SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you saying that you went on with your
activities at the beginning of the war without knowing that this was the
view of the Naval High Command?
DÖNITZ: I was not informed about this letter. I have said already that
my knowledge of it...
THE PRESIDENT: That wasn’t an answer to the question. The question was
whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High
Command. Answer the question.
DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I knew that the view of the Naval High
Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, that is the entire difference,
Defendant. That is what you said at great length in giving your evidence
the day before yesterday and yesterday, that you were answering, step by
step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that
you didn’t know that this was the view of the Defendant Raeder, formed
on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn’t know it at all, you
had no inkling that that was Raeder’s view?
DÖNITZ: No; I did not know that because I did not know of this letter;
and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder’s view. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I don’t want to argue with you; but
if the Commander, the Chief of the Navy—and I think at that time he
called himself chief of the naval war staff as well—allows the chief of
his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign
Office—is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to
put forward a view like that when it is not held by the
Commander-in-Chief?
It is ridiculous, isn’t it? No Commander-in-Chief would allow a junior
officer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held
it, would he?
DÖNITZ: Will you please ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder.
I cannot give any information as to how this letter came to be written.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that with very great pleasure,
Defendant; but at the moment, you see, I have got to question you on the
matters that you put forward, and my next question is: Was it not in
pursuance of the view and desire expressed in that memorandum that the
U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about
warning ships?
DÖNITZ: No, on the contrary, entirely on the contrary. In the West we
wanted to avoid any further complications, and we endeavored as long as
possible to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen
from all the directives that the U-boats received.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you perhaps to draw his attention to the
penultimate paragraph in that memorandum?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I probably should. My Lord, I will read
the three, because if you will notice it goes on:
“The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by
unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the
world trade center of England spells serious disruptions of
their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer
them no compensation.
“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using
military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England
gives us a justification, by her method of waging war, to order
this form of warfare as a reprisal.
“It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the
field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it
should be arrived at not only as a result of military
considerations, but taking into full account the needs of
foreign politics.”