“_U-512_ reports that the _Monte Corbea_ was recognized as a
neutral ship before being torpedoed. Assumed suspicions of being
a camouflaged English ship are insufficient and do not justify
the sinking. The commander will have to stand court-martial for
his conduct. All boats at sea will be informed.”
Two days later, on 27 September 1942, a radio signal was sent to all. I
read:
“Radio signal to all:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly
ordered anew that all U-boat commanders are to comply exactly
with the orders concerning the treatment of neutral ships.
Violations of these orders will have incalculable political
consequences. This order is to be disseminated at once to all
commanders.”
Will you please tell me what resulted from the court-martial which you
ordered here?
DÖNITZ: I had sent my radio signal to the commander stating that after
his return he would have to be answerable before a court-martial,
because of the sinking. The commander did not return from this mission
with his boat. Therefore this court-martial did not take place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, in any other case, have experience
as to how the courts-martial treated the difficult task of the U-boat
commanders when you had ordered a court-martial?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I remember a case against Kapitänleutnant Kraemer, who had
to be acquitted by the court-martial because it was proven that, before
the attack, before firing the shot, he had taken note once more through
the periscope of the identification of the ship—it was a German
blockade-runner—and, in spite of that, was of the opinion that it was a
different ship, an enemy ship, and that he was justified in sinking it.
In other words, it was not a case of negligence, and therefore in this
case he was acquitted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Taking into consideration all the results of
your measures for training and punishing personnel, do you have the
impression that enough was done to make the U-boat commanders obey your
orders, or did the U-boat commanders in the long run disobey your
orders?
DÖNITZ: I do not think it is necessary to discuss this question at all.
The simple facts speak for themselves. During the 5½ years, several
thousand naval actions were engaged in by submarines. The number of
incidents is an extremely small fraction and I know that this result is
only due to the unified leadership of all submarine commanders, to
co-ordination and also to their proper training and their
responsibility.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document,
GB-195 on Page 32 of the Prosecution’s document book. In this document
is entered an order of the Führer, dated 18 July 1941, and it reads as
follows:
“In the original operational area, which corresponds in extent
with the U.S. prohibited zone for U.S. ships and which is not
touched by the U.S.-Iceland route, attacks on ships under
American or British escort or U.S. merchantmen sailing without
escort are authorized.”
In connection with this order by the Führer, the Prosecution, Admiral,
termed your attitude cynical and opportunistic. Will you please explain
to the Tribunal what the meaning of this order actually is?
DÖNITZ: In August 1940 Germany had declared this operational area in
English waters. U.S. ships were, however, expressly excluded from attack
without warning in this operational area because, as I believe, the
political leaders wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with
the U.S.A. I said the political leaders. The Prosecution has accused me,
in my treatment and attitude, my differing attitude toward the neutrals,
of having a masterful agility in adapting myself, that is guided by
cynicism and opportunism. It is clear that the attitude of a state
toward neutrals is a purely political affair, and that this relation is
decided exclusively by the political leadership, particularly in a
nation that is at war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mean to say, in other words, that you
had nothing to do with the handling of this question?
DÖNITZ: As a soldier I had not the slightest influence on the question
of how the political leadership believed they had to treat this or that
neutral. Regarding this particular case, however, from knowledge of the
orders I received through the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff from
the political leadership, I should like to say the following: I believe
that the political leadership did everything to avoid any incident on
the high seas with the United States. First, I have already stated that
the U-boats were actually forbidden even to stop American ships.
Second...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. To stop them where, in
the operational area or outside the operational area?
DÖNITZ: At first, everywhere.
Second, that the American 300-mile safety zone was recognized without
any question by Germany, although according to the existing
international law only a three-mile zone was authorized.
Third, that...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, an interesting distinction which may be
drawn between the United States and other neutrals is not relevant to
this Trial, is it? What difference does it make?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the document cited by me,
GB-195, the Prosecution has made the accusation that Admiral Dönitz
conducted his U-boat warfare cynically and opportunistically: that is,
in that he treated one neutral well and the other one badly. This
accusation has been made expressly, and I want to give Admiral Dönitz
the opportunity to make a statement in reply to this accusation. He has
already said that he had nothing to do with the handling of this
question.
