“It is suggested that Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of
the steamships _Deptford_, _Thomas Walton_, and _Garoufalia_ be
answered somewhat in the following manner:
“As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government,
the matter of the sinking of the steamships _Deptford_, _Thomas
Walton_, and _Garoufalia_ has been thoroughly investigated. The
following facts have thus been ascertained:
“The steamer _Deptford_ was sunk by a German U-boat on 13
December, as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According
to the report of the U-boat commander, the sinking did not take
place within territorial waters but immediately outside. The
German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake
any war operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the
U-boat commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to
be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian authorities, and
should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in
consequence, the German Government regrets this most sincerely.
As a result of this incident, the German Naval Forces have once
again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral
territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial
waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it.
“As far as the sinking of the steamships _Thomas Walton_ and
_Garoufalia_ is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations
by German U-boats, as at the time of the sinking none of them
were in the naval area indicated.”
And then there is a draft reply put forward which is on very much the
same lines.
And you say in the face of that document that the German Navy never
misled the neutrals?
WAGNER: The neutrals had been advised that in these areas dangers of war
might be encountered. We were of the opinion that we were not obliged to
tell them through which war measures these areas were dangerous, or
through which war measures their ships were lost.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is that really your answer to this document? This is a
complete lie, is it not? You admit the one sinking that you cannot get
away from. And you deny the others. You deny that there was a German
U-boat anywhere near, and you are telling this Tribunal that you were
justified in order to conceal the weapons you were using. Is that the
best answer you can give?
WAGNER: Yes, certainly. We had no interest at all in letting the enemy
know what methods we were using in this area.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are admitting that one of them was sunk by a
U-boat. Why not admit the other two as well? Why not say it was the same
U-boat?
WAGNER: I assume that we were concerned with another area in which the
situation was different.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the difference? Why did you not say, “One of
our U-boats has made a mistake or disobeyed orders, and is responsible
for all these three sinkings?” Or, alternatively, why did you not say,
“We have given you fair warning, we are going to sink at sight anyone in
this area. And what is your complaint?”
WAGNER: Obviously I did not consider it expedient.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It was considered expedient to deceive the neutrals.
And you, an Admiral in the German Navy, told me you did not do that ten
minutes ago. As a matter of fact, these three boats were all sunk by the
same U-boat, were they not?
WAGNER: I cannot tell you that at the moment.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I say they were all sunk by _U-38_, and the dates of
sinking were: the _Deptford_, on 13 December, the _Garoufalia_ on the
11th, and the _Thomas Walton_ on the 7th. Do you dispute that?
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you dispute those details, or do you not remember?
WAGNER: I cannot recall; but I actually believe it is impossible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you another instance of deceiving the
neutrals, and this time it was your friends, the Spanish. Would you look
at C-105?
My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-455. It is an extract
from the SKL War Diary for 19 December 1940.
[_Turning to the witness._] You kept the SKL War Diary yourself at that
time, did you not?
WAGNER: No, I did not keep it, but I signed it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You signed it. Did you read it before you signed it?
WAGNER: The essential parts, yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, it reads: “News from the Neutrals,” and it is
headed “Spain”:
“According to a report from the naval attaché, Spanish fishing
vessel was sunk by a submarine of unknown nationality between
Las Palmas and Cape Juby. In the rescue boats the crew was
subjected to machine gun fire. Three men badly wounded. Landed
at Las Palmas on 18 December. Italians suspected. (Possibility
it might have been _U-37_).”
Then on 20 December, the next day:
“Commander, Submarine Fleet, will be informed of Spanish report
regarding sinking of Spanish fishing vessel by submarine of
unknown nationality on 16 December between Las Palmas and Cape
Juby, and requested to conduct an investigation. On the
responsibility of the Naval Operations Staff it is confirmed to
our naval attaché in Madrid that, regarding the sinking, there
is no question of a German submarine.”
