[120] Diog. 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν

σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. Ibid. 62: τυγχάνει δ’ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ

Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Seneca l.c.:

διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e.

in res, quæ dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction

between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, to which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real

object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in

another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly

approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the

definition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is

also found in the Platonist Alcinous, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has

pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School,

but, at most, to a few of its later members.

[121] Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio,

without, however, giving it.

[122] There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen’s attempt (Phil.

Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his

reference of the words in Sext. Math. viii. 11 to the parts of logic is

unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater

caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.

[123] Diog. 55.

[124] Diog. 44: εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν

προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ

καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ

ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ

περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. The theory of the

determination and division of conceptions occupies such an important

place in the section περὶ φωνῆς, that we might feel disposed to suppose

some mistake in the authority. Still, from the later authorities, pp.

60–62, it is seen that by many it is usually so represented.

[125] Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt’s Stoicorum

Grammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten;

Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265–363; Nicolai, De Log.

Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into the

voice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in

motion, or something hearable—ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν

ἀκοῆς; the human voice as ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διάνοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, is

distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς

πεπληγμένος (Diog. 55; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; Gell. N. A.

vi. 15, 6). That the voice is something material is proved in various

ways (Diog. 55; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). The

voice, in as far as it is ἔναρθρος, or composed of letters, is called

λέξις; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is λόγος (Diog.

56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (λέξις

κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς ἢ λέξις ποταπὴ) was called

διάλεκτος (Diog. 56). The elements of λέξις are the 24 letters, divided

into 7 φωνήεντα, 6 ἄφωνα, and 11 semivowels (Diog. 57); the λόγος has 5

parts, called στοιχεῖα by Chrysippus—ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα,

σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον—to which Antipater added the μεσότης, or adverb

(Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; Lersch, ii. 28;

Steinthal, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain

peculiarities of things have been imitated in the chief sounds of which

they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by

etymological analysis (Orig. c. Cels. i. 24; Augustin. Dialect. c. 6;

Opp. T. I. Ap. 17, c.). (Chrysippus, however, observes (in Varro, L.

Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ,

and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings.)

See Simpl. Cat. 8, ζ. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech

are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60),

various kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4),

the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.

[126] Diog. vii. 54.

[127] The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference

to φαντασία, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge

from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from

the data supplied by the senses. A passage in Zeno, explaining the

relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required

progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he

distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction

which they produced.

[128] Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. Φαντασία

is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός,

in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as

itself; φανταστὸν is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν, and therefore πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν

δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. Φαντασία is distinguished from φανταστικόν,

because no φανταστὸν corresponds to φανταστικόν· it is διάκενος

ἑλκυσμὸς, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον· and the

object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Compare also Sext.

Math. vii. 241: διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is called φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν.

Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual

perceptions, are called by Diog. 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων

γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, φαντασία means any kind of notion.

[129] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος

ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτης (χάρτην as Galen, H.

Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφήν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν

ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ

διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says

that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν

κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

[130] Plut. Comm. Not. 47: φαντασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in Diog.

vii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from

what follows.

[131] Sext. Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ

εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ

τύπωσιν. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400.

[132] Sext. vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ

τοιοῦτον·—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to

receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different

notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος

ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία

ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this

definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise

to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more

accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, which was

equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in

Zeno’s definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχὴ in

a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, which really comes to the same

thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and

hence ἑτεροίωσις was limited to change in feeling (ἑτεροίωσις κατὰ

πεῖσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already

remarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the

soul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The

statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50;

Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Boëth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in

Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.

[133] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ

καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν

αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ

καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καὶ καθόλου

ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ

εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ

ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to

mean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of

sensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are

individual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived

from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only

obtained by a process of abstraction.

[134] Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ

ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμαι

γένωντα τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν.

[135] Diog. vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν,

ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως

συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ

νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’

ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ

σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν ... νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν

(transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ

καὶ ὁ τόπος. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta

sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia,

quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam

posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium

sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid.

Fin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu

(experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine,

aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia

facta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic

doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas

arise either κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν

μετάβασιν (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by

comparison, or actual combination, or analogy.

[136] Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2.

[137] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ’ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ

τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by

memory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been

careless in his extracts here) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ’ ἤδη δι’

ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται

μόναι, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. Diog. vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μέν

εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.

[138] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ

τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (the first

seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged

τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ’ ὧν

μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ... καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. Sen.

Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus præsumtioni (πρόληψις) omnium

hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri.

Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and

consensus gentium.

[139] Diog. vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι

δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus

(in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις of good and evil.

In Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked,

How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics

reply, By means of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι.

[140] Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni

notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam,

adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit.

Similarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos

prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura

docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit ...

nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe

factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et

honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength

has grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of

virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral

perfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being

passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues

serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was

produced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by ἀπόδειξις. See p. 80, 1. Conf.

Stob. Ecl. i. 792: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν

λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ

δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη.

[141] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ

ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν

τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην

δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ

ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ (knowledge in a relative sense) ἕξιν φαντασιῶν

δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει (sc.

τῆς ψυχῆς) κεῖσθαι. Diog. vii. 47: αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ

κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου.

(This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165,

certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν

σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ.

[142] See p. 80, 4.

[143] This was the object of Plutarch’s treatise περὶ τῶν κοινῶν

ἐννοιῶν. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr.

Ev. vi. 8, 10) throws it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst

appealing to generally received opinions, he is always going contrary

to them, and that he considers all men, with one or two exceptions, to

be fools and madmen.

[144] Diog. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν,

κ.τ.λ. λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι,

κ.τ.λ.

[145] Sext. Math. viii. 10: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε

αἰσθητῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ

κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητά.

[146] Sext. l.c. continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ

ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ (this μὴ is

obviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where

the same definition is given without the μὴ) ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ

ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an

assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other.

Ibid. viii. 70: ἠξίουν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι

καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν

ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ

παραστῆσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ

(conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) ... προσαγορεύουσι

δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ

ψευδόμεθα. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ

ψεῦδος (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) ἢ πρᾶγμα (better λεκτὸν as Gell. N. A.

xvi, 8, 4 reads) αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῴ· ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός

φησιν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that

the distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See

Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1.

[147] Sext. Math. vii. 93; ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν

Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται,

ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ

συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 508,

B.

[148] See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.

[149] Ibid. ii. a, 211.

[150] Diog. 61: ἐννόημα (object of thought) δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας.

οὔτε τί ὂν οὔτε ποιὸν, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τί ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν. Stob. Ecl. i.

332: τὰ ἐννοήματά φησι μήτι τινὰ εἶναι μήτι ποιὰ, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ

ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας

προσαγορεύεσθαι ... ταῦτα [ταύτας] δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασὶν

ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ

πτώσεων, ἃς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν. Although defended by

Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not

appear capable of any passable meaning and are most probably corrupt.

Plut. Plac. i. 10, 4: οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς

ἰδέας ἔφασαν. Simpl. Categ. 26, e: Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας, εἰ

τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ

τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὔτινα

τὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. Syrian. on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen’s

Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): ὡς ἄρα τὰ εἴδη ... οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν τῆς

τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ

πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὕστερον ᾠήθησαν ... οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ νοήματά εἰσι παρ’

αὐτοῖς αἱ ἰδέαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκε. Prantl, l.c. takes

objection to what Stobæus and Plutarch here say; yet this view is not

that the Stoics regarded their conception of the ἐννόημα as identical

with Plato’s conception of ideas, but that they asserted that these

ideas were only ἐννοήματα—an assertion which had also been made by

Antisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of

the λεκτόν, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to

the Stoics: οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι]·

ὧν γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα· if

mankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος

will be neither one nor the other. The further therefore a conception

is removed from individual limitations, the further it is removed from

truth.

[151] Diog. vii. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Exc.

e Joan. Damasc. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: Χρύσιππος τὸ

μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη (Petersen, 83

without cause suggests ἡδὺ) αἰσθητόν.

[152] See p. 82, 1.

[153] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.

[154] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be ἕξις φαντασιῶν

δεκτικὴ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει

κεῖσθαι.

[155] Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii.

463; Pyrrh. ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of

arguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically

admitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against

Carneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28; 34, 109): He who asserts that nothing

can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with

certainty know this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections,

and the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in

Sext. Math. l.c. and vii. 433.

[156] Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, according to

the view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by

anticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that

the labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between

two of the most important Sceptics. Plut. Sto. Rep. i. 4, p. 1059.

Diog. 198 mentions a treatise against Arcesilaus.

