πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο
συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν,
ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα
δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου
νόμῳ κοίνῳ τρεφομένης.
[862] In Epictet. Man. c. 53: more fully, Ibid. Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4,
34; and translated by Sen. Ep. 107, 11. See p. 182, 1. The verses are:
ἄγου δέ μ’ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύγ’ ἡ Πεπρωμένη
ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος·
ὡς ἑψομαί γ’ ἄκονος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.
[863] Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and 8: Boni viri laborant, impendunt,
impenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.... Quid
est boni viri? Præbere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5: Deum sequere.... Quæ
autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?... Quicquid ex universi
constitutione patiendum est, magno excipiatur animo. Ad hoc sacramentum
adacti sumus, ferre mortalia.... In regno nati sumus: Deo parere
libertas est. Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum,
non quia necesse est, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. Epictet.
Diss. ii. 16, 42: τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι
λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι. οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν
σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his
will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. iv. 7. 20:
κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἢ [ὃ] ἐγώ. iv. 1, 131, in
reference to the verses of Cleanthes: αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει,
αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας. Man. 8: θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὡς
γίνεται καὶ εὐροήσεις. Similarly Fragm. 134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60.
M. Aurel. x. 28: μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαι τοῖς
γινομένοις· τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. Ibid. viii. 45; x. 14.
[864] Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind
arrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of
virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et
omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens
sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu,
arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam:
Nunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortunæ maledixit.
Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem
credens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam
malum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum
sibi.... Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis ingemuit,
nunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non
aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium
animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter
æquus, &c.
[865] Conf. Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. præcipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor.
Volunt.: Ut. 1842, p. 220.
[866] Diog. vii. 130: εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν
σοφὸν (ἐξαγωγὴ is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide.
Full references for this and other expressions are given by Baumhauer,
p. 243). καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται
ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις. Stob. Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the
comœdian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to
sell his slave to Zeno ἐπ’ ἐξαγωγῇ.
[867] Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate
vivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad
libertatem viæ multæ, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in
vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5,
6, makes the deity say: Contemnite mortem quæ vos aut finit aut
transfert.... Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet
exitus.... Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui.
Trahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et
quam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right
of committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius
æterna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus
multos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8
and 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.
[868] De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.
[869] In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1; 50, 2.
[870] See Epictetus’s discussion of suicide committed simply in
contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the
rule (in Plato, Phæd. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the will of God. ii.
15, 4. Conf. M. Aurel. v. 10.
[871] Muson. in Stob. Floril. 7, 24, says: ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν
ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς
μηκέτι ἐξῇ; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not
to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.
[872] M. Aurel. v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free
from the body: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῇν ἔξιθι· οὕτως
μέντοι, ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων.
[873] Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3. Clem. Strom. iv. 485, A, likewise calls
the restriction of rational action sufficiently decisive reason: αὐτίκα
εὔλογον ἐξαγωγὴν τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγχωροῦσι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (i.e. the
Stoics), εἴ τις τοῦ πράσσειν αὐτὸν οὕτως τηρήσειεν [l. οὕτω
στερήσειεν], ὡς μηκέτι ἀπολελεῖφθαι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐλπίδα τῆς πράξεως.
[874] Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; De Ira, iii. 15, 3.
[875] See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.
[876] See p. 335, 2.
[877] Olympiod. in Phædr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite
comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five
occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a
banquet.
[878] Plut. C. Not. 11, 1: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπον ᾧ πάντα
τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ
καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηθὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι μηδ’ ἔσται
τὰ δὲ δεινὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ πάρεσται διὰ
τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν
ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. Ibid. 22, 7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; Alex.
Aphr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.
[879] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 5: ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως, φασὶν, οἴεται δεῖν
Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ’ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς
παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι
γίνεται ποτὲ καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῇν τοῖς
κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt
molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in
necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi cœpit suspecta esse
fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit.
Nihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an
citius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex
stillicidio potest perdere. Conf. 77, 6.
[880] Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia
proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes
nostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem.
In quo enim plura sunt, quæ secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est
in vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore
videntur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et
sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et
stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.... Et quoniam excedens e vita et
manens æque miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam
fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus
frui possint esse in vita manendum. Stob. 226: The good may have
reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though
they never should become wise: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῇν,
οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον
μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.
[881] Ep. 70, 11.
[882] Teles. in Stob. Floril. 5, 67, p. 127 Mein.
[883] The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 30, and the verses
quoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without
importance. He asserted, at least according to Philodem. De Mus. Vol.
Herc. i. col. 28: ἀμείνονά γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μουσικὰ
παραδείγματα καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν
δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν
λέξεις οἰκείας. τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μάλιστα
προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θεωρίας.
[884] Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 28,
71: Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque
pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce
veneremur; and more particularly Epict. Man. 31, 1: τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ
αὐτῶν ἔχειν ... καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς
καὶ εἴκειν ἐν πᾶσι γινομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Id. Diss. ii. 18, 19. Further
particulars on p. 345, 2.
[885] M. Aurel. ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us
something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: διδόναι
αὐτοὺς τὸ μήτε φοβεῖσθαί τι τούτων μήτε ἐπιθυμεῖν τινος τούτων. Diog.
vii. 124: We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.
[886] See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math. ix. 28, says that Rome of the younger
Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have
been already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to
the golden age.
[887] In this spirit, Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw
doubts on the popular Gods, not considering that by so doing they
deprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum
ab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism.
[888] Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta,
in Cic. N. D. i. 22, 61; iii. 2.
[889] Plut. Sto. Rep. 6, 1; Diog. vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.
[890] Ep. 41, 1: Non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus nec exorandus
ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus,
admittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35,
1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are
only ægræ mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.
[891] Benef. iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere
salutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish
to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira,
ii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how
greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in
which fear holds such a prominent place.
[892] Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet præcipi: accendere
aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et
ne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus
matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis
officiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles
ferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non quærit ministros Deus. Quidni?
Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus præsto est.... Primus
est Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam,
reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos
coluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3):
Vultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum ... non immolationibus et
sanguine multo colendum—quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas
est?—sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi
congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique
consecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy
temple of God is the universe.
[893] In Fr. 120 (in Lact. ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to
pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of
in their own profession. On this point he expressed his opinion with
great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which
Augustin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal
Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are
clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary
appearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they
would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are
honoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and
mutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take
part in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This
view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who
otherwise was so much admired by the Stoics.
[894] Fr. 119 (in Lact. i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas
salacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius
factus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium
liberorum? An ... timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno?
Similarly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. l.c.); Brevit. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26,
6, the ineptiæ poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter’s many
adulteries, give free rein to sins.
[895] Augustin. l.c. Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T.
Tatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit
Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem,
teterrimos hominum adfectus.... Hæc numina potius credes et cœlo
recipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo
longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus
magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.
[896] N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit
multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis
suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt.
Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo
pluribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa
est in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c.
28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones
pæne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic
legends.
[897] Phædrus (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to
Petersen’s restoration. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii. 147;
both of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human
in form; and Lactant. De Ir. D. c. 18: Stoici negant habere ullam
formam Deum.
[898] The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.
[899] Cic. l.c. 37. Conf. Krische, Forschung. i. 406 and 415.
[900] Clem., indeed, says (Strom. vii. 720, D): οὐδὲ αἰσθησέων αὐτῷ [τῷ
θεῷ] δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσε τοῖς Στωῑκοῖς, μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ
δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. But, according to all accounts,
this must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers
have conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with
their real opinion. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 139.
[901] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology,
evidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented
as being like men: διότι τῶν μὲν ἁπάντων τὸ θεῖον κυριώτατον, τῶν δὲ
ζῴων ἄνθρωπος κάλλιστον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἀρετῇ διαφόρως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
νοῦ σύστασιν, (τὸ κράτιστον—probably these words should be struck out),
τοῖς οὖν ἀριστεύουσι τὸ κράτιστον ὁμοίως καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν διενοήθησαν.
[902] Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19, p. 420.
[903] The numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent
on the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. Sen.
Fr. 26, 16 (in Lact. Inst. i. 5, 26).
[904] Diog. vii. 147.
[905] See p. 206, 1.
[906] Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.
[907] Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.
[908] See p. 131.
[909] Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39; ii. 26; Diog. vii. 147.
[910] Plut. De Is. c. 66; Cic. l.c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, where this
view is attributed, in particular, to Zeno’s pupil Persæus. Krische
(Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of
Prodicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.
[911] Phædr. (Philodemus), Nat. De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38,
attribute this assertion specially to Persæus and Chrysippus. Id. ii.
24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus,
Romulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate
fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni. Diog.
vii. 151. See p. 351, 1.
[912] This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is
there said, is held in three forms—the physical, the mythical, and the
form established by law (theologia civilis). All the gods belong to
seven classes, εἴδη: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ μετεώρων: the
observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes
of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven
and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) τὸ βλάπτον καὶ
ὠφελοῦν: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful
Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἐλπὶς,
Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as Ἔρως, Ἀφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν
ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον (τὸ μυθικὸν), such as the Gods invented by Hesiod
for the purpose of his genealogies—Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are
honoured for their services to mankind—Hercules, the Dioscuri,
Dionysus. This list includes not only things which deserve divine
honours, but all things to which they have been actually given: hence
it includes, besides the purely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics
can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions,
on which see p. 345, 1; 346, 2. On the other hand, they could raise no
objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list the
elementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of
fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that
followed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno—see p. 44,
1—or some later Stoic, is unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad
Nat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods into three classes: the
visible—the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of
nature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they make
themselves felt in the elements and in planets); and those facti, or
deified men.
[913] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες,
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν
θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ’ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι πλὴν
μόνου τοῦ Διὸς, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους.
[914] Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und
Dämonen (Berl. 1860), pp. 29–39.
[915] Tim. 90, A.
[916] Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6, p. 469: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν
αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ
κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν
φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει
ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. Sen. Ep. 41, 2, according to the
quotation, p. 344, 4: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum
bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus
est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc [animus
rectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Just as
Kant calls the moral idea, a primary notion which mankind has embraced,
the moral tone a good spirit governing us. Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12:
ἐπίτροπον [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἑκάστῳ παρέστησε τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε
φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. He who
retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ
ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστί. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance,
as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ
προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνταῦθα δ’ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων; so that the demon is
lost in the αὐτὸς within. M. Aurel. v. 27: ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ
προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ
ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. See ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12,
16; v. 10; viii. 45.
[917] See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3.
(Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, as
source), which receives its explanation (if it needs one) from the
above words of Posidonius.
[918] In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood:
Sepone in præsentia quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pædagogum
dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ ... ita
tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt,
Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et Genium et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the
old Romans, not the Stoics.
[919] Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, quoted p. 146, 1,
it is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea,
there must be νοερὰ ζῷα in the air, which is so much purer; and these
are the demons.
[920] Diog. vii. 151: φασὶ δ’ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων
συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας τὰς
ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360: Plato,
Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians
(amongst whom Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly thinks of the Orphics),
that the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of
them by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: The Stoics
believe demons to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων,
οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. A special treatise περὶ
ἡρώων καὶ δαιμόνων proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, probably, as
was his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an
extract from which is given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, containing the
etymology of δαίμων.
[921] Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277: καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται
φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται
καλασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. Id. Def. Orac. 17,
p. 419: φαύλους ... δαίμονας οὐκ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μόνον ... ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος—a statement which, particularly
as it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of
mythology (p. 350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who
did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which
purify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and
whom Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, reminds of), are not borrowed from
Stoicism, but from Plato (Rep. x. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.
[922] Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See p. 191, 2.
[923] Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui
Chrysippi sectator illudit ea.
[924] The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical
explanations of myths. Just as, before philosophy had broken away from
mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether
consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of
legend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry; so, now
that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to
conceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the
real meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the
original framers had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of
treating the myths resulted—that by natural explanation, and that by
allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of
history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific.
Both methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning besides the literal
one. This method of treating myths had been already met with among the
older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other
followers of Anaxagoras (according to Hesych. even Agamemnon was
explained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite one in
the time of the Sophists (Plato, Theæt. 153, C; Rep. ii. 378, D; Phædr.
229, C; Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg. 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as
appears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the
view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved
of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth
in popular notions without attributing to it any higher value. The
founder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the
Cynics the Stoics appear to have taken it. They carried it much further
than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater
influence on posterity than the Cynics.
[925] Cic. N. D. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3.
[926] The definition of allegory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα
δὲ ὧν λέγει σημαίνων, ἐπωνύμως ἀλληγορία καλεῖται (Heraclit. Alleg.
Hom. c. 5, p. 6). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical
expression. In earlier times, according to Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19,
it was termed ὑπόνοια, which term is found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D,
conf. Io. 530, D; Xen. Symp. 3, 6.
[927] In this way Zeno treated all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (Dio
Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 275; Diog. vii. 4; Krische, Forsch. 393), and so
did Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 175; Phædr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3;
Plut. Aud. Po. 11, p. 31; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003; Krische, 433) and
Persæus. Chrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus,
and Musæus (Phæd. col. 3; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, vol. v. 349,
Krische, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (Phæd. col. 5; Cic.
N. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also Plut. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and
respecting the theological literature of the Stoics Villoisin on
Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by
Varro (Preller, Röm. Myth. 29), and from his writings Heraclitus
(living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories
(edited by Mehler), and Cornutus for his work on the nature of the Gods
edited by Osann from Villoisin’s papers.
[928] Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.
[929] Corn. c. 17, p. 80: δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους, μήδ’ ἐξ ἑτέρου
τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταφέρειν, μηδ’ εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς κατ’
αὐτοὺς παραδιδομέναις γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνέντων ἃ αἰνίττονται
κεχρημένων δ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι.
[930] Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus.
Conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that
Jupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos Jovem
intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi,
&c.
[931] Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 276, R. speaking of Zeno’s commentaries
on Homer, says: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου λέγει, ἀλλὰ διηγούμενος
καὶ διδάσκων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν.... ὁ
δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένειός ἐστι πρότερον ... ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ
ἐξειργάσατο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.
[932] Special references are hardly necessary after those already
quoted, p. 148, 1; 153, 2; 164, 2: 165, 5. Conf. the hymn of Cleanthes;
Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48; Arat. Phæn. Begin.; Plut. Aud. Poët.
c. 11, p. 31; Varro, in August. Civ. D. vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in
Georg. i. 5; Heraclit. c. 15, p. 31; c. 23, 49; c. 24, 50; Corn. pp. 7;
26; 35; 38, where Ζεὺς is derived from ζῇν or ζέειν and Διὸς from διὰ,
ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα; conf. Villoisin and Osann on the passage of
Cornutus, who give further authorities in their notes on the respective
passages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of θεὸς
from θέειν or τιθέναι; of αἰθὴρ from αἴθειν or ἀεὶ θέειν. A portion of
these etymologies is well known to be Platonic.
[933] Πολυώνυμος, as he is called by Cleanthes, v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147;
Corn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in
the Neoplatonic doctrine.
[934] See Diog. l.c.; Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66; Phæd. (Philodem.), Fragm.
col. 2–5; Heracl. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl. c. 15 and 41,
p. 85; Corn. c. 3; on Hephæstus, Heracl. c. 26, 55; 43, 91; Corn. c.
19, p. 98; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377 (Diog. l.c. perhaps confounds as
Krische, p. 399, supposes, common fire with πῦρ τεχνικὸν, but it is
also possible that the artificial God of mythology may have been
explained now one way now another in the Stoic School, which is not
always uniform in its interpretations); on Poseidon, Heracl. c. 7, 15;
c. 18, 77; c. 46, 117; Corn. c. 12; Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367;
on Hades, whom Cicero l.c. makes the representative of terrena vis;
Heracl. c. 23, p. 50; c. 41, 87; Corn. 5; on Demeter and Hestia, Corn.
c. 28, p. 156; Plut. l.c.; on Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39; c. 28, 59; c.
61, 123; Corn. c. 20, 103. It is only by a forced interpretation of a
passage in Homer, that (Heraclit. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth.
That even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one
general divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Krische, Forsch.
399, by a comparison of Phædr. col. 5, with the passages quoted from
Cicero and Diogenes.
[935] Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem
et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit....
Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus
editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est
numerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus
(Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.
[936] Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf. Il. i. 395.
[937] Heracl. c. 40, 83; Il. xv. 18.
[938] Ibid. c. 37, 73; Il. viii. 18.
[939] Heracl. c. 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation
to the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96),
Corn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness of Hephæstus, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 3, p.
922.
[940] According to Eustath. in Il. p. 93, 46, probably following a
Stoic interpretation, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is
surrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two
elements are opposed to each other.
[941] Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. p. 19), where this
explanation is given very fully. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to
represent the passage of winter into spring. Here’s tresses are the
foliage of trees, &c.
[942] See Diog. vii. 187; Proœm. 5; Orig. con. Cels. iv. 48; Theophil.
ad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[943] c. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed
matter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements
[944] See the description. Alleg. Hom. 43–51, p. 90, of which the above
is a meagre abstract.
[945] According to Heraclit. 53, 112.
[946] We learn from Ps. Plut. De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleanthes
wrote a θεομαχία, a small fragment of which, containing a portion or
the Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded
form, is there preserved. The theomachy described by Cleanthes (the
Stoic Cleanthes seems to be meant) is, however, not the Homeric
theomachy, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans,
described in the book περὶ γιγάντων (Diog. vii. 175). Perhaps on this
occasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate the moral
interpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer’s θεομαχία is quite in the
style of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, and was probably
borrowed from Cleanthes.
[947] Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.
[948] Alleg. Hom. c. 54.
[949] Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11; Corn. 32, p. 191; 34, 206; Cic. N. D.
ii. 27, 68; Phædr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Phædrus, too,
col. 2 (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλω), if ἥλιον seems too wild, perhaps φῶς
should be substituted for τούς, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the
earth.
[950] Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p. 922. The Stoics address the moon as
Artemis and Athene.
[951] See p. 147, 1.
[952] The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιουμένου; by Chrysippus, as
derived from α privative and πολὺς, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων
αὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ὄντα. The latter explanation is quoted by Plotin. v.
5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have taken it from
Pythagoras, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in
imitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of
Apollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the ἕλικες λοξαὶ of the
sun’s course, or the ἀκτῖνες λοξαὶ of the sun; and by Œnopides, to the
λοξὸς κύκλος (the ecliptic). The epithet Λύκιος is explained by
Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem
eripit radiis; Antipater, ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου.
In the same author Macrobius found the derivation of πύθιος from πύθειν
(because the sun’s heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as
well as of other epithets of Apollo, of the name of Artemis and her
epithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found
in abundance in Cornutus, c. 32, 34, and in Macrobius, l.c., who
probably got most of them from Stoic sources.
[953] The first of these stories is explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17,
down to the most minute details, in the sense of the cosmical views
already given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the
Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the
marshy earth, which were overcome by the sun’s heat (the arrows of
Apollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by
Macrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same
source. Another likewise quoted by him, according to which the dragon
represents the sun’s course, is perhaps also Stoical.
[954] Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as Ληθὼ,
and referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at
night.
[955] c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang
of Apollo’s arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.
[956] c. 15, p. 31.
[957] Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141.
[958] See Corn. c. 20, 105, and Villoisin’s notes on the passage. The
most varied derivations of Athene are given: from ἀθρεῖν by Heracl. c.
19, 40; Tzetz. in Hesiod. Ἐρ. καὶ Ἡμε. 70; Etymol. Mag. Ἀθηνᾶ—from
θῆλυς or θηλάζειν (Ἀθήνη = ἀθήλη or ἀθηλᾶ = ἡ μὴ θηλάζουσα), by Phædr.
Nat. D. col. 6; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17, p. 78—from θείνω,
because virtue never allows itself to be beaten—from αἰθὴρ + ναίω, so
that Ἀθηναία = Αἰθεροναῖα.
[959] This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to
Phædr. col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the
derivation from τρεῖν.
[960] c. 33, p. 69.
[961] It is to be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349–353,
but, according to Phædr. (Philodem.) l.c., conf. Cic. N. D. I. 15, 41,
was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other
explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of
Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest
place in the universe. Cornut. c. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between
this explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head
as the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter,
Eustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.
[962] p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.
[963] See p. 359, 1, Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367: Demeter and Core
are τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν κάρπων διῆκον πνεῦμα. Phædr. col. 2: τὴν
Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ γόνευμα [γόνιμον πνεῦμα]. On Demeter as γῆ
μήτηρ or Δηὼ μήτηρ, see Corn. c. 28, p. 156, and Villoisin on the
passage.
[964] Plut. l.c.: Dionysus is τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον.
[965] Macrob. Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from
διανύσαι, because the sun daily completes his course round the world.
It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of
Apollo with Dionysus was common, and it is elaborately proved by
Macrobius. Servius, too, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed
the sun, Apollo, and Bacchus—and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno,
and Proserpine—to be identical. Other etymologies of Διόνυσος are given
by Corn. c. 30, 173.
[966] Corn. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story
and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heracl. c. 35, p.
71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.
[967] Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who also refers the legend and worship of
Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of
Persephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66.
According to Plut. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called
Περσεφόνη, τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα. A
somewhat different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in a
passage of Mai’s Mythograph, vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann. on
Cornutus, p. 343.
[968] The legend of Triptolemus is explained by Cornutus, l.c. p. 161,
as referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.
[969] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (Theodoret.
Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47,
5; Corn. c. 13, p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.
[970] According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole
book, probably of a treatise not otherwise mentioned on kind deeds,
with these ineptiæ—ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique
beneficii pauca admodum dicat, nee his fabulas, sed hæc fabulis
inserit. A portion of these was made use of by Hecato in his work on
this subject.
[971] Chrysippus, in Phædr. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars
in Sen. l.c., and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of
Λιταί (Corn. 12, 37; Heracl. 37, 75), which at best are only casual
personifications.
[972] Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and
number; Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; Erato indicates the
importance of music for ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή. Ibid. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes;
29, 171, on the Horoi.
[973] Heracl. 31, 63; Plut. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.
[974] Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62, and above, p. 360.
[975] Ibid. 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with
Zeus, which was really done by Phædr. Nat. De. col. 1: ἀνάλογον εὐν ...
θαι [Petersen suggests εὐνομεῖσθαι, but probably it should be
ὀνομάζεσθαι] τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ
ἀνάγκην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ
Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν.
[976] The story of Ares, νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, means, according to
Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes, ἐπὶ τὰ κενὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντεπάλων τάξεως
παρεισελθὼν, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (ἀφροσύνη, ibid. 30,
62), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced
troops of barbarians.
[977] In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, the connection of Ares and
Aphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets.
Heracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to
the union of φιλία and νεῖκος, which produces harmony, or to the fact
that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephæstus) into objects of
beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by Corn. 19,
102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the
union of strength and beauty.
[978] Corn. 27, 148; Plut. Krat. 408, C.
[979] His lewdness was said to indicate the fulness of the σπερματικοὶ
λόγοι in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the
world.
[980] Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann ad locum, who points out similar
interpretations, probably of Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the
theogony, and also in Etymol. M.
[981] Besides the etymologies of οὐρανὸς in Corn. c. 1, and the
observation of Plut. Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all
things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because
she brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63, on
which Krische, Forsch. 397, comments, deserve notice. It is there said,
probably after Zeno: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his
vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things.
Cronos is Time (the same is said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in
Rhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his children, just as Time
does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course
of time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second
explanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain
attempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Rhea. Cronos
(from κραίνειν) stands for the order of nature, putting an end to the
all too-violent atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the
vapour-masses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2), and
he is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited.
Macrob. Sat. i. 8 (who betrays that he is following a Stoic example by
quoting Chrysippus’s definition of time: certa dimensio quæ ex cœli
conversione colligitur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation:
Before the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all
things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity,
and the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and
the different sexes were left to propagate animal life.
[982] See p. 292, 4, and Sen. Benef. i. 13, 3.
[983] C. 31, 187.
[984] Plut. De Is. 44, Schl. p. 367: He is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν
πνεῦμα. Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2, and what Villoisin
quotes on Cornutus, p. 366. from Schol. Apollon. Among the natural
philosophers, i.e. the Stoics, Hercules symbolises strength and
intelligence.
[985] Pers. Sat. v. 63.
[986] Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who, in the introduction, expressly
refers to δοκιμώτατοι Στωϊκῶν.
[987] C. 70–75.
[988] C. 70–73, p. 137.
[989] Conf. the way in which Heraclitus, 74, 146, expresses himself as
to Plato’s and Epicurus’s attacks upon Homer.
[990] Conf. Wachsmuth’s treatise mentioned above, p. 351, 2.
[991] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on
divination, which are also referred to (as Wachsmuth, p. 12, shows) by
Diog. vii. 149; Varro (in Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9); Phot. Amphiloch.
Quæst. (Montfaucon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν
διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has
borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and
perhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also wrote a book, περὶ χρησμῶν (Cic.
Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; Suid. νεοττός); and one περὶ
ὀνείρων (Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27,
66: Suid. τιμωροῦντος). In the former, he collected oracular responses;
in the latter, prophetic dreams.
[992] Diog. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphærus περὶ μαντικῆς.
Cic. (Divin. i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101) mentions
a treatise having the same title as that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and
two books of Antipater περὶ μαντικῆς, in which many interpretations of
dreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54,
123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101) mentions a treatise of Posidonius
περὶ μαντικῆς in five books, Diog. vii. 149; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6; 30,
64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; De Fato, 3; Boëth. De Diis et
Præsens (in Orelli’s Cicero, v. 1) p. 395.
[993] Boëthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and
explain the indications of a storm. Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47.
On Panætius’s objections to μαντικὴ a word will be presently said.
[994] Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118: Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum
fissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec
Diis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. Ibid. 58, 132: Nunc illa
testabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui quæstus causa hariolentur,
ne psychomantia quidem ... agnoscere. Similarly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii.
32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and the
ordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics,
auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt
significent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter
should hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an
opinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.
[995] Conf. Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5: τὸ χρειῶδες αὐτῆς
(divination) καὶ βιωφελὲς, δι’ ὃ καὶ μάλιστα Χρύσιππος δοκεῖ ὑμνεῖν τὴν
μαντικήν; and M. Aurel. ix. 27; God shows his care for the wicked by
means of prophecies and by dreams.
[996] Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where among the four reasons from which
Cleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is præsensio rerum
futurarum, extraordinary natural phenomena—pestilence, earthquakes,
monsters, meteors, &c., being the third. Ibid. 65, 105: The Stoic says
of divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia
consuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132: If there were no Gods, all
the varieties of divination would be unmeaning; these are nevertheless
universally admitted. Cic. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175,
3, 4.
[997] Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera
divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos,
vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum,
inquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si
sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non
diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil
interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suæ
majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi
quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non
igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶ μὲν θεοὶ οὐ
προσημαίνουσι δὲ—the well-known expression of Chrysippus for εἰ θεοί
εἰσιν, οὐ προσημαίνουσι, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant
ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis
scientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est
divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by
Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as
belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the
same proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab
iis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν
ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ᾗ καὶ πρόνοιαν
εἶναι, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from
providence to divination, but from divination to providence.
[998] Cic. Div. i. 55, 125: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a
Deo ... deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque
repetenda.
[999] Cic. l.c. 55, 126.
[1000] Ibid. 57, 129.
[1001] See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.
[1002] Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. τιμωροῦντος), ii. 65, 135 (Suid.
νεοττός), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, quoting
from Antipater; i. 30, 64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posidonius—gives
instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst
their opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the
prophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to be accidental (Cic.
Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De Fato, 3, 5).
[1003] Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the
marvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the
existence of presentiments within certain limits.
[1004] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after the passage quoted: Sed a Stoicis vel
princeps ejus disciplinæ Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri
degeneravit Panætius, nec tamen ausus est negate vim esse divinandi,
sed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107;
Diog. vii. 149; Epiphan. Adv. Hær. Cicero appears to have borrowed from
Panætius, as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology
(Divin. ii. 42–46), and he allows, c. 42, 88; 47, 97, that Panætius was
the only Stoic who rejected it.
[1005] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3: Nimis illum [Deum] otiosum et pusillæ
rei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista
nihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennæ avium reguntur nec
pecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series
explicatur ... quicquid fit alicujus rei futuræ signum est ... cujus
rei ordo est etiam prædictio est, &c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after the
passage quoted, p. 371, 3: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum,
ut certis rebus certa signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in
avibus, &c. Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see p. 373, 2). Nor was the
meaning otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15, 33;
69, 142) were based on a συμπάθεια τῆς φύσεως (on which see p. 183, 2),
an opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for
instance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous
business, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.
[1006] As in the passage quoted from Boëthus on p. 371, 2.
[1007] Conf. p. 374, 2; 379, 1, and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90, according to
whom Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow
that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali
quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he
would not allow, because twins often differ widely in their course of
life and destiny.
[1008] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.
[1009] Cic. l.c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius
assert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque
divinam, quæ tota confusa mundo sit, as was explained i. 52, 118.
[1010] Cic. ii. 15, 35: Illud vero multum etiam melius, quod ...
dicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52, 118): cum immolare quispiam velit, tum
fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum
enim numini parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.
[1011] Cic. i. 53, 120, defends auguries somewhat similarly by arguing:
If an animal can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater
power over His? (his body according to them being the whole world).
[1012] See p. 181.
[1013] Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5;
Alex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.
[1014] Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its
reality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p.
372, 1.
[1015] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit
prædictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c.
This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic.
Divin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi.
col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above-quoted and more
general form it is found in Alexander and Eusebius, probably also taken
from Chrysippus, see p. 181.
[1016] According to the definition in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which Cic.
Divin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an ἐπιστήμη (Cic.
more accurately: a vis = δύναμις, since besides scientific there is
also natural divination), θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν
ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων. Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238; Eus. Pr. Ev.
iv. 3, 5.
[1017] Plut. Vit. Hom. 212, p. 1238: [τῆς μαντικῆς] τὸ μὲν τεχνικόν
φασιν εἶναι οἱ Στωϊκοί. οἷον ἱεροσκοπίαν καὶ οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὸ περὶ φήμας
καὶ κληδόνας καὶ σύμβολα, ἅπερ συλλήβδην τεχνικὰ προσηγόρευσαν· τὸ δὲ
ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον, τουτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς. To the same
effect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34; ii. 11, 26.
