It has been suggested by Byron's enemies that he flattered himself with
the notion of some day becoming King of Greece, and that his conduct
during the latter part of his life was influenced by ambition. The idea
is, of course, absurd. No one knew better than Byron that the Greek
_leaders_ were not disposed to accept a King at that time. He also knew
that, in order to attain that position, it would have been necessary to
have recourse to measures which were utterly repugnant to his deep sense
of humanity and justice. That Byron may have been sounded by some of the
intriguing chieftains with some such suggestion is more than probable, but
he was far too honest to walk into the snare. One day he said to Parry:
'I have experienced, since my arrival at Missolonghi, offers that
would surprise you, were I to tell you of them, and which would turn
the head of any man less satiated than I am, and more desirous of
possessing power than of contributing to freedom and happiness. To all
these offers, and to every application made to me, which had a
tendency to provoke disputes or increase discord, I have always
replied: "I came here to serve Greece; agree among yourselves for the
good of your country, and whatever is your _united_ resolve, and
whatever the Government commands, I shall be ready to support with my
fortune and my sword." We who came here to fight for Greece have no
right to meddle with its internal affairs, or dictate to the people or
Government.'
That Byron, if he had lived, and if he had chosen to _usurp_ power, could
have made himself a Dictator admits of no doubt. In the then state of that
distracted country, and the well-known mercenary disposition of the
Greeks, he might with his dollars have raised an army which would have
made him supreme in Greece.
'No single chieftain,' Parry says, '_could_ have resisted; and all of
them would have been compelled--because they would not trust one
another--to join their forces with Byron's. The whole of the Suliotes
were at his beck and call. He could have procured the assassination of
any man in Greece for a sum too trifling to mention.'
But Byron had no such views; he never wished to possess political power in
Greece. He had come to serve the Greeks on their own conditions, and
nothing could have made him swerve from that intention.
Byron's talk with Trelawny at Cephalonia on this subject was not serious,
and it took place before he had mastered all the perplexing problems
connected with Greece.
It is to Byron's lasting credit that, with so many opportunities for
self-aggrandizement, he should have proved himself so unselfish and
high-minded.
What might have happened if he had been able to attend the Congress at
Salona we shall never know. But we feel confident, from a long and close
study of Byron's character, that, even if the Government and the
chieftains had offered him the throne of Greece, he would have refused it.
Not only would such a throne have been, figuratively, poised in air,
swayed by every breath which the rival chieftains would have blown upon
it, but Byron himself would have been accused, throughout the length and
breadth of Europe, of exploiting the sufferings of Greece for his own
personal aggrandizement. While we are discussing this question, it is well
to understand the position of affairs at the time when the proposal to
hold a Congress at Salona was made.
The ostensible object of the Congress was to shake hands all round, to let
bygones be bygones, and to unite all available forces in a spirit of
amity. It was high time. The Morea was troubled by the hostilities between
Colocotroni's men and Government factions. Colocotroni[22] himself was
shut up in Tripolitza, and his son Pano in Napoli di Romagna. Eastern
Greece was more or less tranquil. Odysseus[23] was at Negropont, from
whence seven hundred Albanians had lately absconded. The passes of
Thermopylæ were insecure. Although Western Greece was for the moment
tranquil, life in Missolonghi was not worth an hour's purchase; and there
was a serious split between the so-called Odysseans and the party of
Mavrocordato, skilfully fostered by both Colonel Stanhope and Odysseus.
Though Candia was subdued, the peasantry threatened a rising in the
mountains; the Albanians were discontented; and, finally, the Government
itself was not sleeping on a bed of roses, for it had most of the great
military chiefs dead against it.
There were, in fact, at that time two Governments--one at Argos and one at
Tripolitza--and both hostile to each other. The Primates were in favour
of a Turkish form of government, and they had great influence in the
Morea. The chiefs, on the contrary, while professing democratic
principles, were really in favour of frank terrorism and plunder. Some of
them were personally brave; others were the offspring of heroes, whom the
Turks had never been able to subdue, and who held a sort of feudal tenure
over lands which they had kept by the sword. The people of the
Peloponnesus were under the influence of the civil and military oligarchs;
those of Eastern and Western Greece were chiefly under the captains. Of
these, Odysseus and Mavrocordato were the most influential. The islands
Hydra and Spezzia were under the influence of some rich oligarchs; while
Ipsara was purely democratic. The only virtue to be found in Greece was
monopolized by the peasantry, who had passed through a long period of
Turkish oppression without being tainted by that corruption which was so
prevalent in the towns. Indeed, the peasants and some of the islanders
were the finest examples of the 'national' party, which had never been
subdued by military or civil tyrants. When we consider the mercenary
character of the Greeks, their real or assumed poverty, their insatiable
demands for Byron's money; when one realizes the hopeless tangle into
which greed and ambition had thrown the affairs of Greece (the open
hostility of the capitanis to any settled form of government), it is
evident that the supreme management of such a circus would have been no
sinecure. No one believed that Greece, under the conditions then
prevailing, would have found repose under a foreign King. Nothing short of
a cruel, unflinching despotism would have quieted the country.
It is, of course, possible that the chiefs assembled at Salona would have
offered to Byron the general direction of affairs in the western
continent. Gamba says that he had heard rumours to the effect that in a
short time the general government of Greece would have been placed in
Byron's hands. 'Considering,' he says, 'the vast addition to his authority
which the arrival of the moneys from England would have insured to Byron,
such an idea is by no means chimerical.'
Writing to Barff on March 22, Byron says:
'In a few days Prince Mavrocordato and myself intend to proceed to
Salona at the request of Odysseus and the chiefs of Eastern Greece, to
concert, if possible, a plan of union between Western and Eastern
Greece, and to take measures, offensive and defensive, for the ensuing
campaign. Mavrocordato is _almost_ recalled by the _new_ Government to
the Morea (to take the lead, I rather think), and they have written to
propose to me to go either to the Morea with him, or to take the
general direction of affairs in this quarter with General Londos, and
any other I may choose, to form a Council. Andrea Londos is my old
friend and acquaintance, since we were lads in Greece together. It
would be difficult to give a positive answer till the Salona meeting
is over; but I am willing to serve them in any capacity they please,
either commanding or commanded--it is much the same to me, as long as
I can be of any presumed use to them.'