“As I was deputy commandant I stayed at the camp up to the
capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British
troops who were quite satisfied with the transfer. Squadron
Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming this. I enclose a
photostat of this letter.”
This photostat copy appears on the following page, and it says:
“Korvettenkapitän W. Rogge was for 10 months chief camp officer
at the Marlag Camp at Westertimke. Without exception all the
prisoners of war in that camp have reported that he treated them
with fairness and consideration.”
Then follows another affidavit from the intelligence officer in that
camp. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February
1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any
terror measures. I shall read from Page 129, the third from the last
paragraph:
“No means of pressure were employed at Dulag Nord. If a man told
falsehoods he was sent back to his room and was not interrogated for 2
or 3 days. I believe I can say that no blow was ever struck at Dulag
Nord.”
I should now like to refer briefly to the accusation raised against the
defendant according to which he as “a fanatical Nazi” prolonged a
hopeless war. I submit Dönitz-50, which contains statements made by
Admiral Darlan, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be
found on Pages 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that
the afore-mentioned persons also considered it expedient in a critical
situation to call upon the nation—partly with success and partly
without—to render the utmost resistance.
During his examination Admiral Dönitz gave as the reason for his views
that he wanted to save German nationals in the East. As evidence for
this I draw your attention to Exhibit GB-212, which can be found on Page
73 of the British document book. It is a decree of 11 April 1945, and I
shall read two sentences under heading 1:
“Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of
Germany by the Allies along the lines of partition discussed by
them at Yalta. It also means, therefore, the ceding to Russia of
further considerable parts of Germany west of the river Oder. Or
does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not
keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of
the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces, and will
begin a war with Russia for our sake? The reasoning, ‘Let the
Anglo-Saxons into the country; then at least the Russians will
not come,’ is faulty, too.”
I shall also quote from Exhibit GB-188, which is on Page 10 of the
document book of the Prosecution—I beg your pardon, Page 11. It is an
order to the German Armed Forces dated 1 May 1945. I shall quote the
second paragraph:
“The Führer has designated me to be his successor as head of
State and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I am taking
over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed
Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the
Bolsheviks until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands
of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from
slavery and destruction.”
This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence.
Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Kapitän zur
See Rösing and the other of Fregattenkapitän Suhren. Furthermore—and
this is something I particularly regret—the interrogatory from the
Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, has still not
been received. I will submit these documents as soon as I have received
them.
And now, with permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my
witness, Admiral Wagner.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, while the witness is being called in, I would
like to raise one matter with the Tribunal. On Saturday I understand
that the question of when the witness Puhl would be called was raised
before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left
for counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called
before the Raeder case comes on or after the Raeder case.
I should like to say that we have some reasons for asking that he be
called before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is
here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under
which he has been held by the French in the French territory; and
secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the
Funk case, is very anxious—for compelling personal reasons—to return
to the United States, and of course he will not be able to do so until
we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take
very long in my judgment to hear this witness. He is only here for
cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he
could come on at the conclusion of the Dönitz case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought for
cross-examination after the Dönitz case.
[_The witness Wagner took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD WAGNER (Witness): Gerhard Wagner.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, when did you join the Navy?
WAGNER: On 4 June 1916.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which positions did you hold in the High
Command of the Navy, and at what time?
WAGNER: From summer 1933 until the summer of 1935 I was adviser in the
operational department of the High Command. I was Kapitänleutnant and
then Korvettenkapitän. In 1937, from January until September, I had the
same position. From April 1939 until June 1941 I was the head of the
operational group, known as “IA,” in the operations section of the Naval
Operations Staff. From June 1941 until June 1944 I was the chief of the
operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1944 until
May 1945, I was admiral for special tasks attached to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that during the entire war you were a
member of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Yes, that is so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the general tasks of the Naval
Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The tasks of the Naval Operations Staff included all those
involved in naval warfare, both at sea and in the defense of the coasts,
and also in the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as
territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Operations Staff did not
have any, neither at home nor in the occupied territories.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Naval Operations Staff part of the
High Command of the Navy, the OKM?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff was part of the High Command of the
Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the relationship between the Naval
Operations Staff and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW?