[1018] Conf. the fragment quoted in ‘Aristotle and the Peripatetics,’
p. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of
the Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, without, however, defending them.
[1019] Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64; ii. 10, 26: The naturale genus divinandi
is, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde
omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Plut. Plac. v.
1; where, however, the words κατὰ θειότητα τῆς ψυχῆς are only a gloss
on the preceding words κατὰ τὸ ἔνθεον, κ.τ.λ. Galen. Hist. Phil. p.
320.
[1020] Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and Plut. Compare the many Stoic stories
of dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56; 30, 64; ii. 65, 134; 70,
144.
[1021] See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110;
50, 113; 51, 115; and in particular i. 57, 129. Hence the prophecies of
the dying (ibid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius; conf. Arist. l.c.),
and the statement (ibid. 53, 121; see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come
of innocent sleep.
[1022] Conf. the quotations on p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26;
15, 35; and his remarks on the instinct us afflatusque divinus. Cic. i.
18, 34.
[1023] According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic
dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus
ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod
plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ
veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus
colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the
second, corresponds with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl.
ii. 122, 238, μαντικὴ is defined = ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ
θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Posidonius can only
have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he
would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which
is referred to in the first mode.
[1024] Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50,
114; 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural
scenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapours arising from the
earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he
can have attached value to oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or justified
them otherwise than in the way mentioned on p. 375, 4.
[1025] Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.
[1026] Ibid. i. 56, 127.
[1027] Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after
having previously (i. 33) treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut.
V. Hom. 212. See above, p. 377, 2, Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions
tentatively, as varieties of μαντικὴ τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν, καὶ τὸ
οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no
Gods, there would be neither μαντικὴ nor θεοληπτικὴ, ἀστρομαντικὴ nor
λογικὴ πρόῤῥησις δι’ ὀνείρων. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory
of dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is
impossible to say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes
the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.
[1028] Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128.
[1029] Ibid. i. 56, 127.
[1030] Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quieti præparato animo
cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment; conf.
c. 29, 60; 51, 115) ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera
cernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum
et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est
paratior.
[1031] See p. 46.
[1032] See p. 139.
[1033] See p. 132.
[1034] Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the Cynics, was
following a Stoic authority or not (vii.), is a moot point;
nevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations
of the two must have been well known, and the quotation from Posidonius
on p. 274, 2, quite accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi.
14, speaking of Antisthenes, says: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης
Στωϊκῆς κατάρξαι ... οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς
Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ
πόλει τὰ θεμέλια: and Juvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a
Cynicis tunica (the common dress in distinction to the tribon)
distantia.
[1035] Krische, Forschungen, i. 363, and above, p. 145, 2.
[1036] On Aristo see p. 59; 260; 281.
[1037] Aristo cannot, therefore, be considered (as he is by Krische,
Forsch. 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory. On
the contrary, he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in
Stoicism against the other component parts of this philosophy.
[1038] See p. 290.
[1039] Apart from the testimony of Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5,
10), to which no great value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno
with Heraclitus is established by the fact that not only the ethics,
but also the natural science of the Stoic School owes its origin to
him. See pp. 40, 3; 62, 2, 3; 126, 2; 141, 2; 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 146,
4; 148, 2; 151, 1. Diog. mentions treatises of Cleanthes, vii. 174; ix.
15, of Aristo, ix. 5, of Sphærus (vii. 178; ix. 15) treating of
Heraclitus; and Phædrus (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 4, says that
Chrysippus explained the old myths after the manner of Heraclitus.
[1040] Instances have often occurred. See p. 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 232, 4.
Conf. Sen. Ep. 83, 9.
[1041] Besides meteorological and other points of natural science,
which the Stoics may have borrowed from Heraclitus, Heraclitus’
attitude towards the popular faith also belongs here.
[1042] See p. 101, 2.
[1043] See p. 100, 4, 5; 101, 2; 140, 1.
[1044] As an illustration of the difference, take Heraclitus’ statement
of the daily extinction of the sun, which every one must admit would
not have been possible in the Stoic School.
[1045] πνεῦμα as with the Stoics.
[1046] See particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in many passages. See
above, p. 39, 2.
[1047] See p. 46, 1, 2.
[1048] The story in Diog. vii. 3 bears out this view, that Zeno was
first won for philosophy by Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and that on asking
who was the representative of this line of thought, he was referred to
Crates. According to the quotations on pp. 274, 2; 387, 1, the Cynics
were regarded in the Stoic School as genuine followers of Socrates.
[1049] Consult, on this subject, the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in
Ersch and Gruber’s Encyclopædia, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459–477.
[1050] Diog. x. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging
to the δῆμος Gargettos. Diog. l.c.; Lucret. Nat. Rer. vi. 1; Cic. Ad
Fam. xv. 16; Ælian, V. H. iv. 13.
[1051] Diog. i.; Strabo, xiv. 1, 18, p. 638. According to these
authorities, and Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone thither as a
κληροῦχος. That this happened before his birth has been demonstrated by
Steinhart, p. 461.
[1052] Apollodorus (in Diog. x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion, Ol. 109, 3, as
the birthday of Epicurus. It was observed (Epicurus’ will, Diog. 18) τῇ
προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος. Gamelion being the seventh month of the
Attic year, the time of his birth must have been either early in 341
B.C., or the last days of 342 B.C.
[1053] His father, according to Strabo, was a schoolmaster, and
Epicurus had assisted him in teaching (Hermippus and Timon, in Diog. 2;
Athen. xiii. 588, a). His mother is said to have earned money by
repeating charms (καθαρμοί), and Epicurus to have assisted in this
occupation (Diog. 4). Although the latter statement evidently comes
from some hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in
early life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education.
His language in disparagement of culture would lead us to the same
conclusion, even were the express testimony of Sext. Math. i. 1
wanting: ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθὴς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς
κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις (in common expressions, conf. the censure passed on
him by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aristophanes in Diog. 4, 13)
καθαρεύων. Cic. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis
fuisset instructor—est enim ... non satis politus in artibus, quas qui
tenent eruditi appellantur—aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Athen.
xiii. 588, a: ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὤν.
[1054] According to his own statement (Diog. 2), he was not more than
fourteen (Suid. Ἐπικ. has twelve) years of age when he began to
philosophise, i.e. to think about philosophical subjects; probably
about chaos, following the suggestion of Hesiod’s verses. He
subsequently boasted that he had made himself what he was without a
teacher, and refused to own his obligations to those shown to be his
teachers. Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72; 33, 93; Sext. Math. i. 2, who mentions
his disparagement of Nausiphanes; Diog. 8, 13; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 18,
4; conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3. It is, however, established that in his youth
he enjoyed the instruction of Pamphilus and of that Nausiphanes, who is
sometimes called a follower of Democritus, sometimes of Pyrrho (Cic.;
Sext.; Diog. x. 8; 13; 14; ix. 64; 69; Proœm. 15; Suid. Ἐπικ.; Clem.
Strom. i. 301, D). The names of two other supposed instructors are also
mentioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (Diog. Proœm. 15; x. 13), but
they almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus and Nausiphanes.
[1055] According to Cic. l.c., he denied the fact. Others, however,
asserted it, and, among them, Demetrius of Magnesia. Diog. 13.
[1056] Whither he came, in his eighteenth year, according to Heraclides
Lembus, in Diog. 1. Conf. Strabo, l.c.: τραφῆναί φασιν ἐνθάδε (in
Samos) καὶ ἐν Τέῳ καὶ ἐφηβεῦσαι Ἀθήνῃσι.
[1057] According to Hermippus (Diog. 2) Democritus first gave him the
impulse to pursue philosophy; but this is only a conjecture. Besides
Democritus, Aristippus is also mentioned as a philosopher whose
doctrines he followed (Diog. 4). Epicurus is even said to have
expressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93;
Diog. 8). Nor is this denied by Diog. 9: but it probably refers to
particular points only, or it may have reference to the attitude of
later Epicureans, such as Colotes (Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108).
Plut. l.c., says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself
a follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and
Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus’ respect for Democritus. Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to expressions of
Epicurus which excuse certain mistakes of Democritus. Lucret. iii. 370,
v. 620, also speaks of Democritus with great respect; and Philodem. De
Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 36, calls him ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν
ἀρχαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων.
[1058] Diog. 1, 15 mentions Colophon, Mytilene, and Lampsacus. Strabo,
xiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also affirms that Epicurus resided for some time
at Lampsacus, and there made the acquaintance of Idomeneus and
Leonteus.
[1059] Diog. 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to
him, Epicurus returned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates,
307–6 B.C. In that case the numbers must be slightly reduced in the
statement (Diog. 15) that he came to Mytilene when 32, and taught there
and in Lampsacus for five years.
[1060] Not immediately, however, since Diog. 2 says, on the authority
of Heraclides: μέχρι μέν τινος κατ’ ἐπιμιξίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν,
ἔπειτ’ ἰδίᾳ πως τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν συστήσασθαι.
[1061] On this celebrated garden, after which the Epicureans were
called οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, see Diog. 10, 17; Plin. H. N. xix. 4, 51; Cic.
Fin. i. 20, 65; v. 1, 3; Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Sen. Ep. 21, 10; Steinhart,
p. 462, 45; 463, 72. Epicurus had purchased it for 80 minæ.
[1062] This subject will be discussed at a later period.
[1063] Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus (Diog. 5; 25;
26; Clem. Strom. iv. 522, D).
[1064] Diog. 4; 6; 7; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 92, Balfor.; Plut. N. P.
Suav. Vivi, 4, 8; 16, 1 and 6; Lat. Viv. 4, 2. The best-known among
these ἑταῖραι is Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of
Epicurus (Diog. 6; 23), and wrote with spirit against Theophrastus
(Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Plut. Hist. Nat. Præf. 29). Conf. Diog. 5;
Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii. 593, b,
tells a fine story of self-sacrifice of her daughter Danaë.
[1065] Ol. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his
seventy-second year. Diog. 15; Cic. De Fat. 9, 19.
[1066] Diog. 15; 22; Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 26; Fin. ii. 30, 96; Sen. Ep.
66, 47; 92, 25. That he put an end to his own life (Baumhauer, Vet.
Philo. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. 322), Hermippus (Diog. 15) by no means
implies.
[1067] According to Diog. Pro. 16, x. 26, he was, next to Chrysippus,
the most voluminous writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings
filling 300 rolls. The titles of his most esteemed works are given by
Diog. 27. Conf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 595, Harl.
[1068] Three epistles in Diog. 35; 84; 122; and the κύριαι δόξαι, an
epitome of his ethics, mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 30, 85, and 139. Of
his 37 books περὶ φύσεως, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited
(Vol. Hercul. ii.).
[1069] Fragments in Diog. 5; 7. Besides the testament and the letter to
Idomeneus (Diog. 16–22), many individual expressions of Epicurus have
been preserved by Seneca.
[1070] Aristophanes (in Diog. 13) calls his style ἰδιωτικωτάτη.
Cleomed. Meteor. p. 91, complains of his awkward and barbarous
expressions, instancing: σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα· τὰ περὶ ταύτης
πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα· λιπάσμα ὀφθαλμῶν· ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα· γαργαλισμοὺς
σώματος. In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him. See
above, p. 48, 1.
[1071] See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 598, Harl. They were, no doubt, very
numerous. Diog. x. 9, probably exaggerates their number in saying the
friends of Epicurus would fill towns. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65, speaks of
magni greges amicorum. Plut. Lat. Viv. 3, 1, also mentions his friends
in Asia and Egypt. In Greece, however, on his own testimony, and that
of Metrodorus (Sen. Ep. 79, 15), they attracted little notice.
[1072] A native of Lampsacus (Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and, next
to Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. Cicero, Fin.
ii. 28, 92, calls him pæne alter Epicurus, and states (Fin. ii. 3, 7)
that Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man (Diog. 18; Sen. Ep. 52,
3). Further particulars respecting him and his writings in Diog. x. 6;
18; 21–24; Philodem. De Vitiis, ix. (Vol. Herc. iii.), col. 12; 21; 27;
Athen. vii. 279; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; Adv.
Col. 33, 2 and 6; Sen. Ep. 98, 9; 99, 25. Fragments of the letters are
to be found in Plutarch, Seneca, and Philodemus. Whether the fragments
of a treatise περὶ αἰσθητῶν in vol. vi. of Vol. Hercul. belong to him,
is very uncertain. According to Diog. 23, he died seven years before
Epicurus, in his fifty-third year, and must therefore have been born
330 or 329 B.C. For the education of his children probably by Leontion,
whom Diog. 23 calls παλλακὴ, and Sen. Fr. 45 in Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i.
191 calls his wife, provision is made by Epicurus in his will (Diog.
19, 21).
[1073] Son of Athenodorus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 24), a
capital mathematician, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. i. 6,
20. Diog. l.c. calls him ἐπιεικὴς καὶ φιλήκοος; Metrodorus, in
Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a), col. 6, ἀποφθεγματίας. Sen.
Ep. 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus, viros magnos.
Philodemus (vol. v. b), Fr. 49. praises his frankness towards his
teacher. A son of his is also mentioned in Epicurus’ will (Diog. 19),
whose mother would appear to have been a courtesan, according to Plut.
N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 6.
[1074] This individual’s name, formerly written Hermachus, appears as
Hermarchus in the modern editions of Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca. The
latter form is now established beyond doubt by the Herculanean
fragments from Philodemus (περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, vol. vi. col. 13, 20; De
Vitiis, ix. vol. iii. col. 25, 1), and the inscription on a monument to
him (Antiquitat. Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace was Mytilene,
Agemarchus being his father. (Diog. 17, 15, 24.) Diog. 24 gives a list
of his books. Epicurus (Diog. 20) describes him as one of his oldest
and most faithful friends, in the words: μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγηρακότος
ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. On his character, see Sen. Ep. 6, 6.
[1075] According to what is stated in the testament of Epicurus. Diog.
16.
[1076] Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. Diog. 25. Further particulars
about him may be obtained from Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 5; 1, 1; N. P. Suav.
Vivi, 1, 1; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 2. Vol. Hercul. iv. Introd. in
Polystr. p. iii.
[1077] In particular, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the
brothers of Epicurus (Diog. 3, 28; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 5, 3; where
Ἀγαθόβουλος is evidently a copyist’s error; 16, 3; De Lat. Viv. 3, 2);
Idomeneus, a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 25; 22; 23; 5; Plut. Adv. Col.
18, 3; Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589; Athen. vii. 279; Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας. Fr. 72, Vol. Herc. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7; 22, 5; Phot.
Lex.; and Suid. Πύθια καὶ Δήλια), from whose historical writings many
fragments are quoted by Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 489; Leonteus,
likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 5; 25; Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3;
Strabo, l.c.); Herodotus (Diog. 4 and 34); Pythocles (Diog. 5 and 83;
Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1; Adv. Col. 29, 2; Philodem. περὶ
παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6); Apelles (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1); Menœceus
(Diog. 121); Nicanor (Diog. 20); Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus,
who afterwards fell out with Epicurus (Diog. 4 and 6; 23 and 28; Cic.
N. D. i. 33, 93: Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Adv. Col. 32, 7;
Comment. in Hesiod. Fr. 7, 1; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v.
a, col. 20). This Timocrates must not be confounded with the Athenian
Timocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, jointly with Amynomachus
(Diog. 16; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). The two last named were probably
pupils of Epicurus. Other pupils were: Mithras, a Syrian, an official
under Lysimachus (Diog. 4 and 28; Plut. Adv. Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav.
Viv. 15, 5); Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty
(Diog. 21; 3; 10; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; the ladies
mentioned on p. 407, 2, 3; likewise Anaxarchus, to whom Epicurus
addressed a letter, and Timarchus, to whom Metrodorus addressed one
(Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3); Hegesianax, who died early (Plut. N. P. Suav.
Vivi, 20, 5); the poet Menander, whose wondrous epigram on Epicurus is
to be found in the anthology; and probably Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος.
(See above, p. 44, 1.)
[1078] Diog. 16. In Cicero’s time, the plot of ground, together with
the tenement standing thereupon, and at that time in ruins (parietinæ),
was in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero
wrote (Ad Fam. xiii. 1), conf. Ad Att. v. 11, begging him to restore it
to the School. Whether he was successful is not known from Sen. Ep. 21,
10.
[1079] Diog. 25. does not say that Polystratus was a personal disciple
of Epicurus, but it seems probable. Fragments of a treatise of his περὶ
ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως in the fourth volume of Vol. Hercul.
[1080] According to Valer. Max. i. 8, ext. 17, both these individuals
were born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a
common purse. Lysias, according to the older text of Diog. x. 25, was a
cotemporary, at whose house Hermarchus died, as Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii.
606 believes, and who is styled in Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of Tarsus,
Cobet, however, reads παραλύσει instead of παρὰ Λυσίᾳ.
[1081] Diog. 25. The Dionysius referred to can hardly be Dionysius ὁ
μεταθέμενος (see p. 44, 1), or Diogenes would have said so. Besides the
chronology forbids such an assumption.
[1082] Strabo, xiv. 2, 20, p. 658. He is probably the Protarchus whose
sayings are quoted by Simpl. Phys. 78, a; Themist. Phys. 27, a.
[1083] According to Strabo, l.c., Diog. 26, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. iii.
137, Math. viii. 348, x. 219, Erotian, Lex. Hippocr. Κλαγγώδη,
Demetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans. Whether a
treatise on mathematics, illegible fragments of which are found in
Herculaneum (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or
belongs to another Demetrius mentioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 16, page 548,
it is impossible to say.
[1084] Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria (Diog. 25); Diogenes of Tarsus
(Diog. vi. 81; x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Orion (Diog. 26); Timagoras
(Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); and also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went
over from Epicurus to Carneades (Diog. 9)—a very rare thing for an
Epicurean to do—may be named among his pupils.
[1085] According to Athen. xii. 547, a, Ælian, V. H. ix. 12, two
Epicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Rome, in the
consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see Clinton’s Fasti),
because of their evil influence on youth. Although the story is
obviously taken from a hostile authority and in Suid. (Ἐπίκουρος, vol.
i. b, 419 Bern.), it is told with such exaggerations as to inspire
grave mistrust, it can hardly be altogether without some foundation.
Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 19, 4, says, that in some cities severe laws were
passed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong
feeling in Rome against innovations, witness the well-known enquiry
into the Bacchanalia instituted 186 B.C.
[1086] According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come
forward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156 B.C.; nor is this
at variance with Lucr. v. 336, who claims primus cum primis to have set
forth the Epicurean teaching in Latin. His works made a great
impression at the time, according to Cic. l.c. (cujus libris editis
commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam). According
to Acad. i. 2, 5, he pursued natural science, carefully following the
views of Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Rabirius, we know
not which one is meant, nor whether he was an Epicurean, qui nulla arte
adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant: nihil
definiunt, nihil partiuntur, &c. Conf. Tusc. ii. 3, 7. Cassius, too
(Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 12), calls him and Catius (see p. 414, 3) mali
verborum interpretes.
[1087] Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem æmuli
rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque
maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile
ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse discipliæ
putant. Conf. in Fin. i. 7, 25, the question: Cur tam multi sint
Epicurei?
[1088] Surnamed ὁ κηποτύραννος, the writer of more than 400 books.
Diog. 25; 2; 13; vii. 181.
[1089] Diog. vii. 35, x. 25, and Procl. in Euclid. 55, says that Zeno
was a native of Sidon, and a pupil of Apollodorus; nor can these
statements be referred to an older Zeno, as some previous writers
maintained, believing Apollodorus to be called in error a pupil of
Epicurus by Diog. x. 25, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. For
no trace of such a one exists; and Diogenes vii. 35 would then have
passed over the teacher of Cicero without notice, although the latter
cannot possibly have been unknown to him. According to Cic. Acad. i.
12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades and admired them; and
since Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been
born much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was really the
successor of Apollodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the
second century. But this fact is not sufficiently established. Cicero,
in company with Atticus, attended his lectures (Cic. l.c.; Fin. i. 5,
16; Tusc. iii. 17, 38. In Cic. N. D. i. 21, 58, Cotta says the same of
himself), on his first visit to Athens, 78 or 79 B.C.; conf. N. D. i.
34, 93; but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno or Xeno (as Krische,
Forsch. 26, maintains) whom Cic. Ad Att. v. 10, 11; xvi. 3 mentions as
living in 50 and 43 B.C. Cic. N. D. i. 21, calls him princeps
Epicureorum (and Philo of Larissa, coryphæus Epicureorum); Tusc. l.c.,
acriculus senex, istorum (Epicureans) acutissimus. Diog. x. 25, calls
him πολύγραφος ἀνήρ. From Procl. in Euclid. 55; 59; 60, we hear of a
treatise of Zeno, in which he attacked the validity of mathematical
proofs. Philodemus’ treatise περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a) seems,
from the title, to have been an abstract from Zeno. Cotemporary with
Zeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during
the Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and
sometimes an Epicurean (Plut. Sulla, 12; 14; 23). See Zeller’s
Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 759, 2. Perhaps to the time of
his despotism the statement may be referred (Demetrius Magnes in Athen.
xiii. 611, b) that the Stoic Theotimus, who wrote against Epicurus, was
killed at the instance of Zeno.
[1090] Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; Legg. i. 20,
53) had also studied under him in Athens, and previously in Rome, where
Phædrus must then have been residing (Ad Fam. xiii. 1). He was old when
Cicero for the second time was brought into relations with him.
According to Phlegon, in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a, 17, he was
succeeded by Patro (Ol. 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the
School, after holding it only for a very short time; but this is not a
well-ascertained fact. Cicero l.c. praises the character of Phædrus. He
calls him nobilis philosophus (Philip, v. 5, 13). It is supposed that
Cicero’s description (N. D. i. 10, 25; 15, 41), and that the fragments
first published by Drummond (Herculanensia: London, 1810), and then by
Petersen (Phædri ... de Nat. De. Fragm.: Hamb. 1833), and illustrated
by Krische (Forschungen), were from a treatise of Phædrus on the Gods,
to which perhaps Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel (from the
Herculanean rolls, Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας. Abh. d. Münch. Akad.
Philos-philol. Kl. x. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De Philodemi libro ... de
pietate. Gött. Lectionsverz. für Sommer, 1864) have shown that the
Neapolitan (Vol. Herc. Coll. Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are right in
regarding these fragments as the remains of a treatise of Philodemus
περὶ εὐσεβείας.
[1091] Philodemus (see Vol. Herc. i. 1; Gros, Philod. Rhet. cxii.;
Preller, Allg. Encycl. Sect. III. Bd. xxiii. 345) was a native of
Gadara. in Cœle-Syria (Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759). He lived at Rome in
Cicero’s time, and is mentioned by Cicero as a learned and amiable man
(Fin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Pison. 28). Besides philosophic works, he
also wrote poems (Cic. In Pis.; Hor. Sat. i. 2, 121). A number of the
latter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical
works mentioned by Diog. x. 3; 24, no fewer than thirty-six books were
discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been
published (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii.) so far as they were
legible. Spengel and Gros have separately edited Rhet. IV.; Sauppe, De
Vitiis X.; and Petersen and Sauppe, the fragments περὶ εὐσεβείας.
[1092] Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. ii. 35, 110; Ad Fam. vi. 11.
According to Virgil, Catal. 7, 9; 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv. Ad
Ecl. vi. 13, Æn. vi. 264, he was the teacher of Virgil. The name is
variously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the
grammarian Pompilius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to Sueton.
Illust. Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome at the same time as Gnipho, the
teacher of Cæsar (Ibid. c. 7), and gave up his profession for the
Epicurean philosophy, and afterwards lived at Cumæ.
[1093] Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad Att. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i.
2, 4, where besides him an Epicurean Plato of Sardes is mentioned, and
above, pp. 410, 1; 413, 1.
[1094] Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T.
Albutius, called by Cic. Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cic. Brut.
26, 102; Tusc. v. 37, 108; N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Orat. iii.
43, 171]; In Pison. 38, 92; Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator, 44, 149; In
Cæcil. 19, 63; Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281), and
Velleius, who, as Krische (Forsch. 20) proves, by a gloss on Nat. De.
i. 29, 82 and Cic. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf. Divin. i. 36, 79), was a
native of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Epicurean
of his time (Cic. N. D. i. 6, 15; 21, 58; conf. De Orat. iii. 21, 78).
Other Epicureans were: C. Catius, a native of Gaul, spoken of by Cicero
(Ad Fam. xv. 16) as one long ago dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 124, he is
called levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auctor; and the Comment.
Cruqu. in Hor. Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote four books De Rerum
Natura et De Summo Bono;—C. Cassius, the well-known leader of the
conspiracy against Cæsar (Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Plut. Brut. 37); C.
Vibius Pansa, who died as consul at Mutina in 43 B.C. (Cic. Ad Fam.
vii. 12; xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii. 26); L. Piso, the patron of
Philodemus (Cic. in Pis. 28, see above, p. 413, 2; l.c. 9, 20; 16, 37;
18, 42; 25, 59; Post Red. 6, 14); Statilius (Plut. Brut. 12); a second
Statilius appears to be meant (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus, to
whom Cic. Fin. i. 5, 13 delegates the representation of the Epicurean
teaching. T. Pomponius Atticus, the well-known friend of Cicero,
approached nearest to the Epicurean School, calling its adherents
nostri familiares (Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3) and condiscipuli (Legg. i. 7,
21). He was a pupil of Zeno and Phædrus and a friend of Patro’s; but
his relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be
ranked in any one school (Cic. Fam. xiii. 1). The same observation
applies also to his friend, L. Saufeius (Nepos, Att. 12; Cic. Ad Att.
iv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Orata (Cic. Fin. ii. 22, 70; Off.
iii. 16, 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. l.c.), and
Postumius (Ibid.) be called Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with
certainty respecting L. Papirius Pætus (Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26),
not even from the chief passage Ep. 25, or respecting C. Trebatius from
Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Memmius (from the way in which he is spoken of
by Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as a member of the
Epicurean School, although Lucret. De Rer. Nat. i. 24; v. 9, expressed
the hope of winning him.
[1095] Born, according to Hieron, (in Eus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in
his 44th year, or 51 B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659 ought therefore to be
substituted for 699 A.U.C. It is clear, from Nepos, Att. 12, that he
was dead before the assassination of Cæsar. Teuffel (in Pauly’s
Realencycl. iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that
he committed suicide in a fit of madness.
[1096] According to Sext. Math. vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of
Ascalon, whose language towards him is there quoted, and reckoned by
Galen. Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among the leaders of the logical
School of Physicians. His medical treatises are often referred to by
Galen. Plutarch in his Placita often names him.
[1097] Known for three things—his theory of atoms, his theory of the
acquisition of knowledge, and his resolution of the soul into matter.
All bodies, he held, consist of atoms, which differ from the atoms of
Democritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up
of greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable
(ἀπαθεῖς). Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 32; Math. ix. 363; x. 318; viii. 220; iii.
5; Galen. l.c. 9, p. 698; Dionys.; Alex. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4);
Cœl. Aurelian. De Pass. Acut. i. 14. See Fabric. on Pyrrh. iii. 32. The
latter is probably in error in describing the primary atoms of
Asclepiades as without quality, differing only in size, form, number,
and arrangement. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with
whom he is generally classed, and applied, like him, the name ὄγκοι to
atoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was
traditionally derived from the Epicureans.
He also asserted, with Epicurus (Antiochus, in Sext. Math. vii. 201):
τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως
ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν. At the same time he maintained that our senses
cannot distinguish the component parts of things, but even Epicurus and
Democritus admitted as much in respect of atoms.
He differs entirely from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul
apart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the
soul itself, to the action of the senses (Sext. Math. vii. 380; Plut.
Plac. iv. 2, 6; Cœl. Aurelian. l.c. in Fabric. on the passage of Sext.;
Tertullian, De An. 15). What is elsewhere stated of Asclepiades,
leaving alone his medical views, for instance, that with Heraclitus he
believed in a perpetual flux of things, is not at variance with
Epicurean principles.
[1098] Quint Inst. vi. 3, 78, names L. Varus as an Epicurean, a friend
of Augustus, perhaps the individual who according to Donat. V. Virg.
79, Serv. on Ecl. vi. 13. attended the lectures of Syro in company with
Virgil. Horace, notwithstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but
only a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (Sat. i.
5, 101). In Caligula’s time, a senator Pompedius was an Epicurean
(Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1, 5); under Nero, Aufidius Bassus, a friend of
Seneca (Sen. Ep. 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the elder Celsus (Orig. c.
Cels. i. 8), and Diodorus, who committed suicide (Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1);
under Vespasian or his sons, Pollius (Stat. Silv. ii. 2, 113). In the
first half of the second century, Cleomedes, Met. p. 87, complained of
the honours paid to Epicurus. In the second half of the same century
lived Antonius, mentioned by Galen. De Prop. An. Affect. v. 1, and
Zenobius, who, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was an opponent of
Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived
Diogenes Laërtius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at
least a friend of the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names
of Athenæus (whose epigram on Epicurus is quoted by Diog. x. 12).
Autodorus (Diog. v. 92), and Hermodorus (Lucian, Icaromen. 16) may be
mentioned; but Diog. x. 11 does not justify us calling Diocles of
Magnesia an Epicurean.
[1099] Diog. x. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes: ἥ τε
διδαχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐσαεὶ διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους
ἀρχὰς ἀπολύουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων. The testimony of
Lactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the wide extension of Epicureanism is not
so trustworthy, although he treats it as an existing fact. It may be
that he is only following older writers, as Cicero does. See above, p.
412, 1.
[1100] Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 20: Quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri
κυρίας δόξας? Diog. 12 (according to Diocles). Epicurus often exhorted
his scholars (Ibid. 83; 85; 35) to commit to memory what they had
heard. His last exhortation to his friends was (Diog. 16): τῶν δογμάτων
μεμνῆσθαι.
[1101] He speaks of himself and Metrodorus in Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7, as
wise men. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 5, quotes, as coming from him: ὡς
Κολώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειεν γονάτων ἁψάμενος· Νεοκλῆς
δὲ ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου
γεγονέναι μηδ’ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὑτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι
συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν. Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 16, p. 487; Adv.
Col. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 89. Not only was Epicurus’ birthday
observed by the Epicurean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of
every month was celebrated as a festival in honour of him and
Metrodorus. In his testament Epicurus especially ordered this twofold
observance for the future. Diog. 18; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101; Plut. N. P.
