39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: δοκεῖ δὲ
αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ
ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές. Stob. Ecl. i. 180: Χρύσιππος
δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν τοῦ οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς
διοικητικήν; or, according to another definition: εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ
κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος, τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, κ.τ.λ.
Instead of λόγος, he also used ἀλήθεια, φύσις, αἰτία, ἀνάγκη, &c.
[318] See p. 143.
[319] Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior,
perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus
commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo hæc quæ nota nobis sunt,
retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiæque
hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse
sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et
mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Didymus, in the passage quoted,
p. 146, 4, p. 105, 127.
[320] Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo,
quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive
incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per
omnia maxima ac minima æquali intentione [= τόνος] diffusus, sive fatum
et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series. Conf. p. 153, 1.
[321] Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also
calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back
presently to what he says as to the divinity of the stars.) Cleanthes
gives the name of deity to the world, reason, the soul of the world,
and ether; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling
reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and
eternal law.
[322] Krische, Forsch. i. 365.
[323] See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4.
[324] Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1.
[325] Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3.
[326] Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1.
[327] Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν
εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ
ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καί ποτε πάντα φθειρόντων καὶ μόνον τὸν θεὸν
καταλιπόντων. Ibid. iv. 14: ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων ὅτε
μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ
μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις.
[328] Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153,
2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ
εὐσεβείας), Col. 5: Διογένης δ’ ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν
κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διῒ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ
ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν. Cic. N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to
the idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri
excellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34:
Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3;
Vis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides
totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13:
Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod
non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus
excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra
tenet. Diog. vii. 148: οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον
καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 and 3: ὅλον δὲ
τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν.... διὸ δὴ καὶ
Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος. Orig. c. Cels. v. 7: σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον
λέγουσιν εἶναι θεὸν Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον. The arguments given, p. 144,
for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the
same as the World. The existence of God is proved by showing the
reasonableness of the world. Aratus gives a poet’s description of the
Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the Phænomena: Zeus is the being of
whom streets and markets, sea and land, are full, whose offspring is
man, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heavens
to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known
lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220; Æn. vi. 724. The round figure of the
Stoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113, 22; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to
the world as God. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.
[329] Stob. Ecl. i. 444: κόσμον δ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ
οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων
σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ’ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ
θεὸς, καθ’ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. Diog. vii. 137:
λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας
ἰδίως ποιὸν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς
διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν
ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν
τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.
καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ἢ (according to the first meaning of the word) ὁ ἰδίως
ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας, (universal substance in its definite
quality) ἢ (second meaning) ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ... σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ
καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ (third meaning) σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν
καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν, and for
τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διάταξιν ἔχον. In the former
sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter,
created, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the
mathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.
[330] See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13,
says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe
itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et
nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum
est. Totus est ratio, &c.
[331] The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and
body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is
κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων. See p. 135.
[332] Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.
[333] Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words
of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς
ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—imply the same, but these words evidently are not
taken from Boëthus.
[334] Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν
ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the
corresponding statements of other Stoics: the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world
resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is
no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according
to the view of Boëthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly
stated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the
charioteer guiding the world, and παριστάμενος the stars and elements.
But this passage, beginning at καὶ μήποτ’ εἰκότως, is evidently Philo’s
own expansion of what he has just quoted from Boëthus.
[335] Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν]
τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ
σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου
τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν
τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. Seneca, Nat. Quæst. iii. 13, 1: Fire will
consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in
rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem
latere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.
[336] Stob. i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην
δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ
πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν
συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. Diog.
vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος
εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ
λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιπλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἶτα
κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. Chrys. in Plut. St.
Rep. 41, 3, p. 1053: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι’ ἀέρος εἰς
ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου γῆς ὑφισταμένης ἀὴρ ἐνθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου
δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the
Scholia on Hesiod’s Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὅλων καὶ
ὄμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἔκκρισιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάσθαι. Conf.
Clemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.
[337] Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe
begins with earth.
[338] Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς
συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου.
τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ
τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον (the probable meaning is,
that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the
opposite direction) εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ
ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον ἀεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν
ποιουμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνου (for this favourite
expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) μὴ παύεσθαι
[διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὅλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ
σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ
τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ
ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις
διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ
ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), ὁδῷ
καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are
supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo
and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque
post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et
elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque
instabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim æthereo calore atque
inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus,
i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hæc sidera edita esse creduntur;
et solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et
velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse,
tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. The statement
that besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the
intermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the
sense of generatio æquivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics
make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28
says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.
[339] There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes
and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from
which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C,
observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the
ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world
would be possible. διὸ καί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ
τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν
τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.
[340] Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης
εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ
ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν
μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.
[341] Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν
στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ
πῦρ, παθητικὰ δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127,
5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points
connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed.
It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and
likewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another
Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the
statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the
whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view
of things.
[342] The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is
apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not
κόσμος, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end,
partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very
logical inferences: οὗ τὰ [vulgo οὗ τε τὰ, Cobet: οὗ τά τε] μέρη φθαρτά
ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρα τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτὰ, εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ
μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ
χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ
ἐξυδατοῦται. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p.
1054, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος
belongs a ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσία.
[343] Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ
προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα
καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς
αὑτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. Stob. Ecl.
i. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): Ζήνωνι καὶ
Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ
πῦρ (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this
description) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν
οἷα πρότερον ἦν. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic
description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the
Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, Diog. vii. 142, 137
(see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com.
Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad.
ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex.
Aphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the
Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water
are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b;
De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i.
20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the
ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p.
1067, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν
ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.
[344] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις
τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς
μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. According to Philo,
Incorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή.
Respecting ἄνθραξ, φλόξ, αὐγή, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p.
151 respecting the identity of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, αἰθὴρ apply here.
[345] This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned
to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in
the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene,
in a retrograde order, as in their generation.
[346] See p. 147, 1.
[347] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει
λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν]
πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.
[348] It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is
liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf.
Sen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ
(the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum
ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio,
in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are
perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar
deities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M.
950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not.
31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the
Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According
to Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even
Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods
of time.
[349] Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς
λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα
πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται (it occupies
the room of the whole substance) ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα
λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν [? κατάστασιν] ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν
τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ
ἀποκατάστασις (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70),
ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ’ οἵας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον
πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. See p. 161. According to Nemes.
Nat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις
takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places
which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words,
when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was
estimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365
periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p.
389 mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν
χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι. Inasmuch as it had been previously said
that the duration of κόρος (i.e. ἐκπύρωσις) was longer, and that
therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was
honoured nine months with the pæan, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by
the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only
honoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept
in. Probably we ought either to read ὅπερ πρὸς τρία ἕν, or to transpose
the passage from διακόσμησιν to ἐκπύρωσιν.
[350] The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek
philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The
belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding
one is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected
with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus,
in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing
Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): εἰ δέ τις
πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ κἀγὼ μυθολογήσω
τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ
τὸν χρόνον εὔλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (in that case the time must be
the same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this
view from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views
it was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being
in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: μετὰ τὴν
ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ὡς καὶ
τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ
τῷ κόσμῳ (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὡς
οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν
εἰλημμένων χρόνον εἰς ὃν νῦν ἐσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα (Chrysippus,
περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10:
Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every
fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the παλιγγενεσία or
ἀποκατάστασις (as the return of a former age is called): thus there
will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be
accused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1,
deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys.
207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Græc. c,
3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and
23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the
Stoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in
the future world would be numerically identical (εἷς ἀριθμῷ) with the
present Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)—the answer being, that they
could not be numerically identical, since this would involve
uninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a
difference (ἀπαράλλακτοι). Others, however, chiefly among the younger
Stoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences
between the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have
given rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21; Epiphan.
Hær. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of
souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course
of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one,
can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such
empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the
general conflagration.
[351] Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου
γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν
τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις
ὑφεστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ
δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Philop.: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, ὥς
φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει,
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ
περίοδόν τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ’
ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινές φασι κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ
τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις
γίνεται. See M. Aurel. v. 32.
[352] According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and
Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus
asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of
the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of
Seleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority
of Numenius (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the
destruction of the world by fire could not be proved (φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν
περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων). But these statements are elsewhere
contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the
destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is
confirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius
only allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for
the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. The difference between
his view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58)
deduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to
Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance
can be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting
Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are:
πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of Diog.:
ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
Boëthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief
reasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:—(1) If the world
were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is
no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect.
(2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ
ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in the crushing of a statue),
κατὰ σύγχυσιν (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the
world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the
world, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything
were consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With
that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.
The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut.
Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the
condensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703,
supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How
Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos.
p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the
Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.
[353] The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu.
iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to
contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has
been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies
venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum
ordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from
the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of
the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of
earth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the
sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxiæque generentur [res
humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio
generis humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo
revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo
inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long.
Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of
the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign
of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the
Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter
turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin.
Di. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii:
Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... æstas autem ecpyrosis. Conf.
Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the
supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end,
by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ’ ἄθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη,
κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι.
[354] For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus
tells, for the latter that of Seneca.
[355] Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι
Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος
καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro
περὶ προνοίας quarto εἱμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν
ὅλων ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μετὰ πολὺ
μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125
(according to Posidonius): Fatum, or εἱμαρμένη, was called ordinem
seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat.
Qu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum
omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis
humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et
rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.
[356] Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος
δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς
διοικητικήν.
[357] Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ
τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ
διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα
γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also
used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p.
87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἱμαρμένον and
κατηναγκασμένον, explaining εἱμαρμένη to be κίνησις ἀΐδιος συνεχὴς καὶ
τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as δύναμις
κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος
τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, or as εἱρμὸς αἰτίων. (The same in
Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even τύχη, he
continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as
a θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον); but this supposes it to be essentially
identical with εἱμαρμένη. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050:
τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν
γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν, κατ’ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ
τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ’ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ
ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ
σχήσει ἄλλως [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl.
i. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.
[358] It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into
one another.
[359] Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ
τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν,
κ.τ.λ. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας
προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ’ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε
παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ
γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ ... κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ
τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην ... οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος
γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνης λόγον. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:
οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,
οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
[360] See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148;
145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii.
10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ
γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν
κατὰ μεταβολήν. Ibid. 21: αἱ ψυχαὶ ... εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν
λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι.
[361] See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut.
Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν
συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα,
κ.τ.λ. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς
τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ
αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 157: μέρη δὲ
ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτὼ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς
λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.
[362] As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p.
161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the
seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν.
[363] σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg
itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as
λόγος ἐνδεὴς γενέσεως.
[364] See p. 101, 2.
[365] This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the
world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.
[366] Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.
[367] Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8,
7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη,
πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of
Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the
quotation from Eusebius, τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ χρεών. We ought rather to
read, according to Theod. Gaisf., τὸ χρεὼν κατὰ τὸ χρέος), Μοῖραι,
Κλωθώ: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo,
c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in
Sen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.
[368] Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus.
l.c. 8, 1.
[369] See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.
[370] The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on
p. 145, 4.
[371] See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought
differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β.
[372] Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.
[373] Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς
θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι ... καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν
πειρᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην
οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὔλογον.
[374] Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous
exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1):
Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things
happen καθ’ εἱμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless
things were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες
τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ
ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.
[375] Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα
μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον,
σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations
confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man’s acquiescence in
the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true
or false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων
περιεστηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.
[376] Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως
ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.
[377] Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα ... καὶ ὑπὸ
φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν
ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν; so that
everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ
ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ
πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ
ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν
αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων·
διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν ἀεὶ,
κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις
εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel.
x. 5.
[378] In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo
generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et
provideri solet.
[379] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim
et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant,
parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ...
ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.
[380] Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential
care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they
must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the
cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument
may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals
was the result of God’s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ
θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο ... εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ’ ἰδίαν περὶ
ἐμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν
καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, iv.
28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of
divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused
by the connection of nature.
[381] As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.
[382] The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά
τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3)
were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong
to him.
[383] See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He
assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ
τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος
καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i.
29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6.
See p. 171, 1.
[384] Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do
not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο
φασὶ μηδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαραβάτως γινόμενα, ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ
ἀντικείμενον. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate
pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.
[385] Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and
above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39,
p. 149): ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ
προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, which is evidently
more explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the
statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.
[386] See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and
Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the
latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the
case of things happening καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, there is nothing to prevent
the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this
from happening are unknown to us.
[387] See above, p. 171, 3.
[388] Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.
[389] Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140.
Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument,
concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως
ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator,
a Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has
consistently attributed τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to lifeless objects.
[390] Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold
fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ
adjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to
fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus.
Conf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power,
still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. Œnomaus
(in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a
ἡμίδουλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its
freedom.
[391] Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.
[392] Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν
ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται,
τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ
ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ
ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.
[393] Alex. c. 26, p. 82.
[394] Alex. c. 32, p. 102.
[395] The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with
great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.
[396] Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not
a πεπρωμένη) οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα,
οὐκ [οὐδὲ] ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος·
οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν
ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ
ἁμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη
ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν
ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι
καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν·
οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν.
What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρως ἀξίωσις, and what is
blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανόρθωσις.
[397] Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας
is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν
τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· (for
κόσμος, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole,
including gods and men. See p. 158, 1) εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ
θεοί· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις·
ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ
ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ.
οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ
ἐπανορθοῦν.
