Operations Staff in Berlin
on other business. On the occasion of that visit I was asked whether
Commander, U-boats, was interested in bases in Norway and what demands
should be made in that connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you informed how those bases in Norway
were to be secured for the use of the German Navy?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has quoted an extract from
the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dating from the same period.
Mr. President, I am thinking of the extract reproduced on Page 15 of the
document book.
[_Turning to the witness._] That extract contains four questions.
Questions (a) and (d) deal with technical details regarding bases in
Norway, whereas (b) and (c) deal with the possibility of obtaining such
bases against the will of the Norwegians, and the question of defending
them.
Which of these questions was put to you?
GODT: May I ask you to repeat the questions in detail first of all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The first question is: Which places in
Norway can be considered for bases?
GODT: That question was put.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you show me from the letter from
Commander, U-boats, whether the question was answered and where it is
answered?
GODT: The question was answered under Number 1 (c) at the end of Number
1.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There it says, “Trondheim or Narvik are
possible places.”
GODT: Yes, that is right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Question Number 2 is: “If it is impossible
to obtain bases without fighting, can it be done against the will of the
Norwegians by the use of military force?” Was that question put?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell me if the question was answered
in the letter from Commander, U-boats?
GODT: This question was not answered.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The third question is: “What are the
possibilities of defense after occupation?” Was that question put to
you?
GODT: No, that question was not put.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it replied to in the letter?
GODT: III-d refers to the necessity of adopting defense measures.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is that reference connected with the fourth
question I put to you now: “Will the harbors have to be developed to the
fullest extent as bases, or do they already offer decisive advantages as
possible supply points?”
GODT: These two questions are not connected.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that fourth question put to you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it answered?
GODT: Not in this letter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the significance of the figures II
and III? Do they not answer the question of whether these ports must be
developed as bases or whether they can be used just as supply points?
GODT: They indicate what was thought necessary in order to develop them
to the fullest extent as bases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read the last sentence of
the document? There it says, “Establishment of a fuel supply point in
Narvik as an alternative supply point.” Is that not a reply to the
question asking whether a supply point is enough?
GODT: Yes; I had overlooked that sentence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can I sum up, therefore, by saying that the
first and fourth questions were put to you and answered by you, whereas
questions 2 and 3 were not put to you and not answered by you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the War Diary of the Naval Operations
Staff there is a note which says, “Commander, U-boats, considers such
ports extremely valuable even as temporary supply and equipment bases
for Atlantic U-boats.” Does that note mean that Admiral Dönitz was
working on this question before your visit to Berlin? Or what was the
reason for the note?
GODT: That was my own opinion, which I was entitled to give in my
capacity as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the first time that plans for bases
were brought to your notice?
GODT: No. We had been considering the question of whether the supply
position for U-boats could be improved by using ships—in Iceland, for
instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these considerations in any way
connected with the question whether one ought to start a war against the
country concerned?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-91. This
appears on Page 18 of the Prosecution’s document book. It is an
operational order issued by Commander, U-boats, on 30 March 1940 and
dealing with the Norwegian enterprise. Is it true, that this is your
operational order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many days before the beginning of the
Norwegian action was that order released?
GODT: Approximately ten days.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Paragraph II, Section 5, contains the
following sentence: “While entering the harbor and until the troops have
been landed, the naval forces will probably fly the British naval
ensign, except in Narvik.” Is that an order given by Commander, U-boats,
to the submarines under his command?
GODT: No. That passage appears under the heading: “Information on our
own combat forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the meaning of this allusion?
GODT: It means that U-boats were informed that in certain circumstances
our own naval units might fly other flags.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that necessary?
GODT: It was necessary so as to prevent possible mistakes in identity.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are there any other references to mistakes
in identity in this order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where?
GODT: In Paragraph IV, Section 5.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read it?
GODT: There it says, “Beware of confusing our own units with enemy
forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Only that sentence. Did this order instruct
U-boats to attack Norwegian forces?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please indicate what the order says
about that?
GODT: IV, a2 states, “Only enemy naval forces and troop transports are
to be attacked.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was meant by “enemy” forces?
GODT: “Enemy” forces were British, French, and Russian—no, not Russian.
It goes on: “No action is to be taken against Norwegian and Danish
forces unless they attack our own forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please look at Paragraph VI-c?