[157] Plut. Sto. Rep. 10 (see p. 66, 1); Ibid. 47, 12: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε

τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ

Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως,

ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας

φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκατατιθεμένους.

Ibid. adv. Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ’ οἱ πολλὰ

πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους

ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῆς τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν

ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν. Epict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15)

quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα.

Following also the Stoic line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10–12, makes Antiochus

argue that Scepticism makes all action impossible.

[158] In Sext. Math. vii. 244, ἀληθεῖς φαντασίαι are, first of all,

literally explained to be φαντασίαι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν

ποιήσασθαι· then, under the head of true φαντασίαι, the καταληπτικαὶ

and οὐ καταληπτικαὶ are distinguished, i.e., notions which are

accompanied by a clear impression of being true, and such as are not;

and, in conclusion, φαντασία καταληπτικὴ is defined: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ

ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ

ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. This

definition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is

given Ibid. 402 and 426; viii. 85; Pyrrh. ii. 4; iii. 242; Augustin. c.

Acad. ii. 5, 11; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. Diog. vii. 46: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας

τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον

εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασὶ, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ

ὕπαρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ

ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον, τὴν

μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Ibid. 50.

[159] Sext. Math. viii. 397: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἔστι παρ’

αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν

εἶναι πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ

ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν καὶ οὐκ

ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὑτωσὶ διατεθῆναι

... τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ

τὴν φαντασίαν. Diog. vii. 51; Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40: [Zeno] ad hæc quæ

visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum:

quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De

Fato, 19, 43, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem

et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in

potestate. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος [ὁ

Χρύσιππος] οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν

εἴρηκεν ὅτι· βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ

φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, κ.τ.λ. Id. 13: αὖθις δέ

φησι Χρύσιππος, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφὸν

... ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις.

Id. Fragm. De An. 2: οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τρέπει ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων

κατάληψιν καὶ ἀπάτην, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. Epictet. in Gell. N. A.

xix. 1, 15: visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant ... non

voluntatis sunt neque arbitrariæ, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese

hominibus noscitandæ; probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant,

quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur voluntariæ sunt fiuntque

hominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool

consists in συγκατατίθεσθαι and προσεπιδοξάζειν. The freedom of

approbation must, of course, be so understood in harmony with Stoic

doctrine of the freedom of the will.

[160] On the difference between the conception of εὔλογον and that of

καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, the latter alone being unerring, see Athen. viii.

354, e; Diog. vii. 177.

[161] Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: [Zeno] visis (=

φαντασίαις) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam

quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem

visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (καταληπτικὴ

φαντασία). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra

ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere ... non

potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76:

percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse

percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54;

Sext. Math. vii. 227: κριτήριον τοίνον φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες

οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a departure from the older

Stoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a

conceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the

proviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth.

Sext. 253: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν

εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι

προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα, since cases could be

imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of

truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a

criterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there

was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic

teaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional

perception: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν,

φασι, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς

δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτῃ προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b:

ἀνῄρουν τὰ ἄλλα ... πλὴν τὰ ἐναργῆ.

[162] Diog. vii. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν

καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι

Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ

μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν

καὶ ἐπιστήμην (this looks like an approximation to the teaching of the

Peripatetics); ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ

λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν ... ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν

ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ

Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησίν. See above p. 76.

[163] See above p. 82, 1.

[164] See above p. 89, 2, and Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the

Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa

esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.

Chrysippus had enquired into the truth of the perceptions of the

senses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise περὶ

συνηθείας, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections

which he quoted against the theory. See p. 46, 2.

[165] See p. 60.

[166] See p. 73, 3.

[167] See Sext. Math. viii. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν

ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὧν

σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ... σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’

αὐτῆς δηλούμενον ... τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον ... τούτων δὲ δύο

μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον,

ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ λεκτόν. Sen. Ep. 117, 13, giving it

expressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Sunt, inquit,

naturæ corporum ... has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi

corporum—for instance, I see Cato walk—corpus est, quod video.... Dico

deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed

enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii

enuntiatum, alii edoctum. Compare also on the λεκτόν Sext. Math. viii.

70 (above p. 83, 2); Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the

Stoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (λεκτὸν) is

material, as has been said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of the distinction

between utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in Sext.

Pyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul

is material, but that truth itself is not material: λέγεται διαφέρειν

τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ, συστάσει, δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μὲν,

ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτὸν, ἡ δὲ

ἀλήθεια σῶμα, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη

πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν (Id. Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is

expressly attributed to a Stoic); likewise a similar statement which

Sen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble,

but not till after a lengthy refutation: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere

bonum non esse. The statement rests on the assertion that nothing can

be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself

felt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens

perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapientiæ.

Accordingly, λεκτὸν (as Ammon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a μέσον τοῦ

τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος· if, however, νόημα be taken to express

the thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it becomes

identical with λεκτόν. Conf. Simpl. Cat. 3, α, Basil.: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα

καὶ λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματά ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐδόκει. In Plut. Plac.

iv. 11, 4, a definition of νόημα or ἐννόημα is given similar to that of

λεκτὸν in Sext. Math. viii. 70: φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου. See

above p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a,

Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, that the Stoics called things

τυγχάνοντα, thoughts ἐκφορικὰ, and sounds λεκτά, whereas ἐκφορικὸν may

be used of thoughts in the same sense as λεκτόν.

[168] See p. 84, 4. This question was raised in the Stoic School

itself. Sextus at least, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching

from this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an ἀνήνυτος μάχη in

reference to the ὕπαρξις of λεκτὰ, and he remarks (viii. 258): ὁρῶμεν

δὲ ὡς εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀνῃρηκότες τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ

ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, ὡς οἱ περὶ

τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. Probably the question

was first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents.

Basilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise the existence

of λεκτὰ was spoken of as quite natural.

[169] Sext. Math. viii. 70, see above p. 83, 2: τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν

ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ. Various kinds of propositions are then

enumerated as being αὐτοτελῆ. Following the same authority, (Diocles?

see Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says: φασὶ δὲ τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν

λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ

Στωϊκοὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν

ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ

ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. Prantl in

saying, p. 438, that the Stoics divide judgments (ἀξιώματα) into

complete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Only λεκτὰ are so divided, but

λεκτὸν has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. ἀξιώματα

are only one form of λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ.

[170] Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. A judgment (πρότασις or ἀξίωμα)

ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ, τὸ

δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν. The terms πτῶσις and κατηγόρημα belonging to

the Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by οἱ διαλεκτικοί. In

the first class of words they distinguish ὄνομα and προσηγορία,

limiting ὄνομα to proper names, and understanding by προσηγορία all

general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; Bekker’s

Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stob. Ecl. i. 332, πτῶσις was only used

to express προσηγορία. Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus περὶ

τῶν προσηγορικῶν. For the meaning of κατηγόρημα or ῥῆμα, the verb,

consult Diog. 58 and 64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21;

Porphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Construct.

i. 8, ῥῆμα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other

forms being called κατηγορήματα.

[171] The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγόρημα was somewhat bluntly

referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as

may be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ,

οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον

κατηγόρημα.... Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον

οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. Hence for the latter

the names σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα. See following note.

[172] In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according

to Ammon. l.c. being called ὄνομα, and the other five cases πτώσεις· a

statement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those

terms. In Diog. 65, the cases (γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ) are called

πλάγιαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five

cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγόρημα.

According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive

verbs (ὀρθὰ), such as ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται· passive verbs (ὕπτια), such as

ὁρῶμαι· neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν· and verbs

which, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation

(ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point Philo,

De Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια, also

Dionys. Thrax, § 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, α, ζ; Diog. 191;

and respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch.

der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and

παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα

or κατηγόρημα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case;

περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a

nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an

oblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject,

the verb is called ἔλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα, as in the

sentence Πλάτων φιλεῖ, φιλεῖ is so called; for these words only make a

complete sentence by the addition of an object thus: Πλάτων φιλεῖ

Δίωνα. If this is necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it is called ἔλαττον ἢ

παρασύμβαμα· such, for instance, is the word μέλει, for to complete the

sentence it is not enough to say Σωκράτει μέλει, but the object must be

added, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This

difference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch,

ii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is

evidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the

meaningless οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν—τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα, which at

least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto.

Gramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299,

Bekk.; Suid. σύμβαμα (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who,

in his equally inaccurate account, has ἀσυμβάματα. The example which

Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting

anent σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα proves, of course, nothing.

[173] There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the

position held by the categories. By several, definition and division

were treated of most improperly under the head of language.