THE PRESIDENT: What more can he say than that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, according to the principles
of the Statute, a soldier is also made responsible for the orders which
he executed. For this reason it is my opinion that he must be able to
state whether on his side he had the impression that he received cynical
and opportunistic orders or whether on the contrary he did not have the
impression that everything was done to avoid a conflict and that the
orders which were given actually were necessary and right.
THE PRESIDENT: You have dealt with this order about the United States
ships, now.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I have almost finished.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you want to say something more about
the third point, Admiral?
DÖNITZ: I wanted to mention two or three more points on this subject.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think that is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, but we hope that you will deal with this
point shortly. It appears to the Tribunal to be very unimportant.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Sir.
DÖNITZ: For instance, I had suggested that mines be laid before Halifax,
the British port of Nova Scotia, and before Reykjavik, both bases being
important for warships and merchant shipping. The political leaders, the
Führer, rejected this because he wanted to avoid every possibility of
friction with the United States.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I formulate the question this way, that
you, from the orders for the treatment of U.S. ships, in no way had the
impression that opportunism or cynicism prevailed here, but that
everything was done with the greatest restraint in order to avoid a
conflict with the United States?
DÖNITZ: Yes. This went so far, in fact, that when the American
destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German
submarines, that is, before war started, when they were still neutral
and I was forbidden to fight back, I was then forced to forbid the
submarines in this area to attack even British destroyers, in order to
avoid having a submarine mistake an American for a British ship.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 9 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Dönitz resumed the stand._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will
continue my examination of the witness.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, how many merchant ships were sunk
by German U-boats in the course of the war?
DÖNITZ: According to the Allied figures, 2,472.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many combat actions, according to your
estimate, were necessary to do this?
DÖNITZ: I believe the torpedoed ships are not included in this figure of
2,472 sunk ships; and, of course, not every attack leads to a success. I
would estimate that in 5½ years perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 actions actually
took place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the course of all these actions did any
of the U-boat commanders who were subordinate to you voice objections to
the manner in which the U-boats operated?
DÖNITZ: No, never.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What would you have done with a commander
who refused to carry out the instructions for U-boat warfare?
DÖNITZ: First, I would have had him examined; if he proved to be normal
I would have put him before a court-martial.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You could only have done that with a clear
conscience if you yourself assumed full responsibility for the orders
which you either issued or which you transmitted?
DÖNITZ: Naturally.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In battle engagements with U-boats, crews of
merchant ships no doubt lost their lives. Did you consider crews of
enemy merchantmen as soldiers or as civilians, and for what reasons?
DÖNITZ: Germany considered the crews of merchantmen as combatants,
because they fought with the weapons which had been mounted aboard the
merchant ships in large numbers. According to our knowledge one or two
men of the Royal Navy were on board for the servicing of these weapons,
but where guns were concerned the rest of the gunners were part of the
crew of the ship.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many were there for one gun?
DÖNITZ: That varied according to the size of the weapon, probably
between five and ten. Then, in addition, there were munitions men. The
same applied to the servicing of depth charge chutes and depth charge
throwers.
The members of the crew did, in fact, fight with the weapons like the
few soldiers who were on board. It was also a matter of course that the
crew was considered as a unit, for in a battleship we cannot distinguish
either between the man who is down at the engine in the boiler room and
the man who services the gun up on deck.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this view, that the members of the crews
of hostile merchant ships were combatants, have any influence on the
question of whether they could or should be rescued? Or did it not have
any influence?
DÖNITZ: No, in no way. Of course, every soldier has a right to be
rescued if the circumstances of his opponent permit it. But this fact
should have an influence upon the right to attack the crew as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean that they could be fought as
long as they were on board the ship?