When you reported that, you thought it possible, did you not, that it
might have been _U-37_; is that not so?
WAGNER: It seems to me that in the meantime it became known that it was
not _U-37_.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will read on. This is under date of 21 December:
“_U-37_ reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the _Kopbard_
type (7329) ran off in a circle and probably hit an Amphitrite
submarine in the tanker’s convoy. Tanker burned out. Spanish
steamer _St. Carlos_ (300) without distinguishing marks, through
concentrated gunfire. Nine torpedoes left.
“Then _U-37_ torpedoed French tanker _Rhone_ and the submarine
_Sfax_ and sank the Spanish fishing vessel.”
And then, if you will read the next entry.
“We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there
is no question of a German or Italian submarine in the sea area
in question being responsible for the sinkings.”
Do you still say that you did not deceive the neutrals?
WAGNER: This case is doubtless a deception, but I do not remember for
what particular reason this deception was carried through.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But it is pretty discreditable, is it not? Do you
regard that as creditable to the German Navy, that conduct?
WAGNER: No, this...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did the Defendant Raeder sign the War Diary?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you tell the Defendant Dönitz what answer you were
giving to the Spaniards and the Norwegians?
WAGNER: That I do not recall.
COL. PHILLIMORE: He would get a copy, would he not?
WAGNER: I did not understand you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would send him a copy, would you not, of your note
to the Foreign Office?
WAGNER: That is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, does the signature of the Defendant
Raeder appear at the end of this document, C-105?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I regret to say I have not checked that. But
as the witness has said, the practice was that he was to sign the War
Diary, and that the Commander-in-Chief was to sign it periodically.
Is that right, Witness?
WAGNER: Yes. On the next page, on 21 December my signature appears as
well as those of Admiral Fricke, Admiral Schniewind, and Admiral Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I would be very grateful to the Prosecution
if the documents which concern the Defendant Raeder would also be given
to me, for it is relatively difficult for me to follow the situation
otherwise. I have received none of these documents.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am extremely sorry, My Lord. That is my fault, and I
will see that Dr. Siemers has the copies tonight.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now at this point until tomorrow morning.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-NINTH DAY
Tuesday, 14 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Wagner resumed the stand._]
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the sinking of the _Monte Corbea_ in
September 1942?
WAGNER: I have some recollection of it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was the ship in respect to which the Defendant
Dönitz sent a telegram to the U-boat commander, threatening him with
court-martial on his return because he had sunk the ship after
recognizing it as a neutral. Now, in 1942 the friendship of Spain was
very important to Germany, was it not?
WAGNER: I assume so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You told us yesterday that Admiral Raeder was
considering Mediterranean policy—recommending it. Now that was the
reason, was it not, why the U-boat commander was threatened with
court-martial, that it mattered in 1942 if you sank a Spanish ship?
WAGNER: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the commander
of the U-boat in question had obviously not acted according to the
directives of the Commander of U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It did not matter in 1940 when you thought you were
winning the war, but in September 1942 I suggest to you it became
politically inexpedient to sink a Spanish ship; is that not right?
WAGNER: You will have to ask the political departments of the German
Reich about that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If that is the answer, do you think it is unfair to
describe your attitude to the sinking of neutral ships as cynical and
opportunist?
WAGNER: No, I reject that absolutely.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I want to ask you one or two questions about the
witness Heisig. You spoke yesterday of a conversation in the jail here
in the first week of December 1945.
WAGNER: In December 1945?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. You knew at the time you spoke to Heisig that he
was going to be called as a witness, did you not?
WAGNER: That could be assumed from his presence here at Nuremberg.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you knew you were going to be called as a witness,
did you not?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not tell the
defense lawyers about this conversation until quite recently?
WAGNER: I did not understand the sense of your question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not report
this conversation with Heisig to the defense lawyers until quite
recently?
