THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy
we have before us—“...all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships
by night...” Is that it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It should be corrected
to read, “all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be
sunk.”
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I said it wrong—“and all ships by night.” Yes,
very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, what was the significance of
this statement and this practice so far as the German ships were
concerned?
WAGNER: It means that all German ships by day and by night in this area
were to be sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what does it mean for the neutral ships?
WAGNER: It means that without warning all neutral ships in this area by
night...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely the document speaks for itself.
We don’t need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn’t a lawyer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Then, tell me, please, from what period of
time onward, according to German experiences, did this practice exist in
the Skagerrak?
WAGNER: With certainty from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that
even on 7 April this practice was already in existence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had this area at this period of time, that
is, the 7th or 8th of April, already been declared a danger zone?
WAGNER: No, the first declaration of danger zone for this area took
place on 12 April 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall have a sea-chart handed to you
dealing with the British danger zones, and this shall be Dönitz-92.
Please explain the significance of this chart briefly to the Tribunal.
WAGNER: This chart shows the danger zones in European waters as declared
by England on the basis of German data. The following areas are of
special significance:
First of all, the area in the Bay of Helgoland which on 4 September
1939, that is, on the second day of the war, was declared dangerous.
Then the afore-mentioned danger zone, Skagerrak and the area south of
Norway, which was declared on 12 April 1940. Then the danger zone in the
Baltic, on 14 April 1940; and following upon that, the other danger
zones as declared in the course of the year 1940.
I should like to remark also that, according to my recollection, these
danger zones were all declared mine danger zones, with the exception of
the Channel zone and of the Bay of Biscay, on 17 August 1940. These were
generally dangerous zones.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these areas actually dominated by the
British sea and air forces, or did German traffic still continue?
WAGNER: In these areas there was even very lively German traffic. Thus
the Baltic Sea, which in its entire expanse from East to West, about 400
nautical miles in length, had been declared a danger zone, was in
reality controlled by us during the entire war. In this area there was
an extensive freight traffic, the entire ore traffic from Sweden and the
corresponding exports to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there only traffic of German ships or
also of neutral ships?
WAGNER: This traffic was in German and Swedish ships, but other neutrals
also participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar
situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply
traffic, a large part of the foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was
transported. Of course, during this time both German and neutral ships
were lost.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I assume, therefore, that both German and
neutral seamen lost their lives. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Of course, personnel losses took place as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the German merchantmen, at the time
when these operational zones were declared, armed—that is, at the end
of 1939 or the beginning of 1940?
WAGNER: Until the middle of 1940 German merchantmen were not at all
armed. From then on they were comparatively slightly armed, especially
with antiaircraft weapons.
Transport ships of the Navy had always been armed, that is, government
ships, which supplied German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the
Atlantic.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall submit to you a document of the
Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is found in the Prosecution’s
document book on Page 29. This document deals with a proposal by the
Commander of the U-boats that “...in the Channel, ships with blacked-out
lights may be sunk without warning.” Can you tell me just whose ideas we
are dealing with in the statements set forth in this document?
WAGNER: From the signature found in this document it appears that we are
concerned with a document by a U-boat expert in the Naval Operations
Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that?
WAGNER: Lieutenant Fresdorf, who was my subordinate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are these statements in accord with the
actual circumstances and were they approved by the Naval Operations
Staff, or just what was the situation?
WAGNER: Here we are concerned with the rather romantic ideas of a young
expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The
situation was rather as follows: At this time, that is, in September
1939, the second wave of the British Expeditionary Corps left England
for France. The transports ran mostly during the night and were blacked
out. At this same time an order existed according to which French ships
were neither to be stopped nor attacked; this was still in force for
political reasons.
It is quite obvious that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be
told from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchant ship
cannot, or only with difficulty, be told from a warship.
These orders, therefore, meant that at night, in order to avoid a
mistake, practically no shooting could be done, and therefore the
English troop transport was entirely unhampered. This brought about
really grotesque situations. It was ascertained that a German U-boat in
a favorable position of attack let a fully-loaded English troop
transport ship of 20,000 tons pass by, since there was the possibility
of making a mistake. The Naval Operations Staff agreed completely with
the commanders of the U-boats that no naval war could be carried on in
this manner. If a blacked-out ship sails in a belligerent area, better
still, in an area where there is a large supply and troop transport
traffic, it is liable to suspicion and cannot expect the war to be
halted at night for its sake.
Therefore it was not a question of our explaining or excusing ourselves
for sinking a ship without warning because we had mistaken it, but the
obvious fact at hand was that the blacked-out ship alone was to blame if
it was not properly recognized and was sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these notes we find that the commanders
of U-boats, when sinking a merchant ship without warning, were required
to make the notation in their log that they had taken it for a warship
and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the
commanders of the U-boats. Is that correct, and was it done in actual
practice?
WAGNER: No, we never did anything like that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Flag Officer of the U-boats given
strict and clear orders that blacked-out ships at night in the Channel
might be attacked without warning?
WAGNER: Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the statements of this young officer are
not correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that
these things can be found in the War Diary of the Naval Operations
Staff?
WAGNER: This paper is not a direct part of the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff. The War Diary itself, in which the daily happenings
were recorded, was signed by me, by the Chief of Staff of the Naval
Operations Staff, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Here we are
concerned with the entry of an expert which was destined for a file
collection and motivated by the War Diary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means, then, that the considerations
and opinions of experts were collected and filed no matter whether they
were approved of or put into actual practice?
