I had the document handed to you...

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Page 35, Mr. President, the entry of 13

September, time 0125 hours, the number at the beginning of the line; at

the bottom of the page.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I had the documents handed to you to

refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what impression or what

knowledge you had about this ship _Laconia_ which had been reported

sunk, and about its crew.

DÖNITZ: I knew from the handbook on armed British ships which we had at

our disposal that the _Laconia_ was armed with 14 guns. I concluded,

therefore, that it would have a British crew of at least about 500 men.

When I heard that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was

clear to me that this number would be further increased by the guards of

the prisoners.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please describe now, on the basis of the

documents, the main events surrounding your order of 17 September, and

elaborate, first, on the rescue or nonrescue of British or Italians and

secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question.

DÖNITZ: When I received this report, I radioed to all U-boats in the

whole area. I issued the order:

“Schacht, Group Eisbär, Würdemann and Wilamowitz, proceed to Hartenstein

immediately.”

Hartenstein was the commander who had sunk the ship. Later, I had to

have several boats turn back because their distance from the scene was

too great. The boat that was furthest from the area and received orders

to participate in the rescue was 710 miles away, and therefore could not

arrive before two days.

Above all I asked Hartenstein, the commander who had sunk the ship,

whether the _Laconia_ had sent out radio messages, because I hoped that

as a result British and American ships would come to the rescue.

Hartenstein affirmed that and, besides, he himself sent out the

following radio message in English...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 36, Mr. President, under

time figure 0600.

DÖNITZ: “If any ship will assist the shipwrecked _Laconia_ crew, I will

not attack her, provided I am not being attacked by ship or air force.”

Summing up briefly, I gained the impression from the reports of the

U-boats that they began the rescue work with great zeal.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many U-boats were there?

DÖNITZ: There were three or four submarines. I received reports that the

numbers of those taken on board by each U-boat were between 100 and 200.

I believe Hartenstein had 156 and another 131. I received reports which

spoke of the crew being cared for and taken over from lifeboats; one

report mentioned 35 Italians, 25 Englishmen, and 4 Poles; another, 30

Italians and 24 Englishmen; a third, 26 Italians, 39 Englishmen, and 3

Poles. I received reports about the towing of lifeboats towards the

submarines. All these reports caused me the greatest concern because I

knew exactly that this would not end well.

My concern at that time was expressed in a message to the submarines

radioed four times, “Detailed boats to take over only so many as to

remain fully able to dive.” It is obvious that, if the narrow space of

the submarine—our U-boats were half as big as the enemy’s—is crowded

with 100 to 200 additional people, the submarine is already in absolute

danger, not to speak of its fitness to fight.

Furthermore, I sent the message, “All boats are to take on only so many

people...”

THE PRESIDENT: Are these messages in the document?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, where are they? Why did he not refer to the time of

them?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: They are all messages contained in the three

diaries of the U-boats. The first message is on Page 36, Mr. President,

under group 0720. I will read it.

“Radio message received”—a message from Admiral

Dönitz—“‘Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Maintain

ability to dive. Detailed boats to take over only so many as to

remain fully able to dive.’”

DÖNITZ: Then I sent another message:

“Safety of U-boat is not to be endangered under any

circumstances.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message is on Page 40, Mr. President,

under the date of 17 September, 0140 hours.

DÖNITZ: “Take all measures with appropriate ruthlessness,

including discontinuance of all rescue activities.”

Furthermore, I sent the message:

“Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and underwater

use.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 37, under 0740, Heading 3.

DÖNITZ: “Beware of enemy interference by airplanes and submarines.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “All boats, also Hartenstein, take in only

so many people that boats are completely ready for use under water.”

DÖNITZ: That my concern was justified was clearly evident from the

message which Hartenstein sent and which said that he had been attacked

by bombs from an American bomber.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message, Mr. President, is on Page 39,

under 1311 hours. It is an emergency message, and under 2304 hours there

is the whole text of the message which I should like to read.

DÖNITZ: At this occasion...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. The message reads:

“Radiogram sent: From Hartenstein”—to Admiral Dönitz—“Bombed

five times by American Liberator in low flight when towing four

full boats in spite of a Red Cross flag, 4 square meters, on the

bridge and good visibility. Both periscopes at present out of

order. Breaking off rescue; all off board; putting out to West.

Will repair.”

DÖNITZ: Hartenstein, as can be seen from a later report, also had 55

Englishmen and 55 Italians on board his submarine at that time. During

the first bombing attack one of the lifeboats was hit by a bomb and

capsized, and according to a report on his return there were

considerable losses among those who had been rescued.

During the second attack, one bomb exploded right in the middle of the

submarine, and damaged it seriously; he reported that it was only by a

miracle of German shipbuilding technique that the submarine did not fall

to pieces.

THE PRESIDENT: Where has he gone to now? What page is he on?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is speaking about the events which are

described on Pages 38 and 39, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal, you know, if you kept some

sort of order instead of going on to one page and then to 40, and then

back to 38.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The reason is that we are using two

different war diaries, Mr. President.

Admiral, would you tell us now what measures you took after

Hartenstein’s report that he had been attacked repeatedly in the course

of the rescue measures?

DÖNITZ: I deliberated at length whether, after this experience, I should

not break off all attempts at rescue; and beyond doubt, from the

military point of view, that would have been the right thing to do,

because the attack showed clearly in what way the U-boats were

endangered.

That decision became more grave for me because I received a call from

the Naval Operations Staff that the Führer did not wish me to risk any

submarines in rescue work or to summon them from distant areas. A very

heated conference with my staff ensued, and I can remember closing it

with the statement, “I cannot throw these people into the water now. I

will carry on.”

Of course, it was clear to me that I would have to assume full

responsibility for further losses, and from the military point of view

this continuation of the rescue work was wrong. Of that I received proof

from the submarine U-506 of Würdemann, who also reported—I believe on

the following morning—that he was bombed by an airplane.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That report, Mr. President, is on Page 42 in

the war diary of Würdemann, an entry of 17 September, at 2343 hours. He

reported:

“Transfer of survivors to _Annamite_ completed.”—Then come

details—“Attacked by heavy seaplane at noon. Fully ready for

action.”

DÖNITZ: The third submarine, Schacht’s, the U-507, had sent a wireless

message that he had so and so many men on board and was towing four

lifeboats with Englishmen and Poles.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the report on Page 40, the first

report.

DÖNITZ: Thereupon, of course, I ordered him to cast off these boats,

because this burden made it impossible for him to dive.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the second message on Page 40.

DÖNITZ: Later, he again sent a long message, describing the supplying of

the Italians and Englishmen in the boat.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 41, at 2310 hours. I shall

read that message:

“Transferred 163 Italians to _Annamite_.”—The _Annamite_ was a

French cruiser which had been called to assist in the

rescue.—“Navigation officer of _Laconia_ and another English

officer on board. Seven lifeboats with about 330 Englishmen and

Poles, among them 15 women and 16 children, deposited at Qu. FE

9612, women and children kept aboard ship for one night.

Supplied all shipwrecked with hot meal and drinks, clothed and

bandaged when necessary. Sighted four more boats at sea-anchor

Qu. FE 9619.”

Then there are further details which are not important.

DÖNITZ: Because I had ordered him to cast off the lifeboats and we

considered this general message as a supplementary later report, he was

admonished by another message; and from that, the Prosecution wrongly

concluded that I had prohibited the rescue of Englishmen. That I did not

prohibit it can be seen from the fact that I did not raise objection to

the many reports speaking of the rescue of Englishmen.

Indeed, in the end I had the impression that the Italians did not fare

very well in the rescue. That this impression was correct can be seen

from the figures of those rescued. Of 811 Englishmen about 800 were

rescued, and of 1,800 Italians 450.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I want once more to clarify the

dates of the entire action. The _Laconia_ was torpedoed on 12 September.

When was the air attack on the lifeboats?

DÖNITZ: On the 16th.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the night of the 16th? On the 17th?

DÖNITZ: On the 16th.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On the 16th of September. So the rescue took

how many days altogether?

DÖNITZ: Four days.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And afterwards was continued until when?