WAGNER: The OKW passed on the instructions and orders of Hitler, who was
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, regarding the conduct of the
war; usually, as far as naval warfare particularly was concerned, after
examination and review by the Naval Operations Staff. General questions
of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations
with members of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which manner were the preparations of the
High Command of the Navy for a possible war carried out?
WAGNER: Generally speaking, they consisted of mobilization preparations,
tactical training, and strategic considerations for the event of a
possible conflict.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff during your
time receive an order to prepare for a definite possibility of war?
WAGNER: The first instance was the order for “Case White,” the war
against Poland. Before that, only tasks regarding security measures were
given us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were plans elaborated for the naval war
against England?
WAGNER: A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before
the beginning of the war. Such a war seemed to us outside the realm of
possibility. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the British
fleet, which can hardly be expressed in proportionate figures, and
considering England’s strategical domination of the seas such a war
appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which
Britain could have been damaged effectively was by submarine warfare;
but even the submarine weapon was by no means being given preferential
treatment nor was its production accelerated. It was merely given its
corresponding place in the creation of a well-balanced homogeneous
fleet.
At the beginning of the war all we had were 40 submarines ready for
action, of which, as far as I can remember, barely half could have been
used in the Atlantic. That, in comparison with the earth-girdling naval
means at the disposal of the first-ranking world power England, is as
good as nothing. As a comparison, I should like to cite the fact that
both the British and the French Navy at the same time had more than 100
submarines each.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the then Captain Dönitz, as chief of the
submarines, have anything to do with the planning of the war?
WAGNER: Captain Dönitz at that time was a subordinate front-line
commander, under the command of the chief of the fleet and he, because
of his warfare experience, had the task of training and tactically
guiding the inexperienced submarine personnel.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he in turn make any suggestions or
instigate any plans for the war?
WAGNER: No, these preparations and this war planning, in particular for
the “Case White,” were exclusively the task of the Naval Operations
Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Dönitz at any previous time hear about
the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz hear of the military
intentions of the Naval Operations Staff at a time earlier than
necessary for the carrying out of the orders given him?
WAGNER: No, he heard of it by means of the orders reaching him from the
Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, you know of the London
Agreement of 1936 regarding submarine warfare. Did the Naval Operations
Staff draw any conclusions from that agreement for their preparation for
a war, in particular, for carrying on a possible economic war?
WAGNER: The Prize Regulations still existing from the last war were
revised and made to conform with the London Agreement. For that purpose
a committee was formed which included representatives from the High
Command of the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Justice,
and scientific experts.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these new Prize Regulations made known
to the commandants some time before the war or were they communicated to
them just when they were published shortly before the outbreak of the
war?
WAGNER: These new Prize Regulations were published in 1938 as an
internal ordinance of the Navy, which was available for the purpose of
training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the Fleet in 1938 a
number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of acquainting the
officer corps with these new regulations. I, myself, at that time...
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new Prize Regulations you are referring to?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am talking about the regulations published
on 26 August 1939, which are contained in my document book. They are on
Page 137, in Volume III of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the date
is not 26, but 28 August.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was saying that exercises were carried out?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, in the year 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: [_Turning to the witness._] Which
conceptions did the Naval Operations Staff have after the beginning of
the war regarding the development of the naval war against Britain?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff thought that Great Britain would
probably start in where she had stopped at the end of the first World
War. That meant that there would be a hunger blockade against Germany, a
control of the merchandise of neutral countries, introduction of a
system of control, the arming of merchant ships, and the delimitation of
operational waters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have the battle order of 3
September 1939 shown to you. It is Document Dönitz-55. It can be found
on Page 139, in Volume III of the document book. You will see from this
that submarines, like all naval forces, had orders to adhere to this
Prize Ordinance in the economic warfare.
Then, at the end, you will find an order which I propose to read to you.
This is on Page 140:
“Order prepared for intensifying the economic war because of the
arming of enemy merchant ships.
“1) Arming of, and therefore resistance from, the majority of
English and French merchant ships is to be expected.
“2) Submarines will stop merchant ships only if own vessel is
not endangered. Attack without warning by submarines is allowed
against plainly recognized enemy merchant ships.
“3) Battleships and auxiliary cruisers will watch for
possibility of use of arms by merchant ships when stopped.”
I should like to ask you whether this order was prepared long ago or
whether it was improvised at the last moment?