WAGNER: I think it was in February or March when I told the Defense
Counsel about this conversation.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I just want to put the dates to you. The U-boat
Commander Eck was sentenced to death on 20 October. Do you know that?
WAGNER: I did not know the date.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Death sentence was passed by the Commission on 21
November and he was executed on 30 November. That is to say he was
executed before you had this conversation. Did you know that?
WAGNER: No. I just discovered that now.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, the witness Heisig knew it before he gave
his evidence, did he not?
WAGNER: Obviously not. Otherwise, he would most likely have told me
about it. Previously, he had for 10 days...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you just listen to a question and answer from his
cross-examination. It is Page 2676 of the transcript (Volume V, Page
227). This is a question by Dr. Kranzbühler:
“In your hearing on 27 November were you not told that the death
sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been set?”
Answer: “I do not know whether it was on 27 November. I know
only that here I was told of the fact that the death sentence
had been carried out. The date I cannot remember. I was in
several hearings.”
Now if that is right...
THE PRESIDENT: What date was that evidence given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was given on 14 January, My Lord; Page 2676 of the
transcript (Volume V, Page 227).
WAGNER: I did not understand who gave this testimony.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The witness Heisig, when he gave evidence here in
Court. So that whether or not he was deceived, as you suggest, before he
gave his affidavit, he at least knew the true facts before he gave
evidence here to the Tribunal?
WAGNER: Then he told an untruth to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you one question on the order of 17
September 1942. That is the order that you say you monitored in the
naval war staff and saw nothing wrong with it. Did the Defendant Raeder
see that order?
WAGNER: That I cannot say with certainty.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were Chief of Staff Operations at that time?
WAGNER: Yes, but one cannot expect me to remember every incident in 6
years of war.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, no, but this was an important order, was it not?
WAGNER: Certainly, but there were many important orders in the course of
6 years.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you normally show an important operational order
to the Commander-in-Chief?
WAGNER: It was my task to submit all important matters to the Chief of
Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and he decided which matters were
to be submitted to the Grossadmiral.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that you would not have shown this to
the Chief of Staff?
WAGNER: No. I am sure he had knowledge of it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you any doubt that this order would have been
shown to Admiral Raeder?
WAGNER: That I cannot say; I do not recall whether he received it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I want to ask one or two questions about your tasks
as Admiral, Special Duties. You became Admiral, Special Duties, in June
1944, is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And from then on you attended the important conferences
with Admiral Dönitz and in his absence represented him, did you not?
WAGNER: I never participated in any discussions as his representative.
Dönitz was represented by the Chief of the SKL.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now at that stage of the war all questions were
important insofar as they affected military operations in one way or
another, were they not?
WAGNER: At every stage of the war all military questions are of
importance.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What I am putting to you is that at that stage of the
war the importance of all questions chiefly depended on how they
affected the military situation.
WAGNER: Yes, that, I imagine, one has to admit.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And during that period Germany was virtually governed
by the decisions taken at the Führer’s headquarters, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I want you to look at a record of one of Admiral
Dönitz’ visits—My Lord, this is D-863; it is a new document and becomes
Exhibit GB-456.
Now that is a record of a visit to the Führer’s headquarters on 28 and
29 of August 1943. You were not there yourself, but your immediate
superior Vice Admiral Meisel accompanied Admiral Dönitz, and the names
of the Naval Delegation are set out at the top of the page: Admiral
Dönitz, Vice Admiral Meisel, Kapitän zur See Rehm, _et cetera_. And your
program as set out was: After your arrival, at 1130, conversation with
Commander-in-Chief Navy, Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; 1300, situation
conference with the Führer, closing with a further conversation between
the Commander-in-Chief Navy and the Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; then
at 1600 the Commander-in-Chief Navy left. After that Admiral Meisel had
a conversation with Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office. Then a
conversation with General Jodl, an evening conference with the Führer,
and then at midnight a conference with Reichsführer-SS Himmler. On the
next day the usual conference with the Führer; then a conference with
the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. And then he left.