GODT: Paragraph VI says: “Steamers may only be attacked when they have
been identified beyond doubt as enemy steamers and as troop transports.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Commander, U-boats, informed of the
political action taken with regard to incidents caused by submarines?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what way?
GODT: U-boats had orders to report immediately by wireless in the case
of incidents, and to supplement the report later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not think you quite understood my
question. I asked you, was Commander, U-boats, informed as to how an
incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled with a neutral
government?
GODT: No, not as a rule.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember any individual case where
he was informed?
GODT: I remember the case of the Spanish steamer _Monte Corbea_. Later
on I learned that Spain had been promised reparations. I cannot remember
now whether I received the information through official channels or
whether I just heard it accidentally.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to establish the dates of
certain orders which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall
show you Standing Order Number 171, which is on Page 159 of Volume III
of the document book. What is the date on which that order was issued?
GODT: I shall have to look at it first.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please do.
GODT: That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940.
Probably 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what do you base that conclusion?
GODT: I base it on the reference made in 4a to equipment for depth
charges. This was taken for granted at a later stage. I also gather it
from the reference made in 5b to the shifting of masts and colored
lights, something which was formulated then for the first time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us the exact month in 1939?
GODT: I assume that it was November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another order,
Standing War Order Number 122. It appears on Page 226 in Volume IV of my
document book. Up to now all we know is that this order was issued
before May 1940. Can you give us a more exact date?
GODT: This order must have been issued about the same time as the first,
that is to say, about November 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. How was the conduct of U-boat
warfare by Commander, U-boats, organized in practice? Will you explain
that to us?
GODT: All orders based on questions of international law, _et cetera_,
originated with the Naval Operations Staff. The Naval Operations Staff
also reserved for itself the right to determine the locality of the
center of operations—for instance, the distribution of U-boats in the
Atlantic Theater, the Mediterranean Theater, and the North Sea Theater.
Within these various: areas U-boat operations were, generally speaking,
entirely at the discretion of Commander, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the standing orders for U-boats given
verbally or in writing?
GODT: In writing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were there not verbal orders as well?
GODT: Verbal instructions personally issued by Commander, U-boats,
played a special part and amounted to personal influence on commanders,
as well as to explanations of the contents of written orders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what occasions was that personal
influence exerted?
GODT: Particularly when reports were being made by the commanders after
each action. There must have been very few commanders who did not make a
personal and detailed report to Commander, U-boats, after an action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it possible for written orders to be
changed in the course of verbal transmission, or even twisted to mean
the opposite?
GODT: Such a possibility might have existed, but it never actually
happened.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When they made these verbal reports, could
the commanders risk expressing opinions which were not those of
Commander, U-boats?
GODT: Absolutely. Commander, U-boats, even asked his commanders in so
many words to give him their personal opinions in every case, so that he
could maintain direct personal contact with them and thus remain in
close touch with events on the front, so that he could put matters
right, where necessary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this personal contact used for the
verbal transmission of shady orders?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution holds that an
order—apparently a verbal order—existed, prohibiting the entry in the
log of measures considered dubious or unjustifiable from the point of
view of international law. Did such a general order exist?
GODT: No; there was no general order. In certain individual cases—I can
remember two—an order was given to omit certain matters from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which cases do you remember?
GODT: The first was the case of the _Athenia_; and the second was the
sinking of a German boat, which was coming from Japan through the
blockade, by a German submarine.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before I ask you to give me details of that,
I should like to know the reason for omitting such matters from the log.
GODT: It was done for reasons of secrecy. U-boat logs were seen by a
great many people: First, in the training stations of the U-boat service
itself; and, secondly, in numerous offices of the High Command. Special
attention had therefore to be paid to secrecy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many copies of each U-boat war log were
made?
GODT: I should say six to eight copies.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the omission of such an item from the
log mean that all documentary evidence was destroyed in every office; or
did certain offices keep these documents?
GODT: These records were received by Commander, U-boats, and probably by
the Naval Operations Staff as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a standing war order prescribing
treatment of incidents?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the contents?
GODT: It stated that incidents must be reported immediately by wireless
and that a supplementary report must be made later, either in writing or
by word of mouth.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this standing order contain any
allusion to the omission of such incidents from the log?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell me now how this
alteration was made in the log in the case of the _Athenia_?
GODT: In the case of the _Athenia_ Oberleutnant Lemp reported on
returning that he had torpedoed this ship, assuming it to be an
auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the
first time I realized that such a possibility existed or whether the
idea that this might possibly have been torpedoed by a German submarine
had already been taken into consideration. Lemp was sent to Berlin to
make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered with regard to the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By whom?