WAGNER: At the beginning of the war we were forced to improvise a great
many orders we were issuing, because they were not prepared thoroughly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order become operative at all?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not?
WAGNER: After consultation with the Foreign Office, we had decided that
we would strictly adhere to the London Agreement until we had clear-cut
evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes.
We remembered from the last war the power which the enemy propaganda
had, and we did not under any circumstances want to give anyone cause
once more to decry us as pirates.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When, at what stage, did the military use of
enemy merchant ships become clear to the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The fact that enemy merchant vessels were armed became clear
after a few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about
artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and armed enemy
merchant ships. Certainly one, and probably several boats were lost by
us. One British steamer, I think it was called _Stonepool_, was praised
publicly by the British Admiralty for its success in combating
submarines.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Tribunal already has knowledge of the
order of 4 October allowing attacks against all armed merchant ships of
the enemy and also of the order of 17 October allowing attacks on all
enemy merchant ships with certain exceptions.
Were these orders the result of experiences which the Naval Operations
Staff had regarding the military use of enemy merchant ships?
WAGNER: Yes, exclusively.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Both orders contain exceptions favoring
passenger ships. They were not to be attacked even when they were
members of an enemy convoy. To what were these exceptions due?
WAGNER: They were due to an order from the Führer. At the beginning of
the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging
war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that also in
naval war any incidents in which women and children might lose their
lives should be avoided. Consequently, even the stopping of passenger
ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it
very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly where passenger
ships were traveling in enemy convoys. Later on, step by step, this
order was altered as it became evident that there was no longer any
peaceful passenger traffic at all and that enemy passenger ships were
particularly heavily armed and used more and more as auxiliary cruisers
and troop transport ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the orders of the German Naval
Operations Staff regarding the combating of armed enemy ships and later
enemy ships as a whole made known to the British Admiralty?
WAGNER: Neither side made its war measures known during the war, and
that held true in this case also. But in October the German press left
no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk
by us without warning, and later on it was equally well known that we
were forced to consider the entire enemy merchant marine as being under
military direction and in military use.
These statements by our press must no doubt have been known to the
British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I
think this was in October, Grossadmiral Raeder gave an interview to the
press on the same theme.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff
was issued in the middle of October: “On the Possibilities of
Intensifying the War against Merchant Shipping”; I am going to have this
memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. After looking at this
memorandum please tell me what its purpose was and what the memorandum
contains.
Mr. President, some extracts can be found on Page 199, in Volume IV of
the document book.
WAGNER: This memorandum was issued due to the situation that existed
since the beginning of the war. On 3 September 1939 Britain had begun a
total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally that was not directed
only against the fighting men, but against all nonfighting members,
including women, children, the aged, and the sick. It meant that Britain
would declare all food rations, all luxury goods, all clothing, as well
as all raw materials necessary for these items, as contraband and would
also exercise a strict control of neutral shipping of which Germany
would be deprived insofar as it would have to go through waters
controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a
growing political and economic pressure upon the European neighbors of
Germany to cease all commerce with Germany.
That intention of the total hunger blockade was emphatically confirmed
by the Head of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain,
during a speech before the House of Commons at the end of September. He
described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it was not
customary for beleaguered forts to be accorded free rations. That
expression of the beleaguered fort was also taken up by the French
press.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated around the beginning of
October—according to this memorandum it was on 12 October—that in this
war Britain would utilize her entire strength for the destruction of
Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, aided by the experiences of
the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under
some pretext or other.
With the shadow of the total hunger blockade, which no doubt had been
thoroughly prepared during long years of peace, creeping in upon us we
now had a great deal to do to catch up, since we had not prepared for
war against Great Britain. We examined, both from the legal and military
point of view, the possibilities at our disposal by which we in turn
might cut off Britain’s supplies. That was the aim and purpose of that
memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are saying, therefore, that this
memorandum contains considerations regarding means for countering the
British measures with correspondingly effective German measures?
WAGNER: Yes, that was definitely the purpose of that memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Studying that memorandum you will find a
sentence—C. 1. is the paragraph—according to which the Naval
Operations Staff must remain basically within the limits of
international law, but that decisive war measures would have to be
carried out even if the existing international law could not be applied
to them.