DÖNITZ: Yes, there can be no question of anything else—that means
fought with weapons used for an attack against a ship as part of naval
warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know that the Prosecution has submitted
a document about a discussion between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese
Ambassador, Oshima. This discussion took place on 3 January 1942. It is
Exhibit Number GB-197, on Page 34 of the document book of the
Prosecution. In this document Hitler promises the Japanese Ambassador
that he will issue an order for the killing of the shipwrecked, and the
Prosecution concludes from this document that Hitler actually gave such
an order and that this order was carried out by you.
Did you, directly or through the Naval Operations Staff, receive a
written order of this nature?
DÖNITZ: I first heard about this discussion and its contents when the
record of it was submitted here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, may I ask you to answer my
question? I asked, did you receive a written order?
DÖNITZ: No, I received neither a written nor a verbal order. I knew
nothing at all about this discussion; I learned about it through the
document which I saw here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you see Hitler for the first time
after the date of this discussion, that is, January 1942?
DÖNITZ: Together with Grossadmiral Raeder I was at headquarters on 14
May 1942 and told him about the situation in the U-boat campaign.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is a note written by you about this
discussion with the Führer, and I would like to call your attention to
it. It is Dönitz-16, to be found on Page 29 of Document Book Number 1. I
submit the document, Dönitz-16. I will read it to you. The heading runs:
“Report of the Commander of Submarines to the Führer on 14 May
1942 in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy”—that is, Grossadmiral Raeder.
“Therefore it is necessary to improve the weapons of the
submarines by all possible means, so that the submarines may
keep pace with defense measures. The most important development
is the torpedo with magnetic detonator which would increase
precision of torpedoes fired against destroyers and therefore
would put the submarine in a better position with regard to
defense; it would above all also hasten considerably the sinking
of torpedoed ships, whereby we would economize on torpedoes and
also protect the submarine from countermeasures, insofar as it
would be able to leave the place of combat more quickly.”
And now, the decisive sentence:
“A magnetic detonator will also have the great advantage that
the crew will not be able to save themselves on account of the
quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of men
will no doubt cause difficulties in the assignment of crews for
the great American construction program.”
Does this last sentence which I read imply what you just referred to as
combating the crew with weapons...?
THE PRESIDENT: You seem to attach importance to this document.
Therefore, you should not put a leading question upon it. You should ask
the defendant what the document means, and not put your meaning on it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, what did these expositions mean?
DÖNITZ: They mean that it was important to us, as a consequence of the
discussion with the Führer at his headquarters, to find a good magnetic
detonator which would lead to a more rapid sinking of the ships and
thereby achieve the results noted in this report in the war diary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell me what successes you mean by
this, as far as the crews are concerned?
DÖNITZ: I mean that not several torpedoes would be required, as
heretofore, to sink a ship by long and difficult attack; but that one
torpedo, or very few, would suffice to bring about a more speedy loss of
the ship and the crew.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, in the course of this discussion
with the Führer, touch on the question...
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment—the question whether other means
might be envisaged to cause loss of life among the crews?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what way and by whom?
DÖNITZ: The Führer brought up the fact that, in the light of experience,
a large percentage of the crews, because of the excellence of the rescue
means, were reaching home and were used again and again to man new
ships, and he asked whether there might not be some action taken against
these rescue ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by action taken?
DÖNITZ: At this discussion, in which Grossadmiral Raeder participated, I
rejected this unequivocally and told him that the only possibility of
causing losses among the crews would lie in the attack itself, in
striving for a faster sinking of the ship through the intensified effect
of weapons. Hence this remark in my war diary. I believe, since I
received knowledge here through the Prosecution of the discussion
between the Führer and Oshima, that this question of the Führer to
Grossadmiral Raeder and myself arose out of this discussion.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There exists an affidavit by Grossadmiral
Raeder about this discussion. You know the contents. Do the contents
correspond to your recollection of this discussion?
