[1178] Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text being faulty); Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol.

in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups

Epicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point,

according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was a subject of contention between

Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of

the second century after Christ.

[1179] As Aristotle had already done.

[1180] Diog. 60; conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 28, p. 425.

[1181] Epic. in Diog. 43; 61; Lucr. ii. 225; Plut. C. Not. 43, i. p.

1082. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.

[1182] Lucr. ii. 216; 261; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De

Fato, 10, 22; Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015; Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p.

964; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, 394.

[1183] Diog. 44; conf. 62; 90; Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5; Fac. Lun. 4, 5, p.

921; Stob. i. 346; Lucret. v. 432.

[1184] Diog. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. See above, p. 437, 1; Plut. Def. Or.

19, p. 420.

[1185] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p. 444, 3.

[1186] Diog. 45; 73; Lucret. ii. 1048; Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 3. It need

hardly be remarked that by worlds world-bodies are not meant. In Diog.

88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding the

earth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of

the heaven, bounded.

[1187] Diog. 45; 74; 88; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; Stob. i. 490; Cic.

N. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. 40, 125.

[1188] Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, ὅτι οὐδὲν ξένον

ἀποτελεῖται ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.

[1189] Diog. 73; 89; Lucret. ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the

transitory character of the world is elaborately proved; Cic. Fin. i.

6, 21. Stob. i. 418; Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest

variety of ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.

[1190] Diog. x. 89.

[1191] v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much

further back, and arts and sciences be of much greater antiquity.

[1192] On this point see Lucret. ii. 1112. The principle that similar

elements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.

[1193] Lucr. v. 416–508; Plut. Plac. i. 4. The latter view has been

referred, in vol. i. 604, to the Atomists. It would now appear that it

must be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views

attributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the well-known

connection between Epicurus and Democritus. The views of Epicurus on

the formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of

Democritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus (compare the

extracts in vol. i. 608 from Orig. Philosoph. p. 17) that Epicurus, in

Diog. 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or

that sun and moon could be possibly absorbed in our world. Lucret. ii.

1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be

possible.

[1194] On these mœnia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide

with the ether or fire-belt, see Epic. in Diog. 88; Id. περὶ φύσεως,

xi. (Vol. Herc. ii.) col. 2; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. i. 73; ii.

1144; v. 454.

[1195] On this point see page 434.

[1196] See p. 437, 1.

[1197] In Diog. 77; 81; Lucret. v. 78 and 114, where the contrast is

more fully brought out. By ζῷα οὐράνια, in Plut. Plac. v. 20, 2, we

must by no means think of the stars.

[1198] Examples have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review

of the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in

the following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult Plut.

Plac. ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, Diog. 92; Lucr. v. 648;

Cleomed. Met. p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, Diog. 92;

112–114; Lucr. v. 509; 612; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. 94,

and Lucr. v. 574, 703; for eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. 96; Lucr. v.

749; for changes in the length of day, Diog. 98; Lucr. v. 678.

[1199] Diog. 91; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 82; Fin. i. 6, 20; Sen. Qu. Nat. i.

3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. 1; Plut. Plac. ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; Lucr. v. 564.

The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9;

Stob. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated

with fire. According to Lucret. v. 471, sun and moon stand midway

between ether and earth in point of density.

[1200] It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary,

which is tacitly assumed. It would then be bounded by endless space,

and soon come into collision with other masses.

[1201] Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 74, and περὶ φύσεως, xi. col.

1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth

is equidistant from the bounds of the world.

[1202] Further particulars: on clouds, Diog. 99: Lucr. vi. 451; Plut.

Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog.

100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on

sirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes,

Diog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5;

on winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow,

thaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107–109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo

of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shooting-stars, Diog.

114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the

overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738–839), of the

magnet (vi. 906–1087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in summer

(vi. 840).

[1203] Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the

Epicureans were as far as the Stoics from attributing to plants a soul.

Plut. Plac. v. 26, 3.

[1204] Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787, giving further particulars as to the

origin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement

of the productive powers of earth.

[1205] Epic. in Diog. 74.

[1206] Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and

Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.

[1207] Lucr. v. 834–921.

[1208] v. 922–1008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Polit. ii. 8,

1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to

Lucretius.

[1209] Lucr. v. 1009–1025.

[1210] Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin of

language: τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις

τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας

φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν ... ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα

τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι

ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing

puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v.

1026–1088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin. On

the voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.

[1211] Epic. in Diog. 75: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων

φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί

τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ

ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον ἐν δέ τισι

βραδύτερον.

Lucr. v. 1450:—all arts

Usus et impigræ simul experientia mentis

Paulatim docuit.

Ibid. 1103:—

Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem

Commutare novis monstrabant rebu’ benigni

Ingenio qui præstabant et corde vigebant.

In harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various

inventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction

of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on

fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v.

1239–1294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after

attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295).

Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted,

and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of

planting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v.

1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical

instrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle;

from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v.

1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v.

1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v.

1438).

[1212] Lucr. v. 1106.

[1213] Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. See p. 439, 1.

[1214] Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63.

[1215] Diog. 63: ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα (the

body), παρεσπαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν

ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλοτάτων

πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.

[1216] Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf.

Alex. Aphr. De An. 127, b.

[1217] Lucr. iii. 288.

[1218] According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an

ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; and, since he believed in a feminine

σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the

intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.

[1219] Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.

[1220] Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.

[1221] Lucr. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the

harmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An.

E. 1) to one of the objections urged against it by Plato.

[1222] Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 612; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3.

Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational

part anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made

feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the ἡγεμονικὸν was

feelingless, can hardly be correct.

[1223] Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to

leave the body (Lucr. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst

another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all

that is meant by Diog. 66.

[1224] Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417–827, gives an elaborate proof

of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi,

27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to.

Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism,

the soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul.

In Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is

impossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence

over the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and

dependent on it.

[1225] Epic. in Diog. 124–127, for instance: τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν

κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν ὁ

θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν. Id.

in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 229 (Alex. Aphr. Anal. Pri. 117, Top. 9. Gell. N.

A. ii. 8, 1; Stob. Serm. 118, 30): ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμας· τὸ γὰρ

διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Lucr. iii.

828–975.

[1226] Lucr. iii. 830.

[1227] Diog. 81; 142; Lucr. iii. 37.

[1228] Lucr. ii. 991:—

Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, &c.

999:—

Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante

In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris

Id rursum cœli rellatum templa receptant.

[1229] Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest of this

theory, makes them mould the air.

[1230] Epic. in Diog. 46–50; 52; and in the fragments of the second

book περὶ φύσεως; Lucr. iv. 26–266; 722; vi. 921 Cic. Ad Famil. xv. 16;

Plut. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; Sext. Math.

vii. 206; Gell. N. A. v. 16; Macrob. Sat. vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr.

iv. 267; 568; Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo

belong likewise to the doctrine of idola.

[1231] For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and

madmen. Diog. 32; Lucr. iv. 730.

[1232] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾷν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ

εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα, ἃ ποιμαίνουσιν [sc. οἱ

Ἐπικούρειοι] ἀπλέτους ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐμφαινόμενα καὶ περινοστοῦντα

πάντη τὰ μὲν ἔτι ζώντων τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων ἢ κατασαπέντων

ἀποῤῥυέντα.

[1233] Lucr. l.c.

[1234] Sext. l.c.; Lucr. iv. 351.

[1235] Lucr. iv. 766–819; and on the incessant streaming forth of

images, v. 141; Diog. 48.

[1236] Epic. in Diog. x. 52: τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ

ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν,

διάληψιν [al. διάλειψιν] δʹ ἔχουσαν κατὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν συνημμένην τῇ

φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ [impression on the senses], διάληψιν δ’ ἔχουσαν ἐὰν

μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ

ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ἀληθές.

[1237] As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2,

Diog. 32, called the faculty of sensation αἴσθησις, and sensation

itself, ἐπαίσθημα.

[1238] Lucr. iv. 874; conf. Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. v. 2, vol. v. 367,

K.

[1239] Diog. 133: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον· ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ

ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ

κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν.

[1240] Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum

esset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus,

alterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit

esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.

[1241] Steinhart, p. 466.

[1242] Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least says, referring to the above

question: Nisi forte voluimus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales

propositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud

tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis

disjunctiones, sed quæ in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse

verum. Cicero indeed adds: O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem

inscientiam dicendi! but he has no reason for this exclamation; for the

proposition: Either A or B must follow is not identical with the

proposition: It may be stated either of A or of B that it will follow.

Epicurus could, therefore, justly allow the former and deny the latter.

In so doing he is really following Aristotle.

[1243] Diog. x. 123: οἵους δ’ αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν

οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ

τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς

προσάπτων. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.

[1244] iii. 14; vi. 49; and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62:—

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret

In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione,

Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat

Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.

as far as to 101:—

Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.

Conf. Epic. in Diog. 81, and above p. 423, 3; 437, 1.

[1245] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [Ἐπίκουρος] ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν

ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος. Ibid. c. 75.

[1246] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ

γέλωτας οὔτι φοβητέον οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μῦθον

αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν

ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἔμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπιγεγραμμένην.

In Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls πρόνοια anus fatidica, to

which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.

[1247] See p. 460, 1.

[1248] Lucr. v. 196; ii. 1090; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the

disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in Lucian, Jup. Trag. c. 35, and

especially c. 46.

[1249] Lucr. v. 165; conf. p. 437, 1; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.

[1250] Diog. 76; 97; 113; see p. 437, 1; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52; Plut.

Plac. i. 7, 7.

[1251] Cic. l.c. 54.

[1252] Plut. Def. Orac. 19; Plac. i. 83.

[1253] Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in Procl. in Tim. 66,

E: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer,

and so on, ad infin.

[1254] Diog. 135; Lucr. v. 379; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2; Cic. N. D. i. 20,

55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Tertull. De An. 46.

[1255] Lucr. v. 1159–1238; conf. iv. 33; vi. 49; Sext. Math. ix. 25;

vi. 19; Diog. 98; 115.

[1256] This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. See p. 462, 2.

Conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 10; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54.

[1257] He drew up separate treatises περὶ θεῶν and περὶ ὁσιότητος.

Diog. 27; Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 11.

[1258] Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. 1, 3;

Plut. l.c.

[1259] Epic. in Diog. 123: θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσι· ἐναργὴς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν

αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις. The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 43: Solus enim

[Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum

notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens aut quod genus

hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum?

quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be

received with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own

views as to innate ideas. Inasmuch, however, as he expressly refers to

Epicurus’ treatise περὶ κανόνος, we may assume that belief in Gods with

Epicurus rests on a general πρόληψις.

[1260] In support of this view, see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is there

said of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium

speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit

umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? φυσικὴ πρόληψις is here

referred to sensations derived from εἴδωλα. Ibid. 19, 49; and Lucr. vi.

76:

de corpore quæ sancto simulacra feruntur

In mentis hominum divinæ nuntia formæ.

[1261] Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi

ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat

dictum: nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et

æterna esset et beatissima ... et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum

pulsus esset. Ibid. 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque

colimus naturam excellentem atque præstantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen.

Benef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world,

but, at the same time, would have him honoured as a father, propter

majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.

[1262] Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218;

Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stob. i. 66); Phædr. (Philodem.) Fragm. col.

7; Metrodorus, περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 10; col. 16, 21.

[1263] Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.

[1264] Epic. in Diog. 123: πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ

μακάριον νομίζων ... μηδὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς

μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 139. Cic. N. D. i.

17, 45; 19, 51; Lucr. ii. 646; v. 165.

[1265] Cic. N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii. 17,

40; Lucr. v. 148; Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν, col. 7; Plut. l.c. Epicurus

has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi

corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or,

according to Lucretius, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are

indestructible.

[1266] Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; Sen.

Benef. iv. 19, 2.

[1267] Epic. in Diog. 77; 97; 139; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51 (amongst other

things: nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium

vacatione munerum ponimus, both of which features must therefore be

attributed to the Gods); Legg. i. 7, 21; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv.

83; vi. 57; Sen. Benef. iv. 4, 1; 19, 2. Conf. p. 436; 464, 1; 466, 1.

[1268] In the fragments of his treatise περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης

διαγωγῆς, κατὰ Ζήνωνα, col. 12.

[1269] The κλίσια discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20,

had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.

[1270] Col. 14: The reason being assigned that λέγονται μὴ πολὺ

διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον οἴδαμεν

γεγονότας θεοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους. The first statement seems to

refer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second

statement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. For the whole tone of

the system militates against our thinking of men who have afterwards

become Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech?

raised by Carneades in Sext. Math. ix. 178, appears to refer to this

μυθολογία Ἐπικούρου.

[1271] Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 1.

[1272] Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Herc. i.) col. 4, says that the Gods

do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: μάλιστα

μὲν ὁσίαις προλήψεσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον

παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος.

[1273] Cic. l.c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si quæ interimant,

belonging, however, to Cicero only. For Epicurus cannot have described

his ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the universe.

[1274] Cic. N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam

Deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam

nec ad numerum, ut ea, quæ ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat,

sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita

simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et

ad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read

nos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser and Kreuzer)

affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam

infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quæ sit et beata natura et

æterna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the

Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies,

by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our

senses (nec soliditate nec ad numerum, Diog. x. 95), but by single

pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much

alike that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness

and immortality. The passage of Diog. x. 139, ought probably to be

corrected by that in Cicero. It runs: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι, τοὺς θεοὺς

λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ

ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ

ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς. The similarity of most of the

expressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority

as Cicero (probably the same as Plut. Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in

the words οὓς μὲν κ.τ.λ., it asserts the very opposite of this and the

Epicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either

due to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to

the words κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that

Steinhart’s suggestion, p. 477, καθ’ ἁρμὸν or καθ’ ἁρμοὺς, is clearly

wrong. It is more probably to be found in the words οὓς μὲν—οὓς δὲ. We

might suggest for οὓς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι.