DÖNITZ: Until we turned them over to the French warships which had been

notified by us.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, what is the connection between this

incident of the _Laconia_, which you have just described, and the order

which the Prosecution charges as an order for destruction?

DÖNITZ: Apart from my great and constant anxiety for the submarines and

the strong feeling that the British and Americans had not helped in

spite of the proximity of Freetown, I learned from this action very

definitely that the time had passed when U-boats could carry out such

operations on the surface without danger. The two bombing attacks showed

clearly that in spite of good weather, in spite of the large numbers of

people to be rescued who were more clearly visible to the aviators than

in normal heavy sea conditions when few people have to be rescued, the

danger to the submarines was so great that, as the one responsible for

the boats and the lives of the crews, I had to prohibit rescue

activities in the face of the ever-present—I cannot express it

differently—the ever-present tremendous Anglo-American air force. I

want to mention, just as an example, that all the submarines which took

part in that rescue operation were lost by bombing attack at their next

action or soon afterwards. The situation in which the enemy kills the

rescuers while they are exposing themselves to great personal danger is

really and emphatically contrary to ordinary common sense and the

elementary laws of warfare.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the opinion of the Prosecution, Admiral,

you used that incident to carry out in practice an idea which you had

already cherished for a long time, namely, in the future to kill the

shipwrecked. Please, state your view on this.

DÖNITZ: Actually, I cannot say anything in the face of such an

accusation. The whole question concerned rescue or nonrescue; the entire

development leading up to that order speaks clearly against such an

accusation. It was a fact that we rescued with devotion and were bombed

while doing so; it was also a fact that the U-boat Command and I were

faced with a serious decision and we acted in a humane way, which from a

military point of view was wrong. I think, therefore, that no more words

need be lost in rebuttal of this charge.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I must put to you now the wording

of that order from which the Prosecution draws its conclusions. I have

read it before; in the second paragraph it says, “Rescue is contrary to

the most primitive laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships

and crews.”

What does that sentence mean?

DÖNITZ: That sentence is, of course, in a sense intended to be a

justification. Now the Prosecution says I could quite simply have

ordered that safety did not permit it, that the predominance of the

enemy’s air force did not permit it—and as we have seen in the case of

the _Laconia_, I did order that four times. But that reasoning had been

worn out. It was a much-played record, if I may use the expression, and

I was now anxious to state to the commanders of the submarines a reason

which would exclude all discretion and all independent decisions of the

commanders. For again and again I had the experience that, for the

reasons mentioned before, a clear sky was judged too favorably by the

U-boats and then the submarine was lost; or that a commander, in the

role of rescuer, was in time no longer master of his own decisions, as

the _Laconia_ case showed; therefore under no circumstances—under no

circumstances whatsoever—did I want to repeat the old reason which

again would give the U-boat commander the opportunity to say, “Well, at

the moment there is no danger of an air attack”; that is, I did not want

to give him a chance to act independently, to make his own decision, for

instance, to say to himself, “Since the danger of air attack no longer

permits.” That is just what I did not want. I did not want an argument

to arise in the mind of one of the 200 U-boat commanders. Nor did I want

to say, “If somebody with great self-sacrifice rescues the enemy and in

that process is killed by him, then that is a contradiction of the most

elementary laws of warfare.” I could have said that too. But I did not

want to put it in that way, and therefore I worded the sentence as it

now stands.

THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t referred us back to the order, but are you

referring to Page 36 of the Prosecution’s trial brief, or rather British

Document Book?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, Page 36 of the British

Document Book.

THE PRESIDENT: There are two orders there, are there not?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No. It is one order with four numbered

parts.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are two paragraphs, aren’t there? There is

Paragraph 1 and there is Paragraph 2 of 17 September 1942.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think you mean the excerpt from the war

diary of the Commander of the U-boats, which is also on Page 36 in the

document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better read the phrase that you are referring

to?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. I am speaking now of the second

sentence, dated 17 September, under heading 1, on Page 36 of the

document book of the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The second sentence reads, “Rescue is

contrary to the most elementary laws of warfare for the destruction of

enemy ships and crews.” That is the sentence on which Admiral Dönitz

commented just now.

THE PRESIDENT: On Page 36, the first order is an order to “All

Commanding Officers” and Paragraph 1 of it begins, “No attempt of any

kind must be made at rescuing members of ships...” Is that the paragraph

you are referring to?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, and of that I mean the second sentence,

Mr. President. “Rescue is contrary to the most primitive laws of warfare

for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.”

THE PRESIDENT: What about the next paragraph, 17 September 1942,

Paragraph 2?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I just wanted to put that to him. That is an

entry in the war diary on which I would like to question him now.

Admiral, I now put to you an entry in your war diary of 17 September;

there we find:

“All commanders are again advised that attempts to rescue crews

of ships sunk are contrary to the most elementary laws of

warfare after enemy ships and their crews have been destroyed.

Orders about picking up captains and chief engineers remain in

force.”

THE PRESIDENT: It is differently translated in our document book. You

said: “After enemy ships have been destroyed...” In our translation it

is “.... by annihilating enemy ships and their crews.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think it should be “by,” Mr. President,

not “after.”

DÖNITZ: This entry in the war diary refers to the radio order, the four

regular radio messages which I sent during the _Laconia_ incident and

which were also acknowledged.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. Please explain to the

Tribunal first how such entries in the war diary were made. Who kept the

war diary? Did you yourself keep it or who did that?

DÖNITZ: Since I am not to conceal anything here, I have to say that the

keeping of the war diary was a difficult matter for me because there

were no reliable officers available for this task. That entry, as I

suspected and as has been confirmed to me here, was made by a former

chief petty officer who tried to condense my orders during the entire

case into an entry of this sort. Of course, I was responsible for each

entry; but this entry had in reality no actual consequences; my radio

order was the essential thing.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, the decisive point here, in my

opinion, is whether that entry is a record of your actual reflections or

whether it is only an excerpt from the wireless order, an extract which

had been noted down by a subordinate according to his best knowledge and

ability.

DÖNITZ: The latter is correct. My own lengthy deliberations were

concerned with the order of the Naval Operations Staff, the order of the

Führer, and my own serious decision, whether or not I should discontinue

that method of warfare; but they are not included in the war diary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, will you explain what is meant in

the war diary by the entry, “All commanders are advised again,” and so

on.

DÖNITZ: I do not know exactly what that means. My staff, which is here,

has told me that it referred to the four radio messages which I had

sent; because before the _Laconia_ case no statement on this subject had

been made. “Again,” therefore, means that this was the fifth radio

message.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus the order of 17 September 1942 was, for

you, the end of the _Laconia_ incident?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To whom was it directed?

DÖNITZ: According to my best recollection, it was directed only to

submarines on the High Seas. For the various operation areas—North

Atlantic, Central Atlantic, South Atlantic—we had different radio

channels. Since the other submarines were in contact with convoys and

thus unable to carry out rescue measures, they could simply shelve the

order. But I have now discovered that the order was sent out to all

submarines, that is, on all channels; it was a technical matter of

communication which of course could do no harm.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that the fundamental consideration

underlying the entire order was the overwhelming danger of air attack.

If that is correct, how could you in the same order maintain the

directive for the rescue of captains and chief engineers? That can be

found under Heading 2.

DÖNITZ: There is, of course, a great difference in risk between rescue

measures for which the submarine has to stop, and men have to go on

deck, and a brief surfacing to pick up a captain, because while merely

surfacing the submarine remains in a state of alert, whereas otherwise

that alertness is completely disrupted.

However, one thing is clear. There was a military purpose in the seizure

of these captains for which I had received orders from the Naval

Operations Staff. As a matter of principle, and generally, I would say

that in the pursuit of a military aim, that is to say, not rescue work

but the capture of important enemies, one must and can run a certain

risk. Besides, that addition was not significant in my view because I

knew that in practice it brought very meager results, I might say no

results at all.

I remember quite clearly having asked myself, “Why do we still pick them

up?” It was not our intention, however, to drop a general order of that

importance. But the essential points are, first the lesser risk that the

state of alert might not be maintained during rescue and, secondly, the

pursuit of an important military aim.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by the last sentence in the

order, “Be harsh”?