WAGNER: Yes. All of these files were collected for later purposes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff receive news
of the incidents which happened after the sinking of the _Laconia_, and
did it approve of the measures taken by the Commander of the U-boats?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff, then as always, listened in on all
the wireless messages of the Commander-in-Chief in the _Laconia_ case.
It approved of the measures taken by him, but it would not have been at
all surprised if the Commander of the U-boats had stopped the entire
rescue work at the very first air attack upon the U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff know of the
order of the Commander of the U-boats, dated 17 September, in which
rescue work by U-boats was expressly prohibited?
WAGNER: This order given by the Commander of the U-boats was also heard
by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order interpreted by the Naval
Operations Staff to the effect that it was to be an order for the
shooting of shipwrecked people?
WAGNER: No; no one ever had this idea.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like
to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the
credibility of the statements made by the witness Heisig. But I should
like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting
these questions, since my documents referring to the witness Heisig were
not ruled admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering
to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness
who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The general object is to show how the
testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was
submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “originated”?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, what influence on the
witness Heisig forms the basis of this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? You may
state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the
question is.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to ask the witness, “Did the
witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit,
which was submitted to the High Tribunal as evidence by the Prosecution,
originated?”
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was: What
did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came
about? Is that the question?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you purporting to prove by getting the reports
that Heisig may have made to this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr.
President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, that is, that he
wrongly assumed that he could help a comrade through his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig’s affidavit?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That was for the Prosecution, was it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT: And have you asked to cross-examine him?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I interrogated him about this affidavit, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: You did?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I called his
attention to the contradictions between his affidavit and his testimony
here in Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript on this
point for about 10 days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is
that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his
affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your
Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the
witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and
then he gave his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant
matters. So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbühler to
cross-examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr.
Kranzbühler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his
oral evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler has just said, I think, that he did
actually cross-examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did cross-examine him on that point—on any
differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony.
But he was here to be cross-examined, and if it is going to be suggested
that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought
to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with.
My Lord, I object to its coming in at this stage, after the witness
Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us
either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence there, which
could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have
been prepared for any contradictory evidence now.
My Lord, as a matter of strictness, surely, if I may put it that way,
there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig’s
evidence was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure,
then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to
whether it was admissible or not. But if this evidence is, broadly,
merely directed to the credibility of Heisig’s evidence, then I
respectfully submit it falls within the same objections I made on
Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any
pressure put by the Prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that
that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbühler, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no pressure; but the picture as drawn
was not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbühler—if I misunderstood
him, so much the easier—I understood him to say that he wanted to give
this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant, not influence exerted by the
Prosecution, but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness’ own mind
that he was helping a friend.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. My Lord, then that merely goes to
credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is,
if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we go on
_ad infinitum_.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal will allow this question to
be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to
the admissibility of such questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Admiral Wagner, in December you were in the prison here together with
the witness Heisig. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes, from the first until the fifth of December.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what did Heisig tell you about the
underlying considerations of his affidavit?
WAGNER: He told me the following personally: At the interrogation he had
been told that Lieutenant Hoffmann, officer of the watch of
Kapitänleutnant Eck, had testified that at that time he had listened to
the speech by Admiral Dönitz at Gotenhafen in the autumn of 1942, and
that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivors of
shipwrecks. Heisig had been told:
“If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save
not only Eck and Hoffmann, but also two others who would have
been sentenced to death. You will prevent any kind of judicial
proceeding against Captain Möhle from being instituted. Of
course, you will thus incriminate Grossadmiral Dönitz but the
material against Admiral Dönitz is of such tremendous weight
that his life has been forfeited anyway.”
Further he told me, and without prompting, that at that time, on the
occasion of the speech by the Admiral Dönitz, he had been deeply
distressed. He had just returned from Lübeck, where he had experienced
and seen the frightful consequences of an air attack; that is he had
perhaps not experienced it, but at least he had seen the consequences.
His mind was set on revenge for these brutal measures, and he considered
it possible that this emotional state might have influenced his
interpretation of Grossadmiral Dönitz’ speech.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now we shall turn to a different point.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course,
recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer
here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However,
we can consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal
for the permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich; he can be
very easily reached.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when on were you admiral for special
tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and what were your
tasks in that capacity?
WAGNER: From the end of June 1944 onward, and the purpose of my
assignment was the following: After the success of the Anglo-Saxon
invasion in northern France, Admiral Dönitz counted on an increased
tension in the military situation. He believed that one day he might be
forced to leave the Naval Operations Staff, either to remain permanently
at the Führer’s headquarters, or at least for a longer period of time,
in order to keep up with the development of the entire war situation, or
because a transfer of the Naval Operations Staff might be necessary
because of the increasingly heavy air attacks on Berlin. For this
purpose the Grossadmiral wanted an older and experienced naval officer
in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well-versed in the
problems of sea warfare and who was acquainted with the duties and tasks
of the Naval Operations Staff.
My mission was, therefore, a sort of liaison between the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Operations Staff and the other
offices of the High Command for the duration of the Grossadmiral’s
absence from the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you accompany the Grossadmiral regularly
on his visits to the Führer’s headquarters?
WAGNER: Yes; from the period mentioned I was present regularly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I hand you a list of these visits which
has been submitted by the Prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in
the document book of the Prosecution on Page 56. Please look at this
list and tell me whether the dates recorded there are essentially
correct.
