FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Page 32, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to state my position on a
formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements. I
refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is
to use all matters of evidence which have probative value. I believe
that a written report by an officer about his activity as commanding
officer has probative value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of
this kind before a German naval court would be accepted in evidence
without question.
The last document in this group, Dönitz-19, Page 34, concerns the
document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-199. It is a radio message on
Page 36 of the British document book of the Prosecution. It concerns a
radio message which the U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Schacht
received from Admiral Dönitz, and deals with the rescue or nonrescue of
Englishmen and Italians.
Document Dönitz-19 is a log book of Schacht’s U-boat and shows, first,
the armament and crew of the _Laconia_, whose crew is the one in
question, and second, it explains why comparatively few of the numerous
Italians and comparatively many of the less numerous Englishmen were
rescued. The events were known to Admiral Dönitz from radio messages.
Document Dönitz-29...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I told you, the Tribunal has read all
of these documents and examined them, and therefore it isn’t necessary
for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn’t necessary for you
to go into each document, if you will indicate the nature of the groups.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents
Dönitz-29 on Pages 54 to 59 of the document book; Dönitz-31, Page 64;
Dönitz-32 on Page 65; Dönitz-33 on Page 66; Dönitz-37 on Page 78;
Dönitz-38 on Page 80 and Dönitz-40 on Page 86; these documents are also
concerned with the subject of survivors. Dönitz-29 is concerned with a
statement of the witness Heisig.
The Prosecution has declared that I could not question the character of
the witness Heisig because I had not made that point during the
cross-examination of Heisig. In this connection I wish to state that in
my opinion I attacked the credibility of Heisig during the
cross-examination as far as it was possible at the time. I knew of the
existence of that witness only three days before he appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are now proceeding to deal with each
document. You have given us quite a number of documents which all fall
in this group, of the treatment of shipwrecks and we have already seen
those documents and therefore, we can consider them as a group. We do
not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of
Heisig, which is already before us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe it is very
difficult to judge the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to
say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents,
Dönitz-31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200. That is an order by the
Flag Officer of the U-boats dealing with the treatment of so-called
rescue ships. The Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated
it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of
rescue ships, but only to the tendency to kill the survivors also by
sinking rescue ships.
My documents pertaining to this issue are to show that thus they apply
moral standards which do not exist in wartime. I wish to show this
comparison with the sea rescue planes. The sea rescue planes were
rightfully shot down by the British Air Force, because there was no
agreement which prohibited that. The British Air Force was therefore
naturally not kept from shooting down rescue planes by moral
consideration, if international law permitted it; and we have exactly
the same point of view concerning the rescue ships.
In the case of the sinking of the steamer _Steuben_, I should like to
correct an error. That is Document Dönitz-33. It does not deal, as Sir
David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a hospital ship by a
Russian U-boat, but it concerns the sinking of a German transport ship
which carried wounded. This sinking was, therefore, completely justified
and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Operations
Staff did not for a moment consider it unjustified. I believe, Mr.
President, that I shall have to speak in more detail about the Documents
Dönitz-37, 38, and 40, for it is precisely these documents which have
been objected to by the Prosecution, because they show the conduct of
the Allies in certain war measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I have told you more than once, the
Tribunal does not wish to hear you on each individual document. We have
already considered the documents and we want you to deal with them in
groups. You have already given us the documents in a group and have
indicated to what subject they relate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the
documents of the Prosecution to which my documents refer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Dönitz-37 refers to a document of the
Prosecution, Exhibit GB-638. That is the statement by Admiral Dönitz
concerning the case of the _Athenia_. At the end of that statement the
question of the punishment of the U-boat commander is mentioned and the
Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Dönitz of not punishing the
commander except in a disciplinary manner. I want to prove with this
Document Dönitz-37 that a commanding officer will tolerate certain war
measures once even if they were not correct or at least partly not
correct.
Dönitz-38 is in connection with Document Dönitz-39, which has not been
objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the
Document Dönitz-39. This document states the attitude of the Naval
Operations Staff to alleged reports about the Allies’ firing on
survivors and similar incidents. By Dönitz-38 I only intend to show that
the very careful attitude of the Naval Operations Staff was not based on
lack of proof for they even had affidavits to prove it, and in spite of
that rejected any possibility of reprisals.
Dönitz-40 is in connection with Document Dönitz-42 which I submitted and
against which no objection has been raised. In this document quite sober
considerations are raised as to whether survivors could be fired on or
not. I should like to show that such considerations perhaps appear
inhumane and impossible after a war, but that during war such questions
are examined and in certain cases are answered in the affirmative,
according to military necessity.
The next two documents, Göring-7, on Page 89, and C-21, on Page 91, deal
with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-205. That was a radio
message concerning the sinking of an Allied sailing cutter. GB-205 is on
Page 53 of the Prosecution’s document book. The Prosecution in
connection with this document has accused our naval warfare command of
trying to terrorize the crews of neutral ships. Both my documents,
Göring-7 and C-21, give only a few examples to the effect that that
terrorizing is nothing illegal but that naturally each belligerent in
taking military measures considers the psychological effect of these
measures on the enemy.