DÖNITZ: Yes, completely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I would like to submit to the Tribunal,
as Dönitz-17, the affidavit of Grossadmiral Raeder; since it has the
same content, I may dispense with the reading of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to say in case it might help the
Tribunal, I understand the Defendant Raeder will be going into the
witness box; therefore, I make no formal objection to this affidavit
going in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It has the Number Dönitz-17 and is found on
Page 33 of Document Book 1.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You just said that you rejected the
suggested killing of survivors in lifeboats and stated this to the
Führer. However, the Prosecution has presented two documents, an order
of the winter of 1939-40 and a second order of the autumn of 1942, in
which you limited or prohibited rescue measures. Is there not a
contradiction between the orders and your attitude toward the proposal
of the Führer?
DÖNITZ: No. These two things are not connected with each other in any
way. One must distinguish very clearly here between the question of
rescue or nonrescue, and that is a question of military possibility.
During a war the necessity of refraining from rescue may well arise. For
example, if your own ship is endangered thereby, it would be wrong from
a military viewpoint and besides, would not be of value for the one to
be rescued; and no commander of any nation is expected to rescue if his
own ship is thereby endangered.
The British Navy correctly take up a very clear, unequivocal position in
this respect: that rescue is to be denied in such cases; and that is
evident also from their actions and commands. That is one point.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you spoke only about the safety of
the ship as a reason for not carrying out rescue.
DÖNITZ: There may of course be other reasons. For instance it is clear
that in war the mission to be accomplished is of first importance. No
one will start to rescue, for example, if after subduing one opponent
there is another on the scene. Then, as a matter of course, the
combating of the second opponent is more important than the rescue of
those who have already lost their ship.
The other question is concerned with attacking the shipwrecked, and that
is...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, whom would you call shipwrecked?
DÖNITZ: Shipwrecked persons are members of the crew who, after the
sinking of their ship, are not able to fight any longer and are either
in lifeboats or other means of rescue or in the water.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
DÖNITZ: Firing upon these men is a matter concerned with the ethics of
war and should be rejected under any and all circumstances. In the
German Navy and U-boat force this principle, according to my firm
conviction, has never been violated, with the one exception of the
affair Eck. No order on this subject has ever been issued, in any form
whatsoever.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I want to call to your attention one of the
orders submitted by the Prosecution. It is your permanent War Order
Number 154; Exhibit Number GB-196 and in my document book on Pages 13 to
15. I will have this order given to you, and I am asking you to turn to
the last paragraph, which was read by the Prosecution. There it says, I
read it again:
“Do not rescue any men; do not take them along; and do not take
care of any boats of the ship. Weather conditions and proximity
of land are of no consequence. Concern yourself only with the
safety of your own boat and with efforts to achieve additional
successes as soon as possible. We must be hard in this war. The
enemy started the war in order to destroy us, and thus nothing
else matters.”
The Prosecution has stated that this order went out, according to their
records, before May 1940. Can you from your knowledge fix the date a
little more exactly?
DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, I issued this order at the end of
November or the beginning of December 1939, for the following reasons:
I had only a handful of U-boats a month at my disposal. In order that
this small force might prove effective at all, I had to send the boats
close to the English coast, in front of the ports. In addition, the
magnetic mine showed itself to be a very valuable weapon of war.
Therefore, I equipped these boats both with mines and torpedoes and
directed them, after laying the mines, to operate in waters close to the
coast, immediately outside the ports. There they fought in constant and
close combat and under the surveillance of naval and air patrols. Each
U-boat which was sighted or reported there was hunted by U-boat-chasing
units and by air patrols ordered to the scene.
The U-boats themselves, almost without exception or entirely, had as
their objectives only ships which were protected or accompanied by some
form of protection. Therefore, it would have been suicide for the
U-boat, in a position of that sort, to come to the surface and to
rescue.
The commanders were all very young; I was the only one who had service
experience from the first World War. And I had to tell them this very
forcibly and drastically because it was hard for a young commander to
judge a situation as well as I could.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did experience with rescue measures already
play a part here?
DÖNITZ: Yes. In the first months of the war I had very bitter
experiences. I suffered very great losses in sea areas far removed from
any coast; and as very soon I had information through the Geneva Red
Cross that many members of crews had been rescued, it was clear that
these U-boats had been lost above the water. If they had been lost below
the water the survival of so many members of the crews would have been
impossible. I also had reports that there had been very unselfish deeds
of rescue, quite justifiable from a humane angle, but militarily very
dangerous for the U-boat. So now, of course, since I did not want to
fight on the open sea but close to the harbors or in the coastal
approaches to the harbors, I had to warn the U-boats of the great
dangers, in fact of suicide.