WAGNER: The dates are essentially correct. At the end the list is not
complete, for the period from 3—no; from 10 April until 21 April 1945
is missing. On that day the Grossadmiral participated for the last time
at the conferences in the Führer’s headquarters. Beyond that, it seems
to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I also do not
know according to what point of view or with what idea in mind this was
compiled.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If you carefully examine this list of
people, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz was always with these
people on the dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons
were at the Führer’s headquarters at the same time he was? Can you still
recall these points?
WAGNER: Yes. If these people participated in the military conferences,
then Admiral Dönitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high
positions were frequently at the Führer’s headquarters who did not
participate in the military conferences and whom the Grossadmiral did
not see unless he had special conversations with them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For what reason did Admiral Dönitz...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is
saying that any one of these minutes is incomplete, I should be very
grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German
minutes here and confirm the affidavit.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe the witness said only that
additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the
end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just
what details I should question him about. Perhaps the Prosecution will
deal with that matter later in cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if
he can.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] Can you tell me more specifically as to any
one of these dates, whether those present are correctly named or whether
there were other people present, or whether Grossadmiral Dönitz was not
present?
WAGNER: I can tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it
never occurred that neither Field Marshal Keitel nor Generaloberst Jodl
was present at the headquarters. For example, on 4 March 1945 neither
one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6 March or 8 March. Therefore I
conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other places, however,
the name of Jodl appears; for example, on 18 March 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point seems to be whether
Admiral Dönitz was present in the Führer’s headquarters on all of these
days. Can you confirm that point?
WAGNER: Of course, from memory I cannot confirm that with reference to
every single day. However, I am under the impression that the list is
correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the
Grossadmiral corresponds with the notes in this list, and spot checks
show me that the dates are correct.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why did Grossadmiral Dönitz come to the
Führer’s headquarters? What were the reasons?
WAGNER: The chief reason for the frequent visits, which became even more
frequent toward the end of the war, was the desire to keep up with the
development of the general war situation so that he, Dönitz, could lead
the Navy and carry on the naval war accordingly. Beyond that, questions
usually came up which the Admiral could not decide for himself out of
his own authority and which, because of their importance, he wanted to
bring up personally or to discuss with the representatives of the OKW
and of the General Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In each of these cases was there a personal
report of the Grossadmiral to the Führer?
WAGNER: This is what happened: Most of the problems and reports for the
Führer were taken care of during the conference in connection with the
Admiral’s report on the naval warfare situation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment. Was the Admiral always present
at the military conferences when he was at the headquarters?
WAGNER: The Admiral took part at least in the discussion of the main
session every day.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the main session?
WAGNER: At noon every day there was a military conference which lasted
several hours. This was the main conference. In addition, for months,
sessions, including special sessions, were held in the evening or at
night, at which the Admiral participated only when very important
matters were to be discussed—matters of special importance for the
conduct of the war. Then, as I said, he participated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now you say that most of the questions which
the Grossadmiral had to put to the Führer were taken care of at the
military conference. Were there any personal reports besides this?
WAGNER: Personal reports on the part of the Grossadmiral to Hitler took
place very seldom; on the other hand, personal discussions with the OKW
and the other military offices at the headquarters took place daily.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to know something more in
detail about this so-called “Lagebesprechung,” the conferences.
The Prosecution seem to consider this as a sort of War Cabinet at which,
for instance, Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer
about questions of production, Himmler about security questions. Is this
a correct picture? Who took part in these sessions, what people
participated regularly and who attended only once in a while?
WAGNER: The participants at the conferences were generally the
following:
Regular participants: from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl,
General Buhle, Post Captain Assmann, Major Büchs, and a few more Chiefs
of Staff. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or
two aides, and as a rule also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air
Force with one aide. Further regular participants were: the Chief of the
Army Personnel Office, who was Chief Adjutant to the Führer; General
Bodenschatz, until 20 July 1944; Vice Admiral Voss who was the permanent
deputy of the Grossadmiral; Gruppenführer Fegelein, as Himmler’s
permanent deputy; Ambassador Hewel; Minister Sonnleitner, permanent
deputy of the Foreign Minister; Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich.
Frequently the following participated: the Commander-in-Chief of the
Luftwaffe; less frequently, Himmler. In addition to these there was a
varying participation on the part of special officers, mainly from the
General Staff of the Army, and on the part of higher front commanders of
the Army and of the Air Force who happened to be in headquarters. Beyond
that, toward the end of the war Reich Minister Speer in his capacity as
Armament Minister also participated in an increasing measure, and in
rare cases the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, both as listeners
at the conferences. I believe that is the complete list.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who reported at these conferences and what
was reported on?
WAGNER: These sessions were for the sole purpose of informing Hitler
about the war situation—about the Eastern situation through the General
Staff of the Army, and through the OKW about the situation in all other
theaters of war and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The
report took place as follows:
First of all, the Chief of General Staff of the Army reported about the
Eastern situation; then Generaloberst Jodl reported on the situation in
all other theaters of war on land. Next, Post Captain Assmann of the OKW
reported on the naval situation. In between, frequent, often hour-long,
conversations took place which dealt with special military problems,
panzer problems, aerial problems and such. And after the aerial problems
were dealt with the discussion was at an end, and we left the room. I
frequently saw that Ambassador Hewel went in to Hitler with a batch of
reports, apparently from the Foreign Office, and reported on them
without the rest of us knowing what they contained.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these conferences was there voting or was
there consultation, or who gave the orders?
WAGNER: In these conferences all military questions were discussed and
frequently decisions were reached by the Führer, that is, if no further
preparations were necessary for a decision.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What for example did the Foreign Minister
Von Ribbentrop do there when he was present?
WAGNER: I only saw Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop perhaps five or six
times at these conferences, and I cannot remember that he ever said
anything during the entire session. He was only present at the
conference for his own information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How about Minister Speer, what did he do?