DÖNITZ: I had preached to my U-boat commanders for 5½ years, that they

should be hard towards themselves. And when giving this order I again

felt that I had to emphasize to my commanders in a very drastic way my

whole concern and my grave responsibility for the submarines, and thus

the necessity of prohibiting rescue activities in view of the

overwhelming power of the enemy air force. After all it is very definite

that on one side there is the harshness of war, the necessity of saving

one’s own submarine, and on the other the traditional sentiment of the

sailor.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You heard the witness Korvettenkapitän Möhle

state in this Court that he misunderstood the order in the sense that

survivors should be killed, and in several cases he instructed submarine

commanders in that sense.

DÖNITZ: Möhle is...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. I want to put a

question first. As commanding officer, do you not have to assume

responsibility for a misunderstanding of your order?

DÖNITZ: Of course, I am responsible for all orders, for their form and

their contents. Möhle, however, is the only person who had doubts about

the meaning of that order. I regret that Möhle did not find occasion to

clarify these doubts immediately, either through me, to whom everybody

had access at all times, or through the numerous staff officers who, as

members of my staff, were either also partly responsible or participated

in the drafting of these orders; or, as another alternative, through his

immediate superior in Kiel. I am convinced that the few U-boat

commanders to whom he communicated his doubts remained quite unaffected

by them. If there were any consequences I would of course assume

responsibility for them.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are acquainted with the case of

Kapitänleutnant Eck, who after sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_ in the

spring of 1944 actually fired on lifeboats. What is your view of this

incident?

DÖNITZ: As Kapitänleutnant Eck stated at the end of his interrogation

under oath, he knew nothing of Möhle’s interpretation or Möhle’s doubts

nor of the completely twisted message and my decision in the case of

_U-386_. That was the incident which Möhle mentioned when the submarine

met pneumatic rafts with fliers, and I voiced my disapproval because he

had not taken them on board. A written criticism of his actions was also

forwarded to him. On the other hand, some authority pointed out that he

had not destroyed these survivors. Eck knew nothing about the

interpretation or the doubts of the Möhle order, nor of this affair. He

acted on his own decision, and his aim was not to kill survivors but to

remove the wreckage; because he was certain that otherwise this wreckage

would on the following day give a clue to Anglo-American planes and that

they would spot and destroy him. His purpose, therefore, was entirely

different from the one stated in the Möhle interpretation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Eck said during his examination that he had

counted on your approval of his actions. Did you ever hear anything at

all about the Eck case during the war?

DÖNITZ: No. It was during my interrogation here that I heard about it,

for Eck was taken prisoner during that same operation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you approve of his actions, now that you

know of them?

DÖNITZ: I do not approve his actions because, as I said before, in this

respect one must not deviate from military ethics under any

circumstances. However, I want to say that Kapitänleutnant Eck was faced

with a very grave decision. He had to bear responsibility for his boat

and his crew, and that responsibility is a serious one in time of war.

Therefore, if for the reason that he believed he would otherwise be

spotted and destroyed—and that reason was not unfounded, because in the

same operational area and during the same time four submarines, I think,

had been bombed—if he came to his decision for that reason, then a

German court-martial would undoubtedly have taken it into consideration.

I believe that after the war one views events differently, and one does

not fully realize the great responsibility which an unfortunate

commander carries.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Apart from the Eck case did you, during the

war, or after, hear of any other instance in which a U-boat commander

fired on shipwrecked people or life rafts?

DÖNITZ: Not a single one.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, do you not, the documents of the

Prosecution which describe the sinking of the ships _Noreen Mary_ and

_Antonico_? Do you or do you not recognize the soundness of these

documents as evidence according to your experience in these matters?

DÖNITZ: No. I believe that they cannot stand the test of an impartial

examination. We have a large number of similar reports about the other

side, and we were always of the opinion, and also stated that opinion in

writing to the Führer and the OKW, that one must view these cases with a

good deal of skepticism, because a shipwrecked person can easily believe

that he is being fired on, whereas the shots may not be aimed at him at

all, but at the ship, that is, misses of some sort.

The fact that the Prosecution gives just these two examples proves to me

that my conviction is correct, that apart from the Eck case no further

instances of this kind occurred during those long years in the ranks of

the large German U-boat force.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned before the discussion with the

Führer in May 1942, during which the problem whether it was permissible

to kill survivors was examined, or at least touched upon by the Führer.

Was that question re-examined at any time by the Commander-in-Chief of

U-boats or the Naval Operations Staff?

DÖNITZ: When I had become Commander-in-Chief of the Navy...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943?

DÖNITZ: I think in the summer of 1943 I received a letter from the

Foreign Office in which I was informed that about 87 percent of the

crews of merchant ships which had been sunk were returning home. I was

told that was a disadvantage and was asked whether it was not possible

to do something about it.

Thereupon I had a letter sent to the Foreign Office in which I wrote

that I had already been forced to prohibit rescue because it endangered

the submarines, but that other measures were out of the question for me.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is an entry in the War Diary of the

Naval Operations Staff which deals with this case. I submit this entry

as Dönitz-42, on Pages 92 to 94 in Volume II of the document book.

I shall read as introduction the first and second sentences of Page 92.

The entry is dated 4 April 1943.

“The German Foreign Office pointed out a statement of the

British Transport Minister according to which, following

sinkings of merchant vessels, an average of 87 percent of the

crews were saved. On the subject of this statement the Naval

Operations Staff made a comprehensive reply to the Foreign

Office.”

Then there is the reply on the next pages, and I should like to call to

your attention a part of it first, under Heading 1, about the number of

convoy ships sunk. What is the importance of that in this connection?

DÖNITZ: That so many people certainly returned home.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Furthermore, under Heading 2, it is

mentioned that the sailors do not need a long period of training, with

the exception of officers, and that an order for the picking up of

captains and chief engineers already existed. What is the meaning of

that?

DÖNITZ: It is intended to emphasize that a matter like that is being

judged in the wrong light.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. By “a matter like

that,” you mean the usefulness, from a military point of view, of

killing the shipwrecked?

DÖNITZ: I mean that crews were always available to the enemy, or

unskilled men could very quickly be trained.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Under Heading 4, you point to the great

danger of reprisals against your own submarine crews. Did such reprisals

against German U-boat crews occur at any time in the course of the war?

DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not hear anything about reprisals in that

respect. I only received reliable reports that when U-boats were bombed

and destroyed from the air, the men swimming in the water were shot at.

But whether these were individual acts or reprisals carried out on

orders, I do not know. I assume they were individual acts.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point of the entire letter

seems to be in Heading 3; I shall read that to you:

“A directive to take action against lifeboats of sunken vessels

and crew members drifting in the sea would, for psychological

reasons, hardly be acceptable to U-boat crews, since it would be

contrary to the innermost feelings of all sailors. Such a

directive could only be considered if by it a decisive military

success could be achieved.”

Admiral, you yourself have repeatedly spoken about the harshness of war.

Are you, nevertheless, of the opinion that psychologically the U-boat

crews could not be expected to carry out such an order? And why?

DÖNITZ: We U-boat men knew that we had to fight a very hard war against

the great sea powers. Germany had at her disposal for this naval warfare

nothing but the U-boats. Therefore, from the beginning—already in

peacetime—I trained the submarine crews in the spirit of pure idealism

and patriotism.

That was necessary, and I continued that training throughout the war and

supported it by very close personal contacts with the men at the bases.

It was necessary to achieve very high morale, very high fighting spirit,

because otherwise the severe struggle and the enormous losses, as shown

on the diagram, would have been morally impossible to bear. But in spite

of these high losses we continued the fight, because it had to be; and

we made up for our losses and again and again replenished our forces

with volunteers full of enthusiasm and full of moral strength, just

because morale was so high. And I would never, even at the time of our

most serious losses, have permitted that these men be given an order

which was unethical or which would damage their fighting morale; much

less would I myself ever have given such an order, for I placed my whole

confidence in that high fighting morale and endeavored to maintain it.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said the U-boat forces were replenished

with volunteers, did you?

DÖNITZ: We had practically only volunteers.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Also at the time of the highest losses?