Did this mean that international law was to be generally disregarded by
the Naval Operations Staff, or what is the meaning of this sentence?
WAGNER: That question was duly studied by the Naval Operations Staff and
discussed at great length. I should like to point out that on Page 2 of
the memorandum, in the first paragraph, it states that obedience to the
laws of chivalry comes before all else in naval warfare. That, from the
outset, would prevent a barbarous waging of war at sea. We did think,
however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions
for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further
development of the laws of naval warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which technical developments do you mean?
WAGNER: I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the large-scale use
of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide
range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before
the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one
could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction
of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the
beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting
forces against him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It says in this memorandum that decisive war
measures are to be taken even though they create new laws at sea. Did
occasion arise for such measures?
WAGNER: No; at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on 4
November, the United States of America declared the so-called American
combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone
actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American
shipping. By this announcement some of the points of that memorandum
were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within
the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties
during the first World War.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these measures do you mean the warning
against navigating in certain zones?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to some of the exhibits used by
the Prosecution, Numbers GB-194 and 226, submarines were permitted to
attack all ships without warning in certain areas, beginning with
January 1940. The attacks were to be carried out, if possible, unseen,
while maintaining the fiction that the ships struck mines.
Will you please tell the Tribunal which sea lanes or areas were
concerned in this? I shall have a sea-chart handed to you for that
purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-93.
Will you please explain what can be seen on that map.
WAGNER: In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The
large part of the ocean which is shaded on the edge shows the
afore-mentioned American combat zone. The shaded parts of the sea near
the British coast are those parts which were ordered to be German
submarine operational zones. They were given letters from A to F in
accordance with the time when they were set up.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us up to which depth these
German operational zones went?
WAGNER: I think perhaps as far as the 200 meter line.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this depth guarantee favorable use of
mines?
WAGNER: Yes, down to 200 meters the use of anchored mines is possible
without any difficulty.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these operational zones certain dates
have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on those
particular dates, and in that sequence, these territories were made
operational zones?
WAGNER: All those areas were declared to be operational zones where our
fighting forces came into contact with enemy traffic and a concentration
of the enemy defense, resulting in main combat areas.
To begin with, they were the zones at the northern and southern end of
the German-mined zones which had been declared along the British East
Coast and in the Bristol Channel. You can see, therefore, that Zone A
lies to the east of Scotland and is dated 6 January. The Bristol Channel
Zone is dated 12 January, and finally at the southern end of this danger
zone, that is, to the east of London, there is the date of 24 January.
Later on, according to the fluctuations of the actual fighting, further
areas around the British Isles and then off the French Coast were
designated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to what date did this development
continue?
WAGNER: The last zone was declared on 28 May 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had neutrals been warned against navigating
in these zones?
WAGNER: Yes, an official note had informed neutral countries that the
entire U.S.A. fighting zone had to be considered as being dangerous, and
that they should negotiate the North Sea to the east and to the south of
the German mine area which was north of Holland.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What difference is there between the
situation as shown by this map, and the German declaration of a blockade
of 17 August 1940?
That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have submitted as Dönitz-104,
which can be found on Page 214 in Volume IV of the document book.
WAGNER: As far as the limits of the danger zone are concerned, there was
really no difference. This fact was also stated by Prime Minister
Churchill in the House of Commons at the time. However, the difference
which did exist was that up to that time we confined ourselves to the
area I have just described, near the British Coast, whereas now we
considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone.
The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the
meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now
was the focal point of all belligerent action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the German blockade zone in its entirety
correspond exactly or more or less with the U.S.A. combat zone?
WAGNER: It was nearly exactly the same as the U.S.A. combat zone. There
were merely a few insignificant corrections.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another
sea-chart as Dönitz-92, in which...
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off
then.
[_A recess was taken._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Dönitz-94, I submit a
chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August.
Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of
the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that
the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn’t you?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had
not been understood quite correctly before the recess.
[_Turning to the witness._] What was the naval practice of the enemy as
far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that
they followed?
WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with
ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part
of the North Sea, around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and
French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving
previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of
combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or
surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals,
and especially to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a
statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this
on Page 208 of the document book, Volume IV. This statement is dated 8
May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it
is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote
from the original.
“Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the
submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible,
the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of
our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German
ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as
opportunity served.”