WAGNER: Minister Speer also very seldom brought in armament problems
during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were always
discussed between Hitler and Speer in special discussions. However, some
exceptions may have occurred.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was Himmler doing there, or his
permanent deputy Fegelein? Did they discuss questions of security, or
what was their mission?
WAGNER: No. During the military conference security problems were never
discussed. Himmler and his deputy appeared very frequently in connection
with the Waffen-SS, and Fegelein had always to give reports about the
setup, organization, arming, transportation and engagement of the SS
divisions. At this time the SS divisions, according to my impression,
still played a very important part, for ostensibly they represented a
strategic reserve and were much discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have a record of the meeting which was
written by you. It has the Number GB-209. It is not found in the
document book. It says in the third paragraph—and I am just reading one
sentence:
“The Deputy of the Reichsführer-SS at the Führer’s headquarters,
SS Gruppenführer Fegelein, transmits the request of the
Reichsführer as to when he can count on the arrival of the
‘Panther’”—those are tanks—“coming from Libau.”
Is this typical of SS Gruppenführer Fegelein’s work?
WAGNER: Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with at
every one of these sessions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner appeared
several times also. Did he speak or report?
WAGNER: I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner’s part
during one of these military conferences.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What role did Admiral Dönitz play at the
session discussions?
WAGNER: Even when Grossadmiral Dönitz was present the naval situation
was reported by the deputy from the OKW, Commodore Assmann. However, the
Admiral used this occasion to present, in connection with the individual
theaters of war, or in summary at the end, those questions which he had
in mind. The Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion on
questions dealing with air or land warfare which had no connection with
the conduct of the naval war. In his statements he strictly confined
himself to the sphere of the Navy, and very energetically objected if
someone else during the session tried to interfere in questions of naval
warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have come to a break. If
the Tribunal agrees to declare a recess...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order
to sit in closed session.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, as time went on a close
relationship developed between Admiral Dönitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this
due to the fact that the Admiral was particularly ready to comply with
the Führer’s wishes?
WAGNER: No, not at all. Admiral Dönitz’ activity as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was
Hitler’s intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say,
the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already
rejected that plan.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That story is already known, Admiral. You
need not go into it in detail.
WAGNER: Very well. Apart from that, Hitler’s respect for Dönitz was due
to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely
reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular
importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments,
failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without
digression, objectively, and simply. As an example, I should like to
mention that the Admiral had given me the order...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing.
Surely the general statement is quite sufficient.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Admiral in any way show himself
particularly willing to comply with the Führer’s political wishes or
those of the Party?
WAGNER: No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to
the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for
the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is
generally known that the Navy retained its original religious
organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew.
The second request made by the Party was that, modeled on the Russian
example, political commissars should be set up within the Armed Forces.
On that occasion Admiral Dönitz went to see Hitler and prevented the
carrying out of that plan. When after 20 July 1944 Bormann nevertheless
succeeded in getting the so-called “NSFO”—the National Socialist
Leadership Officers—introduced into the Armed Forces, it did not happen
in the way the Party wished, by appointing political commissars. It was
merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of the
commander and who could not in any way interfere with the leadership of
the troops. The third case was the intention on the part of the Party to
take away from, the Armed Forces the political penal cases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This case is also already known, Admiral.
You kept the records of the visits at the Führer’s headquarters, is that
correct?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of these records have been
introduced as evidence in this Court. Will you please explain to the
Tribunal what was the purpose of keeping these records of visits of
commanders-in-chief to the Führer’s headquarters?
WAGNER: The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, the Chief of the Naval
Armaments, and the Chief of the General Navy Department—that is to say,
the three leading men in the High Command of the Navy—were to be
informed by means of these records of all happenings which took place in
the presence of the Admiral, as far as they were of any interest to the
Navy. That was one of my tasks.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have just said “informed about
happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral.” Does that
mean that he himself must have heard everything that has been put down
in these records?
WAGNER: Not necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during
situation reports, when they took place in a large room and when
subjects were discussed which did not interest him so much, the Admiral
would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of
his own or discuss Navy questions with other participants in the
meeting. It was possible that on such occasions I heard things and put
them down in the record which the Admiral himself did not hear. But, of
course, he would know about them later when he saw my record.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am going to have shown to you one of your
own records of discussions on 20 February 1945. It is Exhibit Number
GB-209, and it is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution.
This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva
Convention. Will you please describe exactly what happened as you
remember it?
WAGNER: Approximately two or three days before the date in this
record—in other words, on or about 17 or 18 February 1945—Admiral Voss
telephoned me from headquarters, which at that time was situated in
Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda
to induce our troops to desert in the West, Hitler had stated his
intention to leave the Geneva Convention.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did he hope to achieve?
WAGNER: According to my first impression at the time, the intention was
evidently to express to the troops and the German people that captivity
would no longer bring any advantage. Thereupon, I immediately telephoned
to the Naval Operations Staff, since I considered the intention to be
completely wrong, and I asked them for a military opinion and an opinion
from the point of view of international law.
On the 19th, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once
more referred to this question, but this time not in connection with
happenings on the western front; but in connection with the air attacks
by the western enemies on open German towns—attacks had just been made
on Dresden and Weimar.
He ordered the Admiral to examine the effects of leaving the Geneva
Convention from the point of view of naval warfare. An immediate answer
was not expected and it was not given. Generaloberst Jodl was also quite
strongly opposed to these intentions and he sought the Admiral’s
support. Thereupon it was agreed to have a conference and that is the
conference which is mentioned in the record under Figure 2.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the conference of 20 February,
Admiral?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who participated in that conference?