DÖNITZ: Yes, even during the time of highest losses, during the period

when everyone knew that he took part in an average of two missions and

then was lost.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How high were your losses?

DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, our total losses were 640 or 670.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And crew members?

DÖNITZ: Altogether, we had 40,000 men in the submarine force. Of these

40,000 men 30,000 did not return, and of these 30,000, 25,000 were

killed and only 5,000 were taken prisoner. The majority of the

submarines were destroyed from the air in the vast areas of the sea, the

Atlantic, where rescue was out of the question.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I come now to a new subject.

Would this be a suitable time to recess?

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am turning now to the theme of the

so-called conspiracy. The Prosecution is accusing you of participating

from 1932, on the basis of your close connections with the Party, in a

conspiracy to promote aggressive wars and commit war crimes. Where were

you during the weeks of the seizure of power by the National Socialists

in the early part of 1933?

DÖNITZ: Immediately after 30 January 1933, I believe it was on 1

February, I went on leave to the Dutch East Indies and Ceylon, a trip

which lasted well into the summer of 1933. This leave journey had been

granted me, at Grossadmiral Raeder’s recommendation, by President

Hindenburg.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After that, you became commander of a

cruiser at a foreign station?

DÖNITZ: In the autumn of 1934 I went as captain of the cruiser _Emden_

through the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, and back.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before this sojourn abroad or after your

return in 1935 and until you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy in the year 1943 were you politically active in any way?

DÖNITZ: I was not active politically until 1 May 1945, when I became

head of the State, not before then.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document,

namely, an affidavit by Ambassador Messersmith. It bears the number

USA-57 (Document Number 1760-PS) and I have the pertinent extracts in my

document book, Volume II, Page 100. In this affidavit, Ambassador

Messersmith says that from 1930 until the spring of 1934 he acted as

Consul General for the United States in Berlin. Then, until July 1937,

he was in Vienna and from there he went to Washington. He gives an

opinion about you with the remark, “Among the people whom I saw

frequently and to whom my statements refer were the following....” Then

your name is mentioned. From this one must get the impression that

during this period of time you were active in political circles in

Berlin or Vienna. Is that correct?

DÖNITZ: No. At that time I was Lieutenant Commander and from the end of

1934 on I was Commander.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I sent

an interrogatory to Ambassador Messersmith in order to determine upon

what facts he was basing his opinion. This interrogatory was answered

and I am submitting it as Exhibit Dönitz-45. The answers will be found

on Page 102 of the document book, and I quote:

“During my residence in Berlin and during my later frequent

visits there as stated in my previous affidavits, I saw Admiral

Karl Dönitz and spoke to him on several occasions. However, I

kept no diary and I am unable to state with accuracy when and

where the meetings occurred, the capacity in which Admiral

Dönitz appeared there, or the topic or topics of our

conversation. My judgment on Dönitz expressed in my previous

affidavit is based on personal knowledge and on the general

knowledge which I obtained from the various sources described in

my previous affidavits.”

Did you, Admiral, see and speak with Ambassador Messersmith anywhere and

at any time?

DÖNITZ: I never saw him, and I hear his name here for the first time.

Also, at the time in question, I was not in Berlin. I was in

Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea coast or in the Indian Ocean. If he

alleges to have spoken to me it would have had to be in Wilhelmshaven or

in the Indian Ocean. Since neither is the case, I believe that he is

mistaken and that he must have confused me with somebody else.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you a member of the NSDAP?

DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1944 I received from the Führer, as a decoration,

the Golden Party Badge; and I assume that I thereby became an honorary

member of the Party.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you become acquainted with Adolf

Hitler and how often did you see him before you were appointed

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?

DÖNITZ: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time when, in the presence of

Grossadmiral Raeder in the autumn of 1934, I informed him of my

departure for foreign parts as captain of the cruiser _Emden_. I saw him

again on the day following my return with the _Emden_. From the autumn

of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in 5 years, I saw him four

times in all, including the two occasions when I reported to him as

already mentioned.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what were the other two occasions? Were

they military or political occasions?

DÖNITZ: One was a military matter when he was watching a review of the

fleet in the Baltic Sea and I stood next to him on the bridge of the

flagship in order to give the necessary explanations while two U-boats

showed attack maneuvers.

The other occasion was an invitation to all high-ranking army and navy

officers when the new Reich Chancellery in the Voss Strasse was

completed. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there but I did not speak

with him.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many times during the war, until your

appointment as Commander-in-Chief, did you see the Führer?

DÖNITZ: In the years between 1939 and 1943 I saw the Führer four times,

each time when short military reports about U-boat warfare were being

made and always in the presence of large groups.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until that time had you had any discussion

which went beyond the purely military?

DÖNITZ: No, none at all.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When were you appointed Commander-in-Chief

of the Navy as successor to Grossadmiral Raeder?

DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1943.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the war which Germany was waging at that

time at an offensive or defensive stage?

DÖNITZ: At a decidedly defensive stage.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your eyes was the position of

Commander-in-Chief, which was offered to you, a political or a military

position?

DÖNITZ: It was self-evidently a purely military position, namely, that

of the first soldier at the head of the Navy. My appointment to this

position also came about because of purely military reasons which

motivated Grossadmiral Raeder to propose my name for this position.

Purely military considerations were the decisive ones in respect to this

appointment.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, Admiral, that the Prosecution

draws very far-reaching conclusions from your acceptance of this

appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, especially with reference

to the conspiracy. The Prosecution contends that through your acceptance

of this position you ratified the previous happenings, all the endeavors

of the Party since 1920 or 1922, and the entire German policy, domestic

and foreign, at least since 1933. Were you aware of the significance of

this foreign policy? Did you take this into consideration at all?

DÖNITZ: The idea never entered my head. Nor do I believe that there is a

soldier who, when he receives a military command, would entertain such

thoughts or be conscious of such considerations. My appointment as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy represented for me an order which I of

course had to obey, just as I had to obey every other military order,

unless for reasons of health I was not able to do so. Since I was in

good health and believed that I could be of use to the Navy, I naturally

also accepted this command with inner conviction. Anything else would

have been desertion or disobedience.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you

came into very close contact with Adolf Hitler. You also know just what

conclusions the Prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me

just what this relationship was and on what it was based?

DÖNITZ: In order to be brief, I might perhaps explain the matter as

follows:

This relationship was based on three ties. First of all, I accepted and

agreed to the national and social ideas of National Socialism: the

national ideas which found expression in the honor and dignity of the

nation, its freedom, and its equality among nations and its security;

and the social tenets which had perhaps as their basis: no class

struggle, but human and social respect of each person regardless of his

class, profession, or economic position, and on the other hand,

subordination of each and every one to the interests of the common weal.

Naturally I regarded Adolf Hitler’s high authority with admiration and

joyfully acknowledged it, when in times of peace he succeeded so quickly

and without bloodshed in realizing his national and social objectives.

My second tie was my oath. Adolf Hitler had, in a legal and lawful way,

become the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, to whom the Wehrmacht had

sworn its oath of allegiance. That this oath was sacred to me is

self-evident and I believe that decency in this world will everywhere be

on the side of him who keeps his oath.

The third tie was my personal relationship: Before I became

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I believe Hitler had no definite

conception of me and my person. He had seen me too few times and always

in large circles. How my relationship to him would shape itself was

therefore a completely open question when I became Commander-in-Chief of

the Navy. My start in this connection was very unfavorable. It was made

difficult, first, by the imminent and then the actual collapse of U-boat

warfare and, secondly, by my refusal, just as Grossadmiral Raeder had

already refused, to scrap the large ships, which in Hitler’s opinion had

no fighting value in view of the oppressive superiority of the foe. I,

like Grossadmiral Raeder, had opposed the scrapping of these ships, and

only after a quarrel did he finally agree. But, despite that, I noticed

very soon that in Navy matters he had confidence in me and in other

respects as well treated me with decided respect.

Adolf Hitler always saw in me only the first soldier of the Navy. He

never asked for my advice in military matters which did not concern the

Navy, either in regard to the Army or the Air Force; nor did I ever

express my opinion about matters concerning the Army or the Air Force,

because basically I did not have sufficient knowledge of these matters.