[174] According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined

by Chrysippus as ἰδίου (which must be read in Diog. in place of καὶ)

ἀπόδοσις· by Antipater as λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην)

ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and

the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὁρισμὸς gives in detail

what ὄνομα gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος

is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics

were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like

Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the

conceptions of words of similar meaning, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονὴ, εὐφροσύνη

(Alex. Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained:

γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαιρέτων

ἐννοημάτων· which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a

conception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would

not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely

think of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422

suggests ἀναφορητῶν, which, however, requires explanation); εἶδος as τὸ

ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (Diog. 60). γενικώτατον is ὃ γένος ὂν γένος

οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (Diog. 61; conf. Sext.

Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις

(division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμὸς has

a special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the

previous definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3,

in Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds

of division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the

Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8

διαιρέσεις mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker’s

Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little

that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be

said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from

Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων) on the subject of

στέρησις and ἕξις. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.

[175] Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36–144, is invaluable for

its careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct

the Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious

combinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der

Logik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine

of the categories are besides a few notices in other writers

principally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,

25–30.

[176] The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too

numerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of

expression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, α, this were the

point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, α; 15, δ; 16, δ, who quotes

these as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of

whom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero.

Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories

are given, Ibid. 47, ζ, 91, α.

[177] That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the

categories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by

his observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion—which are

based entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.

[178] It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time

speak of ὂν, at another of τί, as being the highest conception of the

Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος

ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud

primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur

omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the

distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he

proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud ... quod est [τὸ

ὂν] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est

primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [τὸ γενικώτατον]. It

is, however, more usual to find τί. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: κοινὸν

τὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol.

278, b, 20: οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τὶ οἱ ἀπὸ στοᾶς γένος τοῦ

ὄντος (τὶ as the genus, of which ὂν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τὶ,

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὂν ... ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ

σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγοιεν ἂν τὸ ἠπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ

τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: τὸ

τὶ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον. Math. x. 234: The Stoics

affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. Sen. l.c. 13:

Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale

... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum,

inquiunt, natura quædam sunt, quædam non sunt: examples of the latter

are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter,

iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have

placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection

could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an

object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although

it is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the

two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into

Being and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material

and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the

Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut.

Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.

[179] See previous note and p. 92, 2.

[180] The Stoics appear to have regarded them as γενικώτατα or πρῶτα

γένη, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, δ (in other

places as 51, β; 79, β, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic

categories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; κατηγορία did not suit them so well

because of their use of κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1.

[181] Simpl. 16, δ: οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἐξιοῦσι

τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν ... ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα·

εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. Plot.

En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.

[182] Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being,

οὐσία, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also

by Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes οὐσία and ποιὸς

the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple

Mnesarchus.

[183] Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη ... πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ

ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα

τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, Qu. Qual.

S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρώτην ὕλην ἀΐδιον τὴν

ἄποιον. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of

course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4,

that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60);

but as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality

only belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any

authority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it

is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief

in words.

[184] Simpl. 44, δ: ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ

τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους

ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324:

ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον

εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα

κατ’ αὐτήν [καθ’ αὑτὴν]· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι,

διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ

μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναί φασιν.

Further particulars on matter hereafter.

[185] Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ

μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. Dexipp. See

following note.

[186] Diog. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So

thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται.

καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ

μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν

ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (Ζήνωνος·) οὐσίαν

δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ

οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ

διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. The same was held by

Chrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held

that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ’

ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), and

κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ

τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι (the elements, according

to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς

ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις

καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συνβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε

μειοῦσθαι ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν (which may be understood, not of

individual properties, but of individually determined things) οἷον

Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίγνεσθαι. (These words

are explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits

increase or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms αὔξησις and

μείωσις, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted

from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or

diminution of substance in the individual thing.) διὸ καὶ παραμένειν

τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.... ἐπὶ δὲ

τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν δύο μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (individual things

have two component parts, which are capable of change), τὸ μέν τι κατὰ

τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δέ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως

ποιὸν] ὡς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι.

Porphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: ὡς ἔστι τὸ

ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς

πρεσβυτέρους, ἓν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη

... δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται,

ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p.

1083 (the Stoics assert) ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν

οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποιόν]. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον

μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ

αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θἀτέρῳ συμπεφυκὸς καὶ

συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ

παρέχον ἅψασθαι. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former

the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ

λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ

φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας·

οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν, ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν,

ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας

λαμβανούσης. That it should be said of this perpetually changing

material μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον may appear strange; but the

meaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it

increases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same

subject, an ἰδίως ποιὸν during the change; but the material itself,

which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject

of increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro.

Quæst. Nat. I. 5.

[187] ποιὸν or ποιότης, and also ποιὸς (sc. λόγος). According to Simpl.

55. α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to ποιόν. The first,

which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of

quality, whether essential or accidental—the πὼς ἔχον as well as the

ποιόν. In the second meaning ποιὸν is used to express permanent

qualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential—the

σχέσεις. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses τοὺς

ἀπαρτίζοντας (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιοὺς,

i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in

their distinctive features. The substantive ποιότης is only used in the

last sense.

[188] Simpl. 57, ε (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and

Trendelenburg, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν

σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν (separable,

i.e., from matter) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα [sc.

μίαν] ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ

αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ’ ἢν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. In place of ἓν

νόημα Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438,

96), reads ἐννόημα. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain

it with reason, the meaning being that ποιότης constitutes no

independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential

qualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of ποιὸν, and

reckoned under that of πὼς ἔχον.

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not

essential is indicated in the terms ἕξις and σχέσις· ποιότητες, or

essential properties, being called essential forms (ἕξεις or ἑκτά);

non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (σχέσεις).

See Simpl. 54, γ; 55, ε. In determining essential attributes, these,

according to Simpl. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential,

not when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the

nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς

ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν

ἐνεργείαις. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to

σχέσις in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

The distinction between ἕνωσις and συναφὴ also belongs here. That, the

oneness of which depends on an essential quality, is ἡνωμένον·

everything else is either συνημμένον or ἐκ διεστώτων. Sext. Math. ix.

78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ

συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως

κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses,

ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep.

102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη

δὲ τὸ ἓν σῶμα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνελέσθαι [l. συνέχεσθαι].

Simpl. 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἐπὶ

τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον

νεὼς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ

εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπί

τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως.

Those ἕξεις which admit of no increase or diminution (ἐπίτασις, and

ἄνεσις) are called διαθέσεις or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance,

which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where

they exist at all, are διαθέσεις, but arts are only ἕξεις. Simpl.

Categ. 61, β; 72, δ; 73, β; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24;

Stob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was

taken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.

[189] Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ

δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. Stob. Ecl. i.

434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains ἰδίως ποιὸς by

ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.

[190] Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from

Plutarch and Stobæus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιρνάμενα (the

intermingling materials,—the question here is the possibility of

mingling) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαί φασιν. Porphyry in Simpl.

Categ. 12, δ disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly

distinguish ἕξις, or essential form, from the subject to which it

belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said

(Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὡς

μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. They also distinguish between a thing and its

οὐσία. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναί τε τοὐτὸν τό τι ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν

οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μήδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ

ταὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον,

τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μήδ’ ἐν μέρει

θεωρεῖσθαι. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ

οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and Seneca,

Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly

compares the relation of an individual thing to its οὐσία with that of

a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the ἰδίως ποιὸς

distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of

course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus

(in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιοὺς [= ἰδίως ποιοὺς]

ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστῆναι.

[191] L.c. 222.

[192] This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the

previous page.

[193] Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ

ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας

πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης

εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic

teaching (as Simpl. 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to

the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, β). But the Stoic

definition of δύναμις (quoted by Simpl. 58, α—ἡ πλειόνων ἐποιστικὴ

συμπτωμάτων, with the additional words καὶ κατακρατοῦσα τῶν

ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. Ποιότης may also be

connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: εἰ δὲ

τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι ἀλλ’ οὐκ

ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν ... οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ

λόγοι. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς

κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ

αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

[194] Plut. Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις

πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ

ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν

σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ’ ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ’ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. Simpl.

69. γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ

ἄλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν

σωματικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.

[195] Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐστὶ τὴν περὶ κράσεως

κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ

τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Ibid.

144, α, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν

θεόν.

[196] Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾶς

οὐσίας δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους (this follows from their hypothesis,

but it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) καὶ

τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ

διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.

[197] Simpl. 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιοτήτων ποιοῦσιν

ἑαυτῶν (? ἑκτῶν) ποιοῦντες ἑκτὰς ἕξεις [l. ἑκτὰ καὶ ἕξεις or ἕξεις

only]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given

above. The conception of a property is compounded of several

attributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate

properties. If λευκὸν is a χρῶμα, the διακριτικὸν ὄψεως is the ἕξις, or

form of λευκὸν.

[198] This follows of necessity, quite independently of the

above-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the

material nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if

that intermingling of materials in which each one retains its

properties (μῖξις and κρᾶσις in contrast to chemical combination

παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be the complete interpenetration

of one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i.

376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover,

properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are

combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is

inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to

the same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be

explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with

each other and with their subject-matter.

[199] The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare

the remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the λεκτόν.

[200] Simpl. 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς,

τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. Only the

σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are πνεύματα, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties

are called ἑκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms).

Dexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωριζόντων τὰς

ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν

ἐρεσχελεῖν δέον ᾖ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of

terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl.

Categ. 54, γ), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent

of the conception of ἑκτόν. According to this passage it was Antipater

who wished to include under ἑκτὰ, the κοινὰ συμπτώματα σωμάτων καὶ

ἀσωμάτων.

[201] Conf. Simpl. 57, ε, who after giving the definition of quality,

quoted p. 103, 1, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὸν

ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι

ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ

τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.

[202] Simpl. 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος

(including sc. τοῖς οὖσιν) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν

ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς

ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς

ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.

[203] Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον

συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. Plotin.

vi. 1, 30, 594, A: πῶς δὲ ἓν τὸ πὼς ἔχον, πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς

οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἓν [γένος θετέον], τοῦ μὲν

ποσοῦ τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως πὼς

ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως

πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πὼς ἔχον; ... τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πὼς ἔχον ... καὶ ὁ

πάσχον οὐ πὼς ἔχον ... ἴσως δ’ ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τὸ πὼς

ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον ἀλλὰ ἔχον. Simpl.

Categ. 94, ε: The Stoics included ἔχειν under πὼς ἔχον. In saying as

Simpl. 16, δ, does that the Stoics omitted ποσὸν, time, and place, it

must be meant that they did not treat these conceptions as separate

categories. What they did with them Simpl. explains l.c. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πὼς

ἔχον νομίζουσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνειν. Trendelenburg, 229,

with justice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference

lies in ποσὸν as in mathematical conceptions, there ποσὸν comes under

ποιόν.

[204] Simpl. 42, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον

τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦνται, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι τιθέντες, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρός

τί πως ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρός τι ἀντιδιαιροῦντες τοῖς καθ’ αὑτὰ, τὰ δὲ

πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν. (Ibid. 44, β: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ

νομίζουσι πάσης τῆς κατὰ διαφορὰν ἰδιότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι τὰ πρός τί πως

ἔχοντα.) Sweet and bitter belong to τὰ πρός τι· to the other class

belong δεξιὸς, πατὴρ, &c., κατὰ διαφορὰν δέ φασι τὰ κατά τι εἶδος

χαρακτηριζόμενα. Every καθ’ αὑτὸ is also κατὰ διαφορὰν (determined as

to quality), and every πρός τί πως ἔχον is also a πρός τι, but not

conversely. Conf. 43, β. εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα,

πρός τι μὲν λέγουσιν ὅσα κατ’ οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα διακείμενά πως ἀπονεύει

πρὸς ἕτερον (or, according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454:

πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ νοούμενον), πρός τι δέ πως ἔχοντα ὅσα πέφυκε

συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ

ἀλλοιώσεως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ

διαφοράν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρός τι μόνον τοῦτο ἔσται,

ὡς ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν

διαφορὰν κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῆται, πρὸς τί πως

ἔχοντα ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἔξωθεν τινῶν προσδέονται, πρὸς

τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτ’

ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου

μεταστάντος· τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοῖα γένοιτο εἰ μὴ

συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. In this sense, therefore, πρός

τι belongs to ποιὸν, being composed (as Simpl. 43, α, says) of ποιὸν

and πρός τι. On the other hand, πρός τί πως ἔχον only expresses, to

quote Herbart, an accidental relation. Prantl’s quotation (I. 437, 108)

from Simpl. 44, β, we have no special reason to refer to the Stoics.

[205] Trendelenburg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far

subordinate to one another, that the previous one continues in the

next, but with the addition of a fresh determination; a better name for

the second category would be ὑποκείμενα ποιά· for the third, ὑποκείμενα

ποιά πως ἔχοντα· for the fourth, ὑποκείμενα ποιὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. In

support of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, α: ἕπεται δὲ αὐτοῖς κἀκεῖνο

ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ

πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρός τι. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6: τέτταρά γε

ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. Plot.

Enn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A: ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ... ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ

ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν

γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι· if ποιὰ are to be

ὕλη ποιὰ, they are composed of ὕλη and εἶδος or λόγος. See p. 48, 2.

[206] See p. 103, 1.

[207] See p. 107, 2; Plotin. vi. 1, 30: Why are πὼς ἔχοντα enumerated

as a third category, since πάντα περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα; the Stoics

would probably say that ποιὰ are περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, whereas the

πὼς ἔχοντα, in the strict sense of the term, are περὶ τὰ ποιά. Yet

since the ποιὰ themselves are nothing more than ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, all

categories must be ultimately reduced to ὕλη.

[208] Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 440–467.

[209] In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol.

in Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Boëth. De Interp. 315;

Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn

between ἀξίωμα (a judgment), ἐρώτημα (a direct question, requiring Yes

or No), πύσμα (an enquiry), προστακτικὸν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν (wishes),

εὐκτικὸν (a prayer), ὑποθετικὸν (a supposition), ἐκθετικὸν (as ἐκκείσθω

εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ), προσαγορευτικὸν (an address), θαυμαστικὸν, ψεκτικὸν,

ἐπαπορητικὸν, ἀφηγηματικὸν (explanatory statements), ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι (a

judgment with something appended, as: ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ

βουκόλος! by Sextus called Πλεῖον ἢ ἀξίωμα). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist.

Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics,

mentioning, however, only two, προστακτικὸς and ἐβκτικός (so reads the

MS. Waitz suggests ἐφεκτικὸς, more probably it is εὐκτικός). Diog. 191,

mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory

sentences. On the relation of an oath to ἀξίωμα light is thrown by

Simpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus’ distinction between ἀληθορκεῖν and

εὐορκεῖν ψευδορκεῖν and ἐπιορκεῖν in Stob. Floril. 28, 15.

[210] Diog. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. Questions and

other similar sentences are neither true nor false (Ibid. 66 and 68).

This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2,

by Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14; De Fato, 10, 20; Gell. N.

A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35. The purport of the expression

λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς, λεκτὸν ἀποφαντὸν (in Diog. 65; Gell. xvi. 8, 4;

Ammon. De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the same.

[211] Sext. Math. viii. 93: τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ

κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ’ ἣν τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν

ἁπλᾶ τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ. Ibid. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the definitions

of both.

[212] Sext. l.c., by whom Diog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.

[213] Diog. 69: ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ

παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ

διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον.

Further details presently respecting the συνημμένον and διεζευγμένον.

For the παρασυνημμένον—a conditional sentence, the first part of which

is introduced by ἐπειδὴ—see Diog. 71 and 74; for the συμπεπλεγμένον,

the characteristic of which is the καὶ and καὶ, see Diog. 72; Sext.

Math. viii. 124; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 13;

Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.; (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9—Prantl, 446,

says this passage is not quite correct; it only implies that the term

συμπλοκὴ was confined to a copulative judgment); for the αἰτιῶδες,

which is characterised by a διότι, and therefore is not identical with

the παρασυνημμένον, Diog. 72 and 74; for the διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον and

the διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον, Diog. 72; conf. Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188;

Apollon. Synt. (Bekker’s Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the

principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really

indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be

formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus

however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative

judgments could be formed with that material (Plut. Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p.

1047; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).

[214] There is no notice of a division of judgments into general and

particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes

ὡρισμένα as οὗτος κάθηται, ἀόριστα as τὶς κάθηται, and μέσα as ἄνθρωπος

κάθηται, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. When the subject stood in the nominative,

ὡρισμένα were called καταγορευτικὰ (Diog. 70); the others κατηγορικά· a

καταγορευτικὸν is οὗτος περιπατεῖ· a κατηγορικὸν, Δίων περιπατεῖ.

[215] An affirmative judgment was called καταφατικὸν, a negative

ἀποφατικὸν, by Chrysippus in the fragment about to be quoted, and

Simpl. Cat. 102, δ, ζ. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these

terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they

expressed negative sentences, see Boëth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in

Arist. 120.

[216] Diog. 69 gives an example of ἀρνητικὸν, οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ· one of

particular negation, στερητικὸν—ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος· one of double

negation, ὑπεραποφατικὸν—as, οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἐστί.

[217] Sext. Math. viii. 89; Diog. 73: ἀντικείμενα are ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ

ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν or (according to the outward treatment of these

determinations) ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει—as, It is day, and It is not day.

Aristotle called such a contradictory ἀντίφασις, a contrary ἐναντιότης,

putting both under the class conception of ἀντικείμενα. The Stoics

reserved ἀντικείμενα for contradictories (Simpl. Cat. 102, δ and 102,

ζ, a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of ἐνάντιον

is not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is

after all only a difference in terminology. Ἐναντίον they also call

μαχόμενον (Apollon. Synt. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle,

they distinguished between ἐναντίον and ἐναντίως ἔχον· ἐναντία are

conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as φρόνησις

and ἀφρόνησις· ἐναντίως ἔχοντα are those which are only contrasted by

means of the ἐναντία, such as φρόνιμος and ἄφρων (Simpl. Categ. 98, γ).

The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete

notions. That every negative judgment has an affirmative judgment

opposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from

poets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment περὶ

ἀποφατικῶν first edited by Letronne (Fragments inédits, Paris, 1838),

and subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of

probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro περὶ

ἀποφατικῶν, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment

Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one

point, where Bergk is not satisfied.

[218] Simpl. Categ. 103, β; Cic. De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25, 70.

Further particulars above p. 83, 2; 110, 3.

[219] Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their

contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or

pugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the

other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of

these conditions is false (παραδιεζευγμένον). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12;

Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191; Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, b.

[220] Diog. 71; Sext. Math. 109; Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16,

vol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 15. The Stoics distinguish

most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal

punctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with

the inferential clause (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν) and the case in

which it is different (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἔστιν). Conditional

sentences of the first kind are called διφορούμενα συνημμένα. Sext.

viii. 281; 294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112; conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68. That

in all these passages διφορούμενον must be read, and not διαφορούμενον,

appears according to Prantl’s (p. 445, 122) very true observation from

the remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal. Pr. 7, b, on διφορούμενοι

συλλογισμοί.

[221] Sext. Math. viii. 112; κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ

Διαλεκτικοὶ ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ

τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆγον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς, στασιάζουσι πρὸς

ἀλλήλους καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια. Cic. Acad.

ii. 47, 143: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo

judicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut

hoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter

Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. (The further remarks on the points of

difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to

hypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to—the same Philo

against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and 194)—is

the well-known dialectician and pupil of Diodorus, who declared all

conditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause

is not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view,

conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both

false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause

(Sext. l.c. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext.

Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance

among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, for whose connection with Philo

see Diog. vii. 16. But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been

(Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences

may be right, not that they must be right.

Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional

sentences by the connection of the clauses, and either required, for a

conditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite

(ἀντικείμενον) of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with

the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be

potentially (δυνάμει) contained in the leading clause (Sext. Pyrrh. ii.

111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by Diog. 73

as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who

accordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case

to be expressed hypothetically (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15): it was not

right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non

morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari

morietur.

It may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of

conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become

false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to

live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion’s

life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called ἀπεριγράφως

μεταπίπτοντα, because the time could not be previously fixed when they

would become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the

μεταπίπτοντα, according to Dionys. Comp. Verb. p. 72 Schäfer. Diog.

vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, but

characterises them as spurious.

[222] According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the

Stoics distinguished between σημεῖα ὑπομνηστικὰ and σημεῖα ἐνδεικτικά.

The definition of the latter was ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ

καθηγούμενον (or προκαθηγούμενον) ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος· the ὑγιὲς

συνημμένον was a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses

true. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; Math. viii. 249.

[223] Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is

possible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define δυνατὸν as

what is capable of being true (τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι), if

circumstances do not prevent; ἀδύνατον as ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ

ἀληθὲς εἶναι. From the δυνατὸν they distinguish the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,

which is defined as ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν

ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων (Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76;

Boëth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Alex.

Aphr. De Fato, c. 10, p. 30. δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι τοῦτο δ’ ὑπ’

οὐδενὸς κωλύετα γενέσθαι κἂν μὴ γένηται.) On the other hand, ἀναγκαῖον

is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or

owing to other circumstances. Diog. and Boëth. There was probably

another definition of οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, as ὃ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν

ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων· so that it might be said (Boëth. 429) that the

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον was partly possible and partly impossible, without

contradicting (as Boëth. and Prantl, p. 463, believe) their other

statement, that the δυνατὸν was partly necessary and partly not

necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are

thus made to overlap, the former including the Necessary and

Not-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.

To defend his definition of the Possible against the κυριεύων of

Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ

ἀκολουθεῖν, without exposing the confusion contained in it between

sequence in time and causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b; Philop.

Anal. Pr. xlii. b; Schol. in Arist. 163, a; Cic. De Fato, 7, 13; Ep. ad

Div. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack

another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past

occurrence must necessarily be true (Epictet. Diss. ii. 19, 2 and 5).

The Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the

disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true,

without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the

Stoics (Simpl. Cat. 103, β).

[224] Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.

[225] Prantl, pp. 467–496.

[226] Diog. 45; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 194, see above p. 65.

[227] Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term

hypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among the five

ἀναπόδεικτοι. See below p. 119, 2.

[228] Chain-argument seems to have been also treated of in the

categorical form. See p. 120, 3.

[229] As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135;

Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact,

that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at

the very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223.

[230] Anal. Pr. 87, b: δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (Arist. Anal.

Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὓς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους

βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ τῆς

προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου (conditional) ὄντος ἢ

διεζευγμένου (disjunctive) ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου (a copulative judgment

suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the συμπεπλεγμένον in

Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have

the force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same

time A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226.

Cic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for

the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might

otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original

form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.

[231] Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in

definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The

arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not

by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for

instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both

forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων,

ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were

called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment

independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the

major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε

were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The

conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major

premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two

clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics)

and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii.

135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b;

Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal.

Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii.

279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19.

[232] Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες

συλλογισμοὶ, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B,

B = C, ∴ A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things

which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ἀμεθόδως

περαίνοντες of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps.

Galen, Εἰς. διαλ. 59. He then continues: οὓς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι

συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὑγιῶς λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] ... ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται

ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... τοῦ παντὸς

διαμαρτάνουσιν.

[233] συνακτικοὶ or περαντικοὶ, and ἀσυνακτικοὶ or ἀπέραντοι, or

ἀσυλλόγιστοι. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137; Math. viii. 303 and 428; Diog. 77.

[234] Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in

precision of form, were called περαντικοί in the narrower sense; those

complete also in form, συλλογιστικοί. Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ.

58.

[235] An inference is true (ἀληθὴς) when not only the illation is

correct (ὑγιὴς), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as

well as the conclusion, are materially true. The λόγοι συνακτικοὶ may

therefore be divided into true and false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math.

viii. 310 and 412; Diog. 79.

[236] Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 135; Math. viii. 305; 313; and 411: True

forms of inference are divided into ἀποδεικτικοὶ and οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ.

ἀποδεικτικοὶ = οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλόν τι συνάγοντες· οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ

when this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is

light—It is day, ∴ It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is

known as well as it is known that It is day. The ἀποδεικτικοὶ may

proceed either ἐφοδευτικῶς from the premisses to the conclusions, or

ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς· ἐφοδευτικῶς when the premisses rest

upon belief (πίστις and μνήμη); ἐκκαλυπτικῶς when they are based on a

scientific necessity.

[237] According to Diog. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other

forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14,

57), must have been following these authorities.

[238] Consult, on these five ἀναπόδεικτοι of Chrysippus (which need not

be given here more at length, and are absolutely identical with those

of Theophrastus) Diog. 79–81 (on p. 79 we must read συλλογιστικῶν for

συλλογισμὼν. See p. 118, 2); Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156–159; 201; Math. viii.

223–227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 17;

Prantl, 473, 182; on the πέμπτος ἀναπόδεικτος διὰ πλειόνων Sext. Pyrrh.

i. 69; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47; Prantl, p. 475.

[239] Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses,

the other in which the conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The

first class are called διφορούμενοι· If it is day, it is day; It is

day, ∴ It is day. The second class, ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες· It is either

day or night; It is day, ∴ It is day. The latter term is, however,

applied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol.

in Arist. 294, b, 25; Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 96; Prantl, 476, 185.

[240] Cic. Top. 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumerabiles

nascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that

ἀναπόδεικτοι should be divided into ἁπλοῖ and οὐχ ἁπλοῖ. It has been

suggested that ἀποδεικτικῶν should be substituted for ἀναποδείκτων, but

it is also possible that the latter word may be used in a narrow as

well as in a wider sense.

[241] Diog. 78: συλλογιστικοὶ [λόγοι] μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι

ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν

θεμάτων ἢ τινά. According to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224,

Chrysippus had taken great pains in resolving the composite forms of

inference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes.

[242] Sext. 229–243, borrowing the example used by Ænesidemus, but no

doubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite

inference is that mentioned by Sextus l.c. 281.

[243] Sext.; Prantl, p. 478.

[244] Alex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, b, 5, after speaking of the

Sorites, continues (p. 94, b): ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν προτάσεων συνεχείᾳ τό

τε συνθετικόν ἐστι θεώρημα ... καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων

ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. The συνθετικὸν θεώρημα (or

chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a

Peripatetic expression. The same meaning must attach to ἐπιβάλλοντές τε

καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, which are to be found ἐν ταῖς συνεχῶς λαμβανομέναις

προτάσεσι χωρὶς τῶν συμπερασμάτων· for instance, A is a property of B,

B of C, C of D; ∴ A is a property of D. ἐπιβαλλόμενος means the

inference, the conclusion of which is omitted; ἐπιβάλλων, the one with

the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three

Aristotelian figures κατὰ τὸ παραδεδομένον συνθετικὸν θεώρημα. ὃ οἱ μὲν

περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τῇ χρείᾳ παραμετρήσαντες παρέδοσαν, ἐφ’ ὅσον αὐτὴ

ἀπῇτει, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ [στοᾶς] παρ’ ἐκείνων λαβόντες καὶ διελόντες

ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ καλούμενον παρ’ αὐτοῖς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον θέμα

καὶ τέταρτον, ἀμελήσαντες μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν δυνάμενον

λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ κἂν ἄχρηστος ᾖ, ἐπεξελθόντες τε καὶ

ζηλώσαντες. Reference is made to the same thing in Simpl. De Cœlo;

Schol. in Arist. 483, b, 26: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀνάλυσις τοῦ λόγου, ἡ τὸ

συμπέρασμα λαμβάνουσα καὶ προσλαμβάνουσα ἄλλην πρότασιν, κατὰ τὸ τρίτον

λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς θέμα περαίνεται, the rule of which is,

that when a third proposition can be drawn from the conclusion of an

inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be drawn

also from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition.

Both these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his

summing up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον

and τέταρτον θέμα mentioned by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, vol. v.

224; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly suggest to him the various

forms of the ἀναπόδεικτοι instead of the formulæ for the resolution of

composite conclusions. The expressions διὰ δύο τροπικῶν, διὰ τριῶν

τροπικῶν, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ διὰ τριῶν

(sc. τροπικῶν or λημμάτων conf. p. 117, 3) in Diog. vii. 191; (Galen,

l.c.; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite

inferences.

[245] Called μονολήμματοι συλλογισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα

ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, ζῇς ἄρα. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8,

a: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272,

Oud.; Prantl, 477, 186.

[246] Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex.

Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 57. If

Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical

conclusions συνακτικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀξιώματος, and the Stoics also,

according to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke

of a κατὰ δύναμιν τροπικὸν, we have already met with the same thing, p.

119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the ἀμεθόδως

περαίνοντες, which, by the addition of an ἀξίωμα, can be changed into

regular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the τόπος παράδοξος was

also treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably

suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics.

[247] Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3.

According to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on

Συλλογιστικαὶ ἄχρηστοι.

[248] Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only

have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.

[249] The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on

fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος.

[250] Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim

interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto

prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur

ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii.

253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl.

Cat. 6, γ). With this λόγος ἡσυχάζων (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489,

connects ἀργὸς λόγος (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the

practical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The

ἀργὸς λόγος, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad

absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it

attributed to him.

[251] Prantl, pp. 485–496.

[252] Sext. Math. viii. 367: ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν

αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται

προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τυγχάνειν.

Ibid. 375: ἀλλ’ εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ

ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως

ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς,

κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.

[253] Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132):

(1) εἰδικῶς into τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ

θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ· (2) γενικῶς into three divisions,

περὶ κόσμον, περὶ στοιχείων, and the αἰτιολογικός. The first of these

divisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to natural science and

is partly shared by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Simpl.

Phys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and

natural science); and the third, ground which is shared by both the

physician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject

into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very

uncomfortable division.

[254] Soph. 247, D.

[255] Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν,

ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. Plac. i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα

τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. iv. 20: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνήν·

πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ ... ἔτι

πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστιν ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά

ἐστιν. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam

effici posse ab ea [natura] quæ expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut

quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately: in quo

efficeretur aliquid. Conf. Ritter, iii. 577) posse esse non corpus.

Seneca, see below p. 128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. i. 336 (see p. 95, 2)

and 338: Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι’ ὅ. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ

σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως. αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ

τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε

ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1 and 2. Diog.

vii. 56: According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a),

and others, the voice is material, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι. Ibid.

150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ

Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν, ἐξ ἧς

ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται ... σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία. Hippolyt.

Refut. Hær. i. 21: σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, κ.τ.λ.

[256] As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos.

129.

[257] Diog. vii. 135: σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ

τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ.

[258] See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be

subsequently discussed.

[259] See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the

difference of ἡνωμένα· (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod

ex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi

debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in

Plut. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085: τὰς ποιότητας οὐσίας καὶ σώματα

ποιοῦσιν, and Ibid. 44, 4, the statement discussed on p. 101, 2.

[260] Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious

treatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): ἡ δὲ [ἕξις = ποιότης] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα

ἀντιστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό. ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα

τείνεσθαι, ψαῦσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ

τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμίσθη. ἕξεως ὁ συνεχὴς

οὗτος δίαυλος ἄφθαρτος, κ.τ.λ. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D [De Mundo,

1169, A]: ἡ δ’ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος. There can be no doubt

that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.

The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul

and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the

Divine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf. Alex.

Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a: ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται [Χρύσιππος] τὴν σύμπασαν

οὐσίαν πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνάγεταί τε

καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν. (That must be the reading,

the next sentence containing τῶν δὲ, κ.τ.λ. Conf. 143, b). Alex. 143,

b, carefully denies the statement, that the all-penetrating Breath

keeps things together.

[261] Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet

nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit:

quidquid facit corpus est ... sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur,

ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.

[262] This is the conception of τόνος, upon which the strength of the

soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut.

Sto. Rep. 7, 4, p. 1034: πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 110: ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν

νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν

καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή. All properties may be classed under the same

conception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2, p.

1085: γῆν μὲν γὰρ ἴσασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔτε αὑτὰ συνέχειν οὔτε ἕτερα,

πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ, καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν·

ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τ’ εἶναι δι’ εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικὰ καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν

ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. Ps.

Censorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn: Initia rerum eadem elementa et

principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem,

qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente

rursus a summo referatur ad medium. Here tenor or τόνος is made

equivalent to πνεῦμα. Seneca, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21,

endeavours to show that intentio belongs to spiritus more than to any

other body.

[263] Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus

est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria

sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi

sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse

sit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et

avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species

ejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the

Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing

itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.

[264] Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα

οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ... οὐσία μὲν

παρ’ ὅσον ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ

εἰκότως, φασί. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ

λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη

πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον

ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε.

Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2.

[265] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς

καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ

φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν

μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ... οἱ δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς

κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ

λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας

οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς

τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον,

τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. Plutarch

is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5).

observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam

ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid

ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See

p. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be

substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) with the leading

part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα

and ζῷα. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi

scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quæstione jactata apud nostros: an

justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint....

Me in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos

moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil

aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde:

virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (ὁρμὴ) potest. If it

is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of

living beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one

animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and

the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et

prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the

same letter, 23, we gather that Cleanthes explained ambulatio as

spiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as

principale itself.

[266] See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117.

[267] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ

πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμά ἐστιν,

ἡ δ’ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ

ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα, καὶ ἡ δεκάτη, καὶ

πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ

φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός.

[268] Diog. 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἄερα κατεψυγμένον

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν

πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν, θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα καταθαλπόμενον, κ.τ.λ.

Stob. Ecl. i. 260: Chrysippus defines ἔαρ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ

χειμῶνας ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου ... θέρος δὲ ὥραν τὴν μάλιστ’

ἀφ’ ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην· μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μὲν πρὸ

χειμῶνος δὲ κεκραμένην· χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην,

ἢ τὴν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀέρι κατεψυγμένην. Ibid.: According to Empedocles and

the Stoics, the cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause

of summer the preponderance of fire. Ibid. 556: μεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ, φησὶ

[Χρύσιππος] τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα

φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four

meanings of μήν. In the two first it means something material; in the

others, as a definition of time, something immaterial.

[269] Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237;

viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.

[270] See p. 94, 1.

[271] See p. 66, 1.

[272] See p. 93; 132, 1.

[273] See p. 84, 4.

[274] See p. 105, 3.

[275] Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is

heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded

with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the

whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the presence of some

material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there

must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various

materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its

own identity.

[276] Diog. vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ

Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ

παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον

ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται. According to Stob. Ecl. i. 374,

the Stoics more accurately distinguish μῖξις, κρᾶσις, παράθεσις,

σύγχυσις. Παράθεσις is σωμάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for

instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Μῖξις is δύο ἢ καὶ

πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι’ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ

αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and

body. Such a union is called μῖξις in the case of solid bodies, κρᾶσις

in the case of fluids. Σύγχυσις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ

σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, as in

the making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according

to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of

μῖξις: παράθεσις, or union of substances, in which each retains its

οἰκεία οὐσία or ποιότης κατὰ τὴν περιγραφήν; σύγχυσις, in which both

substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (φθείρεσθαι), giving

rise to a third body; κρᾶσις = δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινων σωμάτων ὅλων

δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ

μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας.

Materials thus united can be again separated, but yet are they so

united: ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ

μίγματι.

For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one body

to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a

homogeneous mass. Hence the expression σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν,

σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου

περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου (Plut. C. Not.

37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b;

Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller

body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by

Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν

θάλατταν, or even εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν

(Plut. 10; Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the

smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise

be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily

occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex.

142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C. Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The

absurdities which this theory involves were already exposed by

Arcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and

Plotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) περὶ τῆς δι’

ὅλων κράτεως.

[277] Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ

προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. Sext. Pyrrh.

iii. 56. See previous note.

[278] According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by

Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—our notion of κρᾶσις

is different from that of σύγχυσις or παράθεσις. (2) Many bodies are

capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties;

frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul

penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So

φύσις does in plants, and ἕξις does in all which it connects. (4) The

same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and

earth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and

of light, which penetrates air.

The first of these arguments clearly does not embody the real reason in

the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to

prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena

to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of

simple intermingling (παράθεσις) or complete (σύγχυσις) mixing. Nor

does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the

corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of κρᾶσις

as distinct from παράθεσις and σύγχυσις. For heat, according to the

Peripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light

as a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a),

παράθεσις and σύγχυσις sufficing for other things. Even the fact,

greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be again

separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378),

was not conclusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition

depended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by

Stobæus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an oiled sponge, it will

absorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial

change of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the

Peripatetics, was clung to, it was no difficult matter for an opponent

to reply. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of

property to subject-matter, of φύσις to φυτὸν, of God to the world, can

hardly be otherwise explained than it was by Chrysippus, if once

material existence be assigned to the soul, to φύσις, to ἕξις, and to

God. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of

κρᾶσις was based; and Simplicius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys.

123, b): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον

ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς

σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν ... σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς

ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν

ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι, συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ

σώματος χωρεῖν.

[279] See p. 95, 2; 126, 1.

[280] On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινὴ, see

p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν

ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ’ αὐτούς

ἐστιν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι’ ὅλων τρεπτὴ, μεταβαλλούσης τε ταύτης γίνεται

τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: ἡ ὕλη

καθ’ αὑτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος. M. Aurel. xii. 30: μία οὐσία κοινὴ,

κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώματι μυρίοις. Diog. 137: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα

στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην.

[281] See p. 141, 2.

[282] Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1.

[283] See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2.

[284] Simpl. Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, a, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ

τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν.

διὸ καὶ εὐθεῖαν ὁρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην.

[285] Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν

μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ

ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν.

Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 29: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ,

τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ

ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων

ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark

is confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the

language of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28. Schl. p. 425), in reference to

Chrysippus: πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὑτῆς μέσον ἡ οὐσία καὶ

ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὑτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσεσι.

[286] Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ

ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν

ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα ἀΐδιον

διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Such is the teaching of Zeno,

Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. Sext. Math. ix. 11:

οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχὰς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν

ποιεῖν ὑπειλήφασι, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. Similarly

Alex. Aph. De Mixt. 144; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E; Plut. Pl.

Phil. i. 3, 39; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; 322, according to the passage

quoted, p. 101, 2, from Zeno respecting ὕλη: διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν

τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόνπερ ἐν τῇ γόνῃ τὸ

σπέρμα. Sen. Ep. 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in

rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet

iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e.

ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat, ex illa varia opera

producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc

causa est, illud materia. Ibid. 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo

constant ... potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est

Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.

[287] Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest,

id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν

ἐστιν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most

general Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14—τοῦτο, δι’

ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—and by him said to express the views

of several schools, expresses a narrower conception—the conception of

efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential

one.

[288] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια,

and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’

ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that,

according to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought

to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these.

He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa

efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De

Fato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et

principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and

Aristotelian distinction of αἴτιον δι’ ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ. See Zeller’s

Philosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p.

1056 distinguishes between αἴτια αὐτοτελὴς and προκαταρκτική. Alex.

Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ

μὲν προκαταρκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἑκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ

ἄλλο τι. Conf. Orelli ad locum.

[289] Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to

which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba

causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et

generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia

simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est

Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulistis, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ,

sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον

δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ ... Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δ’ ὃ ...

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον

ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως.

[290] Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens,

conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues:

Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto

non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.

See Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext.

Math. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander.

[291] According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.

[292] Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as

the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living

things, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum

et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and circulation are the

result of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere

in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes

mundi ... calore fultæ sustinentur. There must be fire in earth and

stones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially

fresh spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion

warms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as

it evaporates, air derives its heat.... Jam vero reliqua quarta pars

mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et cæteris naturis omnibus

salutarem impertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes

mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique

natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet,

calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo

insit procreandi vis, &c.

[293] On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38.

3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext.

Math. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even

a particular one from Zeno.

[294] Sext. Math. ix. 75.

[295] Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione

utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo

melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and

12, 34. Sext. Math. ix. 104: εἰ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν

ἐστιν, οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστι, λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ... τὸ

γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν·

οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος.

Likewise Diog. 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius

agree that the world is ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν· τὸ γὰρ

ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῷον κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρα ὁ

κόσμος.

[296] Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars

aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non

igitur caret sensu mundus.

[297] Diog. 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας

ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Sext. Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ

Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὑτωσὶ συνερωτᾷ· τὸ

προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προΐεται

σπέρμα λογικοῦ, λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. The same proof in Sext.

Math. ix. 77 and 84; Cic. l.c. Conf. ibid. ii. 31, 79; 6, 18, where

also the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is

referred to.

[298] Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est,

inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est

homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui

potuit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit,

nisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid.

ii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based

on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs.

[299] Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the

existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he

employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the

regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a

builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling

spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of

Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32–66, gives very fully the

physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is

given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i.

1, 2–4; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i.

2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of

considering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext.

Math. ix. 26.

[300] See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math.

ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero

distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and that being

which is altogether reasonable and perfect deity.

[301] See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2.

[302] Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2:

πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ

ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις

ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. Cic. N. D. ii. 29:

according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non

solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere

aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικὸν] ut in homine mentem, &c....

Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus,

esse omnium optimum. See following note.

[303] Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther

videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14,

36: (Zeno) æthera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem præterea et eum, quem antea

dixi, æthera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii. 138: οὐρανὸς δέ

ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Ibid. 139: τὸν

ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν

αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ... Χρύσιππος δ’ ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ...

τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. He continues: ὁ μέντοι

Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτερον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ [= τῷ

οὐρανῷ] ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν, αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ

τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς

καθ’ ἕξιν. Arius Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 15, 4: Χρυσίππῳ δὲ

[ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι ἤρεσε] τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ

εἰλικρινέστατον, ἅτε πάντων εὐκινητότατον ὄντα καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιάγοντα

τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν. Ibid. xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air

surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8:

Zeus dwells in heaven, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ

κόσμου ψυχῆς. Tertullian (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately

attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.

[304] Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri =

κρατεῖν τῶν ὄντων putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch.

428) in N. D. i. 14, 37: either he considers the original deity; for

this does not exclude the other. No doubt he identified αἰθὴρ with

calor (see p. 144, 1), believing that it emanated from the sun. Diog.