WAGNER: Admiral Dönitz, Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel, and
myself.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the subject?
WAGNER: The subject was the Führer’s intention of renouncing the Geneva
Convention. The result was the unanimous opinion that such a step would
be a mistake. Apart from military consideration we especially held the
conviction that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the Armed
Forces and the German people would lose confidence in the leadership,
since the Geneva Convention was generally considered to be the
conception of international law.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your notes there is a sentence, “One
would have to carry out the measures considered necessary without
warning and at all costs ‘to save face’ with the outer world.” What is
the significance of that sentence?
WAGNER: That sentence means that on no account should there be any
irresponsible actions. If the leaders considered it necessary to
introduce countermeasures against air attacks on open German towns, or
against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one should
confine oneself to such countermeasures which appear necessary and
justifiable. One should not put oneself in the wrong before the world
and one’s own people by totally repudiating all the Geneva Conventions
and announce measures which went far beyond what appeared to be
necessary and justifiable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any concrete measures discussed in this
connection or were any such measures even thought of?
WAGNER: No. I can remember very well that no specific measures were
discussed at all during the various conferences. We were mainly
concerned with the total question of whether to repudiate the Geneva
Convention or not.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever learn anything about a
so-called intention on Adolf Hitler’s part to shoot 10,000 prisoners of
war as a reprisal for the air attack on Dresden?
WAGNER: No, I have never heard anything about that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The expression “to save face”—doesn’t that
mean secrecy, hiding the true facts?
WAGNER: In my opinion it was certain that there was no question of
secrecy, for neither the countermeasures against air attacks nor the
measures of intimidation against desertion could be effective if they
were concealed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long did this whole conversation which
you recorded last?
WAGNER: Will you please tell me which conversation you mean?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The discussion of 20 February which contains
the sentences which I have just read to you.
WAGNER: It took perhaps ten minutes or a quarter of an hour.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that your record is a very brief
condensed summary of the conversation?
WAGNER: Yes, it only contains the important points.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz also submit his
objections to the Führer?
WAGNER: As far as I recollect, it never reached that point. One became
convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Admiral,
could gather from the Admiral’s expression and the attitude of the
others that they rejected his plans. We passed our views on to the High
Command of the Armed Forces in writing and heard no more about the whole
matter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another record
which is submitted under GB-210. It is on the next page of the document
book of the Prosecution and it refers to conferences at the Führer’s
headquarters from 29 June to 1 July 1944.
You will find an entry under the date of 1 July which reads, “In
connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says that
terror can be subdued only with terror.” Was this statement made during
a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Dönitz or in which connection?
WAGNER: This is a statement made by Hitler during a situation discussion
and addressed neither to Admiral Dönitz nor to the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Well, if it was not addressed to the Navy,
then why did you include it in your record?
WAGNER: I included in my record all statements which could be of any
interest to the Navy. The High Command of the Navy was, of course,
interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were
repaired in Copenhagen; and apart from that Copenhagen was a naval base.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to whom did you pass this record? Who
received it?
WAGNER: According to the distribution list on Page 4, the paper went
only to the Commander-in-Chief and department 1 of the Naval Operations
Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff have anything
to do with the treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?
WAGNER: No, nothing at all. From 1943 on the shipyards were entirely
under the Ministry of Armaments.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution sees in this statement and
its transmission to a department of the OKW an invitation to deal
ruthlessly with the inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the
meaning of this record?
WAGNER: There can be no question of that. The only purpose of this
record was to inform the Departments of the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have another document
shown to you. It is Exhibit Number USA-544. It is in the document book
of the Prosecution on Pages 64 and 65. It is a note by the international
law expert in the Naval Operations Staff regarding the treatment of
saboteurs. Do you know this note?
WAGNER: Yes. I have initialed it on the first page.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of that note you will find the
sentence:
“As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be investigated
whether the occurrence cannot be used, after reporting to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to make sure that the treatment
of members of Commando troops is absolutely clear to all the
departments concerned.”
Was this report made to Admiral Dönitz who at that time had been
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ten days?
WAGNER: No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head
of it will show.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain that, please?
WAGNER: The international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff IA
made this suggestion through the Operations Office IA to me as Chief of
the Operational Department. The chief of the IA Section in a handwritten
notice beside his initials, wrote, “The subordinate commanders have been
informed.” That means that he had objected to the proposal of the
international law expert and considered that an explanation of the
orders within the Navy was superfluous. I investigated these matters and
I decided that the operations officer was right. I sent for the
international law expert, Dr. Eckardt, informed him orally of my
decision, and returned this document to him. Thus the suggestion to
report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made in connection with the
explanation of this order was not actually carried out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember whether Admiral Dönitz on
some later occasion received reports on this Commando order?
WAGNER: No, I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have submitted to you GB-208, which is a
record regarding the case of a motor torpedo boat at Bergen. It is the
case which is contained in the British document book on Pages 66 and 67.
Have you ever heard about this incident before this Trial?
WAGNER: No. I heard about it for the first time on the occasion of
interrogations in connection with these proceedings.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I gather from the files of the British
court-martial proceedings, which have been submitted by the Prosecution
during cross-examination, that before the shooting of the crew of that
motor torpedo boat there had been two telephone conversations, between
the Chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo, and
between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a
conversation took place between the SD at Oslo and yourself or one of
the representatives in the High Command?
WAGNER: I certainly had no such conversation, and as far as I know
neither did any other officer in my department or in the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that the
SD at Oslo might get in touch with the High Command of the Navy?
WAGNER: No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo
wanted to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then they
could only do so through their own superior authority, and that is the
RSHA.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now put to you another document; it is
Exhibit GB-212 which appears on Page 75 of the document book of the
Prosecution. It mentions an example of a commandant of a German
prisoner-of-war camp and it says he had communists who had attracted
attention among the inmates suddenly and quietly removed by the guards.
Do you know of this incident?
WAGNER: Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received the
report from a prisoner-of-war—a man who had been severely injured and
who had been exchanged—that the German commandant of a prisoner-of-war
camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_
were detained, had secretly had a man of his crew killed because he had
been active as a spy and traitor.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But this order does not mention the word
“spy.” It says “communist.” What is the explanation?
THE PRESIDENT: It does not say “communist.” It says “communists” in the
plural.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Communists,” plural.
WAGNER: In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of
affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from
tracing the incident and making difficulties for the senior sergeant in
question. Thus, a different version was chosen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It was the opinion of the Soviet Prosecution
that this showed there was a plan for the silent removal of communists.
Can you tell us anything about the origin of this order, whether such a
plan existed and whether it had ever come under discussion?
WAGNER: First of all the order was addressed to those personnel offices
which were responsible for choosing young potential officers and
noncommissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven
personnel offices. Beyond that I can only say that of course...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a moment, Admiral, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, is it necessary to go into all this
detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making
away with the people of this sort or was there not—not all the details
about how the order came to be made.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In that case I shall put the question this
way: Was there any order or any desire in the Navy to kill communists
inconspicuously and systematically?
WAGNER: No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there
were a considerable number of communists in the Navy. That was known to
every superior officer. The overwhelming majority of those communists
did their duty as Germans just as any other German in the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz has been accused by the
Prosecution because as late as the spring of 1945 he urged his people to
hold out obstinately to the end. The Prosecution considers that evidence
of the fact that he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of
the Navy consider this to be so?
WAGNER: No, the Admiral’s attitude was not considered to be political
fanaticism. To them it meant that he was carrying out his ordinary duty
as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that this was the view of the
great majority of the entire Navy, the men and the noncommissioned
officers as well as the officers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions
to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, you have already briefly sketched the
positions you have held. In supplementing I should like to make quite
sure who held a leading position in the Naval Operations Staff under
Grossadmiral Raeder in the decisive years before and after the outbreak
of the war. Who was the Chief of Staff during the two years before the
war, and at the beginning of the war?
WAGNER: The Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff from 1938 until
1941 was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until after Raeder’s retirement
it was Admiral Fricke.
DR. SIEMERS: Those, therefore, were the two officers who worked in the
highest posts under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: They were the immediate advisers of the Admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the Naval Operations Staff had several departments?
WAGNER: Yes, it consisted of several departments, which were given
consecutive numbers.
DR. SIEMERS: And which was the most important department?
WAGNER: The most important department of the Naval Operations Staff was
the Operations Department, which was known as Number 1.
DR. SIEMERS: And the other departments, 2, 3—what did they do?
WAGNER: They were the Signals and Communications Department and the
Information Department.
DR. SIEMERS: Who was the chief of the Operations Department?
WAGNER: From 1937 until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until
after Raeder’s retirement I was the chief of that department.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words, for many years you worked under Admiral
Raeder. First of all I should like to ask you to speak briefly about
Raeder’s basic attitude during the time you were working in the Naval
Operations Staff.
WAGNER: Under Admiral Raeder the Navy was working for a peaceful
development in agreement with Britain. The foremost questions were those
regarding the type of ships, training, and tactical schooling. Admiral
Raeder never referred to aggressive wars during any conference which I
attended. Nor did he at any time ask us to make any preparations in that
direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that in 1940 and in 1941 Raeder declared
himself emphatically against a war with Russia?
WAGNER: Yes, he was very strongly opposed to a war with Russia, and that
for two reasons; first, he considered that to break the treaty of
friendship with Russia was wrong and inadmissible, and secondly, for
strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire strength should be
concentrated against Britain. When in the autumn of 1940 it appeared
that the invasion of Britain could not be carried out, the Admiral
worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean to keep open an outlet
against Britain’s policy of encirclement.
DR. SIEMERS: The Navy had rather a lot to do with Russia during the
friendship period between Russia and Germany in the way of deliveries.
As far as you know did everything in that respect run smoothly?
WAGNER: Yes, I know that a large number of deliveries from the Navy
stocks went to Russia; for instance, uncompleted ships, heavy guns, and
other war material.
DR. SIEMERS: And the Navy, of course, always made efforts to maintain
the friendly relations laid down in the Pact?
WAGNER: Yes, that was the Admiral’s opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, Admiral Raeder has been accused by the
Prosecution that he had never bothered about international law and that
he broke international law conventions as a matter of principle if it
suited him. Can you express a general opinion about Raeder’s attitude in
that respect?
WAGNER: Yes; that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder considered it most
important that every measure for naval warfare should be examined from
the point of view of international law. For that purpose we had a
special expert on international law in the Naval Operations Staff with
whom we in the Operations Department had almost daily contact.
DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution of
advising a war against the United States and trying to get Japan to go
to war with the United States. May I ask for your opinion on that?