And, to state a parallel, English U-boats in the Jutland waters, areas
which we dominated, showed, as a matter of course and quite correctly,
no concern at all for those who were shipwrecked, even though, without a
doubt, our defense was only a fraction of the British.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You say that this order applied to U-boats
which operated in the immediate presence of the enemy’s defense. Can
you, from the order itself, demonstrate the truth of that?
DÖNITZ: Yes; the entire order deals only with, or assumes, the presence
of the enemy’s defense; it deals with the battle against convoys. For
instance it reads, “Close range is also the best security for the
boat...”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What number are you reading?
DÖNITZ: Well, the order is formulated in such a way that Number 1 deals
at first with sailing, not with combat. But the warning against enemy
air defense is given there also, and in this warning about
countermeasures it is made clear that it is concerned entirely with
outgoing ships. Otherwise I would obviously not have issued an order
concerning sailing. Number 2 deals with the time prior to the attack.
Here mention is made of moral inhibitions which every soldier has to
overcome before an attack.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you need only refer to the figures
which show that the order is concerned with fighting enemy defense.
DÖNITZ: Very well. Then I will quote from 2(d). It says there:
“Close range is also the best security for the boat.
“While in the vicinity of the vessels”—that is, the
merchantmen—“the protecting ships”—that is, the
destroyers—“will at first not fire any depth charges. If one
fires into a convoy from close quarters”—note that we are
dealing with convoys—“and then is compelled to submerge, one
can then dive most quickly below other ships of the convoy and
thus remain safe from depth charges.”
Then the next paragraph, which deals with night conditions, says:
“Stay above water. Withdraw above water. Possibly make a circle
and go around at the rear.”
Every sailor knows that one makes a circle or goes around at the rear of
the protecting enemy ships. Further, in the third paragraph, I caution
against submerging too soon, because it blinds the U-boat, and I say:
“Only then does the opportunity offer itself for a new attack,
or for spotting and noting the opening through which one can
shake off the pursuing enemy.”
Then the figure “(c),” that is, “3(c),” and there it says:
“During an attack on a convoy one may have to submerge to a
depth of 20 meters to escape from patrols or aircraft and to
avoid the danger of being sighted or rammed....”
Thus we are talking here about a convoy. Now we turn to point “(d)” and
here it says:
“It may become necessary to submerge to depth when, for example,
the destroyer is proceeding directly toward the periscope...”
And then follow instructions on how to act in case of a depth charge
attack. Plainly, the whole order deals with...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to go into all of these
military tactics. He has made a point on Paragraph “e.” He has given his
explanation of that paragraph, and I don’t think it is necessary to go
into all of these other tactics.
DÖNITZ: I only want to say that the last paragraph about nonrescue must
not be considered alone but in this context: First, the U-boats had to
fight in the presence of enemy defense near the English ports and
estuaries; and secondly, the objectives were ships in convoys, or
protected ships, as is shown clearly from the document as a whole.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that this order was given about
December 1939. Did the German U-boats after the order had been issued
actually continue rescues? What experiences did you have?
DÖNITZ: I said that the order was issued for this specific purpose
during the winter months. For the U-boats which, according to my memory,
went out into the Atlantic again only after the Norwegian campaign, for
these U-boats the general order of rescue applied; and this order was
qualified only in one way, namely that no rescue was to be attempted if
the safety of a U-boat did not permit it. The facts show that the
U-boats acted in this light.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean then that you had reports from
U-boat commanders about rescue measures?
DÖNITZ: I received these reports whenever a U-boat returned, and
subsequently through the combat log books.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When was this order which we have just
discussed formally rescinded?