The next group is Document Dönitz-43, on Page 95; Dönitz-90, on Page
258, and Dönitz-67, on Page 96. They all deal with the subject of
whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger
the ship itself, and relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196
on Page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution and GB-199 on Page 36
of the Prosecution’s book. They show first the methods of the British
navy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have told us the subject they relate
to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether a ship is obliged
to rescue if in danger, and that, you say, is an answer to GB-196 and
199. Why should you tell us anything more than that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed,
Mr. President. The last document in this group is Dönitz-53, Page 99. It
is a statement signed by some 60 U-boat commanders from an English
prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact that they never
received an order to kill survivors. The Prosecution objected to it
because it was considered too general and was not sworn to. I believe
that it contains a very concrete statement concerning the alleged order
for destruction. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German
commanders as prisoners of war to their superior, the English camp
commandant; and I received it through the British War Office. I request
the Tribunal particularly to approve this document, because it has a
high probative and moral value for myself and for my client.
The last group of the documents objected to comes under the heading
“Conspiracy.” It is in the document book, Volume II, Mr. President,
Dönitz-47, and relates to Exhibit GB-212. Dönitz-47 is on Page 120. The
document of the Prosecution is Exhibit GB-212. On Page 75 an incident is
mentioned, namely, that Admiral Dönitz approved the fact that a traitor
in a prisoner-of-war camp was done away with. Dönitz-47 will show that
the removal of traitors is an emergency measure which is approved by all
governments in time of war.
Dönitz-48 deals with the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war.
It is related to the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-209.
Dönitz-48 is on Page 122 in my document book, and GB-209 is on Page 68
of the document book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209,
which deals with the possibility of abandoning the Geneva Convention,
the Prosecution accuses Dönitz of wanting to risk the lives of 150,000
American and over 50,000 British prisoners of war without scruple. In my
opinion, it is not sufficient merely to dispute such a statement which
is made by the Prosecution, but I must prove that those prisoners of war
for whom Admiral Dönitz himself was responsible were not only treated
according to international law but in an exemplary manner and as can be
seen from a British statement, which is contained in evidence, “with
fairness and consideration.”
The next document Dönitz-49 deals with the treatment of native
populations. It is on Page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the
Prosecution GB-210, Prosecution document book Page 69, and GB-211,
Prosecution document book Page 72. According to these two documents of
the Prosecution Admiral Dönitz is connected with the conspiracy for
committing crimes against the native populations of occupied
territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for
which he was personally responsible, he did everything necessary to
protect the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Therefore I have
submitted evidence concerning the sentences imposed by the naval courts
for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed by
Admiral Dönitz even in the case of death sentences against German
soldiers.
The Prosecution states that this document is also very general. The
document has an appendix with about 80 individual examples of sentences.
I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators
this work; but if the Tribunal considers it necessary, I will certainly
have that appendix translated.
The last group contains Dönitz-51, on Page 134, and Dönitz-52, on Page
135. They are in connection with the Prosecution’s Document GB-188, on
Page 10 of the British document book. That is the speech made by Admiral
Dönitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler’s death. In connection with that
document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a
fanatical Nazi and, as such, of prolonging the war at the expense of the
men, women, and children of his country. The very documents of the
Prosecution, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation
necessary in order to make it possible to get as many people as possible
from the East to the West and thus bring them to safety.
The Documents Dönitz-51 and Dönitz-52 will prove that in fact many
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German people were brought to
safety during these last weeks of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably. That is
part of the details in the documents, isn’t it, what you say?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not need to say anything further about
it, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are these all the documents? Dr. Kranzbühler, the
Tribunal is inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal
has ruled upon these documents, if you called the Defendant Dönitz
first. Would you be willing to do that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it,
but I am in a position to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it of course is to try and save time,
and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the
defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be
dealt with in the course of direct and cross-examination.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty, however,
is that during the examination of Admiral Dönitz I should like to count
on the knowledge of the contents of the documents; and I should also
like to discuss some documents with him. But I do not know whether the
Tribunal will approve these documents now or not.
THE PRESIDENT: But what I am suggesting is that the Tribunal should
consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of
these documents, and then tell you—make a rule—as to what documents
are admitted. You will then know what documents are admitted. Then you
can call Admiral Dönitz and of course examine him with reference to the
documents which are admitted; and as I have told you, the Tribunal has
already looked at these documents. They will now reconsider them, in
order to see whether they are admissible, and the Tribunal will in that
way, to a large extent, be fully acquainted with the documents.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I will
call Admiral Dönitz if the Tribunal deems it proper.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have been dealing with a Document
Dönitz-60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to
refer. When we have ruled upon them you will have to give separate
exhibit numbers to each one of the documents—to each one of the pages
which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in
evidence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I point out that this is
one book. Dönitz-60 is one book. That is why I have not given it an
exhibit number, because I submit it as one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more
convenient, will it not, to give each separate page a separate exhibit
number?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, a collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely
different order than the way in which Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe dealt with
them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to
say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. My Lord, I have heard the
Tribunal say that they have had an opportunity of examining the
documents and therefore I propose to be extremely brief in any remarks I
have to make: and may I make one explanation before I deal with the very
few points?
My friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wanted to make it clear—as I think it was
clear to the Tribunal yesterday—that there had been no objection to
Documents 3 and 4 because in these they deal with a secret base in the
North which is only of importance for the attacks against wood
transports from the North Russian ports. The objectionable matter, as I
think the Tribunal pointed out, was introduced in a statement of Dr.
Kranzbühler which has no foundation in the documents. Colonel Pokrovsky
was very anxious that I should make that clear on behalf of the
Prosecution.
My Lord, I think there are really only two points which I need emphasize
in reply to the Tribunal. The first is on my Group 3, the details of the
Contraband Control System. My Lord, I submit that on this there is an
essential _non sequitur_ in Dr. Kranzbühler’s argument. He says that,
first of all, the carrying of contraband by merchant ships, to carry his
argument to its logical conclusion, would entitle a belligerent to
sinking at sight. That, I submit, with great respect to him, is
completely wrong; and it does not follow that because you establish
certain rules and lists of contraband that the right to sink at sight is
affected at all.
Similarly, his second point with regard to the British navicert system.
That system was used in World War I and is a well-known system. But
again, the essential _non sequitur_ or absence of connection is this,
that if a neutral goes to one of the control ports and gets a navicert,
that does not put that neutral into so un-neutral an act as to make it
the equivalent of a ship of war, which is the position that my
friend—that Dr. Kranzbühler—would have to take if that argument were
to succeed.
His third division wishes to put in documents showing economic pressures
on, for example, Belgium, with regard to the import of goods. The naval
defendants are not being charged with economic pressure; they are
charged with killing people on the high seas. Now again, I have dealt
with it very shortly, and the Prosecution submits and takes the view
very strongly that the whole of that documentary evidence is several
steps removed from the issues in the case.
Now the second group of matters which I wanted to refer to. I can take
as an example the document making several score of allegations of
un-neutral acts against the United States. The case for the Prosecution
on sinking at sight is that sinking at sight against various groups of
neutrals was adopted as a purely political matter, according to the
advantage or, when it was abstained from, the disadvantage which Germany
might get from her relations with these neutrals. And it does not help
in answering that allegation of the Prosecution. That is a matter of
fact which can be judged, whether the Prosecution is right. It does not
help on that to say that the United States committed certain nonneutral
acts. If anything, it would be supporting the contention of the
Prosecution that sinking on sight was applied arbitrarily according to
the political advantages which could be obtained from it.
And the only other point—and again my friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wishes
me to emphasize it—is that these, the collection of unsworn statements,
are of course in a very different position, from any legal standard,
from reports made by officers in the course of their duty. Those are
admissible in all military courts, probably in every country in the
world. These are an _ad hoc_ collection. They are not only unsworn but
they are vague, indefinite, and insufficiently related to the order
which is adhered to in the case of the Prosecution.
My Lord, I have tried to cut it very short, but I did want the Tribunal
to appreciate that on all these groups and especially, if I may say so,
on Groups 3 and 4, the Prosecution feels very strongly on this matter in
the case. I am grateful to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of
saying this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent
from this session.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the documents in the order in which they
were dealt with by Fleet Judge Kranzbühler.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-5, Page 7 of the document book.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 152.
The Tribunal allows Dönitz-69, Page 170.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Pages 173 to 197.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-72, Page 185.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 204.
It rejects Dönitz-74, Page 207.
It allows Dönitz-60, Page 208.
It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 209.
It rejects Dönitz-75, Page 218.
It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 219, Page 222 and Page 224.
It allows Dönitz-60, Page 256.
It rejects Dönitz-81, Page 233 and 234; 234 being Dönitz-82.
It rejects Dönitz-85, Page 242.
It rejects Dönitz-89, Page 246.
It allows Dönitz-9, Page 11, and Dönitz-10, Page 12.
It rejects Dönitz-12, Page 18.
It allows Dönitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49.
It allows Dönitz-19, Page 34.
It allows Dönitz-29, Pages 54 to 59, leaving out—that is to say, not
allowing—Page 58.
It rejects Dönitz-31, Page 64.
It rejects Dönitz-32, Page 65.
It rejects Dönitz-33, Page 66.
It allows Dönitz-37, Page 78.
It rejects Dönitz-38, Page 80.
It rejects Dönitz-40, Page 86.
It rejects Göring Number 7, Page 89.
With reference to the next exhibit, Page 91, the Tribunal would like to
know from Fleet Judge Kranzbühler whether that is already in evidence or
not. It is Page 91 in the Dönitz Document Book in English, Volume II,
Page 91.
It is headed “C-21, GB-194.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is an excerpt from a document which the
Prosecution has submitted here and which is therefore already in
evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; we need not be troubled about it.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-43, Page 95.
It allows Dönitz-90, Page 258.
It allows Dönitz-67, Page 96.
It allows Dönitz-53, Page 99.
It rejects Dönitz-47, Page 120.
It allows Dönitz-48, Page 122.
It rejects Dönitz-49, Page 131.
It rejects Dönitz-51 and 52, Pages 134 and 135.
That is all.
The Tribunal will adjourn today at a quarter to five and it will be
sitting in closed session thereafter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call
Admiral Dönitz as witness.
[_The Defendant Dönitz took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
KARL DÖNITZ (Defendant): Karl Dönitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, since 1910 you have been a
professional officer; is that correct?
DÖNITZ: Since 1910 I have been a professional soldier, and an officer
since 1913.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. During the World War, the first World
War, were you with the U-boat service?
DÖNITZ: Yes, from 1916.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until the end?
DÖNITZ: Until the end of the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After the first World War, when did you
again have contact with the U-boat service?
DÖNITZ: On 27 September 1935 I became the commanding officer of the
U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, the first German U-boat flotilla after 1918.
As an introduction to taking up that command, that is, in September
1935, I spent a few days in Turkey, in order to go there in a U-boat and
to bridge the gap from 1918.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus from 1918 to 1935 you had nothing to do
with U-boats?
DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was your rank when you went to the
U-boat service in 1935?
DÖNITZ: I was a Fregattenkapitän.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did the German U-boat service at that
time consist of?
DÖNITZ: The U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, of which I became the commanding
officer, consisted of three small boats of 250 tons each, the so-called
“Einbäume.” Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in
a U-boat school, which was not under my command, for the purpose of
training. Then there were afloat and in service perhaps another six of
these small boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who informed you of that command as C. O. of
the U-boat flotilla?
DÖNITZ: Admiral Raeder.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Raeder on that occasion issue
the order that the U-boat arm should be prepared for a specific war?
DÖNITZ: No. I merely received the order to fill in that gap from 1918,
to train the U-boats for the first time in cruising, submersion, and
firing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you prepare the U-boats for war against
merchant shipping?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I instructed the commanders as to how they should behave if
they stopped a merchantman and I also issued an appropriate tactical
order for each commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say that the preparation for
war against merchantmen was a preparation for war according to Prize
Regulations?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, the preparations were
concerned with the stopping of ships on the surface?
DÖNITZ: The only instruction which I gave concerning the war against
merchantmen was an instruction on how the U-boat should behave in the
stopping and examining, the establishing of the destination and so on,
of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the draft of
the German Prize Regulations came, I passed this on to the flotillas for
the instruction of the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You developed a new tactic for U-boats which
became known under the name “wolf pack tactics.” What was there to these
pack tactics, and did that mean anything in connection with the warfare
against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations?
DÖNITZ: The U-boats of all navies had so far operated singly, contrary
to all other categories of ships which, by tactical co-operation, tried
to get better results. The development of the “wolf pack tactics” was
nothing further than breaking with that principle of individual action
for each U-boat and attempting to use U-boats exactly in the same manner
as other categories of warships, collectively. Such a method of
collective action was naturally necessary when a formation was to be
attacked, be it a formation of warships, that is, several warships
together, or a convoy. These “wolf pack tactics,” therefore, have
nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to Prize
Regulations. They are a tactical measure to fight formations of ships,
and, of course, convoys, where procedure according to Prize Regulations
cannot be followed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you given the mission, or even obliged
to prepare for war, against a definite enemy?
DÖNITZ: I did not receive such a general mission. I had the mission of
developing the U-boat service as well as possible, as it is the duty of
every front-line officer of all armed forces of all nations, in order to
be prepared against all war emergencies. Once, in the year 1937 or 1938,
in the mobilization plan of the Navy, my order read that, in case France
should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany, it would
be the task of the German U-boats to attack the transports in the
Mediterranean which would leave North Africa for France. I then carried
out maneuvers in the North Sea with this task in mind. If you are asking
me about a definite aim or line of action, that, so far as I remember,
was the only mission which I received in that respect from the Naval
Operations Staff. That occurred in the year 1936 or 1937. According to
my recollection, that plan had been issued lest the rearmament of
Germany, at that time unarmed, might be interrupted by some measure or
other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the year 1939, then, was the German
U-boat service prepared technically and tactically for a naval war
against England?
DÖNITZ: No. The German U-boat service, in the fall of 1939, consisted of
about thirty to forty operational boats. That meant that at any time
about one-third could be used for operations. In view of the harsh
reality the situation seemed much worse later. There was one month, for
instance, when we had only two boats out at sea. With this small number
of U-boats it was, of course, only possible to give pinpricks to a great
naval power such as England. That we were not prepared for war against
England in the Navy, is, in my opinion, best and most clearly to be seen
from the fact that the armament of the Navy had to be radically changed
at the beginning of the war. It had been the intention to create a
homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much
smaller than the British fleet, was not capable of waging a war against
England. This program for building a homogeneous fleet had to be
discontinued when the war with England started; only these large ships
which were close to completion were finished. Everything else was
abandoned or scrapped. That was necessary in order to free the building
capacity for building U-boats. And that, also, explains why the German
U-boat war, in this last war, actually only started in the year 1942,
that is to say, when the U-boats which had been ordered for building at
the beginning of the war were ready for action. Since peacetime, that is
in 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has repeatedly termed the
U-boat arm an aggressive weapon. What do you say to this?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is correct. The U-boat has, of course, the assignment
of approaching an enemy and attacking him with torpedoes. Therefore, in
that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say by that that it is a
weapon for an aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: Aggressive or defensive war is a political decision and,
therefore, it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can
certainly use a U-boat in a defensive war because, in defensive war
also, the enemy’s ships must be attacked. Of course, I can use a U-boat
in exactly the same way in a politically aggressive war. If one should
conclude that the navies which have U-boats are planning an aggressive
war, then all nations—for all the navies of these nations had U-boats,
in fact many had more than Germany, twice and three times as
many—planned aggressive war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your capacity as Flag Officer of U-boats,
did you yourself have anything to do with the planning of the war as
such?
DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all. My task was to develop U-boats militarily
and tactically for action, and to train my officers and men.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before the beginning of this war did you
give any suggestions or make any proposals concerning a war against a
definite enemy?
DÖNITZ: No, in no instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you do so after this war had started
concerning a new enemy?
DÖNITZ: No, not in that case either.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted some documents
which contain orders from you to the U-boats and which date from before
the beginning of this war. An order for the placing of certain U-boats
in the Baltic and west of England, and an order before the Norway action
for the disposition of U-boats along the Norwegian coast. I ask you,
therefore, when, at what time, were you as Flag Officer of U-boats, or
from 1939 on as Commander of U-boats, informed about existing plans?
DÖNITZ: I received information on plans from the Naval Operations Staff
only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was
to participate in some way in the carrying out of a plan, and then only
at a time necessary for the prompt execution of my military task.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Let us take the case of the Norway action,
Admiral. When did you find out about the intention to occupy Norway, and
in what connection did you receive that information?
DÖNITZ: On 5 March 1940 I was called from Wilhelmshaven, where I had my
command, to Berlin, to the Naval Operations Staff, and at that meeting I
was instructed on the plan and on my task.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I present you now with an entry from the War
Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, which I will submit to the Tribunal
as Dönitz Exhibit Number 6. It is on Page 8 of Document Book 1.
“5 March 1940: The Flag Officer of U-boats participates in a
conference with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff
in Berlin.
“Object of the conference: Preparation of the occupation of
Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht.”
Is that the meeting which you have mentioned?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the case of Norway, or in the previous
case of the outbreak of war with Poland, did you have the opportunity to
examine whether the tactical instructions which you had to give to your
U-boats led or were to lead to the waging of an aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: No, I had neither the opportunity nor indeed the authority to do
that. I should like to ask what soldier of what nation, who receives any
military task whatsoever, has the right to approach his general staff
and ask for examination or justification as to whether an aggressive war
can evolve from this task. That would mean that the soldiers...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal has itself to decide as a
matter of law whether the war was an aggressive war. It does not want to
hear from this witness, who is a professional sailor, what his view is
on the question of law.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe my question has
been misunderstood. I did not ask Admiral Dönitz whether he considered
the war an aggressive war or not; but I asked him whether he had the
opportunity or the task, as a soldier, of examining whether his orders
could become the means for an aggressive war. He, therefore, should
state his conception of the task which he had as a soldier, and not of
the question of whether it was or was not an aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us what his task was as a matter of fact, but
he is not here to argue the case to us. He can state the facts—what he
did.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does one not also, Mr. President, have to
allow a defendant to say what considerations he had or what
considerations he did not have? What I mean is that the accusations of
the Prosecution arise from this, and the defendant must have the
opportunity of stating his position regarding these accusations.
THE PRESIDENT: We want to hear the evidence. You will argue his case on
his behalf on the evidence that he gives. He is not here to argue the
law before us. That is not the subject of evidence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall question him on his considerations,
Mr. President.
Admiral, in connection with the orders which you issued to the U-boats
before the war or in connection with the orders which you issued before
the beginning of the Norway action—did you ever have any considerations
as to whether it would lead to aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: I received military orders as a soldier, and my purpose
naturally was to carry out these military tasks. Whether the leadership
of the State was thereby politically waging an aggressive war or not, or
whether they were protective measures, was not for me to decide; it was
none of my business.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As Commander of U-boats, from whom did you
receive your orders about the waging of U-boat warfare?
DÖNITZ: From the Chief of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that?
DÖNITZ: Grossadmiral Raeder.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the orders which you received at
the beginning of the war, that is, the beginning of September 1939, for
the conduct of U-boat warfare?
DÖNITZ: War against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations, that
is to say, according to the London Pact.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What ships, according to that order, could
you attack without previous warning?
DÖNITZ: At that time I could attack without warning all ships which were
guarded either by naval vessels or which were under air cover.
Furthermore, I was permitted to exercise armed force against any ship
which, when stopped, sent radio messages, or resisted the order to stop,
or did not obey the order to stop.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, there is no doubt that, a few weeks
after the beginning of the war, the war against merchantmen was
intensified. Did you know whether such an intensification was planned,
and if you do, why it was planned?
DÖNITZ: I knew that the Naval Operations Staff intended, according to
events, according to the development of the enemy’s tactics, to
retaliate blow for blow, as it says or said in the order, by intensified
action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the measures of the enemy and, on
the other hand, what were your own experiences with the measures taken
by the enemy which led to an intensification of action?
DÖNITZ: Right at the beginning of the war it was our experience that all
merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations when an
attempt was made to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages
as soon as they saw any U-boat on the horizon. It was absolutely clear,
therefore, that all merchantmen were co-operating in the military
intelligence service. Furthermore, only a few days after the beginning
of the war we found out that merchantmen were armed and made use of
their weapons.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders on the part of Germany resulted
from these experiences?
DÖNITZ: They first brought about the order that merchantmen which sent
radio messages on being stopped could be attacked without warning. They
also brought about the order that merchantmen whose armament had been
recognized beyond doubt, that is, whose armament one knew from British
publication, could be attacked without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This order concerning attacks on armed
merchantmen was issued on 4 October 1939; is that right?
DÖNITZ: I believe so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a second order, soon after that,
according to which all enemy merchantmen could be attacked, and why was
that order issued?
DÖNITZ: I believe that the Naval Operations Staff decided on this order
on the basis of the British publication which said that now the arming
of merchantmen was completed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the
British Admiralty on 1 October to the effect that the merchantmen had
been directed to ram German U-boats and furthermore—as stated at the
beginning—it was clear beyond doubt that every merchantman was part of
the intelligence service of the enemy, and its radio messages at sight
of a U-boat determined the use of surface or air forces.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have reports about that from
U-boats, according to which U-boats were actually endangered by these
tactics of enemy merchantmen and were attacked by enemy surface or air
forces?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I had received quite a number of reports in this
connection, and since the German measures were always taken about 4
weeks after it had been recognized that the enemy employed these
tactics, I had very serious losses in the meantime—in the period when I
still had to keep to the one-sided and, for me, dangerous obligations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these obligations, are you referring to
the obligation to wage war against merchantmen according to the Prize
Regulations during a period when the enemy’s merchant ships had
abandoned their peaceful character?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you protest later against the directives
of the Naval Operations Staff which led to an intensification of the war
on merchantmen, or did you approve these directives?
DÖNITZ: No, I did not protest against them. On the contrary, I
considered them justified, because, as I said before, otherwise I would
have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and meant
serious losses for me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this intensification of the war against
merchantmen by the order to fire on armed merchantmen, and later the
order to attack all enemy merchantmen, based on the free judgment of the
Naval Operations Staff, or was it a forced development?
DÖNITZ: This development, as I have said before, was entirely forced. If
merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and if they send
messages which summon protection, they force the U-boat to submerge and
attack without warning.
That same forced development, in the areas which we patrolled, was also
the case with the British submarines, and applied in exactly the same
way to American and Russian submarines.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If, on one side, a merchantman sends a
message and opens fire, and on the other side the submarine, for that
reason, attacks without warning, which side has the advantage of this
development, according to your experience? The side of the merchantman
or the side of the submarine?
DÖNITZ: In an ocean area where there is no constant patrolling by the
enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by aircraft, as along the coast,
the submarine has the advantage. But in all other areas the ship
acquires the main attack weapons against a submarine, and the submarine
is therefore compelled to treat that ship as a battleship, which means
that it is forced to submerge and loses its speed. Therefore, in all
ocean areas, with the exception of coastal waters which can be
constantly controlled, the advantage of arms lies with the merchantman.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are you of the opinion that the orders of
the Naval Operations Staff actually remained within the limits of what
was militarily necessary due to enemy measures, or did these orders go
beyond military necessity?
DÖNITZ: They remained absolutely within the bounds of what was
necessary. I have explained already that the resulting steps were always
taken gradually and after very careful study by the Naval Operations
Staff. This very careful study may also have been motivated by the fact
that for political reasons any unnecessary intensification in the West
was to be avoided.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, these orders we have mentioned were
based at that time only on German experiences and without an accurate
knowledge of the orders which had been issued on the British side. Now,
I should like to put these orders to you; we now have information on
them through a ruling of the Tribunal, and I should like to ask you
whether these individual orders coincide with your experiences or
whether they are somewhat different. I submit the orders of the British
Admiralty as Exhibit Dönitz-67. It is on Page 163 in Document Book 3. As
you know, this is the Handbook of the British Navy of 1938, and I draw
your attention to Page 164, to the paragraph on reporting the enemy.
DÖNITZ: There is no pagination here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is D. M. S. 3-1-55, the paragraph on
radio. The heading is “Reporting the Enemy.”
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will read the paragraph to you:
“As soon as the master of a merchant ship realizes that a ship
or aircraft in sight is an enemy, it is his first and most
important duty to report the nature and position of the enemy by
wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the means
of saving not only the ship herself but many others; for it may
give an opportunity for the destruction of her assailant by our
warships or aircraft, an opportunity which might not recur.”
Then there are more details which I do not wish to read, on the manner
and method, when and how these radio signals are to be given. Is this
order in accordance with your experience?
DÖNITZ: Yes. In this order, there is not only a directive to send
wireless signals if the ship is stopped by a U-boat—that alone would,
according to international law, justify the U-boat in employing armed
force against the ship—but beyond that it is stated that as soon as an
enemy ship is in sight this signal is to be transmitted in order that
the naval forces may attack in time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So this order is in accord with the
experiences which our U-boats reported?
DÖNITZ: Entirely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall draw your attention now to the
Paragraph D. M. S. 2-VII, on Page 165, that is the paragraph on opening
fire: “Conditions under which fire may be opened.”
“(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with international
law.—As the armament is solely for the purpose of self-defense,
it must only be used against an enemy who is clearly attempting
to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the outbreak of war it
should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with
international law, and fire should therefore not be opened until
he has made it plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it
is clear that resistance will be necessary if capture is to be
averted, fire should be opened immediately.
“(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of international law.—If,
as the war progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that in
defiance of international law the enemy has adopted a policy of
attacking merchant ships without warning, it will then be
permissible to open fire on an enemy vessel, submarine, or
aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if
to do so will tend to prevent her gaining a favorable position
for attacking.”
Is this order, that is to say, the order “(a)” and “(b),” in accord with
the experiences made?
DÖNITZ: In practice no difference can be established between “(a)” and
“(b).” I should like to draw attention in this connection to D. M. S.
3-III, Page 167, under IV; that is the last paragraph of “(b)” of the
number mentioned.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, do you mean “(b)-V”?
DÖNITZ: It says here “(b)-IV”. There...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is not printed, Mr. President.
DÖNITZ: “In ships fitted with a defensive armament, open fire to
keep the enemy at a distance”—that is (b)-IV—“if you consider
that he is clearly intending to effect a capture and that he is
approaching so close as to endanger your chances of escape.”
That means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, which
during war must be assumed to be there for a reason to effect a
capture—the ship will, in its own defense, open fire as soon as it
comes within range; that is when the submarine has come within range of
its guns. The ship, in using its guns for an offensive action, can act
in no other way.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, did the armed enemy vessels act
then in the manner which you have described; that is, did they really
fire as soon as a submarine came within range?
DÖNITZ: Yes. As early as—according to my recollection, the first report
came from a U-boat about that on 6 September 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With this order, however, we find a further
supplement under AMS 1-118, dated 13 June 1940, on Page 165, and here we
read:
“With reference to D.M.S. Part 1, Article 53, it is now
considered clear that in submarine and aerial operations the
enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without
warning. Subparagraph (b) of this article should therefore be
regarded as being in force.”
That means, then, that the order which we read before, “(b)” was to be
considered in effect only from 13 June 1940. Do you mean to say that
actually before that, from the very beginning, you acted according to
the order “(b)”?
DÖNITZ: I have already stated that between an offensive and defensive
use of armament on the part of a ship against a submarine, there is
practically no difference at all, that it is a purely theoretical
differentiation. But even if one did differentiate between them, then
beyond doubt the Reuter report—I believe dated 9 September—which said
incorrectly that we were conducting unlimited submarine warfare was
designated to inform ships’ captains that now case “(b)” was valid.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I put to you now a directive on the handling
of depth charges on merchant ships. It is on Page 168, the reference
list. The heading is “Reference List (D),” the date is “14 September
1939.” I read:
“The following instructions have been sent out to all W.P.S.’s:
It has now been decided to fit a single depth charge chute, with
hand release gear and supplied with 3 charges, in all armed
merchant vessels of 12 knots or over.”
Then there are more details and at the end a remark about the training
of the crews in the use of depth charges. The distribution list shows
numerous naval officers.
Did you experience this use of depth charges by merchant vessels and
were such depth charge attacks by merchant ships observed?
DÖNITZ: Yes, repeatedly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speaking of a ship with a speed of 12 knots
or more, can one say that a depth charge attack against a U-boat is a
defensive measure?
DÖNITZ: No. Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely
and absolutely an offensive action; for the submarine submerges and is
harmless under water, while the surface vessel which wants to carry out
the depth charge attack approaches as closely as possible to the
position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop the depth
charge as accurately as possible on top of the U-boat. A destroyer, that
is, a warship, does not attack a submarine in any different way.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are therefore basing the manner in which
you attacked enemy ships on these tactics employed by enemy merchantmen.
However, neutral ships also suffered, and the Prosecution charges the
German U-boat command expressly with this. What do you have to say to
that?
DÖNITZ: Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the
orders of the Naval Operations Staff, were only attacked without warning
when they were found in operational zones which had been definitely
designated as such, or naturally only when they did not act as neutrals
should, but like ships which were participating in the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document in
evidence, according to which, in certain ocean areas, attack without
warning against neutrals was authorized, beginning January 1940. I am
referring to Prosecution Document GB-194. I will read to you the
sentence which the Prosecution is holding against you.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where it is?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is in the British document book, Page 30,
Mr. President. In the document book of the Prosecution, Page 30.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I will read you the sentence which is held
against you:
“In the Bristol Channel, attack without warning has been
authorized against all ships where it is possible to claim that
mine hits have taken place.”
This order is dated 1 January 1940. Can you tell me whether at that time
neutrals had already actually been warned against using this shipping
lane?
DÖNITZ: Yes. Germany had sent a note to the neutrals on 24 November
1939, warning them against using these lanes and advising neutrals to
use the methods of the United States, whereby American ships—in order
to avoid any incidents—had been forbidden to enter the waters around
England.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will hand you the note of which you speak,
and I will at the same time submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit
Dönitz-73, to be found on Page 206 of the document book. It is in
Document Book 4, Page 206.