GODT: By the Naval Operations Staff, after a temporary order had been
issued in our department. I ordered the fact to be erased from the war
log of the U-boat.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And that, of course, was on the orders of
Admiral Dönitz?
GODT: Yes, or I ordered it on his instructions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you participate in the further handling
of this incident?
GODT: Only with regard to the question of whether Lemp should be
punished. As far as I remember, Commander, U-boats, took only
disciplinary action against him because it was in his favor that the
incident occurred during the first few hours of the war, and it was held
that in his excitement he had not investigated the character of the ship
as carefully as he might have done.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did I understand you correctly as saying
that the detailed documentary evidence in connection with the sinking of
the _Athenia_ was retained by both Commander, U-boats, and, you believe,
the Naval Operations Staff?
GODT: I can say that with certainty only as far as Commander, U-boats,
is concerned. That is what happened in this case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned a second case just now where a
log book had been altered. Which case was that?
GODT: That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker, that is
to say, a merchant vessel on its way back from Japan, was accidentally
torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk in the North Atlantic. This
fact was omitted from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So it was only a question of keeping matters
secret from German offices?
GODT: Yes. The British learned the facts from lifeboats as far as I
know; and these facts were to be concealed from the crews of other
blockade-breaking vessels.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Documents submitted to the Tribunal by the
Defense show that until the autumn of 1942, German U-boats took steps to
rescue crews as far as was possible without prejudicing the U-boat’s
safety and without interfering with their own assignment. Does this
agree with your own experiences?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to put a few questions to
you regarding the so-called _Laconia_ order which still require
clarification. I refer to Document GB-199. As you know, the Prosecution
calls this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order?
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is the document book of the Prosecution
on Page 36, Mr. President.
GODT: I cannot now tell you that for certain. Generally speaking, such
an order was discussed by Commander, U-boats, the First Naval Staff
Officer, and myself; Commander, U-boats, decided on the general terms of
the order and then it was formulated by one of us. It is quite possible
that I myself worded the order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But, at any rate, Admiral Dönitz signed it,
did he not?
GODT: He must have; yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz thought that he remembered
that you and Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you
remember this, too; and if so, why were you against it?
GODT: I do not remember that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the meaning of the order?
GODT: The meaning of the order is plain. It prohibited attempts at
rescue.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that not forbidden by a reference to
Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of
1939-40?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely a written order must speak for
itself. Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word
used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the
ordinary meaning of the words.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question
any further, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to repeat my last question.
Why, instead of issuing a new order, did they not simply refer
commanders to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the
winter of 1939-40?
I refer, Mr. President, to Document GB-196, on Page 33 of the
Prosecution’s document book.
You remember that order, don’t you. I have shown it to you.
GODT: Yes, I do. That order had already been canceled when the so-called
_Laconia_ order was issued. Apart from that, a mere reference to an
order already issued would have lacked the character of actuality which
orders should have.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean by that that your staff, as a
matter of principle, did not issue orders by references to earlier
orders?
GODT: That was avoided, whenever possible; that is to say, almost
always.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain to me why that order was
issued as “top secret”?
GODT: The order appeared after an operation in which we nearly lost two
boats, and contained a severe reprimand for the commanders concerned. It
was not customary for us to put such a reprimand in a form accessible to
any one except the commanders and all the officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please explain of what this severe
reprimand for the commander consisted?
GODT: It is understandable in the light of previous events—namely,
those very things which it forbids. It is largely contained in the
sentence beginning: “Rescue is against the most elementary demands” and
it is also implied by the harshness, whereby the commander is reproached
with being softhearted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this mean that the commanders were
accused of having endangered their boats too much in connection with the
rescue action of the _Laconia_ and of acting in a manner which was not
in accordance with the dictates of war?
GODT: Yes, and that after having been repeatedly reminded during the
action of the necessity for acting in a manner in accordance with the
dictates of war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were interrogated on this order after
the capitulation, as you told me; but you could not at the moment
remember its exact wording. How was it possible for you not to remember
this order?
GODT: There were certain orders which had to be kept in collective files
and which one therefore saw very frequently. This order was not one of
them, but was filed separately after being dealt with. After it had been
issued I never saw it again until the end of the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did an order intended for inclusion in
such a collection look like on the outside?
