COL. PHILLIMORE: You were in the general staff at that time. You were in
charge of the Department IA. This point of view must have been put
forward by your department?
WAGNER: Yes. I have said already that we had decided, after consulting
with the Foreign Office, to adhere strictly to the London Agreement
until we had proof that English merchant shipping was navigated
militarily and was being used for military purposes. Here we are
apparently concerned solely with information, with an exchange of
opinions with the Foreign Office...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I did not ask for your general view on the document. We
can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small
neutrals and frighten them from sailing on their ordinary lawful
occasions. Is that not right?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that not why in the orders you issued in January
of 1940 you excepted the larger countries from this “sink at sight”
risk? Would you look at Document C-21. That is GB-194, at Page 30 of the
Prosecution document book in English; Pages 59 and 60 in the German.
Now, just look at the second entry on Page 5, 2 January 1940: “Report by
IA.” That is you, is it not? That was you, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes, but I cannot find the point which you are quoting.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Page 5 of the original, under the date of 2 January
1940. Report by IA on directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30
December, referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in
connection with Case Yellow:
“Through this directive the Navy will authorize, simultaneously
with the beginning of the general intensification of the war,
the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those
waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In
this case, for external consumption, the use of mines should be
simulated. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats
should be adapted to this purpose.”
That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships. That
is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted
in with your operations for Case Yellow.
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not give as your reason that the British were
arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was
necessary in connection with intensified measures for Case Yellow. Why
is that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that
it is almost impossible to understand the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put the question to you again. The excuse for
this directive is to be the intensification of measures in connection
with Case Yellow. You notice, do you not, that nothing is said about the
arming of British merchant ships as justifying this step? That is
correct, is it not?
WAGNER: May I have time, please, to peruse these papers first?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Certainly. This was written by yourself, you know.
WAGNER: No, that was not written by me. This measure really came within
the warning which was given to the neutrals on 24 November 1939.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Nothing is said about the warning of 24 November. If
you were entitled, as you have told us, under that to sink neutral
ships, there would not be any need for this special directive, would
there?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: No. Now, let us just...
WAGNER: For military and political reasons we ordered that a hit by a
mine was to be simulated, and that is a special point of this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And just before we leave that document, have a look at
the entry on 18 January, will you? Have you got it? 18 January.
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the actual order for sinking without warning.
You notice the last sentence: “Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan,
and Russia are exempted from these attacks.”
And then Spain is added in pencil. Is it not right that you were out to
terrorize the small neutrals and to bully them, but you were not running
any risks with the big ones?
WAGNER: No, that is not correct. The explanation is, of course, that one
must take military disadvantages into the bargain if one can obtain
political advantages for them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, it was just entirely a question of how it paid
you politically. That is all it was, was it not?
WAGNER: Of course, all military actions were strongly influenced by the
political interests of one’s own country.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And because the Danes and the Swedes were not in any
position to make any serious protest, it did not matter sinking their
ships at sight. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: The motivation you give to this conduct is entirely incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, but what is the difference?
WAGNER: We sank the ships of all neutrals in these areas with the
exception of those countries where we had a special political interest.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, you had no special political interest at this time
for Norway and Sweden and Denmark, so you sank their ships at sight.
That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: We sank them because they entered this area despite warning.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, but if a Russian ship or a Japanese ship did that,
you would not sink it.
WAGNER: No, not at that period of time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to show you what you actually did. Would
you look at Documents D-846 and 847?
My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 and 453.
[_Turning to the witness._] Will you look at the first of these, that is
D-846? That is a telegram from your Minister at Copenhagen, dated 26
September 1939. That is before your first warning and before any of
these zones had been declared. The second sentence:
“Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines has
caused great anxiety here about Danish food transports to
England.”
You see, you had started sinking ships of the small neutrals right away
in the first three weeks of the war, had you not?
WAGNER: In single cases, yes; but there was always a very special reason
in those cases. I know that several incidents occurred with Danish and
Swedish ships in which ships had turned against the U-boat and the
U-boat in turn because of this resistance was forced to attack the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not think it was because the blame could be put
upon mines?
WAGNER: At this period not at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the second telegram, if you would; 26 March
1940, again from the German Minister at Copenhagen. It is the first
paragraph:
“The King of Denmark today summoned me to his presence in order
to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish
ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and
on the whole country.”
And then, passing on two sentences:
“I replied that the reason why the ships sank had not yet been
clarified. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to
the Prize Regulations; but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in
the vicinity of the convoy took upon themselves all the risks of
war. If there were any cases of sinking without warning, it
seemed that they could be traced back to the German
notifications made to date.
“At the same time I stressed the danger of the waters around the
British coast, where neutral shipping would inevitably be
involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken
by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of
the Danish ships had sailed in convoy, but it would probably
never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility
of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking.”
Have you any doubt that those six ships were sunk deliberately under
your sink-at-sight policy?
WAGNER: Without checking the individual cases, I cannot answer this
question; but I am of the opinion that possibly these ships were sunk in
that area off the English coast where, because of heavy military
defenses, there would no longer be any question of open sea.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We will come to an incident where I think I
can supply you with the details. Would you look at Document D-807?
My Lord, that is a new document, it becomes GB-454.
[_Turning to the witness._] You see, this document is dated 31 January
1940; and it refers to the sinking of three neutral ships, the
_Deptford_, the _Thomas Walton_, and the _Garoufalia_. The document is
in three parts. It first sets out the facts as they were known to you.
The second part is a note to the Foreign Office, and the third is a
draft reply for your Foreign Office to send to the neutral governments;
and if you look at the end of the document you will see “IA”; it
emanates from your department.
“It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes to admit only the
sinking by a German U-boat of the steamship _Deptford_, but to
deny the sinking of the two other steamers.”
Would you follow it.
“According to the data attached to the notes presented by the
Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to
have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be
equally strong in all these cases. According to the Norwegian
Foreign Minister’s speech of 19 January, the suspicion in Norway
of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears, however, to be
strongest in the case of the steamship _Deptford_, whereas in
the other two cases it is at least assumed that the possibility
of striking mines can be taken into account; this is considered
improbable in the case of the steamship _Deptford_, because
other vessels had passed the same spot.
“The possibility that the steamship _Thomas Walton_ struck a
mine can be supported, since the torpedoing occurred towards
evening and nothing was observed, and also because several
explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by
torpedoes.
“In the case of the steamship _Garoufalia_, a denial appears
expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which
was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of
an electric torpedo, no torpedo wake could be observed.”
Do you say in the face of that that you did not deceive the neutrals?
That is the advice you were giving to the Defendant Raeder as his staff
officer, is it not?
WAGNER: This memorandum did not emanate from me; it emanated from “Iia.”
COL. PHILLIMORE: Where does it originate?
WAGNER: That is the assistant of the expert on international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would not have seen it?
WAGNER: I do not recall this document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you say it emanated from “Iia?” It has “Ia” at
the end of it.
WAGNER: If this memorandum was dispatched then I also saw it...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will just read the next part of the note to remind
you.
“The following facts have thus been ascertained:”—this is what
you are writing to the Foreign Office—
“The steamer _Deptford_ was sunk by a German U-boat on 13
December...”