DR. DIX: Witness, you have stated that the SD and the Gestapo, in fact,
the whole Police had no jurisdiction over members of the Armed
Forces—for instance, they could not arrest members of the Armed Forces.
Did I understand you correctly?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that all the officers, or in any case
most of them, who were suspected of being involved in the affair of 20
July, were arrested by members of the SD and sent for questioning by the
SD and the SD office, where they were arrested, to prisons under the SD
and there held under SD guard and not under any military guard?
DÖNITZ: No, I don’t know that, because after 20 July, as far as I can
remember, an order was issued specifically stating that the SD were to
give to branches of the Armed Forces the names of those soldiers who had
participated in the Putsch and that these soldiers were then to be
dismissed from the branches of the Armed Forces, particularly to keep
the principle of noninterference in the branches of the Armed Forces
from being violated, and that then the SD would have the right to take
action.
DR. DIX: That order did come out, but perhaps we can come to an
explanation of this order if you answer further questions which I want
to put to you.
Do you know, Witness, that the examination, the interrogation of those
officers arrested in connection with 20 July, was carried out
exclusively by officials of the SD or the Gestapo and not by officers,
that is, members of military courts?
DÖNITZ: I can only judge as to the two cases which I had in the Navy. I
received information that these two officers had participated. I had
questions put to them, and they confirmed it. Thereupon these officers
were dismissed from the Navy. After that the interrogation was, of
course, not carried out by the Navy; but I know that my Navy court
judges still concerned themselves about the officers and the
interrogation.
DR. DIX: Who dismissed these men?
DÖNITZ: The Navy.
DR. DIX: That is you.
DÖNITZ: Yes.
DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that following upon the investigation
regarding 20 July a committee of generals was formed under the
chairmanship of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I heard about that.
DR. DIX: And that this committee, on the basis of the records of the SD,
decided whether the officer in question was to be dismissed from the
Army or would have to leave the Army, so that he could be turned over to
the civil court, namely, the People’s Court?
DÖNITZ: That is not known to me.
DR. DIX: May I put it to you that I am of the opinion that the order
which you have described correctly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, you are bound by his answer. He said he didn’t
know anything about it. You can’t then put to him what you say happened.
If he says he doesn’t know anything about it, you must accept his
answer.
DR. DIX: I just wanted to put to him that the order to which I referred
earlier, which actually exists and which deals with the decision of
whether a person is to be dismissed from the Army and surrendered to the
civil authorities, has to do with this committee presided over by Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt, which had to decide whether the officer in
question was to be dismissed and thereby turned over, not to a military
court, but to the People’s Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood the witness to say he didn’t know anything
about it. I think you are bound by that answer.
DR. DIX: May I add something?
THE PRESIDENT: Who are you offering these questions for? You are counsel
for the Defendant Schacht.
DR. DIX: My colleague’s questions concerning Keitel were put to
challenge the credibility of the witness Gisevius. Schacht’s defense is
naturally interested in the credibility of the witness Gisevius. The
Defense has put three questions in connection with Gisevius’
credibility, therefore, concerning the case for Schacht. May I add
something?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. DIX: I ask the questions to which your Lordship is objecting only
because I think it possible that the answer of the witness may have been
based on a mistake, namely, that he confused the general regulation
stating that the soldier concerned must be dismissed before the SD could
lay hands on him with the order stating that Von Rundstedt’s committee
would have to decide whether the officer in question was to be dismissed
from the Army so that he could be handed over to the People’s Court, not
to the SD. The SD merely carried out the investigation, the preliminary
interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you want to ask him now?
DR. DIX: Admiral, I think you have understood my question, or do you
want me to repeat it?
DÖNITZ: I cannot tell you any more than I have already done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, as Commander of Submarines, you did once have
some official contact with Sauckel?
DÖNITZ: No, not official but private.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the occasion?
DÖNITZ: A submarine, which was to go into the Atlantic for 8 weeks, had
reported to me that it had been discovered after leaving port that
Gauleiter Sauckel had crept aboard. I immediately sent a radio message
ordering the submarine to turn back and put him on the nearest outpost
steamer.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was Sauckel’s motive?
DÖNITZ: No doubt a belligerent one. He wanted to go to sea again.
DR. SERVATIUS: But he was a Gauleiter. Did he not have particular
reasons in order to show that he too was ready to fight in the war and
did not want to remain behind?
DÖNITZ: It surprised me that he, as a Gauleiter, should want to go to
sea; but, at any rate, I considered that here was a man who had his
heart in the right place.
DR. SERVATIUS: You believe that his motives were idealistic?
DÖNITZ: Certainly. Nothing much can be got out of a submarine trip.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Admiral, do you remember that in your capacity as head
of the State on 1 May 1945 you ordered the Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Netherlands to come to Flensburg to report to you?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you also remember that on this occasion my client
asked you to cancel the order originally sent to the Commander-in-Chief
in the Netherlands to the effect that all locks and dykes should be
blown up in the event of an attack, and to give the order that the mined
blasting points be rendered harmless?
DÖNITZ: Yes, he did do that. It was in accordance with my own
principles, for when I became head of the State I gave the order that
all destruction in occupied territories, including for instance
Czechoslovakia, should cease forthwith.
DR. STEINBAUER: At the end of his report, did he ask you for permission
to return to his station in the Netherlands instead of remaining in
Germany?
DÖNITZ: Yes, he did so repeatedly. He tried to get back—the weather
situation was difficult—to the Netherlands by a motor torpedo boat.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you first of all to answer
some questions on your record after becoming Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy on 30 January 1943. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you had the
equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich; is that not so?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had also the right to participate in
meetings of the Reich Cabinet; had any such meetings taken place?
DÖNITZ: I was authorized to participate if such a meeting, or my
participation in such a meeting, was ordered by the Führer. That is the
wording of the order. But I must say that no meeting of the Reich
Cabinet took place at the time I was Commander-in-Chief from 1943 on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the time that you became Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, the government of the Reich was in a sense carried on from
Hitler’s headquarters; isn’t that so?
DÖNITZ: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was a military dictatorship in which the
dictator saw those people he wanted at his military headquarters; that
is right, is it not?
DÖNITZ: One cannot say “military dictatorship.” It was not a
dictatorship at all. There was a military sector and a civilian sector,
and both components were united in the hands of the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I will take the last part of your answer,
and we will not argue about the first.
Now, you saw him on 119 days in just over 2 years; do you agree to that?
DÖNITZ: Yes. But in that connection it must be stated that from 30
January 1943, when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, until the
end of January 1945—that is, approximately 2 years—the number was, I
think, 57 times. The larger figure arises from the fact that in the last
months of the war I took part in the noontime conferences on the
situation which took place daily in the Voss Strasse in Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you about certain of these. At a
number of these meetings the Defendant Speer was present, was he not?
DÖNITZ: I cannot remember that he was present in person at the
discussions of the military situation. Actually Minister Speer as a
civilian had nothing to do with a discussion of the military situation.
But it is possible that he was there on some occasions, for instance,
when tank production and other matters were discussed which were
directly connected with the Führer’s military considerations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly what I was going to put to you,
that the occasions when the Defendant Speer were present were when you
were going into matters of supply; that is, supply for the various
services, including supply for the Navy.
DÖNITZ: Supply questions of the Navy were never discussed at the large
conferences on the military situation. I discussed these matters with
the Führer alone, as I have already said, usually in the presence of
Jodl and Keitel. I submitted these matters to the Führer after I had
come to an understanding with Minister Speer, to whom I had delegated
all matters of naval armament when I became Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy. That, in general, was the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, like the head of every service, you would
have had to learn about priorities and materials and labor. You would
want to know how labor was going to be allocated during the next period,
would you not?
DÖNITZ: I tried to bring it about that by a decision of the Führer
Minister Speer would be given the order to build the largest possible
number of new U-boats which I had to have at the time. But there were
limitations as to the quantities to be allotted to each branch of the
Armed Forces by Speer’s Ministry.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, therefore, you would be very interested in
discovering the figure of manpower for labor for naval supplies and for
the other supplies, to see that you were getting your fair share, would
you not?
DÖNITZ: I am very sorry, but I cannot give you an answer to that. I
never knew, and I do not know today, how many workers Speer was using
for the armament supply for the Navy. I do not even know whether Speer
can give you the answer, because construction of submarines, for
instance, was taking place all over the German Reich in many industrial
plants. Parts were then assembled in the shipyards. Therefore I have no
idea what the labor capacity allotted to the Navy was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember describing Speer as the man who
holds the production of Europe in his hand? That was on 17 December
1943. I shall put the document to you in a little time. But do you
remember describing him as that?
DÖNITZ: Yes; I know that quite well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And don’t you know quite well also that Speer
was getting his labor from foreign labor brought into the Reich?
DÖNITZ: I knew, of course, that there were foreign workers in Germany.
It is just as self-evident that as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I was
not concerned as to how these workers were recruited. That was none of
my business.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did not Gauleiter Sauckel tell you on the
occasion of this trip that he had got 5 million foreign workers into the
Reich, of whom only 200,000 had come voluntarily?
DÖNITZ: I did not have a single conversation with Gauleiter Sauckel. I
have never had a discussion with anyone about questions referring to
workers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, you were head of a service
department in the fifth and sixth years of the war. Wasn’t Germany, like
every other country, searching around to scrape the bottom of the barrel
for labor for all its requirements? Weren’t you in urgent need of labor,
like every other country in the war?
DÖNITZ: I, too, think that we needed workers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not
know after these conferences with Hitler and with Speer that you were
getting this labor by forcing foreign labor to come into the Reich and
be used?
DÖNITZ: During my conferences with Hitler and Speer, the system of
obtaining these workers was never mentioned at all. The methods did not
interest me at all. During these conferences the labor question was not
discussed at all. I was interested merely in how many submarines I
received, that is, how large my allotment was in terms of ships built.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell the Tribunal you discussed that with
Speer and he never told you where he was getting his labor? Is that your
answer on this point?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is my answer, and it is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember, just before we passed from the
industrial side of it, that at certain meetings the representatives for
coal and transport, and Gauleiter Kaufmann, the Reich Commissioner for
Shipping, were present at meetings which you had with the Führer?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take it from me that they are listed as
being present at these meetings. Were you dealing with general problems
of shipping and transport?
DÖNITZ: Never. As far as sea transport is concerned—that is true. I was
thinking of things on land. I thought you meant on land. I have already
stated that at the end of the war I was keenly interested in the tonnage
of merchant vessels because this tonnage, which I needed in order to
carry out military transports from Norway, from and to the East, and for
refugee transports, was not under my jurisdiction but under that of
Gauleiter Kaufmann, the Reich Commissioner for shipping. So at meetings
and discussions which dealt with the sea transport situation I was, of
course, present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another subject of these 119 days.
On 39 of these days the Defendant Keitel was also present at the
headquarters and at about the same number, the Defendant Jodl.
DÖNITZ: I am sorry; I did not understand the date.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put it again. At 39 of these meetings
between January 1943 and April 1945 the Defendant Keitel was present and
at about the same number, the Defendant Jodl. Now, is it right that you
discussed or listened to the discussion, in their presence, of the
general strategical position?
DÖNITZ: I might say that the word “meeting” does not quite describe the
matter. It was rather, as I...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you choose the word; you give us the
word.
DÖNITZ: It was, as I described it, a large-scale discussion of the
military situation; and at this discussion I heard also, of course,
reports about the army situation. That I explained before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get it quite clear that over
these 2 years you had every opportunity of understanding and
appreciating the military strategical position; that is so, isn’t it?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, on 20 of these occasions the Defendant
Göring was present. The Defendant Göring has put himself forward in two
capacities; as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and as a politician.
What was he doing on these 20 occasions?
DÖNITZ: Reich Marshal Göring was there as Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force when the military situation was discussed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so from the Defendant Göring you would have
a full knowledge and appreciation of the air situation and the position
of the Luftwaffe during this period?
DÖNITZ: Insofar as my occasional presence at these discussions, in which
only segments were dealt with—an over-all picture was never given at
such a discussion—insofar as I could form an opinion from these
segments, which naturally was always fragmentary. That was the reason
why I have never made statements about military matters outside the
Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me ask you just one further question on this
point. Following up what Dr. Laternser asked, on 29 June 1944, apart
from Keitel and Jodl and Göring, these defendants, Marshal Von Rundstedt
and Marshal Rommel were also present; and may I remind you that that was
3 weeks after the Allies had invaded in the West. You were being given
the opportunity, were you not, of getting the appreciation of the
strategical position after the Allied invasion of Normandy, isn’t that
so?
DÖNITZ: Yes, from that I gained an impression of the situation in
Normandy after the enemy had set foot there. I was in a position to
report to the Führer which of my new small striking devices I could put
to use in that sector.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us change to another aspect of the
government in general.
On a number of occasions the Reichsführer-SS Himmler was present at
these conferences—shall I call them—isn’t that so?
DÖNITZ: Yes. If the Reichsführer-SS Himmler was there, and as far as I
remember that happened once or twice, it was because of his Waffen-SS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take it from me that he is shown as
being there on at least seven occasions, and that Fegelein, who was his
representative at the Führer’s headquarters, is shown as being present
on five occasions. What did Himmler discuss about the Waffen-SS—the
doings of the Totenkopf division?
DÖNITZ: That cannot be right. Fegelein was always present during the
discussions of the military situation; he never missed, because he was a
permanent representative. If the Reichsführer was present during these
discussions, he reported only on the Waffen-SS, those divisions of the
Waffen-SS which were being used somewhere under the Army. I do not know
the name of these individual divisions. I do not think they included the
Totenkopf; I never heard they did; there was a Viking or...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was because they were being largely
occupied in concentration camps, and you say that Himmler never
mentioned that?
DÖNITZ: That Totenkopf divisions were used in concentration camps I
learned here in Nuremberg. It wasn’t mentioned there. I have already
said that during the military discussions only military matters were
discussed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is only
reported as being present once, on 26 February 1945, when there was
quite a considerable gathering of SS notabilities. What were you
discussing with him then?
DÖNITZ: It is not correct that Kaltenbrunner was there only once. As far
as I remember, he was there two, three, or four times; at any rate,
during the last months of the war I saw him two, three, or four times.
Kaltenbrunner never said a word there; as far as I remember, he just
listened and stood about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want you to tell the Tribunal is: What
was the subject of conversation when you had, not only the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner there, but you had SS Obergruppenführer Steiner, your own
captain in attendance, and Lieutenant General Winter? What were these
gentlemen there for, and what were you hearing from them?
DÖNITZ: Who is the captain and who is Lieutenant General Günther?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Captain Von Assmann; I took it he was the
captain in attendance on you, though I may have been wrong—Kapitän zur
See Von Assmann. Then there was Lieutenant General Winter, SS
Obergruppenführer Steiner, and SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner. What
were you discussing on the 26th of February 1945?
DÖNITZ: I must mention one fact in this connection: Captain Von Assmann
was present at every discussion of the general situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. You can tell us something
afterwards, but first of all listen to my question. What were you
discussing with these people from the SS on 26 February 1945?
DÖNITZ: I cannot remember that now. I do remember, however, that Steiner
received an order in regard to the army groups in Pomerania which were
to make the push from the north to the south in order to relieve Berlin.
I think that when Steiner was present perhaps this question, which did
not concern me, was discussed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to think, before I leave
this point. You have agreed with me that at a number of meetings, a
large number, there were present Keitel and Jodl, at not quite so many
Göring, who would give you the army and air situation in Germany; there
was present the Defendant Speer, who would give you the production
position; there was present Himmler, or his representative Fegelein, who
would give you the security position; and you yourself were present, who
would give the naval position. At all meetings there was present the
Führer who would make the decisions.
I put to you, Defendant, that you were taking as full a part in the
government of Germany during these years as anyone, apart from Adolf
Hitler himself.
DÖNITZ: In my opinion that description is not correct. At these
discussions of the general situation neither Speer nor anybody else
supplied a complete survey of the work being done. On the contrary, only
acute questions of the day were discussed. As I have said, the
happenings of the last 24 hours were discussed, and what should be done.
That there was a staff there which in its reports gave an over-all
picture—that was quite out of the question; it was not at all like
that. The only one who had a complete picture of the situation was the
Führer. At these discussions of the military situation the developments
of the last 24 hours and the measures to be taken were discussed. These
are the facts.
Therefore, one cannot say that any one of the participants had an
over-all picture. Rather every one had a clear view of his own
department for which he was responsible. An over-all picture in the mind
of any of the participants is out of the question. Only the Führer had
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I won’t argue with you; but I suppose,
Defendant, that you say—as we have heard from so many other
defendants—that you knew nothing about the slave-labor program, you
knew nothing about the extermination of the Jews, and you knew nothing
about any of the bad conditions in concentration camps. I suppose you
are going to tell us you knew nothing about them at all, are you?
DÖNITZ: That is self-evident, since we have heard here how all these
things were kept secret; and if one bears in mind the fact that everyone
in this war was pursuing his own tasks with the maximum of energy, then
it is no wonder at all. To give an example, I learned of the conditions
in concentration camps...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want your answer for the moment, and you
have given it to me. I want you to come to a point which was well within
your own knowledge, and that is the order for the shooting of Commandos,
which was issued by the Führer on 18 October 1942. You have told us that
you got it when you were Flag Officer of U-boats. Now, do you remember
the document by which the Naval Operations Staff distributed it? Do you
remember that it said this:
“This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla
leaders, section commanders, or officers of this rank.
“After verbal notification to subordinate sections the above
officers must hand this order over to the next higher section,
which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.”
Do you remember that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I read that again when I saw the order here. But on the
other side it says also that this measure had already been announced in
the Wehrmacht order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is: Why was there
this tremendous secrecy about this order in the naval distribution?
DÖNITZ: I did not understand that question. I do not know whether
tremendous secrecy was being observed at all. I am of the opinion that
in 1942 all naval officers had been informed about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is on 28 October, 10 days after the order
was issued. I am not going to quarrel with you about adjectives,
Defendant. Let me put it this way: Why did the naval distribution
require that degree of secrecy?
DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not make up the distribution chart. As an
officer at the front I received this order at that time. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Within 3 months you were Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. Did you never make any inquiries then?
DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you never make any inquiries?
DÖNITZ: No, I did not. I have told you that I saw this order as
Commander of U-boats and that as far as my field of activities was
concerned this order did not concern me in the least and, secondly, that
men captured during naval engagements were expressly excepted; so, as
far as that goes, this order at that time had no actual, no real
significance. In view of the enormous number of things that I had to
deal with when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, it was quite
natural that it did not occur to me to take up the question of this new
order. I did not think of the order at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to put to you when the time comes a
memorandum from the Naval Staff showing that it was put before you.
Don’t you remember that?
DÖNITZ: If you are referring to the memorandum which is in my trial
brief, then I can only say that this memorandum was not submitted to me,
as can be clearly seen from this note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to ask you before the Tribunal
adjourns is: Did you approve of this order or did you not?
DÖNITZ: I have already told you, as I...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you haven’t. I want you to tell the Tribunal
now, and you can answer it either “I approved” or “I did not approve.”
Did you or did you not approve this order to your commanders?
DÖNITZ: Today I do not approve of that order since I have learned here
that the basis was not so sound...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with it when you were
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy at the beginning of 1943? Did you
approve of it then?
DÖNITZ: As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I was not concerned with this
order. While I was Commander of U-boats, as I have already explained to
you, I considered it simply a reprisal order. It was not up to me to
start an investigation or to take it up with the office which had issued
the order to find out whether the basis was correct or not. It was not
up to me to start an investigation on the basis of international law.
And it was quite clear in Point 1 of the order that here the enemy, the
opponent, had placed himself outside the bounds of the Geneva
Convention, because they were murdering prisoners, and that therefore we
had to do certain things as reprisals. Whether these reprisal measures
were necessary or whether they were fully justified by the conditions in
Point 1, that is something I did not and could not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the last question. I want you to try and
answer it with a straight answer if you can. At the beginning of 1943
did you or did you not approve of this order?
DÖNITZ: I cannot give you an answer, because at the beginning of 1943 I
did not think of the order and was not concerned with it. Therefore I
cannot say how that order affected me at that particular time. I can
tell you only how it affected me when I read it as Commander of U-boats;
and I can also tell you that today I reject this order, now that I have
learned that the basis on which it was issued was not so sound. And
thirdly, I can tell you that I personally rejected any kind of reprisals
in naval warfare—every kind, in every case, and whatever the proposal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will ask some more questions about it
tomorrow, as the time has come to break off.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-SIXTH DAY
Friday, 10 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Dönitz resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understand there are some supplementary
applications for witnesses and documents, which would probably not take
very long to discuss. Is that so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not actually received the final
instructions. I can find out in a very short time. I will get Major
Barrington up. I am told that is so.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, therefore, proposes to sit in open session
tomorrow until a quarter to 12 dealing with the Trial in the ordinary
course and then to take the supplementary applications at a quarter to
12 and then to adjourn into closed session.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we shall be ready for them at a quarter
to 12 tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, the first document that I want you to
look at with regard to the Führer Commando Order of 18 October 1942 is
on Page 65 of the English document book and on Page 98 of the German
document book. It is Document Number C-178, Exhibit USA-544. You will
see that that document is dated 11 February 1943. That is some 12 days
after you took over as Commander-in-Chief and you will see from the
reference that it went to “1.SKL Ii.” That is the international law and
prize law division of your operations staff, isn’t it—Admiral Eckardt’s
division?
DÖNITZ: No. It is addressed to the first section of the Naval Operations
Staff, that is, the operational section. It originates with Eckardt and
is sent to the first section, that is, to the section chief.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think I am quite right—the reference
about which I asked you, 1.SKL Ii, that is Admiral Eckardt’s department.
That is the reference for Admiral Eckardt’s international law
department?
DÖNITZ: No, no, no. It is the department in which Admiral Eckardt was
also an official. Admiral Eckardt was an official in that department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the third SKL in the next line is the press
department as you said, isn’t it?
DÖNITZ: No. The third section of the SKL collected information sent in
for the Navy and reported on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I note it was intelligence and press. Is that
right or not?
DÖNITZ: Yes, it was intelligence and press.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help the Tribunal on
three points in this document. You remember I asked you yesterday about
the secrecy standard of the original Führer order of 18 October. If you
will look at the second paragraph you will see that it says:
“... was given the protection of top secret merely because it is
stated therein (1) that ... sabotage organization ... may have
portentous consequences ... and (2) that the shooting of
uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried
out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for
pardon.”
Do you see that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that that was one of the reasons for
giving the order top secrecy?
DÖNITZ: This exchange of notes between Eckardt and the section chief was
not submitted to me, as is obvious from the initials noted in the
book...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the reason for you not answering my
question? Do you agree that that is the reason for giving top secrecy to
this document?
DÖNITZ: I do not know. I cannot tell you that, because I did not issue
this Commando Order. It says in the Commando Order, on the one hand that
these people had killed prisoners. That is the way I had read it as
Commander, U-boat Fleet; and on the other hand...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall give you one more opportunity of
answering my question. You were Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
Do you say that you are not able to answer this question: Is the reason
stated in Paragraph 2 of this document a correct reason for attaching
top secrecy to the Führer order of 18 October? Now you have this final
opportunity of answering that question. Will you answer it or won’t you?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I will do that. I consider it possible, particularly as the
legal expert here thinks so. I do not know if it is correct, because I
did not issue the order. On the other hand, it says in the order that
these things would not be published in the army orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the next point. The next paragraph says
that what is to be published in the army orders is the annihilation of
sabotage units in battle, not, of course, if they are shot—as I would
say, murdered—quietly, by the SD after battle. I want you to note the
next paragraph. The next paragraph raises the difficulty as to how many
saboteurs were to be considered as a sabotage unit and suggests that up
to ten would certainly be a sabotage unit.
Now, if you look at the last paragraph—I will read it to you quite
slowly:
“It is to be assumed that Counterintelligence III is acquainted
with the Führer orders and will therefore reply accordingly to
the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force
Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to
be seen whether or not this case should be used to make
sure”—note the next words—“after a conference with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that all departments concerned
have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of
members of Commando units.”
Are you telling the Tribunal that after that minute from Eckardt’s
department, which was to be shown to 1.SKL, your Chief of Staff’s
department, that you were never consulted upon it?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I do say that, and I will prove by means of a witness that
there are no initials or distribution list here; and this witness will
prove quite clearly that I did not receive a report on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Admiral Wagner was your Chief of Staff?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we will not occupy further time.
DÖNITZ: He was not my Chief of Staff; he was chief of this section. He
was Section Chief 1. SKL, to which this order was directed. He knows
beyond doubt that no report was made to me. The circumstances are
perfectly clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will leave that, if you say that you
have not seen it; and I will ask you to look at Document Number 551-PS.
My Lord, I will pass the Tribunal a copy. This is Exhibit USA-551, and
it was put in by General Taylor on 7 January.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is a document which is dated 26
June 1944; and it deals with the Führer order; and it says how it will
apply after the landing of the Allied Forces in France; and if you will
look at the distribution, you will see that Number 4 is to the OKM, 1.
SKL. That is the department on which you were good enough to correct me
a moment ago. Now, did you—were you shown that document, which says
that the Führer order is to apply to Commando units operating outside
the immediate combat area in Normandy? Were you shown that document?
DÖNITZ: No, that was not shown to me in any circumstances—and quite
rightly, as the Navy did not take part in the affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me yesterday that you were concerned
with the matter and that you had small boats operating in the Normandy
operations. That is what you told me yesterday afternoon. You have
changed your recollections since yesterday afternoon?
DÖNITZ: No, not at all. But these one-man submarines were floating on
water and had nothing to do with Commandos on the land front. That is
clear from this document, too—I do not know if it is the original of
the 1. SKL because I cannot see the initial. I am convinced, however,
that it was not submitted to me, because it had nothing to do with the
Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Will you just look at Document Number
537-PS, which is dated 30 July 1944.
My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-553, also put in by General Taylor on 7
January.
DÖNITZ: Where is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sergeant major will point to the place. That
is the document applying the Commando Order to “military missions,” and
you will see again later that the distribution includes OKM, Department
SKL. Did you see that order?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I can see it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you see it at the time that it was
distributed, at the end of July 1944?
DÖNITZ: It is quite certain that this order was not submitted to me
because again it has nothing to do with the Navy. The Navy had nothing
to do with fighting partisans.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now just to look very quickly,
because I do not want to spend too much time on it, at Document Number
512-PS.
My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-546, which was also put in by General
Taylor on 7 January.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is a report dealing with the
question of whether members of Commandos should not be murdered
immediately in order that they could be interrogated, and the question
is whether that is covered by the last sentence of the Führer order, and
I call your attention to the fact that it refers, with regard to
interrogations, in the second sentence:
“Importance of this measure was proven in the cases of
Glomfjord, the two-man torpedo at Trondheim, and the glider
plane at Stavanger.”
DÖNITZ: I cannot find it at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is 512-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps you ought to read the first sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
DÖNITZ: This document dates from 1942. At that time I was Commander of
U-boats from the Atlantic Coast to the Bay of Biscay. I do not know this
paper at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your answer, but it is 14 December 1942;
and the point is put up which is raised in the first sentence which My
Lord has just directed be read:
“Top secret: According to the last sentence of the Führer order
of 18 October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time
being in order to keep them for interrogation.”
Then follows the sentence I have read. That was the point that was
raised, and what I was going to ask you was, did that point come up to
you when you took over the Commandership-in-Chief of the Navy in January
1943? Just look at the last sentence.
“The Red Cross and the BDS protested against the immediate
carrying out of the Führer order...”
DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but I still cannot find where that is. I have
not yet found the last sentence. Where is it?
THE PRESIDENT: Our translation says “after the immediate carrying
out....”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “After,” My Lord: I am sorry. It is my fault. I
am greatly obliged to Your Lordship. “Protested after the immediate....”
I beg Your Lordship’s pardon—I read it wrong.
DÖNITZ: That dates from December 1942.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is only six weeks before you took over.
DÖNITZ: Yes. I do not know this teleprint. In any case, that is probably
not Red Cross, but probably Reiko See, Reich Commissioner for
Shipping—or so I assume. BDS is probably the SS leader in Norway.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the point that I thought might have some
interest for you was the two-man torpedoes. I thought that might have
been referred to you as a matter of Navy interest. However, if it was
not I will come to a document after you took over. Give the defendant
Document Number 526-PS, on 10 May 1943.
My Lord, that is USA-502, and was put in by my friend Colonel Storey on
2 January.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You see that that is an account—it is
from the Defendant Jodl’s department, and it is annotated for the
Defendant Jodl’s department—about an enemy cutter which carried out an
operation from the Shetlands, a cutter of the Norwegian Navy; and it
gives its armament, and it says that it was an organization for
sabotaging strong points, battery positions, staff and troop billets,
and bridges and that the Führer order was executed by the SD. That was a
cutter which was blown up by the Norwegian Navy, I suppose after they
were attacked, and ten prisoners were murdered. Was that brought to your
attention?
DÖNITZ: This was shown to me during an interrogation, and I was also
asked if I had not had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal
Keitel. It was afterwards found to be the Wehrmacht area commander who
had contacted the OKW. It was a matter for the Army and for the SD, not
for the Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you deny that you ever heard about that, will
you turn to Page 100 of the document book.
My Lord, it is Page 67 of the British document book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] And that is a summary, a summary of the
trial of the SD...
DÖNITZ: Where is it? I cannot find it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 100, I have told you. If you will look for
it, I think you will find it. It is Page 67 of the English, if you
prefer to follow it in that language.
Now I will explain to you; I think you have read it before because you
have referred to it. That is a summary by the judge advocate at the
trial of the SS men of the evidence that was given, and I just want to
see that you have it in mind.
If you will look at Paragraph 4, you will see that they set out from
Lerwick, in the Shetlands, on this naval operation for the purpose of
making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coasts and
for the purpose of laying mines. Paragraph 5:
“The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was
wearing uniform at the time of capture; and there was abundant
evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that
they were wearing uniforms at all times after their capture.”
Now, you mentioned this yesterday. You see that in Paragraph 6:
“Deponent states that the whole of the crew was captured and
taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command
of Admiral Von Schrader, the Admiral of the West Coast. The crew
were taken to the Bergenhus; and there they were interrogated by
Lieutenant H. P. K. W. Fanger, a lieutenant of the Naval
Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitän Egon Drascher, both
of the German Naval Counterintelligence; and this interrogation
was carried out upon the orders of the Admiral of the West
Coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of
the intelligence branch at Bergen that, in his opinion, all
members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing
to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of
the West Coast.”—And that is Admiral Von Schrader.
Now I want just to read you the one sentence which, in view of that, I
do not think you will think is taken out of context of the evidence
given by Lieutenant Fanger at this trial. He was asked:
“Have you any idea at all why these people were handed over to
the SD?”
In answering that question I want you to tell me who was responsible for
their being handed over. This was your officers, your outfit; that was
the general in command of the Norwegian coast, Admiral Von Schrader in
command of this section, whose people captured the crew. That is your
own officers. Is it true what you told the Court yesterday that the crew
were captured by the SD? Have you any reason to believe Lieutenant
Fanger is not telling the truth?
THE PRESIDENT: What is that you were quoting from then?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the shorthand notes taken on the trial of
the SS.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been admitted?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, it has not been, but it was within
Article 19.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not know the document which has been
used. May I have it, please? Shorthand notes which I have not seen are
being used; and according to the Tribunal’s ruling on cross-examinations
they must be given to me when the witness is heard.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, with great respect, but this point
arose yesterday when the defendant made certain statements with regard
to Admiral Von Schrader. I am questioning these statements, and the only
way I can do it is to use documents which I did not otherwise intend to
use. I shall, of course, let Dr. Kranzbühler see them in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy of the German? That was to have been
given in German, that evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have only the English transcript and I am
willing to let Dr. Kranzbühler see it, but it is all I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any other copy you can hand him?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I only was sent one copy.
THE PRESIDENT: After you are through with it, will you please hand that
copy to Dr. Kranzbühler?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, have you any reason to suppose, Defendant,
that your officer, Lieutenant Fanger, is not telling the truth when he
says that these men were captured by Admiral Von Schrader?
DÖNITZ: I have no reason to question that statement because the whole
affair is completely unknown to me. I have already stated that the
incident was not reported to me nor—as I can prove—to the High Command
of the Navy; and I told you yesterday that I could only assume, in
consequence, that these men—here it is, in Paragraph 6—were captured
on an island, not by the Navy but by a detachment of the Police.
Consequently Admiral Von Schrader said that they were not Navy prisoners
but Police prisoners and must be handed back to the Police; and for this
reason he did not make a report.
I assume that that is what happened. I myself cannot furnish the full
details of this story or explain how it came about, because it was not
reported to me at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the point I will get to in a moment. It
nowhere states in this document that they were captured by the Police,
and in fact that they were captured by the forces under Admiral Von
Schrader, who attacked this island to which this boat was moored.
DÖNITZ: I do not know about that. The document says that the men reached
the island—the reason is not clear. That the men were brought back from
the island afterwards in some sort of boat is quite clear; but naturally
they might remain Police prisoners if they were captured there by the
Police or the coast guards. That is the only explanation I can think of,
in view of Admiral Von Schrader’s personality.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you—your own officer, Lieutenant
Fanger, says they were captured by Admiral Von Schrader’s troops, and
you say if Lieutenant Fanger says that you have no reason to believe he
is not telling the truth, is that right?
DÖNITZ: Yes. My estimate of Von Schrader’s personality caused me to
assume yesterday that it happened like that. Since I am informed today
of a Lieutenant Fanger’s statement, things may have happened differently
for I may be wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you look at the end of Paragraph 8, the
last sentence:
“There was an interview between Blomberg of the SS and Admiral
Von Schrader....”
And then the last sentence:
“Admiral Von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this
torpedo boat were to be handed over in accordance with the
Führer orders to the SD.”—and then they were handed over.
And the official of the SD who carried out this interrogation stated at
the trial:
“...that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the
members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war, and that he so informed his superior officer.”
Despite this report and the representations of a superior officer the
crew were dealt with under the Führer order and executed, and it
describes how they were shot and their bodies secretly disposed of. Do
you say you never heard about that?
DÖNITZ: No. I do say that and I have witnesses to prove it. If the SD
official thought that these men did not come under that head, he would
have been obliged to report that to his superiors and his superiors
would have been obliged to take the appropriate steps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say, you already take the position that the
Navy had interrogated them, the Navy Intelligence said they should be
treated as prisoners of war, and Admiral Von Schrader said they should
be handed over to the SS and that the SS examined them and said they
should be treated as prisoners of war, and despite that these men are
murdered? And you say you knew nothing about it? Did your Kapitän zur
See Wildemann say anything to you concerning this? W-i-l-d-e-m-a-n-n.
DÖNITZ: I do not know him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to bring him to your recollection. At
this time he was an officer on the staff of Admiral Von Schrader and
dealt with this matter. Now, Kapitän Wildemann, and I suppose we should
assume, unless you know anything to the contrary, that he is a
trustworthy officer, says:
“I know that Von Schrader made a written report on this action,
and I know of no reason why the handing over of the prisoners to
the SD should not have been reported on.”
Do you still say you never got any report from Von Schrader?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I still say that I did not receive any report, and I am
equally convinced that the High Command of the Navy did not receive it
either. I have a witness to prove that. I do not know where the report
went. Admiral Von Schrader was not directly responsible to the High
Command of the Navy; and the report may have been sent to the OKW, if
this report was made at all. At any rate the High Command of the Navy
did not receive a report on this particular matter, hence my assumption
that these men were captured on the island in the first place by the
Police. Otherwise, I think Admiral Von Schrader would have reported it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you make any further statement, I would
like you to have in mind something further that Kapitän Wildemann said,
which you know probably quite well, “After the capitulation Admiral Von
Schrader many times said that the English would hold him responsible for
handing over the prisoners to the SD,” and Admiral Von Schrader was
under orders to proceed to England as a prisoner when he shot himself.
Did you know Admiral Von Schrader shot himself?
DÖNITZ: I heard it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know he was worried about being held
responsible for this order?
DÖNITZ: No, I had not the slightest idea of that. I only heard of his
suicide here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still telling the Tribunal that Admiral
Von Schrader made no report to you? Do you remember a few days after the
capture of this M.T.B. Admiral Von Schrader received the Knight’s Cross
of the Iron Cross?
DÖNITZ: Yes, but that has no connection with this matter. He did not
make a report on this matter and he did not go to Berlin for his
Knight’s Cross either, as far as I remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Two other officers, Oberleutnant Nelle and
Seeoberfähnrich Böhm were decorated; and in the recommendations and
citations the capture of this M.T.B. was given as the reason for this
decoration. You say you knew nothing about it?
DÖNITZ: I know nothing about it and I cannot know anything about it,
because the competent superior officers would have dealt with these
decorations and not myself. The High Command of the Navy did not receive
a report on this matter; otherwise it would have been passed on to me. I
have that much confidence in my High Command, and my witness will
testify that he did not receive it either and that he must have done so
if it had gone to the Navy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My final question, and I leave this subject:
Admiral Von Schrader was your junior officer, and according to you, a
very gallant officer. Do you want the Tribunal to understand that the
responsibility which broke and made Admiral Von Schrader commit suicide
was his responsibility, that he never consulted you and you were taking
no responsibility for his acts? Is that what you want the Tribunal to
understand?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I will swear to that; because if Admiral Von Schrader
really committed suicide on account of this incident, then he did make a
mistake because he treated naval personnel, engaged in a naval
operation, in a wrong manner. If that is correct, he acted against
orders. In any case, not even the slightest hint of the affair reached
me.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, will you ask the witness what he meant when he
said that Von Schrader was not directly under the Navy? He was under
Admiral Ciliax, wasn’t he, who was on leave at this time?
DÖNITZ: I said that he was not directly under the High Command of the
Navy in Berlin. So if Admiral Von Schrader made any report on the
affair, the report did not come to me directly but went to his immediate
superior, who was in Norway.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that immediate superior was Admiral Ciliax
who was on leave—but omit the leave for the moment; his immediate
superior was Admiral Ciliax?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to put it perfectly fairly: Do you mean
that for operations in Norway Admiral Ciliax was acting under the
commander—correct me if I am wrong—was it General Von Falkenhorst? I
cannot remember, perhaps you can help me. Do you remember that this
Admiral was acting under the commander-in-chief in Norway so that you
will tell the Tribunal...
DÖNITZ: Yes, as far as territory was concerned Admiral Ciliax was not
under the High Command of the Navy but under the Wehrmacht Commander for
Norway, General Von Falkenhorst; but I can only say that if Schrader’s
suicide is connected with this affair, then the Commando Order was not
properly carried out when these men, who were naval personnel and had
been sent into a naval action, were not treated as prisoners of war. If
that is what happened—I do not know—then a mistake was made locally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But at any rate you say that despite these
decorations for this action you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy knew
nothing about it at all. That is what you say?
DÖNITZ: I awarded the Knight’s Cross to Admiral Von Schrader for
entirely different reasons. I awarded it. I knew nothing about
decorations awarded to the other people you mentioned. It has nothing to
do with me because their immediate superiors would attend to that. Nor
do I know whether these awards are really connected with the story or if
they were given for other reasons. I still cannot imagine—and I do not
believe—that a man like Admiral Von Schrader would treat naval
personnel in this way. The document does not say that they were killed
in a naval action but that they were captured on an island. It seems to
me peculiar that the High Command of the Navy should have received no
report on it, since orders to that effect had been given, and that the
Wehrmacht report should make no reference to it in accordance with the
Commando Order. All these factors are against it. I personally am unable
to form an opinion as to the affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am not going into details. You may
take it from me that the evidence at the trial has been that this cutter
was attacked by two naval task forces. If Dr. Kranzbühler finds I am
wrong I will be happy to admit it. But we will pass on to another
subject. Time is going.
Would you turn to Page 105 of the document book?
DÖNITZ: Then I can only say that it is a clear violation of orders and
that the High Command of the Navy was not informed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to come to this next point, 105 in
the German, 71 in the English document book. Now we needn’t have any
trouble about this document because it is signed by you. It is a
memorandum about the question of more labor for shipbuilding; and you
are probably very familiar with it. But will you look at the first
sentence?
DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but what page is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 105, Exhibit GB-211 (Document Number
C-195), English Page 71.
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you would look at the first sentence.
“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working party
by prisoners from the concentration camps.”
I don’t think we need trouble with coppersmiths, but if you will look at
the end of the document, the very last, you will see Item 2 of the
summing-up reads:
“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the
shipyards as additional labor. Security service agrees to this.”
Now, that is your document, so...
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So we may take it that you were familiar with
the fact of the existence of concentration camps?
DÖNITZ: I have never denied it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I think you went further, didn’t you, when
asked about this on 28 September? At that time you said:
“I generally knew that we had concentration camps. That is
clear.
“Question: ‘From whom did you learn that?’
“Answer: ‘The whole German people knew that.’”
Don’t you remember saying that?
DÖNITZ: Yes. The German people knew that concentration camps existed;
but they did not know anything about the conditions and methods therein.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It must have been rather a surprise for you when
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop said he only heard of two: Oranienburg and
Dachau? It was rather a surprise to you, was it?
DÖNITZ: No, it was not at all surprising, because I myself only knew of
Dachau and Oranienburg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you say here you knew there were
concentration camps. Where did you think you were going to get your
labor from? What camps?
DÖNITZ: From these camps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that all your labor was going to
be German or that it was going to be partly foreign labor?
DÖNITZ: I did not think about that at all. I should like to explain now
how these demands came to be made.
At the end of the war I was given the task of organizing large-scale
transports in the Baltic Sea. Gradually the necessity arose to move the
hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees out of the coastal
areas of East and West Prussia where they were exposed to starvation,
epidemics, and bombardment and to bring them to Germany. For this reason
I made enquiries about merchant shipping, which was not actually under
my jurisdiction; and in so doing I learned that out of eight ships
ordered in Denmark, seven had been destroyed by saboteurs in the final
stage of construction. I called a meeting of all the departments
connected with those ships and asked them, “How can I help you so that
we get shipping space and have damaged ships repaired more quickly?” I
received suggestions from various quarters outside the Navy, including a
suggestion that repair work, _et cetera_, might be speeded up by
employing prisoners from the concentration camps. By way of
justification, it was pointed out, in view of the excellent food
conditions, such employment would be very popular. Since I knew nothing
about the methods and conditions in the concentration camps, I included
these proposals in my collection as a matter of course, especially as
there was no question of making conditions worse for them, since they
would be given better food when working. And I know that if I had done
the opposite I could have been accused here of refusing these people an
opportunity of having better food. I had not the slightest reason to do
this, as I knew nothing about any concentration camp methods at the
time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure we are grateful for your explanation.
But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should
get 12,000 people from concentration camps, did you get them?
DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not do anything more about that. After the
meeting I had a memorandum prepared and submitted to the Führer...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keep to the answer. The answer is that you do
not know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them.
DÖNITZ: I did not get them at all. I had nothing to do with shipyards
and consequently I do not know how those responsible for the work in the
shipyards received their additional workers. I just do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you held a position of some responsibility;
if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the shipbuilding
industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren’t in
concentration camps, would they not?
DÖNITZ: Certainly, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling this Tribunal that when you ask
for and you may have got 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who
work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions
inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and
to all the rulers of Germany?
DÖNITZ: First of all, I do not know whether they came. Secondly, if they
did come, I can very well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and
thirdly, I do not even know what camps they came from and whether they
were not people who had already been put into other camps on account of
the work they accomplished. At any rate, I did not worry about the
execution or methods, _et cetera_, because it was none of my business; I
acted on behalf of the competent non-naval departments which required
workmen in order to carry out repairs more quickly, so that something
could be done about repairs for the merchant navy. That was my duty,
considering the arrangements which I had to make for the re-transport of
these refugees. I would do exactly the same thing again today. That is
the position.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look a little down the document
to the fourth paragraph, after it says, “Translator’s note.” If you will
look at the English, the paragraph beginning: “Since elsewhere...” Have
you found that? This is as you have told us, after you express your
worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just
want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs.
“Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement taken against
whole working parties among whom sabotage occurred have proved
successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was
completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the
Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”
That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, a collective penalty
against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn’t that
so?
DÖNITZ: Yes. May I give an explanation in that connection?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. But otherwise, it is so?
DÖNITZ: Agencies outside the Navy connected with shipbuilding stated at
that meeting that sabotage had been prevented in France by the
introduction of certain measures for exacting atonement. Through an
affidavit by an officer who attended the meeting and drafted the minutes
or the short memorandum, I have now ascertained that these measures at
that time meant the withholding of the additional rations issued by the
management of the shipyard. That is what that meant. And, secondly, to
come to Norway and Denmark, I told these people:
“It is impossible for us to build ships there with our foreign
currency and our materials, only to have them smashed up by
sabotage—and assuredly with the co-operation of the shipyard
workmen—when they are nearly ready. What can we do against
that?”
The answer I received was that the only way was to keep them away from
saboteurs and to round them up in camps.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The whole of this explanation that you have
given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal. Have you
anything to add to what is in the document?
DÖNITZ: Right. I have to add that the workmen were to be treated in
exactly the same way as our own workmen who were also housed in
barracks. The Danish and Norwegian workers would not have suffered the
slightest discomfort.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at one more sentence:
“By the employment of the working parties concerned as
concentration camp workers, their output would not only be
increased by 100 percent but the cessation of their previously
good wages might possibly result in their being considerably
deterred from sabotage...”
That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and
Danish workers, does it not?
DÖNITZ: This was a safety measure to allow us to get control of the
sabotage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the
English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is an
extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on 1 July
1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it?
DÖNITZ: Not yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 70 in the English, Page 112 in the German
text (Exhibit Number GB-210).
DÖNITZ: I have got it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In connection with the general strike in
Copenhagen, the Führer says:
“The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial
proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such
men are on everybody’s lips whereas there is silence with regard
to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar
circumstances without court-martial proceedings.”
Silence with regard to those who are condemned without trial! Do you
agree with that statement of Hitler’s?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you distribute it to Operations for
circulation if you didn’t approve of it?
DÖNITZ: I do not agree with this procedure, but it expresses an idea of
the Führer’s. This was not a discussion between the Führer and myself;
it represents notes on the military situation generally, made by the
officer who accompanied me, and contains widely differing points.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you try and answer my question? It is a
perfectly simple one. It is: Why did you distribute that to Operations
for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest
to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to
know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you?
DÖNITZ: It is very easy to explain that. The officer who made the
minutes included it in order to inform our shipyard establishments that
there was a general strike in Copenhagen. That one paragraph from the
long situation discussions was included so that the shipyard
establishments would know that there was a strike in Copenhagen. That
was the whole point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you
circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them.
That is my suggestion. What do you say to that?
DÖNITZ: I say that is entirely wrong. I may tell you also that I did not
even hear the Führer make that statement, but it is possible that it was
taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I
have just given you, to warn our people of the general strike in
Copenhagen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you
about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions
which deal with documents you haven’t signed, so let’s pass on to the
next one.
DÖNITZ: I know the document. I know it because I have signed it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document
book or Page 102 in the German document book (Exhibit Number GB-209),
the minutes of the conference on 19 February 1945, between you and
Hitler.
DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I beg your pardon. It is an extract from the
minutes of the Hitler conference on 19 February 1945; and then there is
a note...
DÖNITZ: No. It says here: Participation by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy in situation discussion with the Führer. It was not a special
conference on the general military situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to say “special.” I said the
Hitler conference on the 19th.
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now the first sentence of Paragraph 1 says:
“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention.”
The last sentence:
“The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to
consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion
as soon as possible.”
And if you look down at the next minutes of the conference on 20
February, which is headed, “Participation of C-in-C Navy at a Führer
conference on 20 February at 1600 hours,” it reads as follows:
“The C-in-C Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, Generaloberst Jodl, and the representative of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Führer’s headquarters,
Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany’s possible
renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military
standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the
conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the
disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general
standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that
this measure would bring no advantage.”
Now look to the last sentence:
“It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary
without warning and at all costs to save face with the world.”
That means, put in blunt and brutal language, “Don’t denounce the
convention, but break it whenever it suits you,” doesn’t it?
DÖNITZ: No, that is not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does it mean? Let’s take it word for word.
“It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary....”
Aren’t these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention?
DÖNITZ: I must give an explanation of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Answer my question first and then make a
statement. You have done it before but try to answer my question: “These
measures considered necessary”—If they don’t mean measures contrary to
the terms of the Geneva Convention, what do they mean? Answer that
question first.
DÖNITZ: They are measures against our own troops. I had heard, or I was
told that the Führer intended, or had said, that because the front was
yielding in the West and he feared that American and British propaganda
might induce men to desert, he intended to leave the Geneva Convention,
so I said to my staff, “How is it possible in this connection to
contemplate abandoning lock, stock, and barrel a system of international
law almost a century old?” I may have said something like this, “The
necessary measures must be taken.” There was no thought of concrete
measures in that connection and no such measures were introduced. My own
views on the treatment of prisoners of war can best be heard from the
8,000 British prisoners of war who were in my camps. That is the
situation regarding this matter. All the chiefs of the Wehrmacht
branches protested against the idea of renouncing the Geneva Convention.
They were not in favor of this idea.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that your total explanation of “to carry out
measures considered necessary”? You have nothing else to add on that
point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr.
Kranzbühler yesterday that when you became Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to
your counsel yesterday?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was not your fault, was it? It was not your
fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took
over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of 14 May
1943?
DÖNITZ: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me just suggest to you, do you
remember the discussion about the sea transport for Sicily and Sardinia?
Do you remember having a discussion on that, and do you remember your
warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were 15 to 17 U-boats a month and
that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather
gloomy? Do you remember that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember Hitler saying, “These losses
are too heavy. This cannot go on.” And did you say to Hitler:
“Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay, and
control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up
ten days. C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation
of Spain, including Gibraltar.”
And did Hitler remark:
“In 1940 this would still have been possible with the
co-operation of Spain; but now, and against the will of Spain,
our resources are no longer adequate.”
Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on 14 May 1943, and Hitler
saying his resources were no longer adequate?
DÖNITZ: I do not think that I had proposed to the Führer that we should
occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly; I said that we
were blocked in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay and that the
situation would be different if there was much more room. That, however,
does not suggest that, in consideration of the defensive situation, we
should occupy Spain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from
Admiral Assmann’s headline diary, a verbatim translation.
The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in
and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven’t got
it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbühler this
entry.
[_Turning to the defendant._] These are the words that Admiral Assmann
records:
“C-in-C Navy continues: ‘Now our only small outlet for sorties
is the Bay of Biscay, and control of this involves great
difficulties and already takes up 10 days.’
“C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation of
Spain, including Gibraltar.”
Did you say that “the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of
Spain, including Gibraltar”?
DÖNITZ: That is possible. If that is the wording you have got there, it
is possible that that is the way I said it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these
general...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on Page
69?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it,
My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in Paragraph 1 appears to have
some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as
short—to the bare bone—and I am sorry if I omit matters.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, would you return to the last
document, C-158. That’s the one about the Geneva Convention; it’s Page
69 of the English book; 102 of the German, whichever you’re following.
The sergeant major will help you to find it.
Now, if you’ll look at the first paragraph, after the sentence I read,
“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the
Geneva Convention,” it goes on:
“Not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating
international law by their actions against the defenseless
population and the residential districts of the towns. It
therefore appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to
show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means
for our existence and, also, through this measure to urge our
people to resist to the utmost.”
Were not these, that are referred to there as the “same course”—were
not these the “measures considered necessary” to which you were
referring in the second minute?
DÖNITZ: The witness who drew up these two records will be able to
explain exactly where and when this information was given. I myself was
only told, just as the Reich Marshal testified, that the Führer was
upset because our Western Front was not holding, and men were quite
pleased to become American and English prisoners of war. That was how
the whole thing began; and that was the information which I originally
received.
I cannot give an opinion on these minutes which were drawn up by an
officer. The best thing would be for Admiral Wagner to give more exact
details of these matters. I cannot say more than that under oath. I was
of the opinion that the renunciation of the Geneva Convention was in
principle a great mistake and was wrong. I have given practical proof of
my views on the treatment of prisoners of war. Everything else is wrong.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make quite clear the point that the
Prosecution put against you as this: That you were prepared not to
denounce the Convention, but you were prepared to take action contrary
to the Convention and say nothing about it; and that’s what I suggested
is the effect of the last sentence, especially when read with these
words in the first paragraph.
My Lord, I am going to pass to the war at sea.
DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but may I say one thing more? If measures are
taken against desertion, they must be made public. They must have a
deterrent effect; and so it never entered my head to keep them secret.
On the contrary my only thought was, “How is it possible to leave the
Geneva Convention at all?” And that is what I was expressing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The document is clear.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, did you know that on the first day of
the war the Navy put up to the Foreign Office that the maximum damage to
England could only be achieved, with the naval forces you had, if
U-boats were permitted the unrestricted use of arms without warning
against Allied and neutral shipping in a wide area? From the first day
of the war, did you know that the Navy put that up to the German Foreign
Office?
DÖNITZ: I do not believe that the Naval Operations Staff at the time
sent me a memorandum of that kind, if it was ever set up, which I do not
know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember because it’s
quite important. You say that the naval command never informed the Flag
Officer of U-boats that that was their view of the war?
DÖNITZ: I do not know. I cannot remember that the Naval War Staff ever
informed me of such a letter to the Foreign Office. I do not believe
they did; I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, perhaps it would assist your memory
if you looked at the letter.
My Lord, this is Document Number D-851 and it will become Exhibit Number
GB-451.
DÖNITZ: No, I do not know this paper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just will take it by stages because, of
course, you wouldn’t know the first part; but I’ll read it to you and
then we’ll look at the memorandum together.
“Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State”—that would
be Baron von Weizsäcker—“with the enclosed memorandum.
“The Chief of the Operational Department of the Naval High
Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the
Führer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had,
however, arisen here that the political connections had again to
be gone into and brought to the Führer’s notice anew. Captain
Fricke had therefore sent Korvettenkapitän Neubauer to the
Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further.”
That’s signed by Albrecht on 3 September 1939. Then there is the
memorandum:
“The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is
discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High
Command.
“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England, which can be achieved with the forces available, can
only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted
use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping
in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map.
“The Navy does not fail to realize that (a) Germany would
thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the
prosecution of economic warfare, and (b) a military operation of
this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto
generally accepted principles of international law.”
And then it goes on to deal with it.
Are you telling the Tribunal that the Defendant Raeder never consulted
or informed you before these data were submitted to the Foreign Office?
DÖNITZ: No, he did not do so, and that is shown by the fact that it is a
memorandum from the Chief of the Operations Department to the Secretary
of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign
Office; and the front-line commander, whose station was on the coast and
who, for all practical purposes, was in charge of the U-boats, had
nothing to do with it.