GODT: It had to be a “Current Order” or an “Admonition Message.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did that occur in the text of the order
concerned?
GODT: It would be in the heading of the order concerned. That is not the
case here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So we may conclude from the fact that this
wireless message is not headed either “Admonition Message” or “Current
Order” that it did not belong to a collection of orders?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But then, how is it possible that
Korvettenkapitän Möhle gave lectures on this order apparently until the
end of the war?
GODT: Korvettenkapitän Möhle had access to all wireless messages issued
by Commander, U-boats. He was entitled to select from these signals
anything he thought necessary for the instruction of commanders about to
go to sea. It made no difference whether the order was marked
“Admonition” or “Current Order.” He had obviously taken out this message
and had had it among the material to be used for these instructions to
the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Möhle ever ask you about the
interpretation of that order?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any other source
interpreting this order to mean that survivors were to be shot?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you judge from your own experience
whether this order had, or could have had, any effect practically on
Allied naval losses?
GODT: That is very difficult to judge. At that time something like 80
percent of all U-boat attacks were probably carried out under conditions
which made any attempt at rescue impossible. That is to say, these
attacks were made on convoys or on vessels in close proximity to the
coast.
The fact that some 12 captains and engineers were brought back as
prisoners by U-boats is an indication of what happened in the other
cases. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether it
was possible to take rescue measures in all cases. The situation was
probably such that the Allied sailors felt safer in the lifeboats than
they did, for instance, aboard the U-boat and probably were glad to see
the U-boat vanish after the attack. The fact that the presence of the
U-boat involved danger to itself is proved by this same case of the
_Laconia_, where two U-boats were attacked from the air while engaged in
rescuing the survivors.
I do not think it is at all certain that this order had any effect one
way or the other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean “one way or the other”?
GODT: I mean whether it meant an increase or a decrease in the number of
losses among enemy seamen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is one argument I did not quite
understand. You pointed to the fact that approximately 12 captains and
chief engineers were made prisoner after this order was issued. Do you
mean by that that only in these few cases was it possible, without
endangering the submarine, to carry out the order to transfer such
officers from the lifeboats?
GODT: It is too much to say that it was only possible in these few
cases, but it does afford some indication of the number of cases in
which it was possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you the wireless message
which went to Kapitänleutnant Schacht. It is on Page 36 of the
Prosecution’s document book. This message, too, was sent as “top
secret.” What was the reason for that?
GODT: It is a definite and severe reprimand for the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How far was that reprimand justified?
Schacht had not received previous instruction to rescue Italians only?
GODT: No, but it had been assumed that U-boats would realize that it was
of primary importance that allies should be rescued, that is, that they
should not become prisoners of war. Apart from that, several reminders
had been issued in the course of operations warning commanders to be
particularly careful. After that came Schacht’s report, which appeared
at the time to indicate that he had disobeyed orders. Viewed
retrospectively, Schacht’s action must have taken place before
Commander, U-boats, issued the order in question, so that in part at
least, the accusation was unjustified.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any further rescue measures carried out
by U-boats after this order was issued in September 1942?
GODT: In isolated cases, yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, object to these
rescues?
GODT: I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To your knowledge, did German U-boats
deliberately kill survivors?
GODT: The only case I know of—and I heard of it after the
capitulation—is that of Kapitänleutnant Eck. We heard an enemy
broadcast which hinted at these happenings, but we were unable to draw
any conclusions from that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now hand to you the Prosecution’s Exhibit
GB-203, which is regarded by the Prosecution as proof of the shooting of
survivors. This is the war log of _U-247_ from which I mimeographed an
extract on Page 74 of Volume II of my document book. This extract
describes an attack made by the U-boat on a British trawler. You have
already seen this war log. After his return, did the commander make a
report on this action?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he report anything about the shooting of
survivors on that occasion?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to a statement made by a survivor
named McAllister this trawler, the _Noreen Mary_, had a gun aboard. Do
you know whether trawlers had guns mounted fore or aft?
GODT: They were almost always in the bows.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember, with the help of this
extract from the war log and on the strength of your own recollection of
the commander’s report, the exact details of this incident?