Now, is that a fair sample of what went on whenever Admiral Dönitz
visited; that he had conversations, various conferences with other
officials?
WAGNER: That is a typical example of a visit of the Grossadmiral at the
headquarters, insofar as he participated only in situation conferences
with the Führer, and in addition he had military discussions with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that shows, does it not, the whole business of
government being carried on at the Führer’s headquarters?
WAGNER: No, not at all. I have already said the Grossadmiral only
participated at the situation conference, that is, the military
situation conference with the Führer and beyond that one or even two
discussions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And with General Jodl or Field Marshal Keitel, somebody
from the Foreign Office, and so on?
WAGNER: Otherwise the Grossadmiral had no discussions of any sort, as
can be seen from the document, for on 28 August at 1600 hours he
returned by air. The other discussions were discussions of the Chief of
Staff of the SKL, the...
COL. PHILLIMORE: But I was putting it to you that this was a typical
visit. If Admiral Dönitz had not left, he would have had these other
conversations and not Admiral Meisel, is that not right?
WAGNER: No, not at all. The Chief of Staff of the SKL very rarely had
the opportunity of coming to headquarters; and according to the record
here, he obviously used his opportunity to contact a few of the
leading...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I do not want to waste time with it. I suggest to you
that when Admiral Dönitz went there he normally saw many other ministers
and conversed with them on any business affecting the Navy.
WAGNER: Naturally, the Admiral discussed all questions affecting the
Navy with those who were concerned with them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you one or two questions on the
minutes with regard to the Geneva Convention—that is C-158, GB-209,
Page 69 of the English Prosecution’s document book, or Page 102 of the
German. Will you look at Page 102.
Now you, as you told us yesterday, initialed those minutes, did you not;
and a copy was marked to you, is that not right?
WAGNER: Yes, I signed these minutes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes; were they accurate?
WAGNER: They contained salient points about the things which had
happened at headquarters.
COL. PHILLIMORE: They were an accurate record, were they?
WAGNER: Undoubtedly I believed that things had taken place as they are
recorded here.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, did you agree with Admiral Dönitz’ advice that it
would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without
warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world? Did you
agree with that?
WAGNER: I already explained yesterday, clearly and unequivocally, how I
interpreted this sentence which was formulated by me; and I have nothing
to add to that statement. In the sense which I stated yesterday, I agree
completely.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And the step which Hitler wanted to take was to put
prisoners of war in the bombed towns, was it not? Was that not the
breach of the Convention that he wanted to make?
WAGNER: No, it was the renunciation of all the Geneva agreements; not
only the agreement about prisoners of war, but also the agreement on
hospitals ships, the Red Cross agreement, and other agreements which had
been made at Geneva.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Then what were the measures considered necessary which
could be taken without warning? Just look at that sentence.
WAGNER: I do not understand that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the last sentence, “It would be better to carry
out the measures considered necessary.” What were those measures?
WAGNER: They were not discussed at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you see any difference between the advice which
Admiral Dönitz was giving them and the advice which you described as the
rather romantic ideas of a young expert on the document about sinking
without warning at night? Let me put it to you; what the naval officer
said on the Document C-191 was: “Sink without warning. Do not give
written permission. Say it was a mistake for an armed merchant
cruiser...”
We have Admiral Dönitz saying, “Do not break the rules, tell no one
about it and at all costs save face with the world.”
Do you see any difference?
WAGNER: I already testified yesterday that the difference is very great.
Admiral Dönitz opposed the renunciation of the Geneva Convention and
said that even if measures to intimidate deserters or countermeasures
against bombing attacks on cities were to be taken, the Geneva
Convention should not be renounced in any case.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to put to you a few questions about
prisoners of war. So far as naval prisoners of war were concerned, they
remained in the custody of the Navy, did they not?