DÖNITZ: To my knowledge this order was captured or salvaged by England
on the U-13 which was destroyed by depth charges in very shallow water
in the Downs near the mouth of the Thames. For this boat, of course,
this order may still have applied in May 1940. Then in the year 1940,
after the Norway Campaign, I again made the open waters of the Atlantic
the central field of operations, and for these boats this order did not
apply, as is proved by the fact that rescues took place, which I just
explained.
I then rescinded the order completely for it contained the first
practical instructions on how U-boats were to act toward a convoy and
later on was no longer necessary, for by then it had become second
nature to the U-boat commanders. To my recollection the order was
completely withdrawn in November 1940 at the latest.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I have here the table of contents
of the “Standing War Orders of 1942,” and that may be found on Page 16
of Document Book Number 1. I will submit it as Dönitz-11. In this table
of contents the Number 154 which deals with the order we have just
discussed is blank. Does that mean that this order did not exist any
more at the time when the “Standing War Orders of 1942” were issued?
DÖNITZ: Yes, by then it had long since ceased to exist.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When were the standing orders for the year
1942 compiled?
DÖNITZ: In the course of the year 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When you received reports from commanders
about rescue measures, did you object to these measures? Did you
criticize or prohibit them?
DÖNITZ: No, not as a rule; only if subsequently my anxiety was too
great. For example, I had a report from a commander that, because he had
remained too long with the lifeboats and thus had been pursued by the
escorts perhaps—or probably—summoned by wireless, his boat had been
severely attacked by depth charges and had been badly damaged by the
escorts—something which would not have happened if he had left the
scene in time—then naturally I pointed out to him that his action had
been wrong from a military point of view. I am also convinced that I
lost ships through rescue. Of course I cannot prove that, since the
boats are lost. But such is the whole mentality of the commander; and it
is entirely natural, for every sailor retains from the days of peace the
view that rescue is the noblest and most honorable act he can perform.
And I believe there was no officer in the German Navy—it is no doubt
true of all the other nations—who, for example, would not consider a
medal for rescue, rescue at personal risk, as the highest peacetime
decoration. In view of this basic attitude it is always very dangerous
not to change to a wartime perspective and to the principle that the
security of one’s own ship comes first, and that war is after all a
serious thing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what years was the practice you have just
described followed, that U-boats did not rescue when they endangered
themselves?
DÖNITZ: In 1940, that is towards the end of 1939, economic warfare was
governed by the Prize Ordinance insofar as U-boats were still operating
individually. Then came the operations, close to the enemy coast, of
1939-40 which I have described; the order Number 154 applied to these
operations. Then came the Norway campaign, and then when the U-boat war
resumed in the spring of 1940, this order of rescue, or nonrescue if the
U-boat itself was endangered, applied in the years 1940, 1941, and 1942
until autumn.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order put in writing?
DÖNITZ: No, it was not necessary, for the general order about rescue was
a matter of course, and besides it was contained in certain orders of
the Naval Operations Staff at the beginning of the war. The stipulation
of nonrescue, if the safety of the submarine is at stake, is taken for
granted in every navy; and I made a special point of that in my reports
on the cases which I have just discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942 there was an order about the
rescue of captains. This has the Number Dönitz-22; I beg your pardon—it
is Dönitz Number 23, and is found on Page 45 of Document Book 1, and I
hereby submit it. It is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff of 5 June 1942. I quote:
“According to instructions received from the Naval Operations
Staff submarines are ordered by the Commander of U-boats to take
on board as prisoners captains of ships sunk, with their papers,
if this is possible without endangering the boat and without
impairing fighting capacity.”
How did this order come into being?
DÖNITZ: Here we are concerned with an order of the Naval Operations
Staff that captains are to be taken prisoners, that is, to be brought
home and that again is something different from rescue. The Naval
Operations Staff was of the opinion—and rightly—that since we could
not have a very high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of
the sunk merchantmen brought back—we even helped in their rescue, which
was natural—then at least we must see to it that the enemy was deprived
of the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the
captains; hence the order to take the captains from their lifeboats on
to the U-boats as prisoners.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order exist in this or another form
until the end of the war?