Of course, he never consulted me on political matters of a domestic or

foreign nature.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said, Admiral, that he never asked you

for advice on political matters. But those matters might have come up in

connection with Navy questions. Did you not participate then either?

DÖNITZ: If by “political” you mean, for instance, consultations of the

commanders with the so-called “National Socialist Leadership Officers,”

then, of course, I participated, because this came within the sphere of

the Navy, or rather was to become a Navy concern. That was naturally the

case.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Beyond those questions, did Hitler ever

consider you a general adviser, as the Prosecution claims and as they

concluded from the long list of meetings which you have had with Hitler

since 1943 at his headquarters?

DÖNITZ: First of all, as a matter of principle, there can be no question

of a general consultation with the Führer; as I have already said, the

Führer asked for and received advice from me only in matters concerning

the Navy and the conduct of naval warfare—matters exclusively and

absolutely restricted to my sphere of activity.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to the table submitted, between

1943 and 1945 you were called sometimes once and sometimes twice a month

to the Führer’s headquarters. Please describe to the Tribunal just what

happened, as far as you were concerned, on a day like that at the

Führer’s headquarters—what you had to do there.

DÖNITZ: Until 2 or 3 months before the collapse, when the Führer was in

Berlin, I flew to his headquarters about every 2 or 3 weeks, but only if

I had some concrete Navy matter for which I needed his decision. On

those occasions I participated in the noontime discussion of the general

military situation, that is, the report which the Führer’s staff made to

him about what had taken place on the fighting fronts within the last 24

hours. At these military discussions the Army and Air Force situation

was of primary importance, and I spoke only when my Naval expert was

reporting the naval situation and he needed me to supplement his report.

Then at a given moment, which was fixed by the Adjutant’s Office, I gave

my military report which was the purpose of my journey. When rendering

this report only those were present whom these matters concerned, that

is, when it was a question of reinforcements, _et cetera_, Field Marshal

Keitel or Generaloberst Jodl were generally present.

When I came to his headquarters every 2 or 3 weeks—later in 1944 there

was sometimes an interval of 6 weeks—the Führer invited me to lunch.

These invitations ceased completely after 20 July 1944, the day of the

attempted assassination.

I never received from the Führer an order which in any way violated the

ethics of war. Neither I nor anyone in the Navy—and this is my

conviction—knew anything about the mass extermination of people, which

I learned about here from the Indictment, or, as far as the

concentration camps are concerned, after the capitulation in May 1945.

In Hitler I saw a powerful personality who had extraordinary

intelligence and energy and a practically universal knowledge, from whom

power seemed to emanate and who was possessed of a remarkable power of

suggestion. On the other hand, I purposely very seldom went to his

headquarters, for I had the feeling that I would best preserve my power

of initiative that way and, secondly, because after several days, say 2

or 3 days at his headquarters, I had the feeling that I had to disengage

myself from his power of suggestion. I am telling you this because in

this connection I was doubtless more fortunate than his staff who were

constantly exposed to his powerful personality with its power of

suggestion.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said just now, Admiral, that you never

received an order which was in violation of military ethics. You know

the Commando Order of the autumn of 1942. Did you not receive this

order?

DÖNITZ: I was informed of this order after it was issued while I was

still Commander of the U-boats. For the soldiers at the front this order

was unequivocal. I had the feeling that it was a very grave matter; but

under Point 1 of this order it was clearly and unequivocally expressed

that members of the enemy forces, because of their behavior, because of

the killing of prisoners, had placed themselves outside the Geneva

Convention and that therefore the Führer had ordered reprisals and that

those reprisal measures, in addition, had been published in the

Wehrmacht report.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, the soldier who received this

order had no right, no possibility, and no authority to demand a

justification or an investigation; does this mean such an order was

justified? As Commander of the U-boats did you have anything to do with

the execution of this order?

DÖNITZ: No, not in the slightest.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As far as you remember, did you as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy have anything to do with the carrying out

of this order?

DÖNITZ: As far as I remember I was never concerned with this order as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. One should not forget, first, that this

decree excludes expressly those taken prisoner in battles at sea and,

second, that the Navy had no territorial authority on land, and for this

latter reason found itself less often in a position of having to carry

out any point of this order.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know the document submitted by the

Prosecution, which describes how in the summer of 1943 a Commando unit

was shot in Norway. I mean the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-208. The

incident is described there as showing that the crew of a Norwegian

motor torpedo boat were taken prisoner on a Norwegian island. This motor

torpedo boat was charged with belligerent missions at sea. The document

does not say who took the crew prisoner, but it does say that the

members of the crew were wearing their uniforms when they were taken

prisoner, that they were interrogated by a naval officer, and that on

the order of Admiral Von Schrader they were turned over to the SD. The

SD later shot them. Did you know about this incident or was it reported

to you as Commander-in-Chief?

DÖNITZ: I learned about this incident from the trial brief of the

Prosecution.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you explain the fact that an incident of

this nature was not brought to your attention? Would this not have had

to be reported to you?

DÖNITZ: If the Navy was concerned in this matter, that is, if this crew

had been captured by the Navy, Admiral Von Schrader, who was the

commander there, would absolutely have had to report this matter to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. I am also convinced that he would have

done so, for the regulations regarding this were unequivocal. I am also

convinced that the naval expert at the Navy High Command, who was

concerned with such matters, would have reported this to me as

Commander-in-Chief.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is your opinion about this case now

that you have learned about it through the document of the Prosecution?

DÖNITZ: If it is correct that it concerns the crew of a motor torpedo

boat which had belligerent missions at sea, then this measure, the

shooting which took place, was entirely wrong in any case, for it was in

direct opposition even to this Commando Order. But I consider it

completely out of the question, for I do not believe that Admiral Von

Schrader, whom I know personally to be an especially chivalrous sailor,

would have had a hand in anything of this sort. From the circumstances

of this incident, the fact that it was not reported to the High Command,

that this incident, as has now been ascertained by perusal of the German

newspapers of that time, was never mentioned in the Wehrmacht

communiqué, as would have been the case if it had been a matter

concerning the Wehrmacht, from all these circumstances I assume that the

incident was as follows:

That the police arrested these people on the island; that they were

taken from this island by vessel to Bergen; that there one or two, if I

remember correctly, naval officers interrogated them, since the Navy, of

course, was interested in this interrogation; and that then these people

were handed over to the SD, since they had already been taken prisoner

by the SD. I cannot explain it otherwise.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You wish to say, then, that in your opinion

these men had never been prisoners of the Navy?

DÖNITZ: No. If they had been, a report to the High Command would have

been made.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Quite apart from these questions I should

like to ask you, did you not in your position as Commander-in-Chief, and

during your visits to the Führer’s headquarters, have experiences which

made you consider disassociating yourself from Adolf Hitler?

DÖNITZ: I have already stated that as far as my activity was concerned,

even at headquarters, I was strictly limited to my own department, since

it was a peculiarity of the Führer’s to listen to a person only about

matters which were that person’s express concern. It was also

self-evident that at the discussions of the military situation only

purely military matters were discussed, that is, no problems of domestic

policy, of the SD, or the SS, unless it was a question of SS divisions

in military service under one of the army commanders. Therefore I had no

knowledge of all these things. As I have already said, I never received

an order from the Führer which in any way violated military ethics. Thus

I firmly believe that in every respect I kept the Navy unsullied down to

the last man until the end. In naval warfare my attention was focused on

the sea; and the Navy, small as it was, tried to fulfill its duty

according to its tasks. Therefore I had no reason at all to break with

the Führer.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Such a reason would not necessarily refer to

a crime; it could also have been, for political considerations, having

nothing to do with crimes. You have heard the question broached

repeatedly as to whether there should have been a Putsch. Did you enter

into contact with such a movement or did you yourself consider or

attempt a Putsch?

DÖNITZ: No. The word “Putsch” has been used frequently in this courtroom

by a wide variety of people. It is easy to say so, but I believe that

one would have had to realize the tremendous significance of such an

activity.

The German nation was involved in a struggle of life and death. It was

surrounded by enemies almost like a fortress. And it is clear, to keep

to the simile of the fortress, that every disturbance from within would

without doubt perforce have affected our military might and fighting

power. Anyone, therefore, who violates his loyalty and his oath to plan

and try to bring about an overthrow during such a struggle for survival

must be most deeply convinced that the nation needs such an overthrow at

all costs and must be aware of his responsibility.