WAGNER: I am not informed about the organization of prisoner-of-war
camps. According to my recollection they were first put into a naval
transit camp. Then they were sent to other camps; but I do not know
whether these camps were under the jurisdiction of the Navy or the OKW.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you not seen the defense documents about the Camp
Marlag telling us how well they were treated? Have you not seen them?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, naval prisoners, when they were captured by your
forces, their capture was reported to the naval war staff, was it not?
WAGNER: Such captures were, in general, reported as part of the
situation reports.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, do you remember the Commando Order of 18 October
1942?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You actually signed the order passing that Führer Order
on to commands, did you not?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the document is C-179, and that was put in as
United States Exhibit 543 (USA-543). It is in that bundle that Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe handed to the Tribunal when cross-examining the defendant.
I think it is either the last or very near to the last document in the
bundle.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did you approve of that order?
WAGNER: I regretted that one had to resort to this order, but in the
first paragraph the reasons for it are set forth so clearly that I had
to recognize its justification.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You knew what handing over to the SD meant, did you
not? You knew that meant shooting?
WAGNER: No, that could have meant a lot of things.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What did you think it meant?
WAGNER: It could have meant that the people were interrogated for the
counterintelligence; it could have meant that they were to be kept
imprisoned under more severe conditions, and finally it could have meant
that they might be shot.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But you had no doubt that it meant that they might be
shot, had you?
WAGNER: The possibility that they might be shot undoubtedly existed.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, and did that occur to you when you signed the
order sending it on to commanders?
WAGNER: I would like to refer to Paragraph 1 of this order, where it...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you mind answering the question? Did it occur to you
that they might be shot when you signed the order sending it on to
commanders?
WAGNER: Yes, the possibility was clear to me.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness was asked whether he approved of
this order. I do not think that Colonel Phillimore can cut off the
witness’ answer by saying that he may not refer to Paragraph 1 of the
order. I believe that Paragraph 1 of the order is of decisive importance
for this witness. Mr. President, the witness Admiral Wagner...
THE PRESIDENT: You have an opportunity of re-examining the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then why do you interrupt?
DR. SIEMERS: Because Colonel Phillimore has interrupted the answer of
the witness and I believe that even in cross-examination the answer of
the witness must be at least heard.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal does not agree with you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I understood him to have already made some
point that the defendant made once? I only interrupted him when he
sought to make it again.
[_Turning to the witness._] I put my question once again. When you
signed the order sending this document on to lower commanders, did it
occur to you then that these men would probably be shot?
WAGNER: The possibility that these people who were turned over to the SD
might be shot was clear to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was it also...
WAGNER: I have not finished yet. But only those people who had not been
captured by the Wehrmacht were to be handed over to the SD.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did it also occur to you that they would be shot
without trial?
WAGNER: Yes, that can be concluded from the order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And what do you mean by saying that it only referred to
those not captured by the Wehrmacht? Would you look at Paragraph 3.
“From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in
Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are
to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops,
whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be
slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference
whether they landed from ships or airplanes for their actions of
whether they were dropped by parachutes. Even if these
individuals when found should apparently seem to give themselves
up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each
individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for
publication in the OKW communiqué.”
Are you saying it did not refer to men captured by the military forces?
WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that statement. There is nothing in the entire
paragraph which says these men who were captured by the Wehrmacht were
to be turned over to the SD. That was the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, read on in the last paragraph.
“If individual members of such Commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the military
forces by some other means, for example through the Police in
occupied territories, they are to be handed over immediately to
the SD.”
WAGNER: Yes. It is expressly stated here that only those people are to
be turned over to the SD who are not captured by the Wehrmacht but by
the Police; in that case the Wehrmacht could not take them over.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Indeed it is not. That capture by the Police is given
as one possible instance. But you know, you know in practice, do you
not, that there were several instances where Commandos were captured by
the Navy and handed over to the SD under this order? Do you not know
that?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, let me just remind you. Would you look at
Document 512-PS.
That is also in that bundle, My Lord, as United States Exhibit 546
(USA-546). It is the second document. According to the last sentence of
the Führer Order of 18 October:
“Individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order
to keep them for interrogation. Importance of this measure was
proven in the cases of Glomfjord, the two-man torpedo at
Trondheim, and the glider plane at Stavanger, where
interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy
intentions.”
And then it goes on to another case, the case of the Geronde.
Do you say that you do not remember the two-man torpedo attack on the
_Tirpitz_ in Trondheim Fjord?
WAGNER: No, no. I am not asserting that I do not remember it. I do
remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Did you not see in the Wehrmacht communiqué after
that attack what had happened to the man who was captured?
WAGNER: I cannot recall it at the moment.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Let me just remind you. One man was captured, Robert
Paul Evans, just as he was getting across the Swedish border, and he
was—that attack took place in October 1942—he was executed in January
1943, on 19 January 1943.
My Lord, the reference to that might be convenient; it is Document
UK-57, which was put in as Exhibit GB-64.
[_Turning to the witness._]
Do you say that you do not remember seeing any report of his capture or
of his shooting or of his interrogation?
WAGNER: No, I believe I remember that, but this man...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now what do you remember? Just tell us what you
remember. Do you remember seeing his capture reported?
WAGNER: I no longer know that. I remember there was a report that a
considerable time after the attack on the _Tirpitz_ a man was captured,
but to my knowledge not by the Navy.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at the Document D-864, a sworn
statement.
My Lord, through some error I am afraid I have not got it here. May I
just put the facts, and if necessary put in the document if I can
produce it in time.
[_Turning to the witness._] I suggest to you that Robert Paul Evans,
after his capture, was personally interrogated by the
Commander-in-Chief, Navy, of the Norwegian North Coast. Do you say you
know nothing of that?
WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that I do not remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, this was the first two-man torpedo attack by
the British Navy against the German naval forces, was it not? That is
so, is it not?
WAGNER: Yes, that is possible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, but you must know that, do you not? You were Chief
of Staff Operations at the time.
WAGNER: I believe it was the first time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that the results of that important
interrogation were not reported to you in the naval war staff?
WAGNER: They were certainly reported, but nevertheless I cannot remember
that the Commanding Admiral in Norway actually conducted this
interrogation.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you see a report by that admiral?
WAGNER: I do not know where it originated, but I am certain I saw a
report of that kind.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was it clear to you that that report was based on
interrogation?
WAGNER: Yes, I think so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you say you did not know that this man Evans, some
two months after his capture, was taken out and shot under the Führer
order?
WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that I do not remember that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put you another instance. Do you remember the
Bordeaux incident in December 1942?
That is 526-PS, My Lord. That is also in the bundle. It was originally
put in as United States Exhibit 502 (USA-502).
[_Turning to the witness._] I am sorry; it is the Toftefjord incident I
am putting to you, 526-PS. Do you remember this incident in Toftefjord
in March 1943?
WAGNER: I do remember that about this time an enemy cutter was seized in
a Norwegian fjord.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And did you not see in the Wehrmacht communiqué
“Führer Order executed”?
WAGNER: If it said so in the Wehrmacht communiqué then I must have read
it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you any doubt that you knew that the men captured
in that attack were shot, and that you knew it at the time?
WAGNER: Apparently he was shot while being captured.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If you look at the document:
“Enemy cutter engaged. Cutter blown up by the enemy. Crew, 2
dead men, 10 prisoners.”
Then look down:
“Führer Order executed by SD.”
That means those 10 men were shot, does it not?
WAGNER: It must mean that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now I just put to you the document that I referred
to on the Trondheim episode, D-864. This is an affidavit by a man who
was in charge of the SD at Bergen and later at Trondheim, and it is the
second paragraph:
“I received the order by teletype letter or radiogram from the
Commander of the Security Police and the SD, Oslo, to transfer
Evans from Trondheim Missions Hotel to the BDS, Oslo.