GODT: Originally the U-boat when submerged encountered a number of
vessels escorting trawlers close to Cape Wrath. It tried to torpedo one
of the trawlers.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness trying to reconstruct this from the
document, reconstruct the incident?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am asking him to tell us what he remembers
of the event, basing his account on his own recollection of the
commander’s report supplemented by the entry in the war log.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn’t said whether he ever saw the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told
him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell us what you remember
after reading the log.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the
commander told him he can tell us that, but the log speaks for itself
and he can’t reconstruct it out of that. He must tell us what he
remembers of what the officer said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Sir.
[_Turning to the witness._] Will you please speak from memory.
GODT: The commander reported that he had encountered a number of
trawlers extraordinarily close to the coast, considering conditions at
the time. Failing in his attempt to torpedo one of them, he sank it with
gunfire. That was all the more remarkable because, in the first place,
the incident occurred quite unusually near the coast and, in the second
place, the commander risked this artillery fight regardless of the
presence of other vessels nearby.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these other ships also armed trawlers?
GODT: It was to be assumed at the time that every trawler was armed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The witness McAllister thought that the
submarine surfaced 50 yards away from the trawler. In the light of your
own recollections and experiences, do you think this is possible?
GODT: I do not remember the details; but it would be an unusual thing
for a U-boat commander to do.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: McAllister also stated the U-boat used
shells filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbühler, the
Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn’t to express opinions of this
sort. He ought to give us the evidence of any facts which he has. He is
telling us in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would
ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the
witness next whether German U-boats used shells filled with wire as
stated by the witness McAllister. Is that question admissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Shells filled with wire?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put.
Will you answer that question, Witness.
GODT: There were no such shells.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this attack by the submarine on the
_Noreen Mary_ reported by wireless immediately? Do you know anything
about it?
GODT: Do you mean the U-boat commander’s report?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, by the British.
GODT: As far as I remember, a wireless message sent by a British vessel
was intercepted, reporting a U-boat attack in the area.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A signal is entered in the war log under
0127 hours. It is intended for Matschulat, which means that it was sent
by you to the commander, and it reads, “English steamer reports attack
by German U-boat west of Cape Wrath.”
GODT: That is the message intended to inform the U-boat that a wireless
signal sent by a British steamer concerning a submarine attack in that
area had been intercepted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to ask you something about
Standing War Order Number 511. This is in Volume I of my document book,
Page 46. When I presented this order, the Tribunal was not sure of the
significance of Paragraph 2, which I am going to read:
“Captains and officers of neutral ships which may be sunk
according to Standing Order Number 101, (such as Swedish except
Göteborg traffic), must not be taken on board, since internment
of these officers is not permitted by international law.”
Can you tell me first the experiences or calculations which led to the
inclusion of Paragraph 2 in the order?
GODT: On one occasion a U-boat brought a Uruguayan officer—a captain
whose ship had been sunk—to Germany. We were afraid that if we released
this captain he might report some of the things he had seen while he was
interned aboard the U-boat. The reason for this order was to avoid
difficulties of that kind in the future; for the Uruguayan captain had
to be released and was, in fact, released.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the meaning of the reference to
neutral ships which might be sunk according to Standing War Order Number
101?
GODT: May I please see the order for a minute?
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
The Standing War Order Number 101 contains the following directives in
connection with the sinking of neutral ships: Once inside the blockade
zone, all neutral ships can be sunk as a matter of principle, with two
main exceptions, or shall we say, two general exceptions.
To begin with, ships belonging to certain neutral countries, with whom
agreements had been made regarding definite shipping channels, must not
be sunk; further, ships belonging to certain neutral states which might
be assumed not to be working exclusively in the enemy’s service. Outside
the blockade zone neutral ships might be sunk; first, if they were not
recognizable as neutrals and therefore must be regarded as enemy vessels
by the submarine in question and, second, if they were not acting as
neutrals.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As, for instance, those traveling in enemy
convoy?
GODT: Yes, those traveling in convoys, or if they reported the presence
of U-boats, _et cetera_, by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Paragraph 2 mean that the captains of
neutral ships would in the future be in a worse position than captains
of enemy ships, or would they be in a better position?
GODT: This is not a question of better or worse, it is a question of
taking prisoners. They were not to be taken prisoners because they could
not be detained as such. Whether this meant that their positions would
be better or worse is at least open to doubt. Captains of enemy ships
usually tried to avoid being taken aboard the U-boat probably because
they felt safer in their lifeboats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you know about orders to respect
hospital ships at the beginning of the invasion?