139: Κλεάνθης δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν φασι] τὸν ἥλιον. Ar. Didymus, l.c.

ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ

μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων

διοίκησιν, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 452; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 4.

According to Epiphan. Exp. Fidei, 1090, C, he called the sun the

δᾳδοῦχος to the universe.

[305] Stob. l.c.: Ἀρχίδαμος (leg. with Cod. A Ἀρχέδημος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν

τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο: the same statement without

mentioning the name in Ar. Didymus, l.c. This reminds one somewhat of

the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus.

The resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if Simpl. De Cœlo,

Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying Archedemus denied with

the Pythagoreans that the earth was in the centre of the world.

[306] See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14:

στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος,

τούτου δ’ ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεὸν, ὡς Πλάτων.

[307] Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Hær. i. 21:

Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ

καθαρώτατον (æther). Diog. 148: Antipater calls the οὐσία θεοῦ

ἀεροειδής. Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Panætius) defines

God to be τὸν κόσμον τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἐπὶ πνεύματος. Sext.

Pyrrh. iii. 218: Στωϊκοὶ δὲ [λέγουσι θεὸν] πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν

εἰδεχθῶν (the adverse). Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, 31 (Schol. in

Ar. 607, a, 19): τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν

αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕγῃ εἶναι. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives them credit: πνεύματι

ὡς διὰ πάντων διήκοντι ἀνάπτειν τό τε εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ σώζεσθαι καὶ

συμμένειν. Compare the quotations p. 127, 5 and De An. 145: [τὸν νοῦν]

καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν.

Lucian, Hermot. 81: ἀκούομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν

οὐρανῷ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων καὶ λίθων καὶ

ζῴων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων. Tertullian, Ad Nation. ii. 4: Zeno makes

God penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honeycombs. See

p. 105, 3.

Clemens, Strom. v. 591, A: φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ

πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. Ibid. i. 295, C: (οἱ

Στωϊκοὶ) σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεὸν διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὕλης πεφοιτηκέναι

λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. Protrept. 44, A: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διὰ πάσης ὕλης,

καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης, τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας. Orig. c. Cels. vi.

71: τῶν Στωϊκῶν φασκόντων ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμά ἐστι διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς

καὶ πάντ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεχόν. Opponents like Origen, l.c. and i. 21,

Alexander, De Mixt. l.c., and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack

them for their materialistic views.

[308] Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to

Chrysippus and Posidonius): τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ

πρόνοιαν ... εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν

τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον. More popularly,

ibid. 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον λογικὸν τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν

εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν

κόσμῳ, μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιοῦργον τῶν

ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ

πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Phæd.

Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 1 and Cic. Nat. De. i. 15, 39,

quoting from him: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is κοινὴ χύσις,

εἱμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. Col. 3: He considered νόμος to be

deity. Cic. l.c.: legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim ... Jovem dicit esse.

Themist. De An. 72, b: τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ... διὰ πάσης οὐσίας

πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις, καὶ ποῦ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν,

ποῦ δὲ φύσιν, ποῦ δὲ ἕξιν. Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt

hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quæ se et ipsum fabricata

sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ipsius

vero mundi ... natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem

Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque

omnium.... As every nature develops from its stock, sic Natura mundi

omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμὰς

Græci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi,

qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is

called πρόνοια. M. Aurel. iv. 40: ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ

ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· πῶς εἰς αἴσθησιν μίαν τὴν τούτου

πάντα ἀναδίδοται καὶ πῶς ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom.

72. Tertullian, Apol. 21: Hunc enim (λόγον) Zeno determinat

factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum

vocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Hæc

Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis

affirmat. Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. Epiphan. Hær. v. 1, p.

12: According to the Stoics, God is νοῦς, residing in the world as its

soul, and permeating the μερικαὶ οὐσίαι. Zeus is also spoken of as

being the soul of the world by Cornutus, Nat. De. 2; by Plut. Sto. Rep.

39, 2, p. 1052; and by Chrysippus, ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050: ὅτι δ’ ἡ κοινὴ

φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς

ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ’

αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ζήνων ... [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] δυνάμιν κινητικὴν

τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν

καλεῖν. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He

is kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called κόσμος as αἴτιος τοῦ

ζῇν, εἱμαρμένη, because εἱρομένῳ λόγῳ διοικεῖ all things, ἀδράστεια,

ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν, πρόνοια, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον

οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. Aristocles (Ibid. xv. 14): Primary fire contains the

causes and λόγοι of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the

world supplies their connection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1: Quid enim aliud

est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus

inserta?... Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly

Frag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii. 8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or

Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature,

the World. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωϊκὸς θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο τὴν

εἱμαρμένην. Zeus is called κοινὸς νόμος by Diog. vii. 88; by Cleanthes

at the end of his hymn (Stob. Ecl. i. 34); likewise Cic. N. D. i. 14,

36 says of Zeno: Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim

obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not. 32,

1; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be

conceived of as μακάριος, εὐποιητικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κηδεμονικὸς,

ὠφέλιμος. Muson. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every

virtue, μεγαλόφρων, εὐεργετικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 95, 48:

Quæ causa est Dis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat, si quis illos putat

nocere nolle: non possunt. Further details respecting the beneficent

nature of the Gods in Sen. Benef. i. 9; iv. 3–9 and 26–28; Clement. i.

5, 7; Nat. Qu. v. 18, 13. On the divine omniscience; Ep. 83, 1; V.

Beat. 20, 5.

[309] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the

argument as to God’s providential care of the world into three parts.

The first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must

also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having

something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that

can be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the world must

be governed by deity. The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom

and power of deity, which must always busy itself with what is best and

highest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the

universe, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that

everything must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved

that the force and skill of nature produced and sustains all things.

All the more reason that a universe so skilfully formed and so

harmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since,

in its parts, it could not be more beautiful or adapted to its purpose,

it must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes

its origin to a forming reason. The third part aims at proving, on

physico-theological grounds, quanta sit admirabilitas cœlestium rerum

atque terrestrium.

[310] Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ

κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] ... Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες,

οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον

πᾶσιν ... Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον. Ib. 64; Plut. Plac. i.

8, 17: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν (Plut. κοινότερον) θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ

τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (a similar definition of nature

is given by Zeno in Cic. Nat. De. ii. 22, 57) ἐμπεριειληφός τε πάντας

τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα (Pl. ἕκαστα) καθ’ εἱμαρμένην

γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνδιῆκον, δι’ ὅλον τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας

μεταλαμβάνον διὰ τὰς τῆς ὅλης, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε μεταλλάξεις. Following

the same source, Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 5, Schl.: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν

θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν, κ.τ.λ. (the same down to γίνεται) τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ

διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ’ αὐτοὺς, Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ

ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ’

ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε, καλούμενος. The latter passage

is explained by Diog. 147, who thus continues: Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν

τὰ πάντα· Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῇν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῇν

κεχώρηκεν. (This, too, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48.) Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς

αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ

Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ

ὑγρόν. καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοί τινος ὁμοιότητος ἀπέδοσαν. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p.

1085: τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες. M. Aurel. 5,

32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev.

xv. 16, 1: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ... πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71:

κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ μέχρι

ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων καταβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα

σωματικόν. The same combination of nature and mind in the conceptions

of God is found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30), Zeus

being described as the ἀρχηγὸς φύσεως, who directs the κοινὸς λόγος ὃς

διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ, by means of πῦρ ἀείζωον.

[311] Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν

ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω·

πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον

δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἔπειτα [? perhaps: αὐτὸ, or: πυρὸς ἢ] αἰθερὸς, ὥστε καὶ

εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά. Diog. vii. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ

πῦρ ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι.

[312] Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15,

40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in

this: Ordinary (ἄτεχνον) fire consumes things; but the πῦρ τεχνικὸν,

which constitutes φύσις and ψυχὴ, preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in

making primary fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but

warmth, which may be equally well described as atmospheric substance or

as ψυχή.

[313] Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam

cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima

omnium causa, ex qua ceteræ pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: Vis illum

fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa

causarum. The same applies to the name of providence and nature. See p.

162, 2.

[314] Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν

εἱμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ

τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Conf. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125,

where prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a

fato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077: λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος,

ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον (instead of which Heine,

Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p. 25, apparently without reason, conjectures: καὶ

τῷ μὲν σώματι τὸν κόσμον), τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις

γένηται μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν

πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας

διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by

Philo, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, πρόνοια is equivalent to ψυχὴ

τοῦ κόσμου.

[315] According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius.

With him Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and

εἱμαρμένη for its second production.

[316] Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in

unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi,

cogitationibus suis traditus.