“I cannot say who signed the radiogram or the teletype letter
from Oslo. I am not sure to whom I transmitted the order, but I
think it was to Hauptsturmführer Hollack. I know that the
Commanding Admiral of the Norwegian Northern Coast had
interrogated Evans himself.”
And then he goes on to deal with Evans’ clothing.
I put it to you once again: Do you say that you did not know from the
Admiral, Northern Coast himself that he had interrogated this man?
WAGNER: Yes, I am asserting that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, I will take you to one more incident which you
knew about, as is shown by your own war diary. Would you look at the
Document D-658.
My Lord, this document was put in as GB-229.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, that is an extract from the SKL War
Diary, is it not?
WAGNER: Let me examine it first. I do not have the impression that...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You said yesterday that it was from the war diary of
the Naval Commander, West France, but I think that was a mistake, was it
not?
WAGNER: I did not make any statement yesterday on the origin of the war
diary.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Just read the first sentence. I think it shows clearly
it was the SKL War Diary.
“9 December 1942. The Naval Commander, West France,
reports”—and then it sets out the incident. And then, the third
sentence:
“The Naval Commander, West France, has ordered that both
soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage if their
interrogation, which has been begun, confirms what has so far
been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in
order to obtain more information.
“According to a Wehrmacht report”—I think that is a
mistranslation; it should be “According to the Wehrmacht
communiqué”—“both soldiers had meanwhile been shot. The measure
would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is
nevertheless something new in international law, since the
soldiers were in uniform.”
That is from the SKL War Diary, is it not?
WAGNER: I do not think that this is the War Diary of the SKL; but rather
it would seem to be the war diary of the Naval Group Command, West, or
the Commanding Admiral in France.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, I will get the original here and clear the matter
up later, but I suggest to you that this is the SKL War Diary, which at
the time...
WAGNER: I cannot recognize that assertion until it is proved by the
original.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And I suggest to you that you, who were Chief of Staff
Operations at the time, must have been fully aware of that incident. Do
you deny that?
WAGNER: I deny—I maintain that I do not remember that affair.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that a matter of that sort would not be
reported to you?
WAGNER: I have been told here that the order to shoot these people was
obtained from headquarters directly by the SD.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, finally, I put to you the incident of the capture
of the seven seamen, six of the Norwegian Navy and one of the Royal
Navy, at Ulven near Bergen in July 1943. That is the document D-649 in
the Prosecution document book, GB-208.
Do you remember this incident? Do you remember the capture of these
seven men by Admiral Von Schrader with his two task forces?
WAGNER: I saw this paper while I was being interrogated, and that is why
I remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But do you remember the incident?
WAGNER: No, not from my personal recollection.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were still Chief of Staff Operations.
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is Page 67 of the English document book,
Page 100 in the German.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you say that as Chief of Staff Operations
you do not remember any of these incidents?
WAGNER: Yes, I assert and maintain what I have already said about this.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did not your operational—did your commanders not
report when they captured an enemy Commando?
WAGNER: I must assume that those things were also reported in the
situation reports.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, you are really suggesting that you have forgotten
all about these incidents now?
WAGNER: In all my testimony I have strictly adhered to what I personally
remember.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know what happened to these men? You know they
were captured in uniform, do you not? There was a naval officer with
gold braid around his arm. That is a badge you use in the German Navy,
is it not?
WAGNER: I have already said that I do not recall this affair.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, let me just tell you and remind you. After
interrogation by naval officers and officers of the SD, both of whom
recommended prisoner-of-war treatment, these men were handed over by the
Navy to the SD for shooting. They were taken to a concentration camp,
and at 4 o’clock in the morning they were led out one by one,
blindfolded, fettered, not told they were going to be shot, and shot one
by one on the rifle range. Do you know that?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you know that is what handing over to the SD meant?
WAGNER: I have already said that handing over to the SD implied several
possibilities.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that then their bodies were sunk in the
fjord with charges attached, and destroyed, as it says in the document,
“in the usual way”—Paragraph 10 of the affidavit—and their belongings
in the concentration camp were burned?
WAGNER: No, I do not know that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. A further point: Do you remember that in
March or April 1945, at the very end of the war, do you remember that
this order, the Führer Order, was cancelled by Keitel?
That is Paragraph 11 of the affidavit, My Lord.
Do you remember that? Just read it.
WAGNER: Yes, I have heard of that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. You thought you were losing the war by then, and
you had better cancel the Commando Order, is that not the fact?
WAGNER: I do not know for what reasons the OKW rescinded orders.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is not this right: You did not worry about this order
in 1942 when you thought you were winning the war, but when you found
you were losing it, you began to worry about international law. Is not
that what happened?
WAGNER: It is absolutely impossible for me to investigate orders. This
paragraph of the Commando Order states clearly and distinctly that these
Commandos had orders—that these Commandos were composed partly of
criminal elements of the occupied territories—that they had orders to
kill prisoners whom they found a burden, that other Commandos had orders
to kill all captives; and that orders to this effect had fallen into our
hands.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you ever make any inquiries to see whether that was
true?
WAGNER: It is absolutely impossible for me to investigate official
information which I receive from my superiors.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were Chief of Staff Operations; you received every
report on the Commando raids, did you not?
WAGNER: I gave detailed evidence in each individual case, but I cannot
make a general statement.
COL. PHILLIMORE: When you were Chief of Staff Operations, did you not
receive a full report every time there was a British Commando raid?
WAGNER: I have already said that I believe such incidents formed part of
the situation reports to the SKL.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I suggest you can answer that question perfectly
straight if you wanted to. Here you were, a Senior Staff Officer,
Commando Raids. Are you saying you did not personally see and read a
full report on every one?
WAGNER: I am not asserting that. I have answered each individual
question by stating exactly what I remember.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that taking these men out and shooting them
without a trial, without telling them they were going to be shot,
without seeing a priest, do you say that...
WAGNER: With regard to the Navy...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that was not murder?
WAGNER: I do not wish to maintain that at all. I do maintain that I was
presumably told about the cases in which men were shot by the Navy, and
I am of the opinion that these people who were captured as saboteurs
were not soldiers, but were criminals who, in accordance with their
criminal...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Let us get it perfectly clear. Are you saying that the
action taken in shooting these Commandos on all these occasions—are you
saying that was perfectly, proper and justified? I thought you agreed
with me it was murder, just now. Which is it?
WAGNER: I would like to answer that in each individual case.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a very simple question to answer generally and it
takes less time. Do you say that men captured in uniform should be taken
out and shot without trial?
WAGNER: I cannot consider men of whom I know that they have orders to
commit crimes, as soldiers, within international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that this action was perfectly
proper—are you?
WAGNER: Yes, entirely and perfectly.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Shoot helpless prisoners without trial, bully little
neutrals who cannot complain? That is your policy, is it?
WAGNER: Not at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What crime did Robert Paul Evans commit, who attacked
the _Tirpitz_ in a two-man torpedo?
WAGNER: I am convinced it was proved that he belonged to a sabotage
unit, and that besides the purely naval character of the attack on the
ship, there were other aspects which marked him as a saboteur.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you said just now that you did not remember the
incident?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you agree on this, will you agree with me, that if
this shooting by the SD was murder, you and Admiral Dönitz and Admiral
Raeder, who signed the orders under which this was done, are just as
guilty as the men who shot them?
WAGNER: The person who issued the order is responsible for it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that person who passed it and approved it; is not
that right?
WAGNER: I assume full responsibility for the transmission of this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, D-658 was an old exhibit, was it not?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given new exhibit numbers to all the new
documents?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship. I did omit to
give a new exhibit number to the affidavit by Flesch.