GODT: At the beginning of the invasion the rule in this area, as in any
other area, was that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders
operating in the invasion zone then reported that there was a very large
number of hospital ships sailing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From where to where?
GODT: Between the Normandy invasion area and the British Isles.
Commander, U-boats, then had investigations made by the competent
department as to whether hospital traffic was really as heavy as alleged
in these reports. That was found to be the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by that?
GODT: It means that the number of hospital ships reported corresponded
to the estimated number of wounded. After that it was expressly
announced that hospital ships were not to be attacked in the future.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the strict respect paid to hospital
ships at that stage of the war in our own interests?
GODT: At that time we only had hospital ships in the Baltic where the
Geneva Convention was not recognized by the other side; so we had no
particular interest in respecting hospital ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case of an enemy hospital
ship being sunk by a German U-boat during this war?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did it happen the other way round?
GODT: The German hospital ship _Tübingen_ was, I think, sunk by British
aircraft in the Mediterranean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Presumably because of mistaken identity?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the question on German hospital ships
which were sunk isn’t relevant, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President,
that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that a hospital
ship was in fact sunk in consequence of such a mistake. My evidence
therefore goes to show that from the sinking of a ship it must not be
concluded that the sinking was ordered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realize that mistakes may be made in
sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should we adjourn now?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President.
[_A recess was taken._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, you have known Admiral Dönitz
very well since 1934; and you have had a good deal to do with him during
that time. Did he have anything to do with politics during that time?
GODT: Nothing at all, to my knowledge, before he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he
made occasional speeches outside the Navy; for instance, he addressed
dock workers, made a speech to the Hitler Youth at Stettin, and gave a
talk over the air on “Heroes’ Day” and on 20 July; I remember no other
occasions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these speeches not always directly
connected with the tasks of the Navy—for instance, the address to the
dock laborers—shipbuilding?
GODT: Yes, when he spoke to the dock laborers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to the Hitler Youth?
GODT: The Hitler Youth, too.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what was the connection there?
GODT: As far as I remember, the speech was concerned with recruiting for
the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he select his staff officers for their
ideological or military qualifications?
GODT: Their military and personal qualities were all that mattered.
Their political views had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The question of whether Admiral Dönitz knew,
or must have known, of certain happenings outside the Navy is a very
important one from the Tribunal’s point of view. Can you tell me who his
associates were?
GODT: His own officers and officers of his own age, almost exclusively.
As far as I know, he had very few contacts beyond those.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did matters change much in this respect
after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: No. He probably had a few more contacts with people from other
branches, but on the whole his circle remained the same.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did he actually live at that time,
that is, after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: After his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was mainly at the
headquarters of the Naval Operations Staff near Berlin.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he live with his family or with his
staff?
GODT: He made his home with his family; but the main part of his life
was spent with his staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And where did he live when his staff was
transferred to the so-called “Koralle” quarters in the neighborhood of
Berlin in the autumn of 1943?
GODT: He lived at his headquarters, where his family also lived—at
least for some time. His official discussions, however, usually lasted
till late in the evening.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, from that time on he lived
constantly in the naval officers’ quarters?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were in a better position than almost
any of the other officers to observe the Admiral’s career at close
quarters. Can you tell me what you think were the motives behind the
military orders he issued?
THE PRESIDENT: You can’t speak about the motives of people. You can’t
give evidence about other people’s minds. You can only give evidence of
what they said and what they did.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I still think that an officer
who lived with another officer for years must have a certain knowledge
of his motives, based on the actions of the officer in question and on
what that officer told him. However, perhaps I may put my question
rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can’t
give evidence about his motives.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall question him on his character,
Your Honor.
Witness, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz ever expressed selfish
motives to you in connection with any other orders he gave or any of his
actions?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that is the same thing, the same
question again, really.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it
to be a different question.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything
of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged
against him in the Indictment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall ask a direct question based on
the Prosecution’s opinion.
The Prosecution judged Admiral Dönitz to be cynical and opportunistic.
Does that agree with your own judgment?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How would you judge him?
GODT: As a man whose mind was fixed entirely on duty, on his work, his
naval problems, and the men in his service.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions
to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to
ask any questions?
[_There was no response._]
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might I first mention the documents that I put
in in cross-examination this morning, or rather it was a document which
had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229. That is the document dealing
with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the
Bordeaux Commando Raid. The dispute was as to whether it was from the
SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from the war diary of some
lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the
Admiralty, and I will produce the original for defense counsel; it comes
from the SKL War Diary, Tagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, and it is from
Number 1 Abteilung, Teil A—that is part A—for December 1942. So it is
from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness.