Suav. Viv. 4, 8; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 5. Athen. vii. 298 d: Ἐπικούρειός
τις εἰκαδιστῆς. Epicurus’ picture is constantly referred to (Cic. Fin.
v. 1, 3; Plin. l.c.). The extravagant importance attached to Epicurus
in his School is proved by the high eulogies in Lucret. i 62; iii. 1
and 1040; v. 1; vi. 1. Metrodorus, in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4, praises τὰ
Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.
[1102] Cic. Tusc. ii. 3, 8.
[1103] Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the
Stoics with the Epicurean’s dependence on the founder: Non sumus sub
rege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Apud istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus,
quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. Omnia quæ quisquam in illo
contubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the
other hand, Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 3), little as he can
agree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully
adhering to their master’s teaching, a point in which only the
Pythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said: μηδ’
αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν πω ἐναντίον οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε Ἐπικούρῳ μηδὲν [μηδένα]
εἰς μηδὲν, ὅτου καὶ μνησθῆναι ἄξιον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς παρανόμημα,
μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοτομηθέν. Thus the Epicurean
School resembles a state animated by one spirit, in which there are no
divisions of party.
[1104] It has been already observed, p. 405, 1; 406, 1, that Epicurus
ignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and
only confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked
not only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. Diog. 8, probably on the
authority of Timocrates, communicates his remarks on Plato, Aristotle,
and others. Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit
contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit. Plut. N.
P. Suav. Vivi, 2, 2: Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes is
polite; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα, βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμοὺς,
κ.τ.λ. συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ
Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἱππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ
οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, κατεσκέδασαν.
[1105] Cic. N. D. ii. 29, 73: Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem
ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis,
ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Ibid. i. 34, 93: Zeno not only
despised cotemporary philosophers, but he even called Socrates a scurra
Atticus, Macrob. Somn. i. 2 (Colotes ridiculing Plato’s Republic).
[1106] Sext. Math. xi. 169: Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν
εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιοῦσαν. Conf.
Epic. in Diog. 122: The demand to study philosophy in youth, as well as
in age, is supported on the ground that it is never too early nor too
late to be happy.
[1107] It was mentioned, p. 408, 3, that Epicurus’ own education was
defective. Not content therewith, he upholds this defectiveness on
principle. Nullam eruditionem, says the Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 21,
71, esse duxit, nisi quæ beatæ vitæ disciplinam adjuvaret. In poets,
nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music,
geometry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse
non possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i.e. quo
melius viveremus.
[1108] Cic. Fin. ii. 4, 12: Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil
opus esse eum, philosophus qui futurus sit, scire literas. They fetch
their philosophers, like Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit,
Epicurus (Diog. 6; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 12, 1) wrote to Pythocles:
παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν (the παιδεία ἐγκύκλιος, the learned culture),
μακάριε, φεῦγε τὸ ἀκάτιον ἀράμενος; and to Apelles (Plut. l.c.; Athen.
xiii. 588, a): μακαρίζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας (Plut.
explains it: τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος) ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησας.
Metrodorus asserted (Plut. l.c.) that it need not be a source of
trouble to anyone, if he had never read a line of Homer, and did not
know whether Hector were a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and
writing, γραμματικὴ in the limited sense, was the only art recognised
by Epicurus. Sext. Math. i. 49.
[1109] Sext. Math. i. 1; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 20.
[1110] Cic. Fin. i. 21 (see p. 421, 1), which probably only means, that
mathematical ideas cannot be applied to phenomena. Hence Acad. ii. 33,
106 (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20): Polyænus ... Epicuro adsentiens totam
geometriam falsam esse credidit. Conf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 85.
[1111] See p. 421, 1; Sext. Math. i. 1: Epicurus rejects mathematics ὡς
τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν. According to
Diog. 93, Epicurus calls astronomy τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις τῶν ἀστρολόγων
τεχνιτείας. Conf. Diog. 79.
[1112] Plut. l.c. 13, 1. Philodemus, in his treatise περὶ μουσικῆς, had
discussed at length the value of music, as we gather from the fragments
of the 4th Book, Vol. Herc. i.; in particular rejecting the notion that
it has a moral effect, see col. i. 24, 28. He was even opposed to music
at table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was in Plut., l.c.). The statement of
Diog. 121, that only the wise man can give a right opinion on poetry
and music, is not at variance with these passages.
[1113] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. iv. col. 3; 12. The same polemic
is continued in the further fragments of this treatise. Ibid. V. Col.
6.
[1114] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22: In logic iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem
videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones: nihil de dividendo
ac partiendo docet. Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio,
tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur,
ostendit. Ibid. 19, 63: In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit
[Epic.] esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam.
Acad. ii. 30, 97: Ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et
inridet. Diog. 31: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν·
ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.
[1115] See p. 424.
[1116] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63: In physicis plurimum posuit [Epic.]. Ibid.
6, 17: In physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.
[1117] Epic. in Diog. x. 82 and 85: μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ
μετεώρων γνώσεως ... νομίζειν δεῖ εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν
βέβαιον καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ibid. 112: εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ περὶ
τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου ... οὐκ ἂν
προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας; but this becomes necessary, since, without
knowledge of nature, we cannot he perfectly free from fear. The same in
Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7; conf. Diog. 79 and 143; Cic. Fin. iv. 5,
11; Lucret. i. 62; iii. 14; vi. 9.
[1118] In Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63, the Epicurean speaks of a fivefold, or,
excluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science: fortitudo
contra mortis timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio
animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderatio natura
cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis.
[1119] Diog. 29: διαιρεῖται τοίνυν [ἡ φιλοσοφία] εἰς τρία, τό τε
κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν. Canonic was also called περὶ
κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ στοιχειωτικόν; natural science, περὶ γενέσεως
καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ φύσεως; ethics, περὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ
βίων καὶ τέλους.
[1120] Diog. 30: τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει.
[1121] Diog. l.c.: εἰώθασι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ
συντάττειν. Cic. Fin. i. 19. See p. 423, 4. Hence Sext. Math. vii. 14:
Some reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide philosophy into
natural and moral science; whilst, according to others, he adhered to a
threefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. Sen.
Ep. 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, naturalem
atque moralem: rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus
cogerentur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia
coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant, alio
nomine rationalem induxerunt: sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis
existimant.
[1122] Ritter, iii. 463; Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 123.
[1123] Steinhart in the treatise often referred to.
[1124] Diog. 29; Sext. Math. vii. 22.
[1125] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p. 422, 4.
[1126] Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext. Math. vii. 203. If, according to Diog.
31, and Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 142, Epicurus named three criteria—πρόληψις,
αἴσθησις, and πάθη—instead of the above two, it must be an inaccuracy
of expression; πρόληψις, as we have seen, is derived from sensation.
[1127] Epicurus, in Diog. x. 146; Lucr. iv. 467–519; Cic. Fin. i. 19,
54. Colotes (in Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic
scepticism by saying: μὴ δύνασθαι ζῇν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. In
this case, as in the case of the Stoics, the dogmatism in favour of the
senses is based on a practical postulate, the need of a firm basis of
conviction for human life.
[1128] Epic. in Diog. x. 50, and 147; Sext. Math. vii. 203–210; viii.
9; 63; 185; Plut. Adv. Col. 4, 3; 5, 2; 25, 2; Plac. iv. 9, 2: Lucr.
iv. 377–519; Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 79; 32, 101; Fin. i. 7, 22; N. D. i.
25, 70; Tertull. De An. 17. Further particulars below respecting
sense-perception.
[1129] Diog. x. 31; Lucr. iv. 480.
[1130] Sext. Math. vii. 203 and 216. In Diog. x. 52, instead of
ἐνεργείας, we should read with Cobet ἐναργείας. Besides this peculiar
expression, Epicurus uses sometimes αἴσθησις, sometimes φαντασία (Sext.
l.c.), for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls φανταστικὴ
ἐπιβολή. Diog. 50.
[1131] Diog. 32.
[1132] Diog. 33: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν
ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ
πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. By the help of this passage, Cicero’s
description, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected.
[1133] Diog. l.c.: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ
ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ
πρώτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον,
εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτὸ ... οὐδ’ ἂν ὠνομάσαμέν τι μὴ πρότερον
αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. Hence the exhortation in
Epicurus’ letter to Herodotus (in Diog. x. 37): πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ
ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις δεῖ εἰληφέναι ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ
ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ὃ ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, κ.τ.λ. Every
impression must be referred to definite perceptions; apart from
perceptions, no reality belongs to our impressions; or, as it is
expressed Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 107, Math. viii. 13, 258: The Epicureans
deny the existence of a λεκτὸν, and between a thing and its name there
exists a third intermediate something—a conception. See also Sext. vii.
267.
[1134] Diog. 33. Sext. Math. i. 57 (xi. 21): οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν
ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σόφον Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως. Ibid. viii. 337, p. 521;
Plut. De An. 6: The difficulty, that all learning presupposes
knowledge, the Stoics met by φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, the Epicureans by
προλήψεις, which accordingly are the natural test of truth.
[1135] See p. 426, 1. Diog. l.c.: ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις καὶ
τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται, ἐφ’ ὃ ἀναφέροντες
λέγομεν.
[1136] See previous note and Epic. in Diog. 38: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως
προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον
ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.
[1137] Diog. 33 (conf. 38, 104): περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ
σημειοῦσθαι.
[1138] See p. 422, 4. Steinhart, p. 466, goes too far in saying that
Epicurus defied all law and rule in thought.
[1139] Diog. 32: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασι,
κατά τε περίπτωσιν (probably: the coincidence of several sensations
which must be distinguished from their σύνθεσις or free combination)
καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ
λογισμοῦ. Conf. p. 422, 4; 429, 1, and the corresponding doctrine of
the Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching of Epicurus, on the genesis of
thoughts from sensations.
[1140] Diog. 33: καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται
... τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν. ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν
γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. Sext. Math. vii. 211:
τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς·
ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς
ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι
πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. Ritter, iii. 486, observes that these statements
are contradictory. According to Sextus, an opinion is only then true
when it can be proved and not refuted; according to Diogenes, when it
can be proved or not refuted. The latter is, however, clearly meant by
Sextus, and is affirmed by Epicurus in Diog. 50 and 51.