WAGNER: I consider this charge completely unjustified. I know that
Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to the fact that all naval
war measures—especially in the critical year of 1941—were to be
examined very closely as to the effects they might have on the United
States of America. In fact he refrained from taking quite a number of
militarily perfectly justified measures in order to prevent incidents
with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941 he withdrew the
submarines from a large area off the coast of the U.S.A. although that
area could certainly be regarded as the open sea. He forbade mine-laying
action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax,
Canada, to prevent, at all costs, the possibility of a United States
ship striking a mine. And finally, he also forbade attacks on British
destroyers in the North Atlantic because the fifty destroyers which had
been turned over to England by the United States created the dangerous
possibility of confusing the British and American destroyers. All this
was done at a time when the United States, while still at peace,
occupied Iceland, when British warships were being repaired in American
shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units
should be reported to the British fleet, and when finally President
Roosevelt in July 1941 gave his forces the order to attack any German
submarines they sighted.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval
Operations Staff that there was no risk in a war against America and
that the fleet or the American submarines were not much good?
WAGNER: No, Admiral Raeder as an expert would never have made such a
statement.
DR. SIEMERS: On the contrary, did not Raeder expressly speak of the
strength of the American fleet and that one could not fight
simultaneously two such great sea-powers as America and Great Britain?
WAGNER: Yes, it was perfectly clear to him and to us that America’s
entry into the war would mean a very substantial strengthening of the
enemy forces.
DR. SIEMERS: Now on one occasion Admiral Raeder suggested in his war
diary that Japan should attack Singapore. Was there any discussion about
Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a
complete surprise, both to the Admiral and to the Naval Operations Staff
and, in my opinion, to every other German department.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there no continuous naval-military discussions and
conferences between Japan and Germany?
WAGNER: No, before Japan’s entry into the war there were no military
discussions according to my conviction.
DR. SIEMERS: I should now like to show you Document C-41, Mr. President,
this is Exhibit GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it
in Document Book 10a for Raeder. I do not know whether the Tribunal
already has it. It is as yet not contained in the trial brief against
Raeder. In the newly compiled: Document Book 10a, it is on Page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You can offer it in evidence now, if you want to, so you
can put it to the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has submitted it; yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: This concerns a document signed by Admiral Fricke, and it
is dated 3 June 1940. It is headed “Questions of Expansion of Areas and
Bases.” That document contains detailed statements on future plans.
[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to ask you if Raeder gave the
order to prepare this memorandum or how did this memorandum come to be
written?
WAGNER: Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum.
This constitutes the personal, theoretical ideas of Admiral Fricke
regarding the possible developments in the future. They are quite
fantastic, and they had no practical significance.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this note talked about or discussed in
any large group in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, in my opinion only the Operations officers had knowledge of
this document, which by its very form shows that it is not a
well-thought-out study made by order of Grossadmiral Raeder but an _ad
hoc_ jotting-down of thoughts which occurred to Admiral Fricke at the
moment.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this document passed on to any outsiders
at all?
WAGNER: I think I can remember that this document was not sent to any
outside office but remained in the Operations Department. The
Grossadmiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it,
particularly since this document shows that he did not initial it.
DR. SIEMERS: You have a photostat copy of that document?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Are there any other initials on it which might show that it
was put before Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally
handled in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Every document that was to be put before the Admiral had on its
first page in the left margin a note: “v.A.v.,” which means “to be
submitted before dispatch,” or “n.E.v.,” “to be submitted after
receipt,” or else “to be reported during situation reports.” And then at
that place the Admiral would initial it with a green pencil, or the
officers of his personal staff would make a note indicating that it had
been submitted to him.
DR. SIEMERS: And there are no such marks on this document?
WAGNER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to show you Document C-38, which is a
document of the Prosecution bearing the number Exhibit GB-223. It is
contained in the Prosecution’s document book on Raeder, Page 11.
The war between Germany and Russia began on 22 June 1941. According to
the last page but one of the document which you have before you, the OKW
as early as 15 June—a week before the outbreak of the war—ordered the
use of arms against enemy submarines south of the Memel line, the
southern tip of Oeland, at the request of the Naval Operations Staff.
The Prosecution is basing the accusation on this document and once more
referring to an aggressive war. Unfortunately, the Prosecution has only
submitted the last page of this document. It did not produce the first
and second page of the document. If it had done so, then this accusation
would probably have been dropped. May I read to you, Witness, what is
contained there; and I quote:
“On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the submarines placed as
outposts on both sides of Bornholm, as precautionary measure,
reported at 2000 hours an unknown submarine in the vicinity of
Adlergrund (20 miles southwest of Bornholm) which had surfaced
and was proceeding on a westerly course and which answered a
recognition signal call with a letter signal which had no
particular significance.”
That ends the quotation.
May I ask you to explain what it means that this submarine did not reply
to the recognition signal call?
WAGNER: In time of war the warships of one’s own fleet have an
arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, the recognition
signal has a call and a reply which immediately identifies the ship as
belonging to one’s own fleet. If a recognition signal is wrongly
answered, it proves that it is a foreign vessel.
DR. SIEMERS: As far as you can remember, were there any other clues
showing that ships appeared in the Baltic sea which were recognized as
enemy ships?
WAGNER: Yes. I remember that there were individual cases where unknown
submarines were observed off the German Baltic ports. Subsequently it
was found, by comparing the stations of our own submarines, that these
were indeed enemy vessels.
DR. SIEMERS: Were these facts the reason which caused the Naval
Operations Staff to ask for the use of weapons?
WAGNER: Yes, these very facts.
DR. SIEMERS: A similar case has been made the subject of an accusation
in connection with Greece. It has been ascertained here in Court from
the War Diary that on 30 December 1939 the Naval Operations Staff asked
that Greek ships in the American blockade zone around Great Britain
should be treated as hostile. Since Greece was neutral at the time,
there has been an accusation against Raeder of a breach of neutrality.