[1275] In Phædrus (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Fragm. col. 7 (10) it is

said in answer to the Stoics: ἐπιδεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἕνα μόνον

[θεὸν] ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐδὲ πάντας ὅσους ἡ κοινὴ φήμη παρέδωκεν, ἡμῶν

οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασὶν οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονας εἶναι λεγόντων

ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τοιούτους οὐδὲ μεμήκασιν ἀπολείπειν, οἵους σέβονται πάντες

καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ

ἀέρα καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρα, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε καὶ τεθαῤῥηκότως εἴπαιμι

τούτους Διαγόρου μᾶλλον πλημμελεῖν. It is then shown how little the

natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9): τὰ θεῖα

τοιαῦτα καταλείπουσιν ἃ καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ πᾶσιν

ἡμεῖς ἀκολούθως ἀϊδίους κἀφθάρτους εἶναι δογματίζομεν. Here we have a

phenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually

accusing one another of atheism, the former missing personality, the

latter missing activity in the deity of their opponents.

[1276] See p. 469, 1.

[1277] Lucr. ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the

earth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for

the sea, corn, and wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the

nether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.

[1278] Epic. in Diog. 128: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ

μακαρίως ζῇν ... πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον ... πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ

... ἀγαθόν.... καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν. Ibid. 141. Cic. Fin. i.

9, 29; Tusc. v. 26, 73: Cum præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum

voluptate.

[1279] Diog. 129: ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ

ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φευγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην

καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. Plut. Adv. Col. 27,

1.

[1280] Diog. 137; Cic. Fin. i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh.

iii. 194; Math. xi. 96.

[1281] Stob. Ecl. ii. 58: τοῦτο δ’ [the τέλος] οἱ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον

φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν

ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν· ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν

ἀποδιδόασι τοῦ τέλους, τὸ οἰκείως διατεθεῖσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν

χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τε ἁπάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Alex. Aphr. De An. 154, a: τοῖς

δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς· προϊόντων

δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν φασι.

[1282] Diog. 129; Cic. Fin. i. 14, 48; Tusc. v. 33, 95; Sen. De Otio,

7, 3.

[1283] Epic. in Diog. 139 (Gell. N. A. ii. 9, 2): ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν

ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. Id. in Diog. 128: τούτων γὰρ

[τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπαναγαγεῖν

οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν. ἐπεὶ

τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν

ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται

λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμὼν οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς

ἐνδέον τι ... τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι

τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. Ibid.

131; 144; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Stob. Serm. 17, 35;

Lucr. ii. 14; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 37.

[1284] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Plut. l.c. 7, 1.

[1285] Diog. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ

ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ

κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται. Ritter, iii. 469, suggests instead of

ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναργείᾳ, but ἐνεργείᾳ gives a very fair meaning: they appear

actually in motion. Sen. Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex

quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit,

animus sine perturbatione.

[1286] Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. Benef. iv.

4, 1: Quæ maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.

[1287] Diog. 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in

Clement, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all

evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal καθαροὶ καὶ

ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν. Id. in Plut. Adv.

Col. 17, 4: ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς

ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς

ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

[1288] Epic. in Diog. 122: μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε

γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε

πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. He who says it is too early or too

late to study philosophy means πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν

ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7: Philosophiæ servias oportet,

ut tibi contingat vera libertas.

[1289] Epic. in Diog. 127: τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ αἱ δὲ

κεναί· καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. τῶν δὲ

ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ

σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῇν. Ibid. 149, further

particulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20; Cic.

Fin. i. 13, 45; Tusc. v. 33, 94; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10;

Eustrat. Eth. N. 48, b; Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1.

[1290] Sen. Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro ... qui adsidue queritur, quod

adversus præterita simus ingrati. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita

ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and Lucr. iii. 929.

[1291] Diog. 11; 130; 144; 146; Stob. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; Sen. Ep.

2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.

[1292] Diog. 144: βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ

κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε. The like in Stob. Ecl. ii. 354; Cic. Fin.

i. 19, 63; Sen. De Const. 15, 4; Epicurus and Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc.

v. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.

[1293] Diog. 135: κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως

εὐτυχεῖν.

[1294] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 4.

[1295] Diog. 118; Plut. l.c. 3, 9; Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic. Tusc.

v. 26, 73.

[1296] Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix.

41; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 1, the latter

perverting Epicurus’ words to a terrible extent.

[1297] Diog. 137: ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν ... ὁ δὲ τὰς

ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ

διὰ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας

ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Further particulars in Plut. l.c. 3, 10: Cic.

Tusc. v. 33, 96. The Epicureans spoke of bodily pleasure by ἥδεσθαι,

mental by χαίρειν. Plut. l.c. 5, 1.

[1298] Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σὰρξ to express

the body in contrast to the soul: σῶμα, in his system, includes the

soul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (Plut.

in N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Plut. has γαστρὶ instead of σαρκί.)

[1299] Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω

τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι’

ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφᾶς (-ῆς). The like,

in a more expanded form, in Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41.

[1300] Plut. l.c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ’

Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ (see previous note) χαρίζεσθαι; and: περὶ

γαστέρα γὰρ, ὦ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν. Conf. ibid. 3, 1.

[1301] See p. 478, 1, and Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ

εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν

ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Ibid. 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς

ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ’ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι

τελευτῶντας.

[1302] Conf., besides the extracts on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i. 17,

55: Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis

voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of

several Epicureans to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may

therefore be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.

[1303] In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful

illness, Epicurus continues: ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ

ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ.

[1304] Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21.

[1305] Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 36;

M. Aurel. vii. 33, 64.

[1306] Diog. 140: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῇν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ

δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. The same p. 132,

138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18.

[1307] Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf. 12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia

sum (invitis nec nostris popularibus—the Stoics—dicam), sancta Epicurum

et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: voluptas enim

illa ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus

eam ille dicit voluptati ... itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum,

sectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit,

infamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2: Apud me vero Epicurus est et

fortis, licet manuleatus sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of

Epicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyænus,

magnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81.

[1308] Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς

παρακαλῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας

τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας.

[1309] Diog. 138: διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐ

δι’ αὑτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης.

Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att. vii. 2): Istæ enim vestræ eximiæ

pulchræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles

aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius

artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. ...; sic sapientia, quæ

ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc

expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirendæ et comparandæ

voluptatis. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι

τῶν ἡδέων κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον.

[1310] Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat

beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia

beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.

[1311] Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62.

[1312] Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.

[1313] Cic. l.c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι,

λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

[1314] Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1;

Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and

often in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused

to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is

forbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Plut. col.

34, 1.

[1315] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws ought to

be kept τῷ μὴ τὰ διωρισμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν αὐτοῖς

ἔχοντα διαφυλάττειν, κἀκεῖνα μὴ μόνον συνειδότων, ἀλλὰ κἂν λανθάνωμεν

ἀπαξάπαντας, καὶ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, οὐ δι’ ἀνάγκην, καὶ βεβαίως, ἀλλ’ οὐ

σαλευομένως.

[1316] Diog. 117; 118; 119.

[1317] Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2.

[1318] Diog. 118; Sen. Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality

of virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Diog. 120.

[1319] Diog. 135; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3; Lucr. iii. 323.

[1320] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem.

Tusc. v. 9, 26; Stob. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.

[1321] Diog. 117.

[1322] Diog. 117: τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν

λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μήδ’ ἐπαλλάττειν ἑκόντα. The latter words appear to

admit the possibility of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through

madness.

[1323] Diog. 126; 145; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63.

[1324] See also page 476, 2.

[1325] We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus’ treatise περὶ

κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ἅ. The

10th book of this treatise gives a portrait of the ὑπερήφανος, and

kindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild

criticism of Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s οἰκονομικός. It is objected to

the latter that the master of the house is there made (col. ii. 30) to

rise earlier than his servants, and to go to bed later than they do,

such conduct being ταλαίπωρον καὶ ἀνοίκειον φιλοσόφου.

[1326] Diog. 144; 146; 130; Stob. Floril. 17, 23; Sen. Ep. 16, 7; Lucr.

ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12: φιλοσόφῳ δ’ ἐστὶ

πλούτου μικρόν· ὃ παρεδώκαμεν ἀκολούθως [for thus and not by εὐκαίρως

must the defective -ως be represented] τοῖς καθηγεμόσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ

πλούτου λόγοις. Conf. p. 476, 3; 477.

[1327] Diog. 130.

[1328] Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37; Sen. Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5:

Honesta, inquit, res est læta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis parasse

divitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.

[1329] Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non

videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.

[1330] Diog. 11; Stob. Floril. 17, 34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen. Ep.

25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought

against him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic.

153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he

spent a mina every day on his table. If this statement be not a pure

invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could

otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by

Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmæ, and

when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived.

Plut. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates—(Diog. 6: αὐτὸν

δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς)—is certainly an unfounded calumny. The

moderation of Epicurus is admitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and

Epicurus flatters himself, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non toto asse pasci,

Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11,

because he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid. he writes: πέμψον

μοι τυροῦ Κυθνίου, ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι, δύνωμαι. Still

less have we any reason to connect the diseases of which Epicurus and

some of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein

following Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness.

[1331] Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See p. 477, 2.

[1332] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 16, 28; 20, Conf.

Plut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος, ὥς φησιν

Ἐπίκουρος, ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον.

[1333] Serious charges on this head, against which Gassendi defends

him, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6; but

neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose

morality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered

conclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, 31, calls Epicurus

ἀναίσθητος. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality.

Thus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons ἡδοναὶ δι’ ἀφροδισίων

among the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Eth. N. 48,

such pleasures are included among φυσικαὶ (see p. 476, 3), not among

ἡδοναὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050;

and Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, 1, not only discusses the most

suitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of

Epicurus: εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν

καλῶν ἁφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεσιν (N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These

enjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do

not entail any bad consequences (Diog. 118), or produce passionate

states of feeling. Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (Diog.

118), but declares οὐκ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν. Diog. 118; Stob. Floril.

63, 31. Eros is defined (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = σύντονος ὄρεξις

ἀφροδισίων. Conf. Plut. Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is consequently a

passionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The

Stoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view

is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to

express the restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of

dependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune and good

name. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of

Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.

[1334] Diog. 120; 140; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 28; Lucr. iii. 59; 993.

[1335] Sen. De Const. 16, 1.

[1336] Diog. 118: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν.

[1337] Lucr. iii. 74.

[1338] See pp. 479, 455. A further argument may, however, be here

quoted. In Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 16, 3, he says: ὅτι νόσῳ νοσῶν ἀσκίτῃ

τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε, καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ

τῷ ὕδρωπι, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ

δακρύων ἡδονῇ. It is true that a certain mawkishness and self-conceit

may be detected in this language.

[1339] Diog. 119; Philodem. De Vit. ix. 12; 27, 40.

[1340] Diog. 120: κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. 121:

χρηματίσεσθαί τε ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα. The limitation implied in

the text would, however, seem to require μόνης. Philodem. in the same

sense l.c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his

scholars, Conf. Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also 15, 31.

[1341] Diog. 121: εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν εἰ ἔχοι· ἀδιαφόρως ἕξειν ἂν μὴ

σχοίη (Cobet, not intelligibly: ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίης).

[1342] Epic. in Diog. 130: καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν

οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ

τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας

ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς δεόμενοι.

[1343] The Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint

[dolores] feramus, sin minus, æquo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat,

tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in

necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On

the other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem

concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridiculum est currere ad

mortem tædio vitæ, cum genere vitæ ut currendum esset ad mortem

effeceris. Diog. 119, the older editions read: καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὄψεις

μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου. Cobet: μετάξειν αὑτὸν τοῦ βίου. Instead of

πηρωθεὶς πηρωθέντα is read, or, as we might prefer, instead of μετάξειν

μετάξει. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In

Seneca’s time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his

fellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by

the precepts of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).

[1344] Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6: Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν

κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.

[1345] Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v. 1106, gives a

long description of the rise of a state.

[1346] Stob. Floril. 43, 139.

[1347] Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15; Plut. Adv.

Col. 35. See p. 482, 4.

[1348] Diog. 150–153.

[1349] Diog. 140.

[1350] Plut. Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Epictet.

Diss. i. 23, 6; Lucr. v. 1125; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. περὶ

ῥητορικῆς (Vol. Herc. iv.) col. 14: οὐδὲ χρησίμην ἡγούμεθα τὴν

πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, οὔτ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις, οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν,

αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αἰτίαν καὶ συμφορῶν ἀνηκέστων, when

combined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes

useful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.

[1351] Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pomponius

Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the

civil war and withdrawal from public life, see Nepos, Att. 6.

[1352] Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 45, 26: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων

ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεῖται τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται.

[1353] Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between

Epicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.

[1354] Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p. 465.

[1355] Epic. in Sen. Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam quæ

ego scio non probat populus, quæ probat populos ego nescio. Similar

expressions from Stoics have been previously quoted.

[1356] Diog. 121: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν [τὸν σοφόν]. Lucr.

v. 1125:—

Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum,

Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

[1357] Epict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): διατὶ ἀποσυμβουλεύεις

τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; ii. 20,

20: Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ’ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ

φίλου. The last words prove with what caution these statements must be

taken.

[1358] Diog. 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity,

owing to a difference of reading. The earlier text was: καὶ μὴν καὶ

γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς διαπορίαις

καὶ ἐν ταῖς περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου οὐ γαμήσειν.

Cobet reads instead: καὶ μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν ...

κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν. What the MS. authority for this

reading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv.

Jovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matrimonio: Epicurus ... raro

dicit sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt

nuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum

malorumque confinio, grave autem esse viro sapienti venire in dubium,

utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

[1359] Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495; Epictet. Diss. i.

23, 3.

[1360] Diog. 10: ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς

ἀδελφοὺς εὐποιΐα. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus’ testament,

ibid. 18.

[1361] Diog. 120: καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας [γίνεσθαι] ...

συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. Epic. Ibid. 148

(also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68): καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις

ἀσφάλεαν φιλίας μάλιστα κρήσει δεῖ νομίζειν συντελουμένην. (Cobet,

however, reads: φιλίας μάλιστα κατιδεῖν εἶναι συντελυμένην, in which

case φιλίᾳ should be substituted for φιλίας or else κτήσει for

κατιδεῖν.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod

Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo’s

cynical self-contentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi ægro adsideat,

succurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui

ipse ægro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet.

Cic. Fin. i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et

metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis

confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest,

etc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De Vit. ix. (V. Herc. iii.) col.

24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to

withdraw from it.

[1362] Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.

[1363] Ibid. 70.

[1364] Ibid. 67.

[1365] The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus

(Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as

his pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his

eye. Man requires a stranger to give him moral support.

[1366] As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the French

freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be

mentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the

Epicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite

natural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and

conversation.

[1367] Diog. 148: ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου

μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. Cic. Fin. ii. 25,

80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven. In Diog. 120, Cobet reads

instead of the usual φίλον τε οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι [τὸν σοφὸν], which is

altogether untrustworthy, φίλων τε οὐδὲν κτήσεσθαι.

[1368] Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio

leonis ac lupi vita est.

[1369] Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7; Diog. 121. We have no reason to suppose,

with Ritter, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real

sentiment. That it is inconsistent we can well allow.

[1370] The Epicureans in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in

domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione

consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis.

Ibid. ii. 25, 80.

[1371] Instances have already been quoted, p. 418, 2, of the

extravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise

his friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and

Pythocles (Diog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the

release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauded him (Plut. N. P. Sua.

Vivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2): ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἅλαδε

κατέβη Μίθρῳ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for

a present: δαΐως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ

σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας.

He wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ

Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω, καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὖ τὸ

τῶν γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς

ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανισκοῦ (Plut. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said

(Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6, V. Herc. v. 2, 11): ὡς διὰ Πυθοκλέα

τύχην θεώσει παρὰ τὸ τεθεμισμένον. Compare the remarks on p. 488, 3.

[1372] Diog. 11: τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι

τὰς οὐσίας καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων λέγοντα,

ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων οὐδὲ φίλων.

[1373] Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (V. Herc. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73,

mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness

towards friends. Probably the words in Sen. Ep. 28, 9—initium salutis

est notitia peccati—are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a

friend.

[1374] Not only does Diogenes 9, praise his unequalled benevolence, his

kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him

(Tusc. ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin. ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et

comem et humanum.

[1375] Diog. 118: οὔτε κολάσειν οἰκέτας ἐλεήσειν μέντοι, καὶ συγγνώμην

τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. 121. ἐπιχαρίσεσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι.

[1376] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2,

p. 778): αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστι τοῦ

πάσχειν. Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by

Ælian, V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts xx. 35.

[1377] Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei

fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita

constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes.

Atticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready

self-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the

same character. See Steinhart’s remarks, l.c. p. 470.

[1378] See p. 445.

[1379] Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.

[1380] It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus admitted

his debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve; otherwise he

claimed to be entirely self-taught, and to have learned nothing from

the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn

as to spare neither them nor their writings. Diog. 8, besides

mentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes (sup. 342, 1), refers also to his

calling the Platonists Διονυσοκόλακας, Plato himself in irony the

golden Plato, Heraclitus κυκητήν, Democritus Ληρόκριτον, Antidorus

Σαινίδωρον, the Cynics ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, the Dialecticians

πολυφθονέρους, Pyrrho ἀμαθῆν and ἀπαίδευτον, and charging Aristotle and

Protagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that

any of these statements are true, Epicurus’ friendliness being well

known. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does

not exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors (see p. 418,

2), of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial

nature of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view.

Sext. Math. i. 2, attests τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ

τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν; Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 1, mentions a false

objection to Arcesilaus; and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus

Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime

maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony

with a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad

jocandum minimeque resipiens patriam. On these jokes he apparently

prided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496,

6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93,

says of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Silum,

ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum ... scurram Atticum

fuisse dicebat (according to Cic. Brut. 85, 292, Epicurus had already

expressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic irony), Chrysippum

nunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.

[1381] Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus on p.

476, 1.

[1382] Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The

same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl.

in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid.

1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic,

notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of

Democritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928;

Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to

Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith

may be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of

imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it

might be supposed that before Pyrrho’s time a doctrine not unlike that

of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it

was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We

have seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to

sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of

Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the

ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the

senses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must

therefore take the statement ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to

this limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have

compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater

scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the

phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have

contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from

Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards

imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from

Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and

esteemed.

[1383] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are

indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting

Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander

Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by

Diogenes.

[1384] Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in

‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools,’ p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition).

Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely

called the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, Diog. ix. 61,

having derived his statement from Alexander’s διαδοχαί, and it is quite

in the style of the compilers of the διαδοχαὶ to assign a Megarian

teacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was sufficiently

obvious.

[1385] Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them

that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, Πύῤῥων, only copies the

present text of Diogenes with a few mistakes.

[1386] Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is

little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus

which Sextus, Math. vii. 48, attributes to him, and since the latter

quotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus

appears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many

others who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a

single word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to

the School of Democritus. Plut. Tranq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer. Max.

viii. 14, ext. 2, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite

number of worlds; and Clemens, Strom. i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in

which, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that πολυμαθία is only

useful when it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus

followed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our

desire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet ὁ

εὐδαιμονικός (Clemens, l.c.; Athen. vi. 250; xii. 548, b; Æl. V. H. ix.

37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. For first he is

charged by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence

far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus; and

according to Plut. Alex. 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the

independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; Timon also in

Plut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led away by φύσις ἡδονοπλὴξ

contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended

in Pyrrho (Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond

the imperturbability of Democritus; and Timon commends him for his

κυνικὸν μένος. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed

in his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon’s club—Diog.

ix. 59; Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449; Clemens, Strom. iv. 496, D;

Valer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol.

50; Dio Chrysos. Or. 37, p. 126, B. But he treats men with the same

contempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of

independence, he spoils the whole by adroit flattery. Conf. Plut. Alex.

52; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; Æl. V. H. ix. 37;

Athen. vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in

nobility. Respecting Anaxarchus see Lusac. Lect. Att. 181.

[1387] Diog. ix. 64; 109.

[1388] According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his

account, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to

Diocles (Diog. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for

his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.

[1389] Diog. 66; 62.

[1390] Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and

doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went

to the extent described by Antigonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting out of

the way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved

from danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special

good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless

conduct.

[1391] All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his

death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived

after the 111 Olympiad (336–332 B.C.) is indefinite. If, however, as

Diog. 62 says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus

at Alexander’s first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30,

the statements above given are true.

[1392] Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are

better authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10,

p. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the supposed poem on Alexander was

extant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.

[1393] Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a

native of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109;

Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life

he repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (Diog. 109). Stilpo being alive

in the third century, and Timon’s birth having happened approximately

between 325–315 B.C., the connection is not so impossible as Wachsmuth,

p. 5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Rom. 398, suppose, though in the

uncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated.

Subsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and leaving his

staunch admirers (Diog. 109, 69; Aristocl. l.c. 11, 14, 21), removed

with his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and,

having amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (Diog. 110;

115). It appears from Diog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus

(who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death

may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For

his life and character, see Diog. 110; 112–115; Athen. x. 438, a; Æl.

V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and

pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting

this satire (Diog. 110) consult Wachsmuth, p. 9 and 3. The latter, p.

51, has collected the fragments.

[1394] Diog. 67–69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as

his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping

his temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecatæus of Abdera, the well-known

historian (on whom see Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384); and

Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only

tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only

a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis

before 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes

before 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Diog. 64, Epicurus must

have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes.

Nausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have

admired his character (Diog. l.c.), so that he cannot properly be

called his pupil. The mention of Numenius, by Diog. 102 (conf. 68),

among Pyrrho’s συνήθεις, is suspicious, because Ænesidemus is named at

the same time. It may be questioned whether he as well as Ænesidemus

does not belong to a later period of Scepticism.

[1395] According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the

latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon

left no successor, and that the School was in abeyance from Timon to

Ptolemæus, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion

and Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides,

Nicolochus, Euphranor, and Praÿlus. His son, too, the physician

Xanthus, followed the father. (Diog. 109.) That Timon was himself a

physician, as Wachsmuth, p. 5, supposes, cannot be concluded with

certainty from the words ἰατρικὸν ἐδίδαξε, since these words only imply

that he had received instruction in medicine. On the other hand,

according to Suid. Πύῤῥων, the second Pyrrho, called Timon’s pupil, was

a changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil (Suid. Ἄρατος; conf. Diog.

ix. 113), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43, 2.

[1396] In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on

the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolemæus was the next one

who is said to have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho’s ἀγωγὴ

can have been known for 150 years.

[1397] Diog. 114.

[1398] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ

Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν·

πρῶτον μὲν ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς

πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν.

[1399] Aristocl. l.c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho)

ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ]

μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Diog. ix.

61: οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Gell. xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is

said to have stated οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως.

[1400] See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114.

[1401] Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ’

ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.

[1402] Diog. ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε

δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ,

νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ

τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Sext. Math. xi. 140: οὔτε ἀγαθόν τί ἐστι φύσει οὔτε

κακὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

[1403] In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be

understood: οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν

ἀντιλογίαν. See note 1.

[1404] Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς

τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ’ ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν

Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος. The meaning of this proverb has been already

explained.

[1405] Diog. ix. 79 refers these τρόποι to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he

was there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was

Pyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36

generally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, by whom, according

to Math. vii. 345, he understood Ænesidemus and his followers.

Aristocles, l.c. 18, 11, refers them to Ænesidemus, and they may easily

have been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since Ænesidemus himself

(Diog. ix. 106) and subsequent writers (Favorin. in Gell. xi. 5, 5;

Philostr. Vit. Soph. i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement

λόγοι or τρόποι Πυῤῥώνειοι. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the

form in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear, since

they obviously refer to later views.

[1406] Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against

the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in

his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no

assertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied

dogmatism; for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another

proof, and so on for ever.

[1407] Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς δεῖν,

ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου

λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ

οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76: οὐ μᾶλλον means,

according to Timon, τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.

[1408] Ænesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς

διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon. Ibid. 105.

See p. 522, 3.

[1409] Diog. ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν ...

περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι

ἐπέχομεν περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀδήλων· μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ

ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῖμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ’

ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται

διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὄντως ἐστί ... καὶ γὰρ

τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν· καὶ ὅτι πῦρ καίει

αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικήν, ἐπέχομεν.

[1410] Diog. l.c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων

λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής

ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον, αἱ δὲ ἐξομολογήσεις εἰσίν. ἐν ᾧ

οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁριζόμεθα. Diog. gives this

view in its later form, probably following Sext. Pyrrh. i. 197, but

agreeing in substance with the quotations from Timon and Pyrrho.

[1411] Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions ἀφασία,

ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχὴ, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use

instead of them, ἀῤῥεψία, ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. If, according to

Aristocles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned ἀφασία in dealing with

the third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.

[1412] Πυῤῥώνειοι, σκεπτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ζητητικοί. Conf.

Diog. 69.

[1413] Aristocl. l.c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι

Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν. Diog. 107: τέλος δὲ

οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς

φασιν οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. Apathy is substituted for

ataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 130.

[1414] Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:—

ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ’ ἀδάμαστον

πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε

(conf. Wachsmuth, p. 62)

λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα

ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.

Id. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The Sceptic lives—

ῥῇστα μεθ’ ἡσυχίης

αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ

μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

Id. in Diog. 65.

[1415] Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni

omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime

ægrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et

Aristone qui omnia exæquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne

sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in

Stob. Serm. 121, 28): Πύῤῥων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῇν ἢ τεθνάναι.

[1416] Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil

omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii.

4, 12.

[1417] See p. 521, 3; 525, 3.

[1418] Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν

Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ

φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. (Conf. Sext. Math. vii. 30.)

Ibid. 106, of Pyrrho: τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. See p. 519, 4.

[1419] See p. 524, 1, 2.

[1420] Sext. Math. xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν

ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν

τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν ὅταν φῇ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι

μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα·

ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ,

ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

[1421] According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus

(Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being

agitated by saving: It is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether.

This language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no

mediating principle between the apathy required by his system and

practical needs. Neither do the remarks of Ritter, iii. 451, prove that

the doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.

[1422] Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann’s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190),

that Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho,

does not appear to be tenable.

[1423] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and

Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry

whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa

and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic.

Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were

together at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no

doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is

hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor

if they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be

referred simply to their personal relation.

[1424] Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16;

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the

founder of the New (second or middle) Academy.

[1425] Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, Gött. 1842, Gymn. Progr.)

was born at Pitane, in Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv.

28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was

his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44),

it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the

mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens,

where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy

by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived

on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the

Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18,

67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a

pupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus.

l.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or

Diodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the

statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with

extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30;

34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit.

7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed.

Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and

well acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own

attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have

early distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it

appears that in Epicurus’ lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he

had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus,

however, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in

making his ἀκμὴ between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the

conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom

it attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in

Eus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in

retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle,

and genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44;

vii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63;

Coh. Ira, 13, p. 461. Ælian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to

Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no

writings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328).

[1426] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum ... ex variis

Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil

esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt ...

aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse

... non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se

sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia

with which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii.

17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis

causa.

[1427] Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.

[1428] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter’s view of

the latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of

philosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be

entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance

by way of overcoming doubt.

[1429] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1.

[1430] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr.

Ev. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards

Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.

[1431] Sext. Math. vii. 153.

[1432] Sext. Math. l.c. 154.

[1433] Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or

conceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as

cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to

prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso

posset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added

discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the

statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to

the Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas

Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenon

autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno

Plut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον

τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης

αἴτια φανεῖται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the

assertion that ἐπιστητόν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη, and that it is so

when it produces a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in which these

statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such

a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These

objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not

admit a false opinion equally well with a true one.

[1434] Sext. 155: μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις

γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις· μὴ οὔσης δὲ

καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα.

[1435] Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col.

24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is

thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχὴ as being a good in every case,

συγκατάθεσις as an evil.

[1436] Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.

[1437] Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv.

28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.

[1438] Stob. Floril. 82, 4: Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς

διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις (jugglers), οἵτινες χαριέντως

παραλογίζονται; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: Ἀρκεσιλάου ἐκ τῶν

Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων): διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω.

[1439] The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as

Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem

to be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to

Arcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the

Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have

condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad.

ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to

dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge?

[1440] This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.

6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later

Sceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they

assert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians

assert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1).

Even Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι

τις ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic

Aristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): πρόσθε Πλάτων ὄπιθεν

Πύῤῥων, μέσος Διόδωρος. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11;

Diog. iv. 33.

[1441] It has been already seen that this was the key to the position

which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics.

[1442] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks

of Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ἐποχὴ

leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ

ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν

αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ

προστίθεσθαι. Perception arises and influences the will without

συγκατάθεσις. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus

(Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that

it was propounded by Arcesilaus.

[1443] Sext. Math. vii 158: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ

Βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι,

ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔχει τὴν

πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τᾶς

αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε

προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν

περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς

κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι (according to the Stoic definition)

ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ

κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in

Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities.

[1444] In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice

rather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works

of art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says:

Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where

there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons.

ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear

of death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a

somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is

the statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there

were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods

into three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It

implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by

the language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory

of a κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλου, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to

natural science.

[1445] Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.

[1446] Geffers, De Arcesilæ Successoribus (including Carneades): Gött.

1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C.,

after presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably

shortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans

Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59–61). The statements made in Diog.

l.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, Ælian,

V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51,

refer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They

must be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59

mentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity.

Diog. calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς·

φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ’ ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. To

his admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was

however declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5,

clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from

Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the

teaching of the New Academy (Suid. Λακ.: ἔγραψε φιλόσοφα καὶ περὶ

φύσεως—the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by

some mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii.

183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during

Arcesilaus’ lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6),

Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7)

are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of

Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also

mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus,

in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander,

who jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to

Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and

was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is

called by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor

of Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the

names.

[1447] Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene

(Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and

died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year.

Lucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability

Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90,

making his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that

his birthday, like Plato’s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu.

Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple

and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in

dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied

philosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more

particularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10,

44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the

well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest

impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the

boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals.

Shortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became

blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his

doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus

(Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his

character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous

in disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting

in a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog.

66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against

justice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).

The quotation in Diog. 64 (ἡ συστήσασα φύσις καὶ διαλύσει) does not

indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature.

Still less does his language on Antipater’s suicide, and also what is

quoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt

to imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very

clever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades

eminently mad.

[1448] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob.

20.

[1449] His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him,

together with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out

of his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that

an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Καρν. adds an eclipse of the sun)

commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ

μεθ’ ἥλιον καλλίστου τῶν ἄστρων (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p.

838, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων

ὁμολογεῖται. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the

force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence.

These gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes

in Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii.

12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10;

Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14;

Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says:

μάλιστα δ’ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς

δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα ... ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος

κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυὴς, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ

χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ’ οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν

καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

[1450] Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.

[1451] See p. 536, note.

[1452] Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ

μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ

τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades

with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles

or every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his

attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p.

514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.

[1453] Sext. l.c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ

λόγος καθ’ ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ

λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα

συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς.

[1454] Sext. l.c. 160–163.

[1455] Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—where

Carneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name.

For the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with

those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus

refute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades.

[1456] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system

of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are

false notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as

true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to

know the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the

side of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it.

The second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and

the first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the

senses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to

which Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4,

look as the most important argument.

[1457] Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem

magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab

omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the συνήθεια against which

Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum

perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res

percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.

[1458] Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in

Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement

in Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades

persistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third

are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it

may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be

distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal

to a third without being or appearing equal to one another.

[1459] Sext. 402 and 408.

[1460] The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated in Cic.

Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in

point.

[1461] Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the

chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by

Arcesilaus against the Stoics.

[1462] Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.

[1463] Sext. 165.

[1464] Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo,

and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to

a similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C.

Not. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It

is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.

[1465] Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but

there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it

is probable that it was the work of Carneades.

[1466] Diog. iv. 62.

[1467] Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical

views of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret

homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.

[1468] Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not

mentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero’s

remark that he is quoting the Academic view.

[1469] Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.

[1470] The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments

were used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii.

20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the

existence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to

Chrysippus’ assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed,

Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the

object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing

to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be

killed and eaten.

[1471] Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65–70. It is here presumed that the leading

thoughts in Cicero’s description belong to the School of Carneades.

[1472] Ibid. 31, 76.

[1473] Ibid. 32, 79.

[1474] Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.

[1475] Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28.

[1476] Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.

[1477] Ibid. 10, 25.

[1478] L.c.

[1479] Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.

[1480] Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139–147. Here

too Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the

agreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the

same person was being referred to.

[1481] Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all

earthly beings are there given.

[1482] Sext. Math. ix. 152–175, quotes the same argument for σωφροσύνη,

and so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name,

but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a

longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before

and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer.

[1483] Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It

alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in

the middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the

individual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His

will or not?

[1484] As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3.

[1485] Sext. 178.

[1486] Sext. l.c. 148–151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is

clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero

introduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, quæ Carneades

afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not

only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades,

when he continues, 182: ἠρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ

σωριτικῶς τινες κ.τ.λ.

[1487] Sext. 182–190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also

observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιούτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν

Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς.

[1488] To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument

given by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want

of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same

name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from

some Greek treatise.

[1489] See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12.

[1490] Ibid. ii. 3, 9.

[1491] Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name.

[1492] Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109.

[1493] Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48.

[1494] Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27.

[1495] Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there

says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a

cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the

will. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to

it unconditional validity.

[1496] Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato

Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.

[1497] Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8–12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18,

59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and

above, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of

casuistry among the later Stoics.

[1498] Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he

compares this ἐποχὴ to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard

of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to ἐποχὴ that Alex. Aphr.

De An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider ἀπτωσία the πρῶτον

οἰκεῖον, πρὸς ταύτην γάρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν

προσπταίειν. ἀπροσπτωσία or ἀπροπτωσία is, according to the Stoic

definition (Diog. vii. 46) = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ

μή. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any

proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you

are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever.

ἀπροσπτωσία becomes then identical with ἐποχὴ or ἄγνοια, which Max.

Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence

Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against

every subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5,

11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4,

11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.

[1499] Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.

[1500] Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπατούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τι

κριτήριον πρός τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τὴς εὐδαιμονίας

περίκτησιν δυνάμιν ἀπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν περὶ τούτου

διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim

contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ

... eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus

rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid,

reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the

assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the

Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They

accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but

they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς,

but not ἀκριβεῖς.

[1501] Sext. and Cic. l.c.

[1502] Sext. l.c. 167–170.

[1503] Ibid. 171–173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24,

78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no

importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this

statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum

quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to

Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum

(aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum

sapientem.

[1504] Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of

matter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel

verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione

potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non

opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the

same effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it

impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν

εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where

the objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt,

omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα

Græci.

[1505] Sext. l.c. 173; 175–182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11,

33; 31, 99; 32, 104.

[1506] Sext. l.c. 173; 181.

[1507] Ibid. 176; 183.

[1508] Ibid. 184.

[1509] Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99.

[1510] Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the

charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic.

Acad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he

allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will

sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain

statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he

expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this

assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as

may be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2.

[1511] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ

καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι

μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ

κακοῦ ὁμοίως.

[1512] See p. 553, 2; 554, 4.

[1513] Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his

conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not

available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20)

that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For

such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot

be gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of

the will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed,

necessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological

theory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did

have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more

so than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain

things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or

disturb happiness.

[1514] Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter,

iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades’ division, or he

would not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial.

[1515] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.

[1516] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo

probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus,

quas primas natura conciliavisset (οἰκειοῦν). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20;

Tusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it

makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in

the enjoyment of natural goods.

[1517] Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis,

unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from

pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf.

Ibid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22.

[1518] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem

sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam

videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum

aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v.

30, 85, voluptas cum honestate—the highest Good.

[1519] Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475.

[1520] Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of

Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on

probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in

ægritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on

ethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing

characteristic about them.

[1521] See p. 279.

[1522] Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however,

only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable

that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against

Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.

[1523] Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus ... rem in summum

discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac

quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum

Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.

[1524] Fin. iii. 17, 57.

[1525] Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59.

[1526] Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque

dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus

satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare

solitum accepimus, etc.

[1527] He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the

highest good, so he determines the honestum (the καλὸν, virtue). The

view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity

aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the

view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature,

the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum

igniculi et semina.

[1528] See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however,

the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.

[1529] Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end.

[1530] Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos

tolleret—quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de

Diis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i.

22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God,

but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh.

iii. 2: τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ

σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν.

[1531] Ritter, iii. 730, 694.

[1532] Clitomachus was a native of Carthage. Hence he is called by Max

Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, ὁ Λίβυς. He originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. At

home he devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his

mother tongue (τῇ ἰδίᾳ φωνῇ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἐφιλοσόφει). When 40 years of

age (according to Steph. Byz. De urbe Καρχηδὼν; 28), he came to Athens,

was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself

to it with such zeal and success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; Athen.

ix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous

writer (Diog. iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii.

31, 98; 32, 102; Diog. ii. 92. He died (according to Stob. Floril. vii.

55) by suicide, not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt remarks, Ueber d.

philosoph. Schulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg. 1842. Hist.

Philol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L.

Crassus, during his quæstorship, which falls at the earliest in this

year, met him at Athens. He must then have been very old.

[1533] Diog. iv. 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 32, 102.

[1534] As the peculiar observation in Diog. iv. proves: (ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς

τρισὶν αἱρέσεσι διαπρέψας, ἔν τε τῇ Ἀκαδημαϊκῇ Περιπατητικῇ καὶ

Στωϊκῇ).

[1535] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Orator,

16, 51, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades, whom he followed not only

in teaching but also in method. He must have survived Clitomachus,

since he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo,

however, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the

School (Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to Cic. De Orat. ii. 88,

360. Tusc. i. 24, 59, he was remarkable for a good memory.

[1536] Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores

nominabantur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent nihil plane tenere,

neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum

inventa didicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile

attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, and says

that both he and the School to which he belonged were engaged in

disputes with them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise,

according to Quintil. ii. 17, 15, entitled ‘Charges against the

rhetoricians.’ Ritter’s inferences, that Charmadas recommended

philosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus betrayed the object

of the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too

much of a casual expression which means no more than what the Stoics,

and before them Plato, had said.

[1537] In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16,

mentions Agnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also

referred to by Quintilian. (See Athen. xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that

Metrodorus of Stratonice passed for a friend of Carneades; he had come

over from among the Epicureans (Diog. x. 9) to join him. This

Metrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the

pupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus

distinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom Æmilius Paulus brought to

Rome (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135). The former must have been younger,

the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius

(Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years (Plut. An

Seni. s. ger. Resp. 13, 1, p. 791), was Æschines of Naples, according

to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, who was likewise a distinguished teacher in

the Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another

pupil, Mentor, was by Carneades forbidden the School, because he was

caught with his concubine (Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8,

7).

[1538] Exc. Vatic. xii 26: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων [τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ] τινὲς

βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων καὶ περὶ τῶν

ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν τοὺς προσμαχομένους τοιαύταις χρῶνται

παραδοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητας, ὥστε διαπορεῖν,

ἀδύνατόν [l. εἰ δυνατόν] ἐστι, τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις ὄντας ὀσφραίνεσθαι τῶν

ἑψομένων ὠῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, καὶ διστάζειν, μή πω καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ

διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἄρ’ ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους

διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους· ἐξ ὧν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας εἰς

διαβολὴν ἤχασι τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς

ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας καὶ τοῖς

νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασι ζῆλον, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν

λόγων μηδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, δι’ ὧν ὄνησις τοῖς

φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ παραδόξους εὑρεσιλογίας

κενοδοξοῦντες κατατρίβουσι τοὺς βίους. In the time of Carneades, whose

cotemporary was Polybius, to whom the language as to the enthusiasm of

youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory remarks could

not have been made of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of

the whole passage is suspicious. It bears besides the mark of

exaggeration so strongly that it is of no greater use for giving a view

of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying an

idea of modern German philosophy.

[1539] Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of

probabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may

be found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachus and

Æschines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers

made the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmadas, the fifth from

Antiochus (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a still

earlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the platform of

Carneades. Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus

and his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id

antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto

placuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra

Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this

passage from a lost treatise of Cicero; hence it may be relied upon.

The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice (see p.

564, 5), mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might

also be suggested (Strabo, xiii. 155, p. 609; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775; Plut.

Lucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20,

75; Tusc. i. 24, 59; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; Quintil. x. 6, 1;

xi. 2, 22; Müller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at

Chalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put

to death by his orders, B.C. 70, at an advanced age. Cic. De Orat. iii.

20, 75, calls him an Academician; and he is mentioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45,

as a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come

from the treatise περὶ συνηθείας (Strabo, p. 775). He is otherwise only

known as a rhetorician and politician. The same uncertainty prevails as

to the Metrodorus referred to in Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3).

We do not know who he is, but it may be inferred that it is the same

Metrodorus who is mentioned by Augustin.