DÖNITZ: Yes, it was later even incorporated into the standing orders,
because it was an order of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it carried out until the end of the war,
and with what results?
DÖNITZ: Yes, according to my recollection it was carried out now and
then even in the last few years of the war. But in general the result of
this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a very few
cases. But through letters which I have now received from my commanders
and which I read, I discovered that there were a few more cases than I
believed, altogether perhaps 10 or 12 at the most.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To what do you attribute the fact that
despite this express order so few captains were taken prisoner?
DÖNITZ: The chief reason, without doubt, was that on an increasing
scale, the more the mass of U-boats attacked enemy convoys, the convoy
system of the enemy was perfected. The great bulk of the U-boats was
engaged in the battle against convoys. In a few other cases it was not
always possible by reason of the boat’s safety to approach the lifeboats
in order to pick out a captain. And thirdly, I believe that the
commanders of the U-boats were reluctant, quite rightly from their
viewpoint, to have a captain on board for so long during a mission. In
any event, I know that the commanders were not at all happy about this
order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, now I turn to a document which is
really the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-199,
Page 36 of the British document book. This is your radio message of 17
September, and the Prosecution asserts that it is an order for the
destruction of the shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I will
read it to you again.
“To all Commanding Officers:
“1. No attempt of any kind must be made to rescue members of
ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and
handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the most
elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships
and crews.
“2. Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still
apply.
“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of
importance for your boat.
“4. Be harsh. Bear in mind that the enemy takes no regard of
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”
Please describe to the Tribunal the antecedents of this order, which are
decisive for its intentions. Describe first of all the general military
situation out of which the order arose.
DÖNITZ: In September of 1942 the great bulk of the German U-boats fought
convoys. The center of gravity in the deployment of U-boats was in the
North Atlantic, where the protected convoys operated between England and
America. The U-boats in the north fought in the same way, attacking only
the convoys to Murmansk. There was no other traffic in that area. The
same situation existed in the Mediterranean; there also the objects of
our attack were the convoys. Beyond that, a part of the boats was
committed directly to American ports, Trinidad, New York, Boston, and
other centers of congested maritime traffic. A small number of U-boats
fought also in open areas in the middle or the south of the Atlantic.
The criterion at this time was that the powerful Anglo-American air
force was patrolling everywhere and in increasingly large numbers. That
was a point which caused me great concern, for obviously the airplane,
because of its speed, constitutes the most dangerous threat to the
U-boat. And that was not a matter of fancy on my part, for from the
summer of 1942—that is, a few months before September, when this order
was issued—the losses of our U-boats through air attacks rose suddenly
by more than 300 percent, I believe.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, for clarification of this point, I
am giving you a diagram which I would like to submit in evidence to the
Tribunal as Dönitz-99. Will you, with the use of the diagram, explain
the curve of losses?
DÖNITZ: It is very clear that this diagram showing the losses of U-boats
corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up
to June 1942 U-boat losses were kept within reasonable limits and
then—in July 1942—what I have just described happened suddenly.
Whereas the monthly losses up till then varied as the diagram shows
between 4, 2, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-boats, from July the losses per month
jumped to 10, 11, 8, 13, 14. Then follow the two winter months December
and January, which were used for a thorough overhauling of the ships;
and that explains the decrease which, however, has no bearing on the
trend of losses.
These developments caused me the greatest concern and resulted in a
great number of orders to the submarine commanders on how they were to
act while on the surface; for the losses were caused while the boats
were above water, since the airplanes could sight or locate them; and so
the boats had to limit their surface activities as much as possible.
These losses also prompted me to issue memoranda to the Naval Operations
Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When?
DÖNITZ: The memoranda were written in the summer, in June.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942?
DÖNITZ: In June 1942 or July. At the pinnacle of my success, it occurred
to me that air power might some day stifle us and force us under water.
Thus, despite the huge successes which I still had at that time, my
fears for the future were great, and that they were not imaginary is
shown by the actual trend of losses after the submarines left the
dockyard in February 1943; in that month 18 boats were lost; in March,
15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38.