May I ask you to tell us the reasons which caused the Naval Operations
Staff and the Chief, Raeder, to make such a request to the OKW?
WAGNER: We had had news that Greece had placed the bulk of its merchant
fleet at the disposal of England and that these Greek vessels were
sailing under British command.
DR. SIEMERS: And it is correct that Greek vessels in general were not
treated as hostile, but only vessels in the American blockade zone
around England?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: The next case, which is somewhat similar, is that which
occurred in June 1942, when the Naval Operations Staff made an
application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although
Brazil at that time was still a neutral. The war with Brazil started
some two months later on 22 August. What reasons were there for such a
step?
WAGNER: We were receiving reports from submarines from the waters around
South America, according to which they were being attacked by ships
which could only have started from Brazilian bases. The first thing we
did was to refer back and get these questions clarified and confirmed.
Moreover, I think I can remember personally that at that time it was
already generally known that Brazil was giving the use of sea and air
bases to the United States with whom we were at war.
DR. SIEMERS: So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part
of Brazil?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to submit to you Documents C-176 and D-658.
Document C-176 has the number Exhibit GB-228. These two documents are
based on the Commando Order, that is, the order to destroy sabotage
troops. The Prosecution has charged Raeder with an incident which
occurred in December 1942 in the Gironde estuary at Bordeaux. In
Document C-176, on the last page, you will find something which I would
like to quote.
“Shooting of the two captured Englishmen took place by a
firing-squad, numbering one officer and 16 men, detailed by the
port commander at Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the
SD and by order of the Führer.”
Previous entries, which I do not want to quote separately and which
portray the same things, show that the SD had intervened directly and
had got into direct touch with the Führer’s headquarters.
I now ask you whether the Naval Operations Staff had heard anything at
all about this matter before these two prisoners were shot, or whether
they knew anything about this direct order from Hitler which is
mentioned in this connection?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had nothing to do with a direct order
for the shooting of people in Bordeaux. The Naval Operations Staff knew
the tactical course of events of this sabotage undertaking in Bordeaux
and nothing at the time beyond that.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, this case was not put to the Naval Operations
Staff or to Admiral Raeder, and it was not discussed by them?
WAGNER: Yes. I am certain that that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the
fact that this war diary is by no means the war diary which has been
frequently mentioned, the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, but
the war diary of the Naval Commander west, and was therefore unknown to
the Naval Operations Staff. That is why the Naval Operations Staff did
not know of this case.
THE PRESIDENT: You are referring now to Document C-176?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, and also to D-658, which is the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it?
DR. SIEMERS: This is D-658, which shows the following: According to the
OKW communiqué, these two soldiers had in the meantime been shot. The
measure would be in keeping with the special order by the Führer. That
has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows—and I shall refer
to this later—that the Naval Operations Staff knew nothing about the
entire episode because this shows an entry dated 9 December, whereas the
whole affair happened on the 11th.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I am now submitting to you Document UK C-124.
Mr. President, C-124 corresponds to USSR-130. This document deals with a
communication from the Naval Operations Staff, dated 29 September 1941,
addressed to Group North, and it deals with the future of the city of
Petersburg. This report to Group North says that the Führer had decided
to wipe the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. The Navy
itself had nothing to do with that report. Despite that, this report was
sent to Group North.
Witness, I will return to this point, but I, would like to ask you
first—you have a photostatic copy of the original—to tell me whether
Raeder could have seen this document before it was dispatched?
WAGNER: According to my previous statements Admiral Raeder did not see
this document since there are no marks or initials to that effect.
DR. SIEMERS: And now the more important question on this point. In view
of the terrible communication which is mentioned by Hitler in Point 2,
why did the Naval Operations Staff transmit it even though the Navy
itself had nothing to do with it?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had asked that in bombarding,
occupying or attacking Leningrad the dockyards, wharf installations, and
all other special naval installations be spared so that they might be
used as bases later on. That request was turned down by Hitler’s
statement as contained in this document, as can be seen from Point 3.
We had to communicate this fact to Admiral Carls so that he could act
accordingly and because in the case of a later occupation of Leningrad
he could not count on this port as a base.
DR. SIEMERS: Because of the significance of this testimony, I would like
to quote to the Tribunal the decisive point to which the witness just
referred, and that is III of USSR-130. I quote:
“The original requests of the Navy to spare the dock, harbor,
and other installations important from the Navy viewpoint are
known to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Compliance with
these requests is not possible, because of the fundamental aim
of the action against Petersburg.”
That was the decisive point which the SKL told Admiral Carls as
commander of Group North.
WAGNER: That was the sole reason for this communication.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether Admiral Carls did anything with this
document? Did he transmit it to any one, or do you not know anything
about that?
WAGNER: As far as I am informed, this communication was not passed on;
and it was not the intention that it should be passed on for it was
meant solely for Group North. On the strength of this document, Admiral
Carls stopped the preparations which had already been made for using the
Leningrad naval installations later on and made the personnel available
for other purposes. That is the only measure which the Navy took on the
basis of this communication and the only measure which could have been
taken.
DR. SIEMERS: I should tell the Tribunal that accordingly I will submit,
under Number 111 in my Document Book Raeder, an affidavit which contains
this fact, which the witness also points out, that nothing was passed on
by Group North so that the commanding naval officers never learned of
this document.
This concerns an affidavit by Admiral Bütow who at that time was
Commander-in-Chief in Finland, and I shall come back to this point when
I present the case on behalf of Admiral Raeder.