the American Colonies, not only on account of our long standing
correspondence of thirty to forty years, but also on that of the true
affection with which we have endeavored to serve them. I am lately
arrived at Madrid on some particular affairs, which have occasioned my
treating with the ministers of State, who have honored me with their
especial favors and trust, and of course this has led me into the
bottom of the principal affairs of Europe, among which I have talked
about your coming from Paris to Spain, undoubtedly with the design of
treating on the subject of the Colonies, as I judge they have already
done, and continue doing at Paris. But I have heard that in such a
small place as Madrid it would be absolutely impossible to remain
incog, either by your own or any other name, and you would of course
be spied by the gentlemen here who have a real interest therein, and
consequently you could not treat with the ministers without hurting
the Colonies in the highest degree by your own doings; and, besides,
you would set this Court at variance without success. I judge you
will improve the opportunity which offers by chance, and I think is
an excellent one, and have therefore no objections to hint it to you;
being fully assured that it will cause no displeasure here.
The Marquis of Grimaldi intends to set out soon for Biscay, and I
propose to do the same for my house at Bilboa, all which we shall so
manage as to meet one and the other at Vitoria, where we shall tarry
under some good disguise until our mutual arrival; and as this noble
minister has had to this day the entire direction of all affairs,
and is of course fully acquainted with his Majesty’s intentions, I
believe he is the most proper person with whom you may treat either
in said place, or some country house that might be picked up for the
purpose, and thereby avoid the inconveniences which must inevitably
follow by your coming to Madrid. By the aforesaid belief I have given
you a further proof of my attachment to the Colonies, and I must also
add with all truth, that the principal persons here are of the same
opinion, although the present state of affairs obliges them to make no
show thereof. In short, Sir, I hope you will approve of my proposed
method being the safest and most natural to carry on the views of both
parties, I beg you will give me an answer through the same hands, as
will deliver the present to you, not doubting that you will tarry at
Vitoria until we get there, and you will also observe that you will be
at full liberty to proceed to Madrid if you should judge proper, after
you have talked over the matter with the said nobleman.
I have the honor to subscribe myself, &c.
JAMES GARDOQUI.
_P. S._ Having considered upon the properest place for our meeting, we
have settled it on that of Burgos instead of Vitoria, which pray note
accordingly, and I hope to meet you there.
[In a letter dated at Burgos, 28th February, 1777, Mr Lee replied to
the above as follows. “I have the honor of yours of the 17th, and
agreeable to your request will wait for you at this place.”]
TO THE COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.
Bordeaux, February 18th, 1777.
Gentlemen,
On my arrival here, on my way to Madrid, I found a letter dated
February 2d, from a confidential correspondent, which contains the
following passages. “Ten thousand Germans are already engaged, and
ships sent to convey them; the number of British cannot exceed three
thousand, and those very indifferent; but much is expected from their
being sent early. Boston is certainly to be attacked in the spring.
Burgoyne will command. Howe will probably attack Philadelphia. The
government expect great advantage from dissensions in Pennsylvania.”
Finding that our commerce here labors under great difficulties from the
heavy duties laid on fish, oil, wax, &c., I have directed an account
of it to be transmitted to your Commissioners at Paris, together with
an estimate of the imports and exports during the last year from
the United States, that they may be better enabled to negotiate an
alleviation or removal of the duties, which were originally intended to
discourage the British commerce.
I had the honor of stating to you a year ago, that tobacco was the
most weighty political engine we could employ with the French Court.
It is absolutely necessary to the Farmers-General, and the Farmers as
absolutely necessary to government.
Mr Delap informs me that there are several more cargoes belonging to
the Congress, in the hands of merchants in Spain, the proceeds of which
cannot be obtained. I have written to Mr Morris, at Nantes, begging the
favor of him to send me a proper account of them, that I may complain
of those merchants at the Court of Spain. There is a ship at Nantes,
totally deserted by her crew, which has been lying there many months
unregarded, at an expense to the Congress of one hundred dollars per
month. I have advised Mr Schweighauser to consult with Mr. Morris about
selling her, which ought to have been done as soon as her crew quitted
her.
The ship too, which was intrusted to Mr Myrkle, is lying here at a
considerable charge, and no appearance of her return.
I enclose you Captain Cleveland’s account of Mr Myrkle’s conduct, which
he wishes may be offered in his justification. I have referred him to
Dr Franklin for advice.
I have the honor of being your obedient servant,
ARTHUR LEE.
TO THE COMMISSIONERS IN PARIS.
Vitoria, February 26th, 1777.
Dear Sirs,
I am thus far safe on my journey, which by the spur of six pistoles
more I am to finish two days sooner than was at first agreed.
Therefore, if no accident happens, I shall reach my destination the
6th of next month. In the Committee’s letter of the 23d of October to
me, it is said, “we are to negotiate with other nations agreeable to
certain plans and instructions transmitted to Mr Deane.” I have none
with me, nor do I remember to have seen any, but those which relate
expressly to France, and that plan has already been transmitted where
I am going. Nothing is more likely than my being asked what I have to
propose, particularly relative to this meridian. This question was put
to us on our first visit to ____ ____.[11] But the same answer will not
serve here. I must entreat you, therefore, to favor me with your ideas
upon this particular. What alteration would you think proper in that
plan, when applied to this country? It is best to be prepared for every
favorable moment that may offer. This must plead my pardon for urging
as speedy an answer as possible. It would grieve me to be put to the
alternative of letting a favorable opportunity pass unembraced, or
of hazarding a measure of so much moment to the public, upon my weak
judgment and very limited information.
With my best wishes for your health and success, and begging to be
remembered kindly to our friends, I have the honor to be, with the
greatest esteem, dear Sirs, your obedient servant,
ARTHUR LEE.
[11] This blank should probably be filled up with the name of Count
d’Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador in France.
MEMORIAL,
_Delivered by Arthur Lee to the Marquis de Grimaldi_.
Burgos, March 5th, 1777.
Upon maturely weighing what his Excellency the Marquis de Grimaldi had
the goodness to communicate from his Majesty, Mr Lee feels himself
obliged (notwithstanding his earnest wish to coincide with his
Majesty’s views, and conciliate his amity to the United States) to beg
his attention to the following considerations.
1st. Were it the question now, whether Mr Lee being at Paris
should come to Madrid, he might do it or not without any material
consequences, but it being known, that he was deputed upon that
business, and upon his way, his return without going to Madrid will
beget an opinion, that Spain has renounced the States of America, in
refusing to receive their deputy. For the fact of his return being
notorious, and the reasons for it necessarily secret, it will make the
same impression as if no such reasons existed.
This opinion will very materially injure the credit of the States
in France and Holland, and it may have a very unfavorable effect in
America. For it must be considered, that the fact will reach America
by a thousand channels, while the reasons for it can pass through one
only, and that too from the situation of things in obscure hints.
Mr Lee therefore hopes, that his Majesty will weigh these reasons
before he determines finally upon a measure, which may be deemed
ungracious to the Congress, and highly detrimental to their interests.
2dly. Mr Lee cannot conceive on what pretence of reason, right, or
law, the English Ambassador, or his Court, can take exception to his
Majesty’s receiving a deputy from the United States, since the right
of a neutral Court so to do is clearly established by the unquestioned
practice of all times, and recognised by the best writers on the laws
of nations. Neither has the English Ambassador at Paris, or his Court,
taken any exception to it there.
3dly. That it will be so far from preventing the execution of any
gracious intentions his Majesty may have of assisting the States,
that the best and safest channel of conveying that aid is from one
from which Mr Lee’s being at Madrid will rather divert than direct
the attention of England. Next to an immediate declaration, a supply
of money to support the credit of the States, and pay for what is
necessary, is the most effectual aid. The support of this contest calls
upon the Congress for considerable funds. The means of establishing
them by the export of their produce are slow and uncertain. This
obliges them to have recourse for assistance to the powers that are
friendly to their cause; among whom they have the greatest reliance
upon his Majesty the king of Spain. This purpose will be answered by
his Majesty’s ordering his Ambassador at the Hague, to authorise Sir
George Grand of Amsterdam to pay the sum destined to this use to the
order of B. Franklin, Silas Deane, or Arthur Lee. Sir George Grand is
fