39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the
notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is
consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as 4, 24:
Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt?... et quid
stultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus
nectere?... non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, quæ ex
virtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potent, id
imperfectum est.
[543] Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic.
Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si
sequi potest. Primæ partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo
loco stare: tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5;
14, 1.
[544] Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1,
quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef.
iv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod
omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et
longissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non
potest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam,
si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3;
13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance
with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be
declared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the
Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison
with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was
only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus
subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of
harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the
difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other
things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6),
with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle
that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes
impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all
philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the
zeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the
point at which his own principles would bear him out.
[545] M. Aurel. vi. 15: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἴδιον
ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν
πρᾶξιν. Conf. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ
πολιτικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
[546] Sen. Ep. 92, 6–10; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep.
92, 10.
[547] Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed
by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by ἡδονὴ an
emotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert
that the wise man feels delight (χαρὰ, gaudium), but not pleasure
(ἡδονὴ, lætitia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2; Diog. 116; Alex. Aphr.
Top. 96; the last-named giving definitions of χαρὰ, ἡδονὴ, τέρψις,
εὐφροσύνη.
[548] Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De
Ira, ii. 6, 2.
[549] Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν
εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question
utrum virtus summi boni causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of
course, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5: The wise man takes
pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex
bono suo ortis. Ibid. 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem præstatura virtus est,
ideo propter hanc petitur ... voluptas non est merces nec causa
virtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et
delectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and
health, in ipso judicio et habitu optimæ mentis, in the sanitas et
libertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui.
Ibid. 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum
sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam lætitia et
tranquillitas ... sunt enim ista bona, sed consequentia summum bonum,
non consummantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stob. ii. 184,
188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74): πάντα τὸν ὁντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα ἴσην
ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, for the reasons stated, p. 230,
1.
[550] Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10–12; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic
arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may
be placed the inference in Clem. Strom. iv. 483, C, which bears great
similarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 233, 2: If thirst be
painful, and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause
of this pleasure: ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.
[551] Diog. 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην
ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα
ἐστὶν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ
ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβη.
[552] Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted
sense, they reject ἡδονή, understanding thereby a particular emotion.
See p. 236. 2.
[553] Sext. Math. xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί
φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’ (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ
φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ
κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς
τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν
κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.
[554] Accordingly, it is also defined to be τέχνη εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b.
[555] Diog. 89: τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν
δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν
αὐτῇ τ’ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτ’ οὔσῃ [-ης] ψύχῃ [-ης] πεποιημένῃ
[-ης] πρὸς ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Sen. De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis
enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum
pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. Id. Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19:
Æquitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede
conduci. Non esse justum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet præter
ipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Benef.
iv 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.;
si quicquam præter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42: τί γὰρ
πλέον θέλεις εὖ πριήσας ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν
σήν τι ἔπραξας, ἀλλὰ τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς; When man does good, πεποίηκε
πρὸς ὃ κατεσκεύασται καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Id. vii. 73; viii. 2. See pp.
230, 1; 236, 4.
[556] Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic.
Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra
se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by
virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance,
in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui
temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui
imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus
est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est.
Similarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This αὐτάρκεια of virtue
was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed
by Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which
the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (προηγμένα), nor, on the
other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without
effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as
only negative conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.
[557] Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged
with at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time,
and at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be
worthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; Benef. v. 17,
6; M. Aurel. xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with
Aristotle.
[558] This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman
period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found
subsequently.
[559] Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42.
[560] Parad. 2.
[561] De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fæce
in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis
erroribus absoluta libertas. Quæris, quæ sit ista? Non homines timere,
non Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam
potestatem: inæstimabile bonum est, suum fieri.
[562] Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo ... philosophia præstabit? Scilicet ut
malis tibi placere, quam populo, ... ut sine metu Deorum hominumque
vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.
[563] See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475.
[564] See p. 148, 2.
[565] νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190,
204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by
Marcian in Digest. i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel
Συναγ. τεχν. 177, Krische, Forsch. 475) = λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν
τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων. It is therefore
σπουδαῖόν τι or ἀστεῖον, something of moral value, imposing duties on
man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λόγος
κοινὸς, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to
Diog. vii. 88 (who here, according to the passage quoted from Cic. N.
D. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = ὁ
ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Διΐ. It is the ratio
summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque
contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Cic. N. D. i.
14, 30, respecting Zeus, on p. 150). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8
and 10, it is no human creation sed æternum quiddam, quod universum
mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia
ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis
(conf. Fin. iv. 5, II, in the fragment in Lact. Inst. v. 8). It is
accordingly, as Chrysippus l.c. says in the words of Pindar (Plato,
Gorg. 484, B), πάντων βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.
[566] Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.
[567] Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει.
[568] This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument
clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est,
iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in
jubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur
datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic
definition of κατόρθωμα as εὐνόμημα, that of ἁμάρτημα as ἀνόμημα.
[569] The good alone, or virtue, is αἱρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. See p.
229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. αἱρετὸν is, however, Ibid. 126,
132, ὃ αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ, or, more accurately, τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς
κινητικόν; and αἱρετὸν is accordingly distinguished from ληπτόν—αἱρετὸν
being what is morally good, ληπτὸν being everything which has value,
including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction
(according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between
αἱρετὸν and αἱρετέον, and similarly between ὀρεκτὸν and ὀρεκτέον,
ὑπομενετὸν and ὑπομενετέον, using the first form to express the good in
itself (for instance, φρόνησις), the latter to express the possession
of the good (for instance, φρονεῖν).
[570] ὁρμὴ is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι· ἀφορμὴ,
which is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2,
22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) φορὰ
διανοίας ἀπό τινος. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction (connecting
herewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stobæus
respecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the impulses
of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the
case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called
forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done
(φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθηκόντος); that every impulse contains an
affirmative judgment in itself (συγκατάθεσις), to which has been
superadded a κινητικόν· συγκατάθεσις applying to particular
propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110,
3; 83, 2), whereas ὁρμὴ applies to κατηγορήματα (i.e. activities
expressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every
desire aims at the possession of a good. Ὁρμὴ λογικὴ is defined to be
φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and is also called ὁρμὴ
πρακτικὴ (only a rational being being capable of πρᾶξις). If the φορὰ
διανοίας refers to something future, the ὁρμὴ becomes an ὄρεξις, for
which the text twice reads ὄρουσις. Among the varieties of ὁρμὴ
πρακτικὴ, Stob. enumerates πρόθεσις, ἐπιβολὴ, παρασκευὴ, ἐγχείρησις,
αἵρεσις, πρόθεσις, βούλησις, θέλησις, the definitions of which he
gives, passing then to the doctrine of emotions, these being also a
kind of ὁρμή. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and
will are included in the conception of ὁρμή, as will be subsequently
seen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which
likewise includes both.
[571] Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν
ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ [l. τὸν] τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον
ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους,
τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. Diog. 89, see p. 238, 3: The soul rests on
the harmony of life with itself (virtue); extraneous influences corrupt
it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile
est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura
fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.
[572] The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which
distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by
nature good and wise.
[573] Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368
Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν
λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί
τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to
ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) ἀπειθῶς τῷ
λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that
Chrysippus’ definition of ὁρμὴ (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood (as in
Baumhauer’s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply
that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in
the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is
peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be
taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses
are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin.
iii. 7, 23 (‘as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so
ὁρμὴ is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of
use’), that ὁρμὴ is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational
by the direction given to it by man.
[574] The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of
modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient
ideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed.
[575] Diog. vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ
παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are
found in Stob. ii. 36, 166, with this difference, that ἀπειθὴς τῷ
αἱροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place of ἄλογος, as in Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic.
Tusc. iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp. et
Plat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4, vol. v. 368, 385, 432, 458 Kühn, and Id. in
Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar
definition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no
longer to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost
books (Heeren suggests in the treatise περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς Diog. v. 23),
was that book genuine?
[576] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [πάθη] antiqui
naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi
cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur
[Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque
judicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem
immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin. iii. 10, 35: Nec vero
perturbationes animorum ... vi aliqua naturali moventur. Tusc. iv. 28,
60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut
naturale aut necessarium.
[577] See p. 215, 3; 242, 2.
[578] Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and
above, p. 215, 3.
[579] Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has
been already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ
ἡγεμονικὸν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ
κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ
γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ. See below, note 3.
[580] See p. 242, 2.
[581] Diog. vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: τὸ πάθος
εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως
σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. Stob. ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς
ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι [instead of which read πάντων
... παθῶν δόξας αἰτίας λέγ. εἶν.], παραλαμβάνεσθαι [add δὲ] τὴν δόξαν
ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes
perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione ... opinationem autem
volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa
omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum
omnium perturbationum? Fin. iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem nulla
naturæ vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis.
Acad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3.
[582] Diog. l.c.
[583] Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p.
416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ
παρουσίας.
[584] See p. 242, 1.
[585] Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones
perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse
dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo
quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et
fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam.
Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν
Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be
struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ
δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be
quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests
δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus
doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς
σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ
τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας.
The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already
given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of
representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic.
Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali)
præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως.
[586] De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ
πάθη, Ζήνων δ’ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς
συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν
εἶναι τὰ πάθη. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.
[587] Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p.
245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus,
Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus
asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called λύπη a μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ
δοκοῦντι; ἡδονὴ, an ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges
him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with
deducing emotions from ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. That Chrysippus
agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated
(p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also
(ii. 166) defines emotion as πτοία (violent mental motion), the words
used being πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν· and, in
Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει
ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ.
Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion
and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition
to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of
the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows
that both Zeno’s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and
iv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor.
10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to
irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobæus
are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is
himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv.
4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was
generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the
emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to
exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was,
that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as
conditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is
clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character
of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words
in Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. τῷ [l. τό] τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ
ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ’ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα φανερῶς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη κἂν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει
τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand,
Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is
perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246,
1.
[588] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to
the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would
suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων
παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.
[589] Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv.
3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.
[590] This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero
already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do
nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis
nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate
nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.
[591] See p. 179, 3, 4.
[592] See p. 88, 1.
[593] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv.
7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius,
ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt
potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.
[594] Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt
intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione
defectio sic aversa a præscriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones
anima nec regi nec contineri queant.
[595] Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar
remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ
πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν
ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους ... ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ...
πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ
παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτωοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ ἠπατημένοι ... διδαχθέντες ... ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν
τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι
ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται
τούτων ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι
τυραννίδος. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who à
propos of Medea remarks: ἐξηπάτηται· δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς, ὅτι
ἐξηπάτηται, καὶ οὐ ποιήσει.
[596] See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms
αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p.
229, 1, and 232, 3).
[597] Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii.
10, 35.
[598] According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the
treatise περὶ παθῶν.
[599] In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ
τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως
καὶ μάχης.
[600] The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος
κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in
Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti
contrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of
φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. See p. 254, 4, 5. In
like manner μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to
Diog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted
Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονὴ (lætitia, voluptas gestiens) =
opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear =
opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with
the προσδοκία κακοῦ of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido,
ἐπιθυμία) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque
adesse. It is, however, more common to hear λύπη (Diog. 111; Stob. 172;
Cic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as συστολὴ ψυχῆς ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, more
briefly συστολὴ ἄλογος, fear as ἔκκλισις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, ἡδονὴ even
according to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρέτῳ δοκοῦντι
ὑπάρχειν, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c.
and Fin. ii. 4, 13, ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, or immoderata
appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong
to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the
additions made which are found in Stobæus.
[601] Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii
174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος,
ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις;
Stobæus πένθος, ἄχος, ἄση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὄκνος,
αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds δέος and
δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονὴ, Diogenes includes κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία,
τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι, ἀσμενισμοὶ, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ
ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργὴ,
ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος,
μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἵμεροι,
φιληδονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these
terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the
writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from
Stoic definitions.
[602] Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς
ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The
Stoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the
expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between
pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire
and will (βούλησις, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1),
αἰσχύνη and αἰδὼς (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).
[603] On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115;
Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with
Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or
indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2;
Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish
between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the
language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati.
If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et
dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as
δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν
ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of
the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a
confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque
insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind,
hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which
prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of
the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc.
iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The
same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among
ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the
two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are
certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within
the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic.
12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally
coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The
former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by
inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota
vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not
consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well
as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the
difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly,
Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on
this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise
who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from
emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the
body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with
excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen,
l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest
to us.
[604] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi
[superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in
angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere
sapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the
mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.
[605] Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.
[606] Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum
est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid.
iv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere
rationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes
approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit,
is partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of
emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice ægrotandum. Ep.
116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla
mediocritas morbi.
[607] Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf.
Ep. 85, 10.
[608] Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88;
Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of
anger.
[609] In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the
assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam
virtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum,
ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.
[610] Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ
ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence
of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.
[611] Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ
βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85,
29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.
[612] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen.
De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec
injuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.
[613] See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.
[614] Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.
[615] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog.
l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.
[616] Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ
ἀπαθείᾳ.
[617] See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν
τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.
[618] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others)
non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes
natura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.
[619] Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici
potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus
quodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.
[620] The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic
definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6
and Diog. vii. 93: εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.
Stob. Ecl ii. 108: ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι
λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων. It is not opposed
to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other
virtues besides those which are τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι; nor for Hecato
(in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ θεωρητικαὶ
(σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων) and ἀθεώρητοι; for by the latter must
be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states
resulting from them—health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On
the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv.
13, 30.
[621] Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps.
Plut. V. Hom. 144.
[622] See p. 260, 3.
[623] Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.
[624] See p. 56.
[625] See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος
τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ
μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῇν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. On the
definition, see p. 82, 1.
[626] Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p.
128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ
κράτος· ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν
ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way,
Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced
what is good in our conduct from εὐτονία and ἰσχύς; what is bad, from
ἀτονία καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred
the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the
soul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii.
104, as διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ; by Diog. 89, as διάθεσις
ὁμολογουμένη.
[627] Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum
vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c.
Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res
patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.
[628] This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.
[629] See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.
[630] See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble
soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.
[631] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3,
and Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one
virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p.
468): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος, οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί
φησιν. vii. 2, p. 595. νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς
δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist
in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch.
Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
[632] Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium
virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim,
quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum
expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam
principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar
definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et
horum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac.
Proœm. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus;
and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between
σοφία and φρόνησις, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded
him in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing
from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential
quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific
virtue. In Zeno’s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut.
Vir. Mat. 2), to φρόνησις was given the meaning of ἐπιστήμη.
[633] ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that
Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than
four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the
subdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main
heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues,
another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1,
that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the
whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion
of virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to
harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by
Panætius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)—that into theoretical
and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the
Peripatetics.
[634] The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep.
7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.
[635] ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον
καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the
definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the
definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. But this is
superfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good
and evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.
[636] ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη
ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ
θαῤῥεῖν ἢ μὴ θαῤῥεῖν (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc.
iv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit,
scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac
perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named
characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed
to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.
[637] ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The
definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p.
258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all
duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the
remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.
[638] ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104,
further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues:
intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to
ὑπομοναὶ, justice to ἀπονεμήσεις. See also the distinctive
peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.
[639] Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία,
ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
καὶ οὐδετέρων. See p. 255, 1.
[640] This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the
basis in all. See p. 258, 1.
[641] Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν
ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’
ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρίαν. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2.
On the other hand valour is here termed φρόνησις ἐν ἐνεργητέοις. He
also says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν
ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ
τὸ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι
δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη. Further
particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2,
p. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can
only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν
αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε λαλεῖ
σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ,
φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατ’
ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ
χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τἀγαθά τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς
δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ
προειρημένα. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that,
according to Cleanthes, strength of mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν
ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις,
ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ
ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch’s account is accurate,
ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv.
24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by
Sphærus. See p. 259, 3.
[642] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος
ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης,
μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία, after the
analogy of πρᾳότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic
virtues, is found an ἐρωτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, &c., and a
συμποτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ
συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτικὴ and συμποτικὴ ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by
Philodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.),
Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτικὴ at length;
and since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.),
none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright,
these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.
[643] Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία,
ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης,
αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαῤῥαλεότης,
μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια (on which
Diog. 119), χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία. Diog. 126, is
slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues,
and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as
ἐπιστῆμαι; by Diogenes, as ἕξεις or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the
definitions are the same. A definition of εὐταξία is given by Cic. Off.
i. 40, 142.
[644] Diog. 93; Stob. 104.
[645] Sto. Rep. 7.
[646] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ
πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην
λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. See p. 260, 3. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε
δὲ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει
χρώμενον.
[647] Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος,
μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι
σχέσιν. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: ἀρετάς τ’ οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν,
ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ἀλλὰ
καὶ [l. κατὰ] τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (scil. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην).
[648] See p. 260, 3.
[649] Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν,
to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo
maintained.
[650] Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ
πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν
ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος. Plut. Sto.
Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις
ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν
ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.
[651] Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ
τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν
καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται (p. 108—the same is more fully set forth by
Panætius, p. 112), τὸ αὐτὸ, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν
ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν.
Diog. 125: τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν
ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus,
Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι
καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ
ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, knowledge and action including all the four
principal instincts.
[652] Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et
perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit;
nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p.
267.
[653] Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς
κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ
ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ
ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης
ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν
αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς,
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of
bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice,
which has τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach
that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἑκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς
ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
[654] Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς
ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1,
conf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: τὰς ἀρετάς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν
ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ
μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτ’ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον
εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ
πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states,
that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always
like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by
experience, contrary to Stoic principles.
[655] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut
superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se
esse præclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed
vitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ
apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by
a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom
he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy
accidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only
ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert,
sed qua mente.
[656] Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium
accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum
omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.
[657] Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:
ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος
οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.
[658] On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11,
1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου
ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not
commands: οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: πᾶν
κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. Stob. ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ
τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ’
οὐδέτερα (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... πάντα
δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνοήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα,
κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ
ἀτακτήματα.
[659] It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and
καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which
will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any
discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a
perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf.
Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ
κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα
... τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A
κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18,
59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id
autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste
depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur
depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et
perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A
virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention,
i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life
according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα
dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem
officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque
absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter
sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii
and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and
Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed
to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum
frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.
[660] See p. 263, 2.
[661] In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics
say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις
ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a
διάθεσις, and no mere ἕξις. οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι,
οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ
μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἤτοι δυσκινήτους οὔσας ἢ μὴ (add οὐκ) εἶναι
διαθέσεις. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, δ (Schol. 76, a, 12): τῶν
Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν
ταύτας οὔτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὔτε ἀνίεσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας
καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. Simpl. (73, α. Schol. 76, a,
24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in
theoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false,
and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of
argument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for
exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction
was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the one being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος
προκοπὴ, the other by a simple ἐπιτηδειότης (Simpl. Categ. 62, β;
Schol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by
Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. für Philol. See Supplementb. xiv.
239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii.
241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf.
Cic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.
[662] Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ
κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν
προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ
δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra
se gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis,
quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa
mutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν
εἶναι μεταξύ.
[663] The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101
and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen.
Ep. 66, 5) is this: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was,
according to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν
ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἄνεσιν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι;
on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ.,
Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no
difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our
conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a
hundred stadia away. Similarly, Stobæus: The Stoics declare all errors
to be ἴσα, although not ὅμοια· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος
συμβέβηκεν· (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258,
3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every ἁμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It
is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equal to one another,
if vices are equal; πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’
ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular
attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa
result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it
follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The
equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also
follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is
equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec
honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises
the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p.
230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is
virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul—the only
primary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the
activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished;
Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet.
It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies
rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius.
All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto
potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti
quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se
pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contigere
... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta
simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia
minuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem
nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ...
nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32:
Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et
pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares
sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the
same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of
all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p.
266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri,
nec quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.
[664] Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν
θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας
πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν
εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον
ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν
ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3).
Stob. ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν
κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ
ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quæ
dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus
extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium
alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte
facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non
putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66,
10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illæ
contigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque
fuerint sapientes pares erunt et æquales.
[665] Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ
Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων
τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι
ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.
[666] Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε
κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν
ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ’ αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον.
[667] Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125;
Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef.
iv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.
[668] Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and
unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.
[669] Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ
σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.
[670] Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.
[671] Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28;
Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.
[672] Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.
[673] Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.
[674] Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all
the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An.
12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep.
i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.
[675] Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf.
Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.
[676] Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus,
περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that
the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.
[677] Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.
[678] Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and
above, p. 230, 1.
[679] Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4.
[680] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii.
198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid.
6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille
extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De
Const. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15;
Horat. Ep. i. l. 106.
[681] See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ...
diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in
exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13:
Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se
minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.
[682] πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii.
124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.
[683] The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp.
Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι
δοκεῖ κατ’ ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο
μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.
[684] Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be
the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα
χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸν πλεῖστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς,
ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.
[685] This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare
at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ
ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ’ αὐτοὺς
τοῦ σοφοῦ. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι
κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν εἷς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι
μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ
Φοίνικος ... οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὡς μηδὲν
διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. Philodem. De Mus.
(Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the
opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it
to be profane and impious.
[686] Benef. i. 10, 1–3.
[687] De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.
[688] De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.
[689] Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.
[690] See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other
passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur
ingenti quidem nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas,
minor verecundia est, &c.
[691] Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ
Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς
περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. The limitation likewise
contained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15,
mentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as θεῖοι.
[692] See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De
Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything
else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato
vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius
exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et
Herculem prioribus sæculis.
[693] Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265,
2.
[694] Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant
Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui
justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia
vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum
ac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non
omnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in
each one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view
coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how
close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian
doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and
folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.
[695] Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.
[696] Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here
ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly,
poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous,
rich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno’s
is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are
advancing in virtue.
[697] See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p.
269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.
[698] Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης
πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν
ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀχρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ
μακάριος γέγονεν. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words,
Ritter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (γίγνεσθαι δὲ καὶ
διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους), and Philo,
De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς
φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἄχρι σοφίας
ἄκρας ἐληλακότας καὶ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῆς ἄρτι πρῶτον ἁψαμένους ἀμήχανον
εἰδέναι, φασι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω
συνίστασθαι τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν,
ἀλλ’ εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise
investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained
the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the
wise. Prantl’s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the
σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as διαλανθάνων,
appears to be questionable.
[699] See p. 230, 3.
[700] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects
of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists
mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet
[unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142:
Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others
neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among
things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων
ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. πρῶτα μέν ἐστι
κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη,
οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἴσθησις, λεγὼ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν
δὲ ... οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ’ ἀνάλογον. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where
the enumeration of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is also in the Stoic sense, and
above, p. 225.
[701] Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum:
quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab
Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res
eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque
ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the
Stoa against the theoretical ἀδιαφορία of the Sceptics (see above, p.
37, 1), with which the practical ἀδιαφορία of Aristo is most closely
connected. It differs only in name from the ἀταραξία of the sceptics,
Aristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.
[702] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις]
hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit
intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔννοιαν illi,
viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam
pluris æstimavit quam omnia ilia quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita
cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum
illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo
sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen
id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima
naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.
[703] Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.
[704] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo
referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum
ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus
honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.
[705] Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ
μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’
ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.
εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μήδ’ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκεῖνον
τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ
μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως·
ἐκεῖνα δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις
ὑπόκειται τὸν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. Cic. See p. 279, 3.
[706] Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.
[707] See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ
ληπτὸν ... καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.
[708] Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα·
(On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ
σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40,
raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum,
because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the
ultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς
καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him,
together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of ἀδιαφορία. It would
appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true
Stoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no
followers after the time of Chrysippus.
[709] Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse
diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes
plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse.
Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia
dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter
virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13,
43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42,
130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Præfract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext.
Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.
[710] Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ
μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα
ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est
in his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; quæ
ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2:
Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea
of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in
that state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See
Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus’ attack on this ἀδιαφορία.
[711] Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ
ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν
ἔχοντα. By ἀξία, the three meanings of which are discussed, they
understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ
φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’
ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα.... δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν
ἐστί. δι’ ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ
ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account,
only somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10,
36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60;
Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52)
explains the conception προηγμένον, and its distinction from ἀγαθόν:
προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ
προηγούμενον λόγον ... οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν
μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ
ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τὸν
προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.
[712] Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ
μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ
τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν—τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα. Similarly
Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is,
however, only a subdivision of the second.
[713] Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.
[714] Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.;
Plut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether
fame after death belongs to things to be desired. According to Cic.
Fin. iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the
younger Stoics, pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen.
Ep. 102, 3, even quotes it as a Stoic maxim that posthumous fame is a
good. But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for προηγμένον.
[715] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and
283, 2.
[716] Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [δεῖσθαι], et tamen
multis illi rebus opus esse [χρῆναι].
[717] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ
συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ
τἀναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστι, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας
παραλλαγὰς (with reference to the greatness of the difference between
προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον) τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακὸν
... ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ δ’ ἄλλα
στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. See p. 284, 1; Cic. Fin.
iv. 25, 68, and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230,
3. Diog. 103, says that Posidonius included bodily and external
advantages among the ἀγαθά. In Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however, expressly
proves that they are not goods.
[718] Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus
auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection
of the highest good), sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the
spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says
(De Vit. Be. 22, 5): Apud me divitiæ aliquem locum habent, only not
summum et postremum. But what philosopher would have said they had
this?
[719] De Vit. Bea. 21.
[720] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes
of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money,
knowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such
like. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panætius, thinks that not only will
a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he
believes that in a famine he will prefer letting his slaves starve, to
maintaining them at too great a sacrifice.
[721] According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to
ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.
[722] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.
[723] Ibid. 5.
[724] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog.
vii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three
ways of earning an honest livelihood—by teaching, by courting the rich,
by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer
condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still
they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more
at variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus
(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 30): καὶ κυβιστήσειν τρὶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαβόντα
τάλαντον. Chrysippus himself (in Diog.) enumerates the objections to
the modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for
money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.
[725] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: λυσιτελεῖ ζῇν
ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν; or, as it is
expressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to
renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their
sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a
wise man in the shape of a beast.
[726] καθῆκον, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog.
108.
[727] See p. 265.
[728] Diog. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει
ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ (the same in Cicero), ὅπερ καὶ
ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. Stob.
158: ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον
ἀπολογίαν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. καθῆκον is,
in general, what is according to nature, with which ἀκόλουθον
coincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108: ἐνέργημα δ’ αὐτὸ [τὸ
καθῆκον] εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.
[729] Diog. vii. 109: τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί·
καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῇν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ
ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58: Eat
autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio
reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod
neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis ... quoniam enim videmus,
&c. (see p. 265, 2) ... quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis quæ
media dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit
aut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad. i. 10,
37. Corresponding to προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, Zeno placed officium
and contra officium, as media quædam between recte factum and peccatum.
Stob. ii. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ
κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι ... οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ
δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια, καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν,
τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.
[730] Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως,
τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ
τὴν κτῆσιν διαῤῥιπτεῖν. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. This
distinction, of course, only applies to μέσον καθῆκον. The
unconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any
circumstances.
[731] Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2,
Diog. 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ
δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.
καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ (demands; see p. 244, 2, the
αἱρῶν λόγος) ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾷν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα,
συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, e.g.
neglect of parents; οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, ὅσα οὔθ’
αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ’ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, κ.τ.λ.
Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that
καθῆκον includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those
which aim at a simple προηγμένον; and, in view of the latter, καθῆκον
is included among things intermediate, or ἀδιάφορα in its more extended
meaning. Cic.; see p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that those καθήκοντα
which are at the same time κατορθώματα, are οὐδὲ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ μέσα ...
παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισὶ καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ
φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ’ εὐφυΐαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ
λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθούμεθα ἀπερισπάστως (if, without particular
occasion, or as Diog. 109 observes, ἄνευ περιστάσεως—see previous
note—we despise or reject them) μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.
[732] In the latter sense καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα have been already
discussed, p. 264.
[733] Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting,
non ... tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet
levem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque
animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Id. ii. 2; Ep. 57,
3; De Const. 10, 4; Stob. Floril. 7, 21; Plut. C. Not. 25, 5; Epictet.
in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, 5, 6.
[734] Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere,
cum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos
(Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest: noster sapiens vincit
quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.
[735] Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2–4, particularly the quotation in Gell.
from Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences,
paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali
percepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis
atque rationis prævertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the
foolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents
(συγκατατίθεται, προσεπιδοξάζει) to such impressions (φαντασίαι).
[736] Diog. vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν,
εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ
οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν·
τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν.
Subdivisions of βούλησις are: εὔνοια, εὐμένεια, ἀσπασμὸς, ἀγάπησις; of
εὐλάβεια: αἰδὼς, ἁγνεία; of χαρά: τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία. The same
three εὐπάθειαι are mentioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, with the remark
that they only belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14;
72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man’s cheerfulness.
[737] Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: καὶ
μὴν οὔθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ
γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145; Quintil. Inst. xii. 1.
18.
[738] Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis
quærimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam?
Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phœnix semel anno
quingentesimo nascitur, see p. 273, 1, just as everything great is
rare. But compare p. 274, 3.
[739] Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2.
[740] Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici
nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further
particulars in Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 33 and 70.
[741] Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius
traced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably
meant by the ‘younger Stoics’ (Sext. Math. ix. 28), who say that they
introduced belief in the Gods.
[742] Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri ...
ignorantia rerum innocentes erant ... virtus non contingit animo nisi
instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc
quidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, &c.
[743] Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν
αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου
διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ’ οὒ. (See p. 251, 2, for the difference
between emotion and disease of the soul.) καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους
ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ
ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων
συμβαινουσῶν, i.e., virtuous men are not all equally secure. These
differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the
other hand to folly), which admits of no increase, but only to such
properties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not
themselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.
[744] Stob. Serm. 7, 21: ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπτων
ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ
τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ
ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the
author of the division of progressers into three classes, which is
discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest
stage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant
complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum
suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non
possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se
nondum liquet et ... scire se nesciunt.
[745] See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7.
[746] Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus
sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi,
affectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in
lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam eam
excussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.
[747] Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ
ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ,
ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the
Cynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those
points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was
weakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes,
says that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against
relapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, α, β (Schol. in Arist.
86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be
indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν
καιροῖς (the reading κάροις is better) καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue,
together with the whole rational life (λογικὴ ἕξις), is lost, and
succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a ἕξις μέση. A similar question
is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the
negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses.
Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will
act virtuously when in a frenzy.
[748] Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep.
95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected,
parænetice, or pars præceptiva. Sextus speaks of two τόποι—a
παραινετικὸς and a ὑποθετικός. Both terms, however, appear to denote
the same thing; for ὑποθετικὸς is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril.
117, 8, as παραινετικός. He who is himself insufficiently educated will
do well ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργον
εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερὰ τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις. ὑποθετικὸς τόπος is
therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65).
See p. 223, note 1.
[749] Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem,
sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiæ et
capita cognovit.
[750] See p. 223, 1.
[751] See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that
he chiefly followed Panætius (περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων), not as a mere
translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See p. 300, 2.
[752] Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio: unum
genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in
præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari possit. He would
devote his attention to officia, quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then
goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i.
29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of
officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait,
conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21).
Panætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.
[753] See p. 223, 1.
[754] Particularly in the portions treating περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων and
περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν.
[755] See p. 260, 4.
[756] See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1.
[757] According to Cic. Off. i. 2; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Panætius, in
the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss
cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his
intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i.
45, 159; iii. 12, 50; 13, 55; 23, 89, that these cases were frequently
discussed, not only by the pupils of Panætius, Posidonius, and Hecato,
but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.
[758] The Treatise of Panætius appears to have been used as a chief
authority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a
cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and
wealth (Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties,
had added further casuistical investigations (Cic. iii. 28, 89).
Brutus, too, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate
Stoicism, and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down
rules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his
treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, may have followed Panætius.
[759] Sen. Ep. 94, 1; 95, 1.
[760] Stob. ii. 128: ἐν ἕξει (not only ἐν σχέσει, see p. 230) δὲ οὐ
μόνας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ,
ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ
ἀρετὰς γίγνεσθαι.
[761] The treatise of Panætius—we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9; iii. 2,
7; 7, 33—discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and
then from that of interest. The third part, which Panætius proposed to
himself—the collision between duty and interest—was never fully carried
out. Cicero adds discussions on two questions, which of two conflicting
duties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3,
10, c. 43; ii. 25). Otherwise he appears in his two first books to
follow the order of Panætius.
[762] See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the
fragment in Athen. xiii. 555, a, Chrysippus discussed the question of
shaving; and Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the
useless enquiries of the Stoics, ἐν τοῖς περὶ καθηκόντων, an enquiry
whether it is proper to take the largest portion before one’s father at
table, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a
philosopher.
[763] εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία, talis ordo actionum ut in vita omnia sint apta
inter se et convenientia. i. 40, 142; 144.
[764] i. 43. We omit Cicero’s treatise, this section not being found in
Panætius.
[765] Panætius still more diffusively, 5, 16.
[766] Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with
enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics
and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.
[767] Diog. 117 says: The σόφος or σπουδαῖος is free from vanity
(ἄτυπος), is earnest (αὐστηρὸς), frank (ἀκίβδηλος), and with no
inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life
(ἀπράγμων), lest he should do anything contrary to duty. See p. 323, 1.
Stob. ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (πρᾶος), quiet (ἡσύχιος),
and considerate (κόσμιος), never exciting angry feelings against
others, never putting off what he has to do.
[768] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς
φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς
συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους
καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανὴν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ
καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. Stob. ii.
230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος
λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσασθαι
[l. -σεσθαι] νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως·
καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
συμφέροντος προόρασιν (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter
iii. 662 does ‘for the sake of advantage’; it rather refers to such
cases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii.
382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the
community require deception) καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς.
In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib.
(Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors
in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷν ἔστι
δικαίως κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε βιάζεσθαι οὔτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη τῶν
πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξεως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The point
here in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one
with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only
for the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stobæus.
[769] Cic. Fin. iii. 20. 68: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii
cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut
id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been
in a minority.
[770] Diog. 121: κυνιεῖν τ’ αὐτὸν [τὸν σοφόν]· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν
σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος [on whom, see p. 51, 1] ἐν τῇ
ἠθικῇ. Stob. 238: κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ
κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντ’ ἂν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.
[771] See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii.
16, Athen. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno’s School must have
presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is
partially true of the earlier history of that School; still I would
attach no great value to it as illustrating the system.
[772] Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.
[773] See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4; Benef. v. 4, 3; 6, 1; Ep.
90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom
of sowing exhortations broadcast.
[774] As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.
[775] Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the
temples by the contact with the dead or lying-in women or unclean
foods); in other cases indeed, as Plutarch objects, he would not allow
these considerations.
[776] Besides Diog. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see
Chrysippus’s own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The
majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of
extreme necessity. See Diog. 121. Chrysippus had probably been
speaking, in the context, of the different modes of treating the dead
among various nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that
no uniformity of practice prevailed.
[777] Cic. Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui
fuerunt Stoici pæne Cynici.
[778] Diog. vii. 33: καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄνδρας
καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι. The latter act is only
conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of
gymnastics.
[779] Diog. 33; 131.
[780] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.
[781] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200; 245; Math. xi. 190; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[782] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 205; 246; Math. xi. 191; Plut. Sto.
Rep. 22; Clement. Homil. v. 18.
[783] Plut. l.c. 21, 1.
[784] Sextus, however (Pyrrh. iii. 206), attributes to him, as the
representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus:
τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ... ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει.
[785] His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con.
iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον
παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ
παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄῤῥεσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά
ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε· πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας
αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ
ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ’ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ
σοι; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but
the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno’s object is not to
justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of
unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt
are morally on a par with the deed.
[786] See the following note.
[787] Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne
amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to
Diog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is only directed to beauty of soul.
By Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top. 75, and Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is
defined to be ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον; and,
according to Plut. C. Not. 28, ἔμφασις κάλλους is an incentive to love;
but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational
are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of
Plat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated τοὺς ἐρασθέντας
αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι καλῶν γενομένων. Love is excited by a sensation of
εὐφυία πρὸς ἀρετὴν, its object is to develop this capacity into real
virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still
foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving,
in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the
teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.
[788] Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend
on the intention alone, and declared external actions, independent of
intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι
τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν
ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν.
καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν ... παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης
καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένου, καὶ
ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ
ἀπολέσθαι ... τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.
[789] How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved
by the fragment, preserved by Clem. Pædag. iii. 253, C, respecting the
dress and conduct of maidens.
[790] Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem censent regi numine Deorum
eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et
unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut
communem utilitatem nostræ anteponamus.
[791] M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a
unit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence
mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri
vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas ... nos homines
hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.
[792] Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem
etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo
et vetando (see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus
igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur ... prima homini cum
Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta
ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum
Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos
communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communio, et
civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach
ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ
ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει.
[793] Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.
[794] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2;
Benef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi.
18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext. Math. ix. 131.
[795] Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only ὠφελήματα and
βλάμματα (moral good and evil), but εὐχρηστήματα and δυσχρηστήματα
(other advantages and disadvantages) are common to all men.
[796] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man
could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the
contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double
meaning of ἀδικεῖν, which sometimes means ‘to wrong,’ sometimes simply
‘to harm.’ Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only
exist towards another. See Cic. on p. 315, 2.
[797] Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in
a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a
justice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a
part.
[798] Sen. Benef. iv. 18.
[799] M. Aurel. vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not
a member, of human society, οὔπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους·
οὔπω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι ὡς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν
ποιεῖς· οὔπω ὡς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.
[800] See p. 298, 3.
[801] Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus, the three
others besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas
hominum inter ipsos et vitæ quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes
duæ sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri
boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel
benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.
[802] Off. i. 7–13; ii. 14–17.
[803] See p. 254, 2, 3.
[804] We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It
may here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De
Clementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i.
3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit
nulla humanior.
[805] Conf. Panætius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.
[806] De Clem. ii. 5–8.
[807] Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the censure deserves
notice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) passes on
gladiatorial shows and the Roman thirst for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The
attitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies
will be considered hereafter.
[808] Stob. ii. 184: τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, διὸ
καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς
κατὰ τὸν βίον. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes
sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute
amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis
diligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55. Conf. p. 309, 3.
[809] Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought is expressed in the
statement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the
universe) as deity is to him.
[810] Sen. Benef. vii. 12, 2; Ep. 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118;
see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates,
was blamed for asserting that only the good (σπουδαῖοι) among
themselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the
bad are enemies and strangers.
[811] He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum
artifex.
[812] Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.
[813] We have already encountered friendship in the Stoic list of
goods. See p. 230, 3. Stob. 186 says, more accurately, that friendship,
for the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ
διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense
of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the
sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual
goods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as
κοινωνία βίου (Stob. 130); κοινωνία τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν
τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς (Diog. 124). Similar definitions are given by
Stob. of varieties of friendship: γνωριμότης, συνήθεια, κ.τ.λ. On the
absolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Ep. 47, 2; 3, 2;
Benef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.
[814] Ep. 109, 3 and 11.
[815] Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens, ad beate vivendum, non ad
vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum animo
sano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.
[816] Ep. 9, 5.
[817] Sen. Ep. 109, 5.
[818] Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; 18.
[819] See p. 318, 2.
[820] Stob. ii. 208: τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι
τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοῦτον· πόλις μὲν εἰ (wrongly struck out by
Meineke) ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην
δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστιν; Floril. 44, 12. See pp.
223; 241, 3.
[821] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life,
placing βίος σχολαστικὸς on the same footing with βίος ἡδονικός. Diog.
vii. 121: πολιτεύεσθαί φασιν τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι
Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν
ἐφορμήσειν. Sen. De Ot. 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam
sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam,
nisi si quid impedierit. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for
the sake of other men, consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit
gerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem
adjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184: τό τε
δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ
τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ... καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν
ἀνθρώπους, κ.τ.λ.
[822] Cic. Legg. ii. 5, 11.
[823] Diog. Ibid.: καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, καὶ
παιδοποιήσεσθαι. Ibid. 120: The Stoics consider love of children,
parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Hieron.
Ad. Jovin. i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus
Γαμήλιος and Γενέθλιος. Antipater (whether the well-known pupil of
Diogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater of Tyre mentioned
by Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob. Floril. 67, 25: Wife
and child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic
life; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the
purest. Musonius (Ibid. 67, 20, Conf. 75, 15): A philosopher ought to
be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and
discharge his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife
and children is the deepest love.
[824] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις, αὐτῷ
Ζήνωνι, πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει, πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ
πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν.
Conf. the titles in Diog. vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes’s list
contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to
be incomplete; for Diog. vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus’s treatise
περὶ πολιτείας, a treatise also quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5).
According to Cic. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Panætius were the only
Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting
legislation, though others might have written much on politics.
[825] Conf. the fragment of Sen. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad. Jovin.
i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute
abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also
preserved of Chrysippus’s treatise on the education of children. See
Quintil. Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; Baguet, De Chrys.
(Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen.
Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of
education, particularly those previous to birth.
[826] Diog. vii. 131.
[827] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3–5; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.
[828] Diog. vii. 4.
[829] Diog. vii. 131.
[830] Diog. 33: κοινάς τε γὰρ γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ
Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους, μήθ’ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια
μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ... νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἀλλαγῆς
ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας. Ibid. 131.
[831] Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.
[832] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 1: οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα
εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τε
αὐτοπραγίας καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων ... τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται
ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.
[833] Stob. Ecl. ii. 186: πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς
τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας
πολιτείας.
[834] Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew
from public life, he replied: διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύεται [-σεται],
τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ, τοῖς πολίταις.
[835] Sen. Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet
virtus? Malis artibus popularis favor quæritur. Similem te illis facias
oportet ... conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest.
[836] Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 3: It needs a special cause for
devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si
respublica corruptior est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est
malis ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec
illum admissura erit respublica, si valetudo illum impediet. Ibid. 8,
1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid
autem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica
illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicæ, si omnibus defutura respublica
est? (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose
quærentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad
Atheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam,
quæ sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in
Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.
[837] Athenodor. l.c. 3, 3.
[838] Diss. iii. 22, 67.
[839] Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram
magnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non
ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostræ
cum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it
not seem like reading Augustin’s De Civitate Dei? Some serve the great,
others the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublicæ et in otio
deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius. Ep. 68, 2: Cum
sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra
rempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in
majora atque ampliora transit, &c. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83: Do you ask
whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could
be greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not
consulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining
information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the
citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and
unhappiness, of freedom and slavery? τηλικαύτην πολίτειαν
πολιτευσαμένου ἀνθρώπου, σύ μοι πυνθάνῃ, εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου
καὶ, εἰ ἄρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρὲ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα ἧς ἄρχει;
[840] Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4.
[841] Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44: πόλις καὶ πατρὶς ὡς μὲν Ἀντωνίῳ μοι ἡ
Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ κόσμος. τὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖν ταύταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα
ἐστί μοι ἀγαθά. ii. 5: πάσης ὥρας φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ
ἄρρην.
[842] Ibid. ix. 29: ὅρμησον ἐὰν διδῶται καὶ μὴ περιβλέπου εἴ τις
εἴσεται μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολίτειαν ἔλπιζε, ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον
πρόεισι.
[843] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.
[844] De Otio, 6, 5; Tranq. An. 1, 10.
[845] See Socrates and Socratic Schools, p. 324.
[846] This connection is already indicated by Plutarch’s grouping the
Stoics and Alexander together.
[847] Sen. Ep. 95, 52; M. Aurel. See p. 312, 2; 313.
[848] Diss. i. 13, 3. See p. 331, 2.
[849] Sen. Ep. 95, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2: Ex
illius [naturæ] constitutione miserius est nocere quam lædi. Ex illius
imperio paratæ sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore
sit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus
prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an
libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos datæ quid refert? Ubicumque
homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. De Clem. i. 1, 3: Nemo non, cui alia
desint, hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.
[850] Sen. De Otio, i. 4: see p. 256, 4: Stoici nostri dicunt ... non
desinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam
inimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from
Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca’s
treatise, De Ira, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially i. 5,
2: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium
mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa
discedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere,
illa etiam carissimos perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1: It is not so
praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic
vinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est ... ultio et talio.
Magni animi est injurias despicere. Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88: Violent
anger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil
magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Even when
severity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in
anger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all. See p. 254, 1.
[851] Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. 328, 3. Cic. Off. i. 13, 41.
[852] Cic. l.c.: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here,
too, belongs the question, discussed in full by Sen. Benef. iii. 18–28,
Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he
can, says Seneca (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus
animi sit, qui præstat, non cujus status: nulli præclusa virtus est,
omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos,
servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine
contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man.
Only the body belongs to his lord; his heart belongs to himself, c. 20.
The duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand
certain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement. i. 18, 2). He
enumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves,
and concludes by saying: Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo
altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium ... unus omnium parens
mundus est ... neminem despexeris ... sive libertini ante vos habentur
sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines: erigite audacter animos, et
quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna
nobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep.
44: Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p. 270, 3.
[853] Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.
[854] Diog. 122, at least, calls δεσποτεία, the possession and
government of slaves, something bad.
[855] According to Sen. Benef. iii. 22, 1, Cic. l.c., Chrysippus had
defined a slave, perpetuus mercenarius; and hence inferred that he
ought to be treated as such: operam exigendam, justa præbenda. Sen. Ep.
47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves, contrasting a man
with a slave: servi sunt; immo homines. He regards a slave as a friend
of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power,
speaks of himself as conservus.
[856] M. Aurel. iv. 4: εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὃν
λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ
λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός. εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ
τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις
ἐστί.
[857] See pp. 312, 1, 3; 325, 3, and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes
the Stoics assert: τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. M.
Aurel. x. 15: ζῆσον ... ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ. iv. 3: ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ
πόλις.
[858] M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus
asserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura
esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet,
qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore,
in the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. See p. 331, 2 and p. 312, 2.
Sen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patriæ: ergo civi quoque ...
ergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in
Stob. Floril. 40, 9): νομίζει [ὁ ἐπιεικὴς] εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ Διὸς
πόλεως ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν. Epict. Diss. iii. 5, 26;
Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.
[859] M. Aurel. iii. 11: ἄνθρωπον πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς
αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν.
[860] Sen. De Ot. 4; Ep. 68, 2. See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and 5:
Unum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis ... patriam
meam esse mundum sciam et præsides Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4: Ideo magno
animo nos non unius urbis mœnibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis
commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret
latiorem virtuti campum dare. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. Ibid. i. 9: If
the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an
Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply κόσμιος and υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Muson.
l.c.: Banishment is no evil, since κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ
κόσμος ἐστίν. It is, says Cic. Parad. 2, no evil for those qui omnem
orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.