[398] Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16);
Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation
of destiny alone Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The
argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489,
erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of
ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c.
11, p. 574, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην as
fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of
the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (Œnomaus, in
Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he
neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results.
According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the
θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it
is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.
[399] Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107,
11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i.
21, has put it very plainly: τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη
διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν
ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται
ἑκὼν ... ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ
δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν
ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The same idea is
expanded by M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ
περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν πειρώμενος καὶ
ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος. It is
man’s business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common
labour.
[400] After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation.
Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity
of the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. 425. M.
Aurel. vi. 38: πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα
ἀλλήλοις ἐστί ... τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ
τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας. Ibid. vii. 9.
[401] Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ
συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ... ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν,
ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστι σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων, ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ
συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν
συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε
ἐπιγείων ζῴων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ
πλημμυρίδες (ebb and flood), περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In
the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising
of the stars: ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος,
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη
ἀλλήλοις. Diog. vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ’ ἡνῶσθαι
αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν
καὶ συντονίαν. Ibid. 143: ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ
ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Alex. De Mixt.
142, a, see p. 127, 5; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2:
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ
ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the
changes in animals and plants corresponding with the changes of
seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of
the sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the
question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were
possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether
the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with
the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῷον, Diog. vii. 143).
The Stoic conception of συμπάθεια was not used to denote the magic
connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural
coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the
world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio
naturæ (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 28; Divin. ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this
sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire
is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each
other’s society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there
exists a ἕνωσις ἐκ διεστηκότων, a συμπάθεια ἐν διεστῶσι. Even the last
remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection;
nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of
sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt
at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.
[402] M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία (the matter of the world)
εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ τι κακῶς ποιεῖ,
οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ
περαίνεται.
[403] Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι
καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.
[404] Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι ...
φιλοκαλεῖν ... τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κακὰ
λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ’ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ
ταώ. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum ... alia
videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata ... alia autem nullam
ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumæ
versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba.
[405] M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ
ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν ...
σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδέως πως
διασυνίστασθαι.
[406] Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this
variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with
admiration for the divine artificer.
[407] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος
καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων
ποικιλίας; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a
sky the most perfect in colour, &c.
[408] See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii.
32.
[409] Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο νὴ Δία τοῦ
Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν
ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῷα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεύειν
κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας, κ.τ.λ.
Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa
involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic præter mundum cetera omnia
aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra
gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi
causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22:
Placet Stoicis, quæ in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari.
[410] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse
hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. N.
D. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching: Why has the universe
been made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of
rational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54–61), by an
appeal to the structure of man’s body, and his mental qualities, how
God has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with
the words, Omnia, quæ sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines,
hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city, and what is
therein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is
intended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad
mundi cohærentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus præbent.
The earth with its plants and animals was created for the service of
man. In Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics assert that
Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings; M.
Aurel. v. 16 and 30; Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the definition of κόσμος
quoted on p. 158, 1.
[411] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful
fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the
dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (Clemens, Strom. vii. 718,
B), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt,
to prevent its corrupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38;
Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20);
oysters and birds for the same purpose also (Porphyr. l.c.). In the
same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see p. 189, 1. The
Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares
that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding
and helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses.
Epictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being
intended to carry burdens; for this purpose they must be able to walk,
and, in order to walk, must possess the power of imagination.
[412] See p. 186, 1.
[413] Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum
contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam
particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est
quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.
[414] We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic
theory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p.
1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν
ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ.
[415] See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): τέλεον
μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως
ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἶναι. Compare also the statement in Plut.
Solert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals must be irrational, because
the irrational must be contrasted with the rational.
[416] Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise περὶ προνοίας,
discussed, amongst other things, the question, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι
κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturæ
consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios ... sed cum multa inquit
atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque
simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quæ faciebat cohærentia: eaque
non per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod
ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.... Proinde morbi quoque et
ægritudines partæ sunt dum salus paritur. M. Aurel. vi. 36: All evils
are ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. Plut. An. Procr. c. 6 and 9, p.
1015: αὐτοὶ δὲ (the Stoics) κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην ... κατ’
ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 3, 1.
[417] Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura
bona, si vitio male utentium nocent.... Si beneficia naturæ utentium
pravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.
[418] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us
good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us
not to leave things about. He also observes (Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are
as useful as colonies, by preventing over-population. See the
quotations, p. 185, 4; 186, 2. M. Aurel. viii. 50, makes a similar
remark in regard to weeds. In the house of nature all the waste has its
uses.
[419] A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously
uses against the Stoics.
[420] Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2:
Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ
εὔλογόν ἐστιν, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. Id. (in Gell.
vii. 2, 7): Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et
principali coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa
mentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est
ipsa et qualitas ... sua sævitate et voluntario impetu in assidua
delicta, et in errores se ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues, in a
passage quoted in Greek by Gellius: ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἑκάστοις παρ’ αὐτοῖς
γινομένων καὶ καθ’ ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἁμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ
τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ πρόθεσιν. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057,
Chrysippus says that, even if the Gods make false representations to
man, it is man’s fault if he follows those representations. Conf.
Epictet. Ench. c. 27: ὥσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως
οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις (evil in itself) ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται. Id. Diss. i. 6, 40.
Such observations bear out in some degree the statement of Plut. Plac.
ii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ
ἀνειμάρθαι. See above, p. 179, 3, 4.
[421] Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also
decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.
[422] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε
δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As
diseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus
hominibus per consilium naturæ gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem
contrariam nata sunt.
[423] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ
αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ
ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As
in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole,
οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ
ἄχρηστός ἐστιν. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2:
(Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui
opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona
malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi
mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu (Heraclitus’ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον)
consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without
injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour
are. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would
be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).
[424] Cleanthes, Hymn. 18:
ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖκαι
καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν·
ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν
ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.
[425] Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ
πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν ... ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα
συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ
κατ’ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ... [τὰ κακὰ] ἀπονέμεται
κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς
τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. Id. 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν
πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον
ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At the beginning of the same chapter,
the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule.
Conf. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277.
[426] Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the
question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says:
πότερον ἀμελουμένων τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ
πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ
καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται
ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii
curant, parva negligunt,—hardly satisfactory explanations for any
theory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca
(Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as
due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by
Chrysippus (in Plut.)—πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite
harmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς
παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ
κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does
Seneca’s—Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)—agree with
his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For,
according to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and
deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt
expressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not
speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See
p. 190, 1, 2.
[427] M. Aurel. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ
ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει,
ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ.
[428] M. Aurel. viii. 35: ὃν τρόπον ἐκείνη [ἡ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον
καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ
μέρος ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὅλην
ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐφ’ οἷον ἂν καὶ ὥρμησεν.
[429] Seneca’s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding
this thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of
good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are:
(1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune: he cannot receive
at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to
himself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for
exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in
conflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2–4. Conf. Ep.
85, 39). (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external
conditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a
natural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in
Epictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37; i. 24, 1; Stob. Ed. i. 132; M. Aurel.
iv. 49: vii. 68 and 64; x. 33.
[430] Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53:
ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων
πιέζωνται, τότε καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν τὰ συναπτόμενα
(what is suitable) μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δύναται.
[431] See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410.
[432] In Diog. 150, there is no difference made between Apollodorus and
Chrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3, p. 1079; Sext.
Math. x. 142. Similarly Aristotle.
[433] Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ
μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τὴν ὕλην. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu.
iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre aqua, ignis
ex aëre, ex igne aër ... ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra?
... omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Similarly Epictet. in
Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2; 198, 3. This is borrowed not
only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.
[434] They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by
κίνησις every form of change.
[435] Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of κίνησις, of φορά,
and of μονή, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110,
β (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds of μεταβολή see the
extracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between μένειν,
ἠρεμεῖν, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀκινητεῖν, but this is rather a matter of language.
Simpl. Cat. 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the
Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and
discusses their assertion that κινεῖσθαι is a wider, κινεῖν a narrower,
idea.
[436] Simpl. Phys. 310, b: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν
ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ
θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμένην.
[437] Simpl. Categ. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others
introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.
[438] Simpl. l.c. 77, β; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself
contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by
Aristotle.
[439] Simpl. l.c. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according
to p. 84, ε, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories,
made the following διαφοραὶ γενῶν: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα
τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἔχει κατασκευῆς—τὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν
κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν ποίησιν
ὑπεργάζονται; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant—τὸ ἀφ’
ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, or ἀπὸ ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, one species of which is τὸ
ἀπὸ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς—τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν. It is, in short, the
application to a particular case of the distinction which will be
subsequently met with of ἕξις, φύσις, ψυχὴ, and ψυχὴ λογική. The
celebrated grammatical distinction of ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια mentioned p. 95, 3
is connected with the distinction between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. Conf.
Simpl. p. 79, α, ζ; Schol. 78, b, 17 and 30.
[440] See page 135.
[441] Stob. Ecl. i. 382: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου
μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b;
Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c. 20, beginning οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος).
διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν τόπον χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος,
τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους
ἐπεχόμενον (Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob. i. 390:
Chrysippus defined τόπος = τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἷον
κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι’ ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπὸ τινὸς εἴτε ὑπὸ
τινῶν. If, however, only one portion of the οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ
ὄντος is really filled, the whole is neither κενὸν nor τόπος, but
ἕτερόν τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, which may possibly be called χώρα. Hence
τόπος corresponds to a full, κενὸν to an empty, χώρα to a half-empty,
vessel. Sext. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect.
Cleomed. Meteor. p. 2, 4; Simpl. Categ. 91, δ. According to the Stoics,
παρυφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει
τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθόσον συμπληροῦνται [-οῦται] ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων.
[442] The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b;
Simpl. Phys. 133, a.
[443] See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of
ἀσώματον δὲ, we should read κενὸν δὲ) definitions of κενόν.
[444] Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus.
[445] See p. 131, 2.
[446] Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν
πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε (conf. Plut. Plat. Quæst.
viii. 4, 3) Χρύσιππος δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Conf. Ibid.
89, α, β; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full is Stob. Ecl. i. 260: ὁ δὲ
Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα καθ’ ὅ ποτε λέγεται μέτρον
τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου
κινήσει. The passages quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (Plut. Plac. i. 22, 2),
254, 256, 258, and Diog. 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and
Posidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur
several other observations on Time, which are, however, of no
importance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the
future, are unlimited, the present is limited; the present cannot be
accurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the
future (Archedemus in Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in
the one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, ibid. 38, 8).
[447] Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260.
[448] For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle
(Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ἀρχὴ, see
Diog. 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed.
Chrysippus (in Stob. Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of
στοιχεῖον. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in
the third, any material out of which something is made.
[449] Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84.
[450] See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into
water δι’ ἀέρος (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing
through air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86,
inaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements.
In this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive
its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have
existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct
to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation
of the upper elements (as Lassalle, p. 88, does).
[451] Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ
πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς
ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς
γῆν, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται
χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δεύτερα δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς
πῦρ. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called
(Ibid. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and
therefore only partially intelligible) ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀΐδιος
δύναμις ... εἰς αὐτήν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ τὸ [ἐξ] αὑτῆς πάλιν
ἀποκαθιστᾶσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῷ. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60: Not
only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ
θεῖα, καὶ νὴ Δί’ αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ
μεταβάλλει· καὶ γῆ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς
αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. On the
flux of things, see also M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N.
D. ii. 33, 84: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum
mundi continuata (= συνεχής; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2, continuatio
est partium inter se non intermissa conjunctio) natura est. Nam ex
terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre æther: deinde retrorsum
vicissim ex æthere aër, ex aëre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis
his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum, ultro citroque
commeantibus, mundi partium conjunctio continetur. See p. 194, 3.
[452] Diog. 137: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν,
τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p.
1053. The air is, according to Chrysippus, φύσει ζοφερὸς and πρώτως
ψυχρός. Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Galen, Simpl.
Medic. ii. 20, vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4: Aër ...
frigidus per se et obscurus ... natura enim aëris gelida est. Conf.
Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which
elements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to each element as
its distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air.
[453] Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the
region of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest,
the driest, and the rarest; but yet, owing to the evaporation of the
earth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which in point
of dryness and density is between the two, but exceeds both in cold.
See p. 146, 4.
[454] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ
ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E,
who is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire:
ἄνθραξ, φλὸξ, αὐγή. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial
fire, which, after all, forms only one small portion of fire.
[455] Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2.
[456] This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity
of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move
altogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence
the meaning can only be this: that the difference of natural motions
can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together,
and so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all
bodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between
heaviness and lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p.
1054: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together,
not to go asunder. οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου
καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως,
πιθανὸν, πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ
τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν, τοῖς δὲ
μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics
maintain that the world continues in empty space, ἐπεὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ
μέρη ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον νένευκε. The same reason is assigned by Cleomedes,
Meteor. p. 5.
[457] Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ
πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ... φύσει γὰρ
ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ’ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. Plut. Sto. Rep.
42, p. 1053: In the treatise περὶ κινήσεως, Chrysippus calls fire
ἀβαρὲς and ἀνωφερὲς καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ
γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου, τοῦ δ’ ἀέρος, τῷ πυρί. (So too in Ach. Tat.
Isag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his
Φυσικαὶ τέχναι, he inclines to the view that air in itself is neither
heavy nor light, which however can only mean that it is neither
absolutely, being heavy compared with fire, and light compared with
water and earth.
[458] Diog. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν
ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων.
μεθ’ ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην
ἁπάντων οὖσαν. Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To these main masses, all
other smaller masses of the same element in different parts of the
world are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place.
Conf. M. Aurel. ix. 9.
[459] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc cœlum, quod igneus æther,
mundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is
called πῦρ by Stobæus, æther by Cicero. See p. 146, 4. The same thing
is meant by Zeno, where he says (Stob. Ecl. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes
says the same in Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, C) that
the stars are made of fire; not, however, of πῦρ ἄτεχνον, but of πῦρ
τεχνικὸν, which appears in plants as φύσις, in animals as ψυχή. See p.
201, 5.
[460] In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ
ἔσχατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. Similarly Diog. 138;
Cleomed. Met. p. 7. Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense.
[461] See p. 146, 4.
[462] Stob. i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ’ αἰθέριον
περιφερῶς κινεῖται. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that
Zeno can (Stob. Ecl. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line.
Cleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on
the strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii.
14, 2; Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, B.
[463] They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i.
11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with
four elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quæ quæque
gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.
[464] The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is
mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3.
Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives an elaborate proof of it, for the most part
taken from Posidonius.
[465] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the
earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by
Stob. i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in Cleomed. Met. p. 47.
[466] Stob. Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ ... κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον
περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὶ δ’ ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον
δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. The earth is the natural
framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water
has been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as
islands. For what is called continent is also an island: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ
ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἐξῆφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα σφαιρικῶς καὶ
περικεχύσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιότατόν τε καὶ
εἰλικρινέστατον. It moves in circular form round the world. Then
follows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes
the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the
earth. Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of
Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun
amongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. That Archedemus also
refused to allow the earth a place in the centre has been already
stated, p. 147, 2. The language of Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is
ambiguous: As the circumference originates from the centre, so
according to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth;
when compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.
[467] Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed.
Met. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the
perfection of this form and its adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil.
Tat. Isag. 130, C, Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11),
with the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes
believed in a spherical form of the earth. According to Ach. Tat. Isag.
152, A, who probably has the Stoics in view, the axis of the world
consists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the
division of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the
earth into five zones, conf. Diog. 155; Strabo, ii. 2, 3, p. 95.
[468] Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.
[469] Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii.
214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i.
21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of
ἀντιπερίστασις, without supposing the existence of empty space. A
number of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found
in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.
[470] See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5.
[471] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is
unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς,
οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To
the same effect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see
Diog. 140 and 143; Stob. i. 260 and 382; Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 1, p.
1054; C. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073; Plac. i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; Theodoret, l.c.
and p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has
been already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world
occupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself, as
Plut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Rep. 44, 2, observes.
[472] Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408.
According to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac.
ii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D,
the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was
included or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is
called τὸ πᾶν; without it, ὅλον (τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα, frequently occurs
with the Stoics). The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor
immaterial, since it consists of both. Plut. C. Not. l.c.
[473] Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516;
540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p.
201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he
considered the moon πιλοειδὴς (ball-like—the MSS. have πηλοειδῆ) does
not agree.
[474] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314;
519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac.
ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Achil.
Tat. Isag. 124, D; 133, C, and above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the stars
generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, or
Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull
fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since (as Plin.
Hist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes)
owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in
vapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive
its light from the sun (Diog. 145), which, according to Posidonius in
Plut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only
illuminates its surface, but penetrates some depth. Cleomed. 100,
believes that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a light of its
own.
[475] Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is.
41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2;
20, 3; 23, 5; Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11; Cic.
N. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16. 2;
Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, p. 74 and 56, p. 117; most of whom affirm
that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of
fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars
are also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut.
Sto. Rep. 41, 3, adds to the passage quoted p. 161, 2: οἱ δ’ ἀστέρες ἐκ
θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐνάπτονται. Plut. Ibid. 2: ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν
ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ
μεταβαλούσης. Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084: γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον
ἔμψυχον λέγουσι τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν.
[476] Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes
and Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already
expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the
stars without anything very peculiar in Stob. i. 448; 538; Plut. Pl.
ii. 15, 2; 16, 1; Diog. 144; Cleomed. Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also
discussed by Diog. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560; Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p.
932; Plac. ii. 29, 5; Cleomed. pp. 106 and 115, nor is there anything
remarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of
Posidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518; Achil Tat. Isag. 132,
B; 165, C. The information—quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor.
51; Procl. in Tim. 277, E; Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119—respecting
observations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry.
[477] Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however,
appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by
Diog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius
proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but
also because of the spherical form of the earth’s shadow in eclipses of
the moon. Diog. l.c.; Macrob. Somn. i. 20; Heracl. Alleg. Hom. c. 46;
Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an
orbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of the earth, with a
diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103,
only calls the moon half that size; and Cleomed. p. 97, probably
following Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The
other stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are some of them as large as,
and others larger than, the sun. Posidonius, according to Plin. Hist.
N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon’s distance from the earth at two
million, and the sun’s distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He
estimated the earth’s circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed.;
at 180,000 according to Strabo, ii. 2, 2, p. 95.
[478] Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut.
Sto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145;
Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 3; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36
and 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr.
l.c.; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 134, A. Hence, in several of these
passages, the sun is called after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a νοερὸν
ἄναμμα (or ἔξαμμα) ἐκ θαλάσσης.
[479] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the
quotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from
Diog. 147.
[480] Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called
μετεωρολογικὴ or μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις; also, vii. 135, a treatise
περὶ μετεώρων, in several books. Alexander, in Simpl. Phys. 64, 6,
speaks of an ἐξήγησις μετεωρολογικῶν, which, judging by the title, may
be a commentary on Aristotle’s meteorology. Geminus had made an extract
from this book, a long portion of which on the relation of astronomy
and natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really
belong to these different treatises is not clear. Posidonius is
probably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic
meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca’s
Naturales Quæstiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10; 13;
ii. 26, 4; 54, 1; iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii. 20, 2; 4),
particularly in his meteorological treatises.
[481] On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle,
looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut.
Plac. iii. 1, 10; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are
explained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580 (Plac. iii. 2, 8.—Whether the
Diogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real stars is
Diogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of Apollonia, is not clear. The former
is more probable, Boëthus having been just before mentioned); Arrian,
in Stob. i. 584; Diog. vii. 152; and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii.
We learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19–21; 30, 2), with
Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars
uniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics—and, amongst their number,
Panætius and Posidonius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v.
1091)—considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the
opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called
πωγωνίαι, δοκοὶ, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1,
14; 15, 4. On σέλας, consult Diog. 153; Sen. i. 15; on halo (ἅλως),
Sen. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116; on the rainbow, Diog. 152; Sen.
i. 3–8; on virgæ and parhelia, Sen. i. 9–13; Schol. in Arat. v. 880
(Posidonius); on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning,
cyclones, and siroccos, Stob. i. 596; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian,
Ibid. 602; Sen. ii. 12–31; 51–58 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius); ii.
1, 3; Diog. 153; on rain, sleet, hail, snow, Diog. 153; Sen. iv. 3–12;
on earthquakes, Diog. 154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi. 4–31
(particularly c. 16; 21, 2); also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102; on winds,
Plac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1–17; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29; iii. 2, 5, p.
144; on waterspouts, Sen. iii. 1–26; the Nile floods, Ibid. iv. 1;
Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, p. 790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo,
i. 3, 12, p. 55; iii. 3, 3, p. 153; 5, 8, p. 73; on seasons, p. 111, 2.
[482] Thus colours are explained as πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης (Stob.
i. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the
air by Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5; Diog. 158.
[483] Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; Müller, Fragm.
Hist. Græc. iii. 245.
[484] Sext. Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων (on ἕνωσις see p. 103, 1)
σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ
ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ, καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ,
ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. 451: καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων
αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει,
τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν. Themist. De An.
72, b; M. Aurel. vi. 14; Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D; De Mundo,
1154, E; Leg. Alleg. 1091, D; Incorrupt. M. 947, A; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7,
8, p. 463, C, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p.
146, 1). Respecting the difference of φύσις and ψυχὴ, φύσις is said to
consist of a moister, colder, and denser πνεῦμα than ψυχή; but, on this
point, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1; Com. Not. 46, 2; Galen, Hipp. et
Plat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In Diog.
139, ἕξις and νοῦς, as the highest and lowest links in the series, are
contrasted. Ibid. 156, there is a definition of φύσις = πῦρ τεχνικὸν
ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν; and (148) another = ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη
κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν
ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ’ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need
be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time
appears as ἕξις, at another as φύσις. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. l.c.;
Sext. Math. ix. 84.
[485] The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the
arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the
Peripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1;
also the explanations of sleep, death, and age in Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4;
30, 5; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on
this point see Plut. Solert. An. 2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963, 967),
but also (according to Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3; v.
1, 6. Vol. v., 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says
in θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία), even in man the emotions being connected with
the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement (Galen,
p. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a ἡγεμονικόν.
(Chalcid. in Tim. p. 148, b.) He even discovered in the scent of dogs
traces of an unconscious inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p.
225, 2.
[486] Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5:
οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι·
συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ
ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν. σῶμα ἄρα
ἡ ψυχή. Chrysippus in Nemes. p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται
σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος·
σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same is said by Tertullian.
[487] Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 30.
[488] Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36.
[489] Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in
Tim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu
digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus
autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus in Chalcid.
l.c.
[490] Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι
γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς
ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ
ἀσώματον· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same in Tertullian, l.c.
[491] Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ
πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον. Zeno. Macrob.
Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum ...
Boëthos (probably the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century,
is meant) ex aëre et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p.
282: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς
ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42:
Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panætius believes that it is
burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater,
Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. Stob.
Ecl. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8: καὶ γὰρ αἱ
ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno
calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν
ἀναθυμίασιν, conf. § 2 and Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. c. 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ
Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν). Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De
An. 127. b: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν
πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every πνεῦμα is not a soul,
a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πὼς ἔχον (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458,
E); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater
warmth and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2, p. 1052: Chrysippus
considers the ψυχὴ to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ
λεπτομερέστερον. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783:
The Stoics say that both φύσις and ψυχὴ is πνεῦμα, but that the πνεῦμα
is thick and cold in φύσις, dry and warm in ψυχή.
[492] Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further
explained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f.
68, a. Plotin. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, as being κρᾶσις, i.e. an
intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for
the body, and not vice versâ, was a point vindicated by the Stoics
against the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E;
Sext. Math. ix. 72.
[493] Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno,
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3;
M. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.
[494] Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ
ἀπόσπασμα ... μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev.
xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (Plut.
Coh. Ir. 15). Similarly Chrysip., in Diog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De
An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by
separation from all parts of the body and can consequently produce all,
as Democritus had already said. Panætius (in Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 79)
proves, from the mental similarity, between parents and children, that
the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother’s share in
producing the soul, see Ar. Did. l.c. See above p. 127, 5.
[495] Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De
Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς
σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως
γενέσθαι ψυχήν. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c. Conf.
Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21, p. 40; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch
(Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of
saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the
vegetable soul, has been developed of it there by cooling and
condensation.
[496] On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not
all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of
the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of
Pallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6.
Conf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, l.c. iii.
8, p. 349. It appears, however, from Galen, l.c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5,
iii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De An. c. 15, that the most
distinguished Stoics—Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and
Apollodorus—decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that
the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the
breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still
did not shrink from using it. Galen, l.c. p. 254, 261. At the same
time, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268; iii. 1, 290, c. 5, 321,
c. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362) that, by universal assent, supported by
numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the
feelings proceed from the heart.
[497] Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.
[498] Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the
ἡγεμονικὸν to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the φαντασίαι,
συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, and ὁρμαὶ, and is by them called λογισμός;
from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the
arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as πνεῦμα
διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοὺ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, μυκτήρων, γλώττης,
ἐπιφανείας, παραστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων).
Galen, l.c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2; Diog. 110 and 157; Porphyr. and
Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836, 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307;
Nicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal
agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De
An. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some
among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Panætius only held
six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among
the Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the
Peripatetic Aristo.
[499] See p. 73, 2.
[500] Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4:
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν.
[501] See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p.
211, 5: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων]
μορίῳ, τὸ διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς
ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν’ ἔχον τοιοῦτον
λόγον, σπερματικὸν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι,
μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ’
οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται [= ταται] διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς
ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr.
(De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχικὴ
δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the
action of the πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. Conversely Tertullian, De An. 14,
speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem non
tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciæ et operæ ... non
enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambl.
in Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics,
the same relation to the soul that qualities bear to the substance;
their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of
which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union
of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary,
for ἡγεμονικὸν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμὴ, and λόγος.
[502] Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and
Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι
καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ
μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς
κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Plac.
Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l.c. iv. 1, p. 364: Chrysippus sometimes speaks
as if he admitted a distinct δύναμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ or θυμοειδής; at other
times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v.
6, 476: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ’ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. See p. 209, 1.
Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47: τοὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in Galen,
l.c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view,
by a passage in which he contrasts θυμὸς with λόγος—but this is making
a rhetorical flourish do duty for a philosophic statement.
[503] Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ
τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ
ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι.
[504] Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχαὶ
συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11.
M. Aurel. ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόρροια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ;
and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer
intra nos spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus
incertum est, habitat Deus. Id. Ep. 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est
quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently,
reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as
in the soul of the universe, as Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 886, states as
a Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a
well-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul’s capacity for studying
nature, and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in
God. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively
regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: εἰς μὲν τὰ ἄλογα
ζῷα μία ψυχὴ διῄρηται· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται.
xii. 30: ἓν φῶς ἡλίου, κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις·
μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ,
κἂν φύσεσι διείργηται μυρίαις καὶ ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς. This oneness,
however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of
the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of ethereal
substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also
Marc. Aurel. viii. 54.
[505] In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus,
magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.
[506] Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189.
[507] See p. 179.
[508] See p. 88, 1.
[509] Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2;
Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26,
7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2;
Ep. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42; Resurr. Carn.
3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking
κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order
to dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of
Tiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) to suppose that they, in many passages
(Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M. Aur. ii. 17; v. 4, 13), supposed the immediate
dissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear,
from M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death,
and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration.
But even this is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics.
According to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam) the souls of the good, as in
the doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are
admitted to the ranks of the blessed; and here this purification is no
doubt required on physical grounds. When the soul is purified, both in
substance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, according to
M. Aurelius, united to the σπερματικὸς λόγος τῶν ὅλων, it lives,
according to the common view, until the end of the world. The ether is
also allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Cic. Tusc. i. 18,
42; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. The
souls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to
heaven, until they reach an atmosphere (the juncti ex anima tenui et
ardore solis temperato ignes) congenial with their own nature. Here
they naturally stop, and are fed by the same elements as the stars.
According to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Il. xxiii. 65), they there
assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An.
54, conf. Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in
speaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably
only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of
the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being
weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.;
Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, p. 73); and meantime, as it is
distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius,
they are punished in the nether world. Tertullian in placing a portion
of the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there
allowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to
the purification mentioned by Seneca. For the supposed transmigration
of souls see p. 166, 2.
[510] The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging
to the Stoics—animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse
et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber—was not required by
their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only
to individual members of that School.
[511] Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld’s Zeitschrift für
wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221.
[512] Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini
humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis
reddam ... per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique
proluditur. As a child in its mother’s womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod
ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we
possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither
brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem
tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body
is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit
enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.
[513] Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit ... ipse
quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus
alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the
soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna
requies manet. Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ.
Ibid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit
illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or
compassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc
animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris
et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur ... fruitur nunc
aperto et libero cœlo ... et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum
naturæ bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus
noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris ...
totum diem admiserit, et cœlo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28:
Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lax
undique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands.
[514] In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of
purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the
addition: excepit illum cœtus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss)
and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.
[515] Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus
sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies ... quo, remotis strophis ac
fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.
[516] Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life)
nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos
rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum
parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere.
[517] Ep. 36, 10: Mors ... intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum
qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos
reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire,
mutari. Æquo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return,
according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration,
presuming that the same persons will be found in the future world as in
the present. See p. 166, 2. As long as the world lasts, the better
souls will continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are
employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and
also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to
the return of personality after the conflagration of the world.
[518] Besides the definitions of αἴσθησις in Diog. 52, and the remark
that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of
feeling is in the ἡγεμονικόν (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following
statements may be mentioned: In the process of seeing, the ὁρατικὸν
πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the ἡγεμονικόν, gives a spherical
form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονικὴ κίνησις (on
τόνος, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in
contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate
from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim.
149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical
undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear.
Diog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also φωνᾶεν, see
Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; Diog. 55, and above p. 214, 2; 74, 6.
Disease is caused by changes in the πνεῦμα, Diog. 158; sleep ἐκλυομένου
τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, Diog. 158; Tertull. De An. 43;
and in a similar way, death ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου Iambl.
(in Stob. Ecl. i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by
name. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is
only a liberation of rational souls.
[519] Page 77.
[520] The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν
μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ
τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων
προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον
καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ
Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιττιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς
ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be
doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of
the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the
five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following
subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would
therefore fall into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these
divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus,
Diss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in
his introduction to virtue three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς
ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ
ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ
ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these
divisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with
his first; but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise
with the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather
refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially
mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of
ὀρέξεις and ἐκκλίσεις. Stobæus again differs from either. In his survey
of the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is
good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of
the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at
length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the
καθῆκον, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one
kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on
friendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on
ἐνεργήματα (κατορθώματα, ἁμαρτήματα, οὐδέτερα), the greater portion of
which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to
Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not
only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and,
moreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been
called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but ætiologia) and
ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14,
the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the
first determining the value of things, the second treating de
actionibus, the third de impetu, περὶ ὁρμῆς. Two of these parts
coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with
the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (περὶ τῶν
πράξεων); and even Seneca’s first part more nearly agrees with one of
these (περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention
his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division
is a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently
met with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus).
None of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by
Cic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir.
c. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises
Seneca’s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such
contending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main
division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were
themselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen’s attempt, l.c. p. 258,
appears to me a failure.
[521] Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα
πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα.
[522] Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the
two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly
from their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their
adopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the
desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably
the treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, since it is distinctly referred
to by Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: ὡς οἰκειούμεθα
πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν. The
difference mentioned by Alex. Aphr. De An. 154—that at one time
self-love, at another the preservation of one’s own nature, is the
impulse—is unimportant.
[523] Diog. vii 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ
τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὑτῶ [αὑτῷ] τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ
Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῴῳ
τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι
εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ [Cobet incorrectly αὐτὸ] τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιῆσαι ἂν [l.
ποιήσασαν sc. τὴν φύσιν] αὐτὸ μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ’ οὐκ [must evidently
be struck out] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ
οἰκείως πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα
προσίεται. Similarly, Cic. l.c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced
the conception of the good to that of οἰκεῖον, without the fuller
explanation. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature,
which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno’s teacher, is combined
therewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question
whether all living creatures possess a consciousness (συνείδησις,
sensus) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural
self-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that
this question (according to Sen. Ep. 121, 5, conf. Cic. l.c.) could be
answered in the affirmative without hesitation, and appealed for
evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals
govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue
what is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which
children and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they
only know their own constitution, but not its true conception
(constitutionis finitio, Sen. p. 11). Constitutio, or σύστασις, was
defined by the Stoics, Sen., p. 10. as principale animi quodam modo se
habens erga corpus.
[524] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.
[525] The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the
hair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136)
three meanings of τέλος, between τέλος and σκοπός.
[526] Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9;
Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8;
Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 171; Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal
definitions are given of ἀγαθὸν, τέλος, and εὐδαιμονία. The latter is
generally paraphrased by εὔροια βίου, as Zeno had defined it. Various
formulæ for the conception of a life according to nature are given by
Cleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panætius, Posidonius, and
others in Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 416; Stob. 134; and Diog., all
apparently taken from the same source.
[527] Diog. vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν·
ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν
ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ
πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ ... εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ
εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν
συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ
βούλησιν.
[528] Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς
λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῷοις. Diog. 86:
Plants are moved by nature without impulse, animals by means of
impulse. In the case of animals, therefore, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν is the
same as τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν. In rational creatures, reason controls
impulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In
Galen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, p. 460, Chrysippus says: ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι
πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν. M. Aurel. vii. 11: τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις
κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον. Hence the definition of a virtuous
life, or a life according to nature: ζῇν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει
συμβαινόντων (Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog. 87; Clem. l.c.; also
Diogenes, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: τὸ
τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (Diog. 94).
[529] Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ
conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo
conciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea
enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Id. Ep. 92, 1: The body
is subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the
rational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam.
ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly. Ep. 76, 8. M. Aurel. vi. 44:
συμφέρει δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ
φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.
[530] According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics
were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express
their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobæus to have defined
τέλος = ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν; Cleanthes first added the words τῇ φύσει,
and Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several
additions. Diog. 87 attributes the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno, adding,
however, 89, that Chrysippus understood by φύσις, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ
ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, whereas Cleanthes understood τὴν κοίνην μόνην
οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. These differences are, however, not
important. The simple expression ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν means, without
doubt, ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, the ζῇν καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον (Stob. ii.
132 and 158), the ὁμολογία παντὸς τοῦ βίου (Diog. vii. 89), the vita
sibi concors, the concordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the
unum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found
in a wise man—in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency.
Nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions
accord with the requirements of the character of the agent.
Accordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει by the
side of ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cleanthes, therefore, in adding to the
expression ὁμολογουμένως the words τῇ φύσει, which, however, according
to Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next
condition of ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν. We can, however, hardly believe with
Diogenes that Cleanthes understood by φύσις only nature in general, but
not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to κοινὴ φύσις
or κοινὸς νόμος only, with the praise of which his well-known hymn
ends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature,
which is only a particular form of nature in general. Chrysippus
therefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his
master.
[531] Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii.
169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i.
10; Parad. 1; Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17;
120, 3; 118, 10, where the relation of the conceptions honestum bonum,
secundum naturam is specially considered. To prove their position, the
Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally
fond. Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 11): τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν·
τὸ δ’ αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ’ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ’ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν.
(The same in Cic. Fin. iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50, where I would
suggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.). Again: τὸ ἀγαθὸν
χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν (The same somewhat
expanded in Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii. 126: πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν
εἶναι, ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν
φευκτὸν. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.
[532] Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;
Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes
reconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the
perfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus
aut status natura absoluti.
[533] Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε
ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι
κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν. Ibid. ii. 202; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20,
1; Cic. Off. ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.
[534] M. Aurel. ix. 16.
[535] See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169;
Math. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here
defined to be either ὠφέλεια or οὐκ ἕτερον ὠφελείας (inseparably
connected with ὠφέλεια, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is
connected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sextus l.c. and
above p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον
ἀρετῆς. (Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is drawn between three
kinds of good: τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ἢ ἀφ’ οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει
ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν. Under the first head comes virtue,
under the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two
others, virtuous subjects—men, Gods, and demons. A second division of
goods (Diog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.) is into goods of the soul,
external goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous
country, and such as are neither (τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ
εὐδαίμονα, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the
individual to himself, as his own possessions). Goods of the soul are
then divided into διαθέσεις (virtues), ἕξεις (or ἐπιτηδεύματα, as
instances of which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes μαντικὴ and
φιλογεωμετρία, &c.; these are not so unchangeable as peculiarities of
character, and are therefore only ἕξεις, p. 103, 1), and those which
are neither ἕξεις nor διαθέσεις—actions themselves. A third division of
goods (Diog., Cic. l.c., Stob. 80, 100, 114) distinguishes τελικὰ or
δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετὰ (moral actions), ποιητικὰ (friends and the services
they render), τελικὰ and ποιητικὰ (virtues themselves); fourthly and
fifthly, μικτὰ (as εὐτεκνία and εὐγηρία), and ἁπλᾶ or ἄμικτα (such as
science), and the ἀεὶ παρόντα (virtues), and οὐκ ἀεὶ παρόντα (οἷον
χαρὰ, περιπάτησις). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by
Diogenes and Stobæus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in
addition, the ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει (χαρὰ, &c.) and ἐν σχέσει (εὔτακτος
ἡσυχία, &c.), the latter being partially ἐν ἕξει; the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ
(virtues) and πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα (honour, benevolence, friendship); the
goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are
not necessary (χαρὰ, ἐπιτηδεύματα). Seneca’s list is far more limited,
although it professes to be more general. He mentions, prima bona,
tanquam gaudium, pax, salus patriæ; secunda, in materia infelici
expressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia; tertia, tanquam modestus
incessus.
[536] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum
definierit id quod esset natura absolutum [αὐτοτελὲς] ... hoc autem
ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando
sed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi
dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum
aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud
quidem plurimi æstimandum, sed ea æstimatio genere valet non
magnitudine, &c.
[537] Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum
nisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: ἡ μὲν ἀρετή τε καὶ ἡ
κακία μόναι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δὲ κακόν. See p. 229; 233, 1.
[538] Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of
ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε
πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον. To this
category belong external goods, health, &c. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς
χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἀδιάφορον· διὰ παντὸς δ’ ἀρετῇ μὲν κακῶς, κακίᾳ
δὲ κακῶς, ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι
χρῆσθαι. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102, who defines
οὐδέτερα as ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει. Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορον = τὸ
μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν. Plut. Sto.
Rep. 31, 1: ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς τοῦτό φασι μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι μήτε κακόν.
[539] Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of
reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum
malum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious
death): ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are
prominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject: that what is
according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is
not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death
are not despised. See Sen. Ep. 30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad. Marc.
19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3; viii. 58. And other passages quoted in
Baumhauer’s Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.
[540] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away
with, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν,
ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2): ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν
μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ’ εἰς
τοῦτο συνεργούντων. Similarly, Sto. Rep. 17, 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3: The
only good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba
rerum, nec detrahens quicquam beatæ vitæ nec adjiciens. Id. Ep. 66, 14:
There is no difference between the wise man’s joy and the firmness with
which he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa,
in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur ... virtutem materia non mutat. Ep.
71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39:
Tu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 3;
Plut. C. Not. 4, 1; Sto. Rep. 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in Ps. Plut. De
Nobil. 12, 2; Diog. 102; Stob. ii. 90; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex.
Aphr. Top. 43 and 107.
[541] Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can
only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ
πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ’ ὑγίεια. Again: ᾧ
ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ
ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. In Sen. Ep. 87, 11, instead
of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following
arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes
nostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38): (1)
Quod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt
bona. (Similarly in M. Aurel. ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral
harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique
contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et
lanistæ contingunt: ergo, &c. (So, too, Marc. Aurelius, v. 10.) (3)
Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiæ fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo,
&c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀγαθόν· πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοβοσκίας κακοῦ ὄντος γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.)
(4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non
est: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c.
(5) Quæ neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem,
contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a
fortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been
included in this class) in hæc impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That
riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 49);
that poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in
Sen. Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit.
Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The
Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view.
Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that
good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad;
consequently, what both enjoy equally—life and death, honour and
dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty—can neither be good
nor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19.