The airplane, the surprise by airplane, and the equipment of the planes
with radar—which in my opinion is, next to the atomic bomb, the
decisive war-winning invention of the Anglo-Americans—brought about the
collapse of U-boat warfare. The U-boats were forced under water, for
they could not maintain their position on the surface at all. Not only
were they located when the airplane spotted them, but this radar
instrument actually located them up to 60 nautical miles away, beyond
the range of sight, during the day and at night. Of course, this
necessity of staying under water was impossible for the old U-boats, for
they had to surface at least in order to recharge their batteries. This
development forced me, therefore, to have the old U-boats equipped with
the so-called “Schnorchel,” and to build up an entirely new U-boat force
which could stay under water and which could travel from Germany to
Japan, for example, without surfacing at all. It is evident, therefore,
that I was in an increasingly dangerous situation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, in order to characterize this
situation I want to call your attention to your war diary of this time.
This will have the Number Dönitz-18, reproduced on Page 32, Volume I. I
want to read only the contents of the entries from the 2nd until the
14th of September, Page 32:
“On 2 September U-256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit
for sailing and diving;
“On 3 September aircraft sights U-boat;
“On 4 September U-756 has not reported despite request since 1
September when near convoy; presumed lost.
“On 5 September aircraft sights U-boat;
“On 6 September U-705 probably lost because of enemy aircraft
attack;
“On 7 September U-130 bombed by Boeing bomber;
“On 8 September U-202 attacked by aircraft in Bay of Biscay.
“On 9 September...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the defendant has already told us of the
losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us
details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I wanted to show, Mr. President, that the
testimony of Admiral Dönitz is confirmed by the entries in his diary of
that time. But if the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of common knowledge. We can read it.
Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we will read it.
We don’t need you to read the details of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. I will do it that way.
DÖNITZ: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary of
those weeks and days just before the issuance of my order; but I wanted
to add the following: The aircraft were very dangerous especially for
psychological reasons: when no aircraft is on the scene, the commander
of the U-boat views his situation as perfectly clear but the next moment
when the aircraft comes into sight, his situation is completely
hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders, but to old
experienced commanders who remembered the good old times. Perhaps I may,
quite briefly, give a clear-cut example. A U-boat needs one minute for
the crew to come in through the hatch before it can submerge at all. An
airplane flies on the average 6,000 meters in one minute. The U-boat,
therefore, in order to be able to submerge at all—and not to be bombed
while it is still on the surface—must sight the aircraft from a
distance of at least 6,000 meters. But that also is not sufficient, for
even if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached a safe depth.
The U-boat, therefore, must sight the airplane even earlier, namely, at
the extreme boundary of the field of vision. Therefore, it is an
absolute condition of success that the U-boat is in a state of constant
alert, that above all it proceeds at maximum speed, because the greater
the speed the faster the U-boat submerges; and, secondly, that as few
men as possible are on the tower so that they can come into the U-boat
as quickly as possible which means that there should be no men on the
upper deck at all, and so on. Now, rescue work, which necessitates being
on the upper deck in order to bring help and take care of more people
and which may even mean taking in tow a number of lifeboats, naturally
completely interrupts the submarine’s state of alert, and the U-boat is,
as a consequence, hopelessly exposed to any attack from the air.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I wish now to take up the
_Laconia_ matter itself which I would be reluctant to have interrupted.
If it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I would suggest that we have a
recess now.
[_A recess was taken._]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you have just described the enemy’s
supremacy in the air in September 1942. During these September days you
received the report about the sinking of the British transport
_Laconia_. I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that
incident under Numbers Dönitz-18, 20, 21, and 22. These are the war
diaries of the commanders of U-boats and of the commanders of the
submarines which took part in this action, Kapitänleutnants Hartenstein,
Schacht and Würdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on Page
34 and the following pages. I shall read to you the report which you
received. That is on Page 35 of the document book, 13 September, 0125
hours. I read:
“Wireless message sent on America circuit:
“Sunk by Hartenstein British ship _Laconia_.”
Then the position is given and the message continues:
“Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now
picked up 90...”
then the details, and the end is: “Request orders.”