Despite this, every nation will judge such a man to be a traitor, and

history will not vindicate him unless the success of the overthrow

actually contributes to the welfare and prosperity of his people. This,

however, would not have been the case in Germany.

If, for instance, the Putsch of 20 July had been successful, then a

dissolution, if only a gradual one, would have resulted inside

Germany—a fight against the bearers of weapons, here the SS, there

another group, complete chaos inside Germany—for the firm structure of

the State would gradually have been destroyed and disintegration and a

reduction of our fighting power at the front would have inevitably

resulted.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendant is making a long

and political speech. It really hasn’t very much to do with the

questions with which we have to deal.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was of the opinion that the

question of whether a Commander-in-Chief is obliged to bring about a

Putsch was regarded as a main point by the Prosecution, a point having a

bearing on the question of whether he declared himself in agreement or

not with the system which is being characterized as criminal. If the

Tribunal considers this question irrelevant I do not want to press it

further.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Prosecution has put forward the view

that anybody had to create a Putsch.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It seemed to me a self-evident view of the

Prosecution.

Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted two documents, dating from the

winter of 1943 and May 1945, containing speeches made by you to the

troops. You are accused by the Prosecution of preaching National

Socialist ideas to the troops. Please define your position on this

point.

DÖNITZ: When in February 1943 I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I

was responsible for the fighting power of the entire Navy. A main source

of strength in this war was the unity of our people. And those who had

most to gain from this unity were the Armed Forces, for any rupture

inside Germany would perforce have had an effect on the troops and would

have reduced that fighting spirit which was their mission. The Navy, in

particular, in the first World War, had had bitter experiences in this

direction in 1917-18.

Therefore in all of my speeches I tried to preserve this unity and the

feeling that we were the guarantors of this unity. This was necessary

and right, and particularly necessary for me as a leader of troops. I

could not preach disunity or dissolution, and it had its effect.

Fighting power and discipline in the Navy were of a high standard until

the end. And I believe that in every nation such an achievement is

considered a proper and good achievement for a leader of troops. These

are my reasons for talking the way I did.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On 30 April 1945 you became head of the

State as Adolf Hitler’s successor; and the Prosecution concludes from

this that prior to that time also you must have been a close confidant

of Hitler’s, since only a confidant of his would have been chosen to be

Hitler’s successor where matters of state were concerned. Will you tell

me how you came to be his successor and whether Hitler before that time

ever spoke to you about this possibility?

DÖNITZ: From 20 July 1944 on I did not see Hitler alone, but only at the

large discussions of the military situation. He never spoke to me about

the question of a successor, not even by way of hinting. This was

entirely natural and clear since, according to law, the Reich Marshal

was his successor; and the regrettable misunderstanding between the

Führer and the Reich Marshal did not occur until the end of April 1945,

at a time when I was no longer in Berlin.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where were you?

DÖNITZ: I was in Holstein. Therefore, I did not have the slightest

inkling, nor did the Führer, that I was to become his successor.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just how, through what measures or orders,

did that actually come about?

DÖNITZ: On 30 April 1945, in the evening, I received a radio message

from headquarters to the effect that the Führer was designating me his

successor and that I was authorized to take at once all measures which I

considered necessary.

The next morning, that is on 1 May, I received another radio message, a

more detailed directive, which said that I was to be Reich President;

Minister Goebbels, Reich Chancellor; Bormann, Party Minister; and

Seyss-Inquart, Foreign Minister.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you adhere to this directive?

DÖNITZ: This radio message first of all contradicted the earlier radio

message which clearly stated: “You can at once do everything you

consider to be right.” I did not and as a matter of principle never

would adhere to this second radio message, for if I am to take

responsibility, then no conditions must be imposed on me. Thirdly, under

no circumstances would I have agreed to working with the people

mentioned, with the exception of Seyss-Inquart.

In the early morning of 1 May I had already had a discussion with the

Minister of Finance, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, and had asked him to

take over the business of government, insofar as we could still talk

about that. I had done this because in a chance discussion, which had

taken place several days before, I had seen that we held much the same

view, the view that the German people belonged to the Christian West,

that the basis of future conditions of life is the absolute legal

security of the individual and of private property.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you know the so-called “Political

Testament” of Adolf Hitler, in which you are charged with continuing the

war. Did you receive an order of this sort at that time?

DÖNITZ: No. I saw this Testament for the first time a few weeks ago

here, when it was made public in the press. As I have said, I would not

have accepted any order, any restriction of my activity at the time when

Germany’s position was hopeless and I was given the responsibility.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document in

which you exhorted the war leaders in the spring of 1945 to carry on

tenaciously to the end. It is Exhibit GB-212. You are accused in this

connection of being a fanatical Nazi who was ready to carry on a

hopeless war at the expense of the women and children of your people.

Please define your position in respect to this particularly grave

accusation.

DÖNITZ: In this connection I can say the following: In the spring of

1945 I was not head of the State; I was a soldier. To continue the fight

or not to continue the fight was a political decision. The head of the

State wanted to continue the fight. I as a soldier had to obey. It is an

impossibility that in a state one soldier should declare, “I shall

continue to fight,” while another declares, “I shall not continue the

fight.” I could not have given any other advice, the way I saw things;

and for the following reasons:

First: In the East the collapse of our front at one point meant the

extermination of the people living behind that front. We knew that

because of practical experiences and because of all the reports which we

had about this. It was the belief of all the people that the soldier in

the East had to do his military duty in these hard months of the war,

these last hard months of the war. This was especially important because

otherwise German women and children would have perished.

The Navy was involved to a considerable extent in the East. It had about

100,000 men on land, and the entire surface craft were concentrated in

the Baltic for the transport of troops, weapons, wounded, and above all,

refugees. Therefore the very existence of the German people in this last

hard period depended above all on the soldiers carrying on tenaciously

to the end.

Secondly: If we had capitulated in the first few months of the spring or

in the winter of 1945, then from everything we knew about the enemy’s

intentions the country would, according to the Yalta Agreement, have

been ruinously torn asunder and partitioned and the German land occupied

in the same way as it is today.

Thirdly: Capitulation means that the army, the soldiers, stay where they

are and become prisoners. That means that if we had capitulated in

January or February 1945, 2 million soldiers in the East, for example,

would have fallen into the hands of the Russians. That these millions

could not possibly have been cared for during the cold winter is

obvious; and we would have lost men on a very large scale, for even at

the time of the capitulation in May 1945—that is, in the late

spring—it was not possible in the West to take care of the large masses

of prisoners according to the Geneva Convention. Then, as I have already

said, since the Yalta Agreement would have been put into effect, we

would have lost in the East a much larger number of people who had not

yet fled from there.

When on 1 May I became head of the State, circumstances were different.

By that time the fronts, the Eastern and Western fronts, had come so

close to each other that in a few days people, troops, soldiers, armies,

and the great masses of refugees could be transported, from the East to

the West. When I became head of the State on 1 May, I therefore strove

to make peace as quickly as possible and to capitulate, thus saving

German blood and bringing German people from the East to the West; and I

acted accordingly, already on 2 May, by making overtures to General

Montgomery to capitulate for the territory facing his army, and for

Holland and Denmark which we still held firmly; and immediately

following that I opened negotiations with General Eisenhower.

The same basic principle—to save and preserve the German

population—motivated me in the winter to face bitter necessity and keep

on fighting. It was very painful that our cities were still being bombed

to pieces and that through these bombing attacks and the continued fight

more lives were lost. The number of these people is about 300,000 to

400,000, the majority of whom perished in the bombing attack of Dresden,

which cannot be understood from a military point of view and which could

not have been predicted. Nevertheless, this figure is relatively small

compared with the millions of German people, soldiers and civilian

population, we would have lost in the East if we had capitulated in the

winter.

Therefore, in my opinion, it was necessary to act as I did: First while

I was still a soldier, to call on my troops to keep up the fight, and

afterwards, when I became head of the State in May, to capitulate at

once. Thereby no German lives were lost; rather they were saved.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defendants’ Counsel wish to

ask questions?

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral Dönitz, you

have already explained that Grossadmiral Raeder and the Navy in the

summer of 1939 did not believe, despite certain ominous signs, that war

was about to break out. Since you saw Grossadmiral Raeder in the summer

of 1939, I should like you briefly to supplement this point. First of

all, on what occasion did you have a detailed conversation with

Grossadmiral Raeder?

DÖNITZ: Grossadmiral Raeder embarked in the middle of July 1939 for

submarine maneuvers of my fleet in the Baltic Sea. Following the

maneuvers...

DR. SIEMERS: May I first ask you something? What sort of maneuvers were

they? How large were they and where did they take place?

DÖNITZ: All submarines which had completed their tests I had assembled

in the Baltic. I cannot remember the exact figure, but I think there

were about 30. In the maneuvers I then showed Grossadmiral Raeder what

these submarines could accomplish.

DR. SIEMERS: Were all those submarines capable of navigating in the

Atlantic?

DÖNITZ: Yes, they were, and in addition there were the smaller

submarines of lower tonnage, which could operate only as far as the

North Sea.

DR. SIEMERS: That means, therefore, that at that time you had no more

than two dozen submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic; is that

right?

DÖNITZ: That figure is too high. At that time we had not even 15

submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic. At the outbreak of

war, as far as I remember, we went to sea with fifteen submarines

capable of navigating in the Atlantic.

DR. SIEMERS: During those few days when you were with Raeder at the

maneuvers did you talk to him privately?

DÖNITZ: Yes. Grossadmiral Raeder told me—and he repeated this to the

entire officers’ corps during his final speech in Swinemünde—that the

Führer had informed him that under no circumstances must a war in the

West develop, for that would be _Finis Germaniae_. I asked for leave and

immediately after the maneuvers I went on leave on 24 July for a

6-weeks’ rest at Bad Gastein. I am merely stating that because it shows

how we regarded the situation at that time.

DR. SIEMERS: But then the war came rather quickly, did it not, and you

had to break off the leave which you had planned?

DÖNITZ: I was called back by telephone in the middle of August.

DR. SIEMERS: These words, that there would be no war with England, and

the words, _Finis Germaniae_, did Raeder speak them during a private

conversation or only in this speech at Swinemünde?

DÖNITZ: As far as the sense is concerned, yes. As far as the exact words

are concerned, I cannot remember now what was said in the main speech

and what was said before. At any rate he certainly said it during the

main speech.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.

DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, on 30 January 1943 you became Commander-in-Chief

of the Navy and thereby a member of the group which is indicted here,

the General Staff and the OKW?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to ask you whether, after you were appointed,

you had discussions with any of the members of these groups regarding

plans or aims as outlined in the Indictment?

DÖNITZ: No, with none of them.

DR. LATERNSER: After you came to office, you dismissed all the senior

commanders in the Navy. What were the reasons for this?

DÖNITZ: Since I was between 7 and 10 years younger than the other

commanders in the Navy, for instance, Admiral Carls, Admiral Boehm, and

others, it was naturally difficult for both parties. They were released

for those reasons and, I believe, in spite of mutual respect and esteem.

DR. LATERNSER: How many commanders in the Navy were involved in this

case?

DÖNITZ: I think three or four.

DR. LATERNSER: Was there close personal and official contact between the

Navy on the one hand, and the Army and Air Force on the other?

DÖNITZ: No, not at all.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you know most of the members of the indicted group?

DÖNITZ: No. Before my time as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I knew

only those with whom I happened to find myself in the same area. For

instance, when I was in France I knew Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. After

I became Commander-in-Chief I knew only those whom I met by chance when

I was at headquarters where they had to submit some army report at the

large military situation conference.

DR. LATERNSER: Then you did not know most of the members of these

groups?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Did those commanders who were known to you have a common

political aim?

DÖNITZ: As far as the Army and the Air Force are concerned, I cannot

say. As far as the Navy is concerned, the answer is “no.” We were

soldiers, and I was interested in what the soldier could accomplish,

what his personality was; and I did not concern myself in the main about

a political line of thought, unless it affected his performance as a

soldier.

I want to mention, as an example, the fact that my closest colleague who

from 1934 until the very end in 1945 always accompanied me as my

adjutant and later as Chief of Staff, was extremely critical of National

Socialism—to put it mildly—without our official collaboration or my

personal attitude toward him being affected thereby, as this long period

of working together shows.

DR. LATERNSER: May I inquire the name of this Chief of Staff to whom you

have just referred?

DÖNITZ: Admiral Godt.

DR. LATERNSER: Admiral Godt. Do you know of any remarks made by Hitler

regarding the attitude of the generals of the Army? The question refers

only to those who belong to the indicted group.

DÖNITZ: At the discussions of the military situation, I naturally heard

a hasty remark now and then about some army commander, but I cannot say

today why it was made or to whom it referred.

DR. LATERNSER: You were quite often present during the situation

conferences at the Führer’s headquarters. Did you notice on such

occasions that commanders-in-chief put forward in Hitler’s presence

views strikingly different from his?

DÖNITZ: Yes, that certainly happened.

DR. LATERNSER: Can you remember any particular instance?

DÖNITZ: I remember that when the question of falling back in the

northern sector in the East was discussed, the army commander of this

sector of the front was not of the same opinion as the Führer, and that

this led to an argument.

DR. LATERNSER: Was that commander successful with his objections?

DÖNITZ: I think so, partly; but I should like you to ask an army officer

about that because naturally I do not know these details so clearly and

authentically.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the high military leaders of the Navy have anything

to do with the Einsatzgruppen of the SD?

DÖNITZ: The Navy, no. As far as the Army is concerned, I do not believe

so and I assume they did not. But please do not ask me about anything

but the Navy.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. This question referred only to the Navy. And now,

some questions about regional Navy commanders. Did the commanders of the

regional Navy Group Commands—Marine-Gruppenkommando—have extensive

territorial authority?

DÖNITZ: No. According to the famous KG-40, that is War Organization

1940, the Navy had no territorial powers ashore. Its task ashore was to

defend the coast under the command of the Army and according to sectors,

that is, under the command of the divisions stationed in that particular

sector. Apart from that they took part in battle in coastal waters.

DR. LATERNSER: So that regional commanders in the Navy were therefore

simply troop commanders?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the commanders of these regional Navy Group Commands

have any influence on the formulation of orders regarding submarine

warfare?

DÖNITZ: No, none whatever.

DR. LATERNSER: Did they influence decisions regarding what ships were to

be sunk?

DÖNITZ: No, not at all.

DR. LATERNSER: And did they influence orders regarding the treatment of

shipwrecked personnel?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Now the holder of the office Chief of Naval Operations

Staff also belongs to this group. What were the tasks of a Chief of

Naval Operations Staff?

DÖNITZ: That was a high command, the office which worked out the purely

military, tactical, and operational matters of the Navy.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Chief of Naval Operations Staff have powers to

issue orders?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Then his position was similar to that of Chief of General

Staff of the Air Force or of the Army?

DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, I must first get the idea clear.

I assume that by “Chief of Naval Operations Staff” you mean the Chief of

Staff of Naval Operations Staff? In Grossadmiral Raeder’s time the name

“Chief of Naval Operations Staff” was the same as “Commander-in-Chief of

the Navy.” The position about which you are asking was called “Chief of

Staff of Naval Operations Staff” while I was Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy; the name “Chief of Staff of Naval Operations Staff” was changed to

“Chief of Naval Operations Staff,” but it was the same person and he was

under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

DR. LATERNSER: Was there in the Navy a staff of Admirals corresponding

to the Army General Staff?

DÖNITZ: No, that did not exist. Such an institution did not exist. The

necessary consultants, “Führungsgehilfen,” as we called them, came from

the front, served on the staff and then returned to the front.

DR. LATERNSER: Now I shall ask one last question. The witness Gisevius

has stated in this courtroom that the highest military leaders had

drifted into corruption by accepting gifts. Did you yourself receive a

gift of any kind?

DÖNITZ: Apart from the salary to which I was entitled, I did not receive

a penny; I received no gifts. And the same applies to all the officers

of the Navy.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

DR. NELTE: Witness, you were present when the witness Gisevius was being

examined here. That witness, without giving concrete facts, passed

judgment in the following manner: “Keitel had one of the most

influential positions in the Third Reich.” And at another point he said,

“I received very exact information regarding the tremendous influence,

which Keitel had on everything relating to the Army and accordingly also

on those who represented the Army to the German people.”

Will you, who can judge these matters, tell me whether that judgment of

Defendant Keitel’s position, his function, is correct?

DÖNITZ: I consider it very much exaggerated. I think that Field Marshal

Keitel’s position has been described here so unequivocally that it ought

to be clear by now that what is contained in these words is not at all

correct.

DR. NELTE: Am I to gather from this that you confirm as correct the

description of the position and functions as given by Reich Marshal

Göring and Field Marshal Keitel himself?

DÖNITZ: Yes, it is perfectly correct.

DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius judged these matters, not on the basis

of his own knowledge, but on the basis of information received from

Admiral Canaris. Did you know Admiral Canaris?

DÖNITZ: I know Admiral Canaris from the time when he was still a member

of the Navy.

DR. NELTE: Later on, when he was Chief of the Intelligence Service for

foreign countries in the OKW, did you not have discussions with him? Did

he not come to see you in his capacity as Chief of the Intelligence

Service?

DÖNITZ: After I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, he visited me and

he made a report about information matters which he thought he could

place at the disposal of the Navy, my sphere of interest. But that was

his last report to me. After that, of course, I received from him or his

department written information reports which concerned the Navy.

DR. NELTE: Is it right for me to say that the position of Admiral

Canaris as Chief of Intelligence, that is, espionage, counterespionage,

sabotage, and intelligence, was of great importance for the entire

conduct of the war?

DÖNITZ: His office or his department?

DR. NELTE: He was the chief of the whole department, was he not?

DÖNITZ: Of course, he worked for the entire Armed Forces, all three

branches of the Armed Forces; and I must say in that connection, if you

ask me about the importance, that I was of the opinion that the

information which we received from him and which interested the Navy was

very meager indeed.

DR. NELTE: Did Canaris ever complain to you that Field Marshal Keitel at

the OKW in any way obstructed and hampered him in carrying out his

activity and that he could not pass on his intelligence and his reports?

DÖNITZ: He never did that and, of course, he could have done so only

during the first report. No, he never did that.

DR. NELTE: With reference to Canaris I should like to know whether you

can tell me anything about his character and consequently about his

credibility as a source of information; whether you consider him

reliable?

DÖNITZ: Admiral Canaris, while he was in the Navy, was an officer in

whom not much confidence was shown. He was a man quite different from

us—we used to say he had seven souls in his breast.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we don’t want to know about Admiral Canaris

when he was in the Navy. I don’t think there is any use telling us that

Admiral Canaris was in the Navy. The only possible relevance would be

his character afterwards when he was head of the intelligence.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, do you not think that, if someone is

unreliable and not credible as a commodore, he might also be so as an

Admiral in the OKW? Do you think that that could have changed during

these years?

[_Turning to the defendant._] But, nevertheless, I thank you for the

answer to this question and I now ask you to answer the following

question. Is it true that Hitler forbade all branches of the Armed

Forces to make reports on any political matters and that he demanded

that they confine themselves to their own sphere of work?

DÖNITZ: Yes, that is true.

DR. NELTE: Witness Gisevius has stated that Field Marshal Keitel

threatened the officers under his command that he would hand them over

to the Gestapo if they concerned themselves with political matters, and

I ask you: Is it true that, according to the regulations applying to the

Armed Forces, the Police—including the Gestapo, the SD, and the

Criminal Police—had no jurisdiction at all over members of the Armed

Forces, no matter what their rank was?

DÖNITZ: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: And is it also correct that the branches of the Armed Forces

and also the OKW were at great pains to preserve this prerogative as far

as the Police were concerned?

DÖNITZ: Yes, that is true.

DR. NELTE: So that any alleged threat, as mentioned by Gisevius, namely,

the handing over of these people to the Gestapo, could not have been

carried out?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. NELTE: And it is correct for me to say that all officers of the OKW

to whom such a statement might have been made naturally knew that, too?

DÖNITZ: Naturally. A soldier was subject to military jurisdiction, and

nobody could interfere with the Armed Forces.

DR. NELTE: Moreover, did Field Marshal Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, have

any right to deal with officers serving in the OKW without the knowledge

and consent of the Commander-in-Chief of the branch of the Armed Forces

to which the officer belonged? Could he promote such an officer, dismiss

him, or anything like that?

DÖNITZ: An officer in a branch of the Armed Forces—for instance the

Navy—was detailed to the OKW for a definite office and thus was sent by

the Navy to the OKW. If this officer was to be given a different office

in the OKW, then the branch of the Armed Forces to which he belonged

would of course have to be consulted.

DR. NELTE: Is it not correct to say that these officers were still on

the roster of their own branch of the Armed Forces, since the OKW was

not a branch of the Armed Forces and was not a formation; in other

words, if there was a promotion, for instance, it would be ordered by

the Navy? If Canaris was to have been promoted, you, as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, would have had to order this promotion,

assuming, of course, that you were in agreement with this proposal? It

was merely a question of the actual command and of personnel?

DÖNITZ: These officers were detailed to the OKW. As far as I can

recollect, they were still on the Navy roster under the heading,

“Detailed from the Navy to the OKW.”

DR. NELTE: But they did not leave the Navy as a branch of the Armed

Forces, did they?

DÖNITZ: Promotion of such officers, I think, was decided by the

Personnel Office of the Navy in agreement with the OKW, and I think also

that no one could be detailed—I consider this self-evident—without

agreement of the branch of the Armed Forces concerned.

DR. NELTE: Witness Gisevius has stated that certain men, among them

Field Marshal Keitel for military matters, had formed a close ring of

silence around Hitler so that nobody they did not want to let through

could approach him. I ask you, was it possible for Field Marshal Keitel

to keep you, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, away from Hitler, if you

wanted to make a report to him?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. NELTE: In the same way, was it possible for Field Marshal Keitel to

keep the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force away, if the latter wanted

to report to the Führer?

DÖNITZ: No.

DR. NELTE: And how was it with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army?

DÖNITZ: I know nothing about that. When I was Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy, there was no such position.

DR. NELTE: Then how was it with the Chief of General Staff of the Army?

Could he at any time report to the Führer without going by way of Field

Marshal Keitel?

DÖNITZ: It was not possible for Field Marshal Keitel to keep anyone

away, and he would never have done so anyway.

DR. NELTE: In reply to a question of the Prosecution, witness Gisevius

stated in this courtroom that his group forwarded reports to Field

Marshal Keitel, by way of Admiral Canaris, which dealt with the crimes

against humanity which have been adduced here by the Prosecution. These

reports had been camouflaged as “foreign reports.”

I ask you, was a camouflaged “foreign report” of this sort ever

submitted to you or sent to you by Canaris?

DÖNITZ: No, never.

DR. NELTE: From your knowledge of Keitel’s personality, do you consider

it possible that he would have withheld from the Führer an important

report which was submitted to him?

DÖNITZ: I consider that absolutely out of the question.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that is a proper question for you to put.

DR. NELTE: With this question I wanted to end my inquiries on this

point; but I still have one other question, which can be quickly dealt

with.

Mr. President, in your communication of 26 March 1946, you gave me

permission to submit an affidavit from Admiral Dönitz concerning the

function and the position of the Chief of the OKW. I received this

affidavit and handed it over to the Prosecution on 13 April for

examination, and I understand that there are no objections to this

affidavit. I have, however, not yet got back the original, which was

handed over on 13 April, and I do not know whether it has in the

meantime been submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution or not.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know anything about the affidavit that you are

dealing with.

DR. NELTE: I shall therefore be forced to put questions to Admiral

Dönitz, which in large part are the same questions which I have already

put to Field Marshal Keitel himself.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution object to the affidavit at all?

DR. NELTE: No, they did not raise any objections. Therefore, if it had

been returned I would have submitted it as an exhibit, without reading

it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.