[1141] Epicur. in Diog. 50; Ibid. 33; Sext. vii. 212. The object of a
future sensation is called by Diog. 38, τὸ προσμένον. Diog. x. 34,
himself gives a perverted explanation of this term, which probably
misled Steinhart, p. 466.
[1142] Sext. l.c. 213.
[1143] The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not,
therefore, as Sextus expressly says, refer to the same cases. Our
assumptions in respect of external appearances must be proved, before
they can be allowed to be true; our impressions of the secret causes of
these appearances must not be refuted. The former test applies to
opinions regarding τὸ προσμένον; the latter, to opinions regarding τὸ
ἄδηλον. Diog. 38.
[1144] Compare the passages in Sext. vii. 206, quoted p. 427, 1.
[1145] Cic. Acad. ii. 14, 45: Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus
Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque
sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate sejungere, nihil profecit,
ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.
[1146] Plut. Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob. Ecl. i. 366; Lucr. ii. 795): ὁ
Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ εἶναι λέγων τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ
γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν. For says
Epicurus, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν σκότει ταῦτα ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα
ἔχειν. Often some see colour where others do not; οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν ἔχειν ἢ
μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον.
[1147] Simpl. Categ. 109, β (Schol. in Arist. 92, a, 10): Since
Democritus and Epicurus attribute all qualities, to atoms except those
of form and mode of combination, ἐπιγίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰς ἄλλας
ποιότητας, τάς τε ἁπλᾶς, οἷον θερμότητας καὶ λειότητας, καὶ τὰς κατὰ
χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμούς. Lucret. l.c.
[1148] Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the
impressions of the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in Diog. 68: ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρεα καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ βεβηκότα καὶ πᾶσιν
ἐνόντα ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστοῖς, οὐθ’ ὡς
καθ’ ἑαυτάς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο),
οὔθ’ ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, οὔθ’ ὡς ἕτερά τινα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα
οὔθ’ ὡς μορία τούτου, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν ἐκ τούτων πάντων
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον ἀΐδιον, κ.τ.λ.
[1149] Epic. in Diog. 143: οὐκ ἦν τὸν φοβούμενον περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων
λύειν μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν
κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίας τὰς ἡδονὰς
ἀπολαμβάνειν. For further particulars, p. 422.
[1150] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῇν. Epic. in Diog. 87.
[1151] Diog. 27, mentions 37 books of his περὶ φύσεως, besides smaller
works.
[1152] Epic. in Diog. 78: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν
ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι· καὶ ἐν τῷ, τίνες φύσεις αἱ
θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτὶ, καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ πρὸς τὴν εἰς ταῦτα
ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι [evidently
μὴ εἶναι must be read], καὶ τὸ εὐδεχομένως καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ’
ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων
ἢ τάραχον μηθέν· καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς οὕτως
εἶναι. τὸ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκὸς τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς
καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τούτοις μηθὲν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τῆς
γνώσεως συντείνειν (how very different from Aristotle! See Zeller,
Philosophie der Griechen, ii. b, 113, 3; 114, 3; 359, 2), ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως
τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατιδόντας τίνες δὲ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας
καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ (as if) μὴ προσῄδεσαν ταῦτα,
τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προκατανοήσεως μὴ
δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν κατὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν.
(Conf. Lucr. vi. 50; v. 82.) διὸ δὴ καὶ πλείους αἰτίας εὑρίσκομεν
τροπῶν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
ἀπειληφέναι ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει, κ.τ.λ.
Ibid. 104: καὶ κατ’ ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται κεραυνοὺς
ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω.
[1153] Ibid. 87: πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων, κατὰ
πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαιρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ
πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπῃ. ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν
ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ
παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταῤῥεῖ. Ibid. 98: οἱ
δὲ τὸ ἓν λαμβάνοντες (those who allow only one explanation for every
phenomenon) τοῖς τε φαινομένοις μάχονται καὶ τοῦ τί δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ
θεωρῆσαι διαπεπτώκασιν. In investigating nature, they proceed on
suppositions chosen at random (ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίαι, Epic. l.c.
86). Conf. 94; 104; 113. Lucret. vi. 703.
[1154] Epic. in Diog. 88; 92–95. Many other similar instances might be
quoted. In support of the view that the sun was extinguished at
setting, Epicurus, according to Cleomed. Meteora, p. 89, is said to
have appealed to the story (respecting which Posidonius in Strabo, iii.
1, 5, p. 138) that, as it sets, the hissing of the ocean may be heard
on the sea-shore.
[1155] The principle is thus expanded by Lucret. i. 1021:—
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se suo quæque sagaci mente locarunt,
Nec quos quæque darent motuspepigere profecto;
Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus et cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata.
v. 156:
Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [scil. Deos] parare
Præclaram mundi naturam, &c.
Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti,
Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur?
Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?...
Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; ...
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?
Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following
Epicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, μήτε
λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ
διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας· οὐ
γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες τῇ
μακαριότητι, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα
γίνεται. Ibid. 97: ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, ἀλλ’
ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι. Ibid. 113. With
these passages Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7 (likewise
ii. 3, 2; Stob. i. 442), are quite in agreement.
[1156] Lucr. i. 440:—
Præterea per se quodcumque erit aut faciet quid
Aut aliis fungi [πάσχειν] debebit agentibus ipsum,
Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse gerique.
At facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res,
Nec præbere locum porro nisi inane vacansque.
Ergo præter inane et corpora tertia per se
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.
Epic. in Diog. 67: καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν ἐπὶ
τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν
μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ’ οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι
τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν εἰ ἦν
τοιαύτη.
[1157] Diog. 68; 40. Lucr. i. 449, who expresses συμβεβηκότα by
conjuncta, and συμπτώματα by eventa. Among the latter Lucretius, 459,
reckons time, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our
knowledge through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Diog. 72
(conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and nights,
and their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion
or rest, and hence that it is only a product (σύμπτωμα) of these
phenomena; and these being again συμπτώματα, time is defined by the
Epicurean Demetrius (Sext. Math. x. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 137): σύμπτωμα
συμπτωμάτων παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ
ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς. The distinction between abstract and
sensuous or undivided time (Steinhart, l.c. 466) does not appear to
exist in Diogenes. His χρόνοι διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ (Diog. 47) are
imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio quæ
comperit esse, which, according to Lucret. iv. 792, are contained in
every given time.
[1158] Lucret. i. 358.
[1159] Lucret. l.c. and i. 329; Diog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math. vii. 213;
viii. 329. Most of the remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and 532 point to the
same fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot
be diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor can noise,
cold, fire and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be
broken up into parts. The same in Themist. 40, b; Simpl. De Cœlo,
Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.
[1160] Lucr. i. 440; Diog. 39; Plut. Adv. Col 11, 5.
[1161] Body is defined by Epicurus (Sext. Math. i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi.
226) as τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, or as σύνοδος κατὰ
ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους. Emptiness is
(according to Sext. x. 2) φύσις ἀναφὴς or ἔρημος παντὸς σώματος. When
occupied by a body, it is called τόπος; when bodies pass through it, it
is χώρα; so that all three expressions, as Stob. Ecl. i. 388 rightly
observes, are only different names for the same thing. To the same
effect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i. 20.
[1162] Hence, in Diog. 69, ἄθροισμα and συμπεφορήμενον are used of
bodies; in Diog. 71, all bodies are called συμπτώματα; and according to
Epicurus (Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local
displacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that
Epicurus deals with ἁφὴ and συμπλοκὴ, but never with ἑνότης.
[1163] Epic. in Diog. 40: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις τὰ δ’ ἐξ
ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἴπερ
μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν
ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων ... ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις. Ibid. 56; Lucr. i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790.
Further arguments for the belief in atoms in Lucret. i. 498: Since a
body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must
originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist
composed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must exist, and
likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be
divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been
produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not
exist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no
indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The
regularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All
that is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts.
If there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of
innumerable parts, as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf.
Epic. in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest
parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in
value, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
1, 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being
must be at the bottom of everything.
[1164] Epicurus and Lucretius, l.c. Lucr. i. 529; Sext. Math. ix. 219;
x. 318; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 29.
[1165] Epic. in Diog. 41; Lucret. i. 528; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in
Arist. 484, a, 23.
[1166] Diog. 44 and 55; Lucret. i. 266, where it is proved, by many
analogies, that there may be invisible bodies; Stob. l.c.; Plut. l.c.;
Simpl. Phys. 216, a.
[1167] Diog. 44; 54; Lucr. ii. 736 and 841; Plut. l.c. See page 433, 2.
[1168] Lucret. v. 235.
[1169] Diog.; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that
Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus
added weight, is not correct.
[1170] Diog. 42; Lucr. ii. 333 and 478; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 30 (where,
however, it would be against the sense to substitute ἢ for μὴ as
Steinhart l.c. p. 473 note 94 does); Alex. Aphr. in Philop. Gen. et
Corr. 3, b; Cic. N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that
Lucret. ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of
atoms. (Ritter, iv. 101.)
[1171] Lucret. i. 500.
[1172] Diog. x. 55; Lucr. ii. 381.
[1173] See the passages quoted, p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The text of
Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages.
Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5.
[1174] Epic. in Diog. 41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ
πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δ’ ἄκρον παρ’ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ
ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, πέρας δ’ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ
πεπερασμένον. The same argument is used by Lucret. i. 951; 1008–1020.
He continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect
towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion
would cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount
lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf.
also Plut. Adv. Col. 13, 3; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9; Plac. i. 3, 28;
Alex. in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the above-quoted argument of
Epicurus as the chief argument of the Epicureans.
[1175] We have but little information; but it has been already shown p.
433, 2, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the
properties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms.
Whenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he
assumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance,
he asserted of wine: οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν
τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὑτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς, ἑτέρας δ’ αὖ ψυχρότητος.
According to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling,
on others a heating effect. Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4; Adv. Col.
6. This agrees with the remarks made on Democritus in vol. i. 597.
[1176] Diog. 43; 47; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to
himself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from Themist.
Phys. 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle’s proof of motion, that no
constant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles (Phys. vi.
1), by saying: Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line,
but not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line
consists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans,
according to Simpl. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves
equally quickly through indivisible spaces.
[1177] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; Lucret. i. 1074.