You have said, Witness, that you don’t recollect protesting against this
order of 17 September 1942.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will try and refresh your memory. Would you look at a
document, D-865?
That’s GB-458, My Lord; that is an extract from an interrogation of
Admiral Dönitz on 6 October. I should say that the record was kept in
English and therefore the translation into German does not represent
necessarily the Admiral’s actual words.
[_Turning to the witness._] Would you look at the second page of that
document at the end of the first paragraph. It is the end of the first
paragraph on Page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with
the order of 17 September 1942, and in that last sentence in that
paragraph he says:
“I remember that Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were opposed
to this telegram. They said so expressly because, as they said,
‘it might be misunderstood.’ But I said, ‘I must pass it on now
to these boats to prevent this 1 percent of losses. I must give
them a reason, so that they do not feel themselves obliged to do
that.’”
Do you remember protesting now, saying “That can be misunderstood”?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And a further extract on Page 3 of the English
translation, the bottom of Page 2 of the German:
“So I sent a second telegram to prevent further losses. The
second telegram was sent at my suggestion. I am completely and
personally responsible for it, because both Captain Godt and
Captain Hessler expressly stated they thought the telegram
ambiguous or liable to misinterpretation.”
Do you remember that now?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at a further statement to the same
effect, on Page 5 of the English, first paragraph; Page 4 of the German
text, third paragraph. He has been asked the question:
“Why was it necessary to use a phrase like the one that I read
to you before: Efforts to rescue members of the crew were
counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the
destruction of enemy ships and crews?”
It is the last clause of the first sentence, and he answered:
“These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in
any way correspond to our actions in the years of 1939, 1940,
1941 and 1942, as I have plainly shown you through the _Laconia_
incident. I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain
Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the dispatch
of this telegram.”
Do you still say that you don’t remember protesting against the sending
of that telegram?
GODT: I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you one more extract, Document D-866, which
will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation on 22 October. The
first question on the document is:
“Do you believe that this order is contrary to the Prize
Regulations issued by the German Navy at the beginning of the
war?”
And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is:
“Godt and Hessler said to me, ‘Don’t send this message. You see,
it might look odd some day. It might be misinterpreted.’”
You don’t remember using those words?
GODT: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were an experienced staff officer, were you not?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You knew the importance of drafting an operational
order with absolute clarity, did you not?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: These orders you were issuing were going to young
commanders between 20 and 30 years of age, were they not?
GODT: Certainly not as young as 20. They would be in their late
twenties, most probably.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous?
GODT: Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context you might
have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the point of the words: “Rescue runs counter
to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy
ships and crews”?
[_There was no response._] Show it to him, will you?
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
What was the point of those words, if this was merely a nonrescue order?
GODT: It was served to motivate the remainder of the order and to put on
an equal level all the ships and crews which were fighting against our
U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, all your orders were so clear, were they not?
Have you got the Defense documents there in the witness box?
GODT: I think so—no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the Defense Document Number Dönitz-8, Page 10.
It is on Page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second
paragraph:
“U-boats may instantly attack, with all the weapons at their
command, enemy merchant vessels recognized with certainty as
armed, or announced as such, on the basis of unimpeachable
evidence in the possession of the Naval Operations Staff.”
The next sentence:
“As far as circumstances permit, measures shall be taken for the
rescue of the crew, after the possibility of endangering the
U-boat is excluded.”
Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is
perfectly clear.
Look at another one, D-642, at Page 13. It is the last paragraph of the
order, on Page 15. Now, this is a nonrescue order. Have you got it?
Paragraph E, Standing Order 154:
“Do not rescue crew members or take them aboard and do not take
care of the ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from
land are of no consequence. Think only of the safety of your own
boat and try to achieve additional success as soon as possible.
“We must be harsh in this war. The enemy started it in order to
destroy us; and we have to act accordingly.”
Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a “nonrescue” order?
GODT: It was just as clear as the order we are talking about.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at one or two more and then let me come back to
that order; Page 45, another order:
“Order from Flag Officer, U-boats”—reading the third line—“to
take on board as prisoners captains of sunk ships with their
papers, if it is possible to do so without endangering the boat
or impairing its fighting capacity.”
It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not?
GODT: That is not an order at all; it only reproduces an extract from
the War Diary.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, reciting the words of the order; and then, on the
next page in Paragraph 4:
“Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be
done without endangering the boat”—Again, perfectly clear.
Look at the next page, Page 47, Paragraph 1 of your order of the 1 June
1944, the last sentence:
“Therefore every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners,
as far as possible, without endangering the boat.”
Now, you have told us that this order of 17 September 1942 was intended
to be a nonrescue order; that is right, is it not?
GODT: Yes, certainly.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence:
“Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the
destruction of enemy ships and crews”?
GODT: That is the motivation of the rest of the order, which states that
ships with crews armed and equipped to fight U-boats were to be put on
the same level.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you
do not mean the destruction of crews?
GODT: The question is whether the ships and their crews were to be
destroyed; and that is something entirely different from destroying the
crews after they had left the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is something entirely different from merely
not rescuing the crews; isn’t that a fact?
GODT: I do not quite understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue
of crews?
GODT: Destruction—as long as the ship and crew are together.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question, are you? But if you
want it again: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of
crews?
GODT: The destruction of the crew is different from the nonrescue of
survivors, yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Were those words merely put in to give this order what
you described as a “lively character,” which an order should have?
GODT: I cannot give you the details; I have already said that I do not
remember in detail the events leading up to this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal has already said to the
witness that the document speaks for itself.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] Would you just look at the next document in
the Prosecution book, that is D-663, at the last sentence of that
document? In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, are you
saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crews
if you could?
GODT: I thought we were talking about survivors.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, it is the same thing, to some extent, is it not;
ships’ crews, once they are torpedoed, become survivors?
GODT: Then they would be survivors; yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you now answer the question? Was it not your
intention at this time to destroy the crews, or survivors if you like,
if you could?
GODT: If you mean survivors; the question can refer to two things. As
regards survivors—no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If you are not prepared to answer the question, I will
pass on.
Do you remember the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck?
GODT: I only heard of the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck from American and
British officers, and only after I came to Germany.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that he was on his first voyage when his
U-boat sank the _Peleus_ and then machine-gunned the survivors? Do you
know that?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: He had set out from the 5th U-boat flotilla at Kiel
where Möhle was briefing the commanders, had he not?
GODT: He must have.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now, if—instead of taking the whole blame upon
himself for the action which he took—if he had defended his action
under this order of 17 September 1942, are you saying that you could
have court-martialed him for disobedience?
GODT: It might have been possible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In view of the wording of your order, do you say that?
GODT: That would have been a question for the court-martial to decide.
Moreover, Eck, as far as I heard, did not refer to this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you explain to the Tribunal how the witness Möhle
was allowed to go on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from
September 1942 to the end of the war?
GODT: I do not know how Möhle came to interpret this order in such a
way. In any case he did not ask me about it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You realize that he is putting his own life in great
jeopardy by admitting that he briefed as he did, don’t you.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You also know, don’t you, that another commander he
briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Dönitz
before he went out?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Again when he came back?
GODT: In general, yes, almost always.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that
none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation
order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with
Admiral Dönitz?
GODT: In no circumstances was this order discussed.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But I suggest to you now that this order was very
carefully drafted to be ambiguous; deliberately, so that any U-boat
commander who was prepared to behave as he did was entitled to do so
under the order. Isn’t that right?
GODT: That is an assertion.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you and Hessler, you tried to stop this order
being issued?
GODT: I have already said that I do not remember this.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to
re-examine, Dr. Kranzbühler?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Korvettenkapitän Möhle has
testified before this Tribunal that he told only a very few officers
about his interpretation of the _Laconia_ order?
GODT: I read that in the affidavit which Möhle made before British
officers last year.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Möhle testified here
personally that he did not speak to Admiral Dönitz, yourself, or Captain
Hessler about his interpretation of the _Laconia_ order, although he
repeatedly visited your staff?
GODT: I know that. I cannot tell you at the moment whether I know it
from the affidavit which Möhle made last year or from another source.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have been confronted with Admiral
Dönitz’ testimony that you and Captain Hessler opposed the _Laconia_
order. You stated that Admiral Dönitz gave an exaggerated account of
your objection to this order, so as to take the whole responsibility
upon himself?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think you can ask him that
question, Dr. Kranzbühler, whether it is possible that the Admiral was
over-emphasizing what he said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I will not put this question. Your
Honor, I have no further question to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.