This is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff,
dated 24 November 1939. It has the following text:
“To the Missions, according to enclosed list.
“Telegram.
“Supplement to wire release of 22 October.
“Please inform the Government there of the following:
“Since the warning issued on (date to be inserted here)
regarding the use of English and French ships, the following two
new facts are to be recorded:
“a) The United States has forbidden its ships to sail in a
definitely defined area.
“b) Numerous enemy merchant ships have been armed. It is known
that these armed ships have instructions to use their weapons
aggressively and to ram U-boats.
“These two new facts give the Reich Government occasion to renew
and emphasize its warning, that in view of the increasingly
frequent engagements, waged with all means of modern war
technique, in waters around the British Isles and in the
vicinity of the French coast, the safety of neutral ships in
this area can no longer be taken for granted.
“Therefore the German Government urgently recommends the choice
of the route south and east of the German-proclaimed danger
zone, when crossing the North Sea.
“In order to maintain peaceful shipping for neutral states and
in order to avoid loss of life and property for the neutrals,
the Reich Government furthermore feels obliged to recommend
urgently legislative measures following the pattern of the U.S.
Government, which in apprehension of the dangers of modern
warfare, forbade its ships to sail in an exactly defined area,
in which, according to the words of the President of the United
States, the traffic of American ships may seem imperiled by
belligerent action.
“The Reich Government must point out that it rejects any
responsibility for consequences brought about by disregarding
recommendations and warnings.”
This is the note to which you referred, Admiral?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, in your opinion, these
sinkings in the Bristol Channel could be carried out lawfully as from 1
January?
DÖNITZ: Yes; these ocean areas were clearly limited areas in which
hostilities took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been
warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war
area, they had to run the risk of being damaged. England proceeded
likewise in its operational areas in our waters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you considered these sinkings legal,
why was the order given to attack without being sighted, if possible, in
order to maintain the fiction that mine hits had taken place? Doesn’t
that indicate a bad conscience?
DÖNITZ: No. During a war there is no basic obligation to inform the
enemy with what means one does one’s fighting. In other words, this is
not a question of legality, but a question of military or political
expediency.
England in her operational areas did not inform us either as to the
means of fighting she uses or did use; and I know how many headaches
this caused me when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, later, in
endeavoring to employ economically the small means we had.
That is the principle. At that time when, as Commander of U-boats, I
received this order to simulate mine hits where possible, I considered
this as militarily expedient, because the counterintelligence were left
in doubt as to whether mine sweepers or U-boat defense means were to be
employed.
In other words, it was a military advantage for the nation conducting
the war, and today I am of the opinion that political reasons also may
have influenced this decision, with the object of avoiding complications
with neutral countries.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could complications with neutral
countries come into being, in your opinion, if this naval warfare
measure was a legal one?
DÖNITZ: During the first World War we had experienced what part is
played by propaganda. Therefore I think it possible that our Government,
our political leaders, for this reason, too, may have issued this order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From your own experience you know nothing
about these political reasons?
DÖNITZ: Nothing at all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to now you have spoken about the orders
which were received by the U-boats, first for combating enemy ships, and
secondly for combating or searching neutral ships. Were these orders
then actually executed? That was primarily your responsibility, was it
not?
DÖNITZ: No U-boat commander purposely transgressed an order, or failed
to execute it. Of course, considering the large number of naval actions,
which ran into several thousands within the 5½ years of war, a very few
individual cases occurred in which, by mistake, such an order was not
followed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could such a mistake occur?
DÖNITZ: Every sailor knows how easily mistakes in identification can
occur at sea; not only during a war, but also in peacetime, due to
visibility, weather conditions, and other factors.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it also possible that submarines operated
on the borders of the operational areas, although they were already
outside these borders?
DÖNITZ: That is, of course, also possible. For again every sailor knows
that after a few days of bad weather, for instance, inaccuracy in the
ship’s course happens very easily. This occurs, however, not only in the
case of the submarine, but also of the ship, which perhaps is under the
impression of having been outside the operational area when torpedoed.
It is very difficult to establish the fact in such cases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What steps did you, as Commander of U-boats,
take when you heard of such a case, a case in which a U-boat had
transgressed its orders, even if by mistake?
DÖNITZ: The main thing was the preventive measures, and that was done
through training them to be thorough and to investigate quietly and
carefully before the commander took action. Moreover, this training had
already been carried on in peacetime, so that our U-boat organization
bore the motto: “We are a respectable firm.”
The second measure was that during the war every commander, before
leaving port, and after returning from his mission, had to report to me
personally. That is, before leaving port he had to be briefed by me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Admiral. That did not
continue when you were Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, did it?
DÖNITZ: That was limited after 1943, after I had become
Commander-in-Chief. Even then it did continue. In any case, it was the
definite rule during my time as Commander of U-boats, so that a
commander’s mission was considered completed and satisfactory only after
he had reported to me in full detail. If, on such an occasion, I could
establish negligence, then I made my decision according to the nature of
the case, as to whether disciplinary action or court-martial proceedings
and punishment had to take place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have found here an entry GB-198, on Page
230, in Document Book 4 of the Prosecution, which I would like to read
to you. This is a war diary of the Commander of U-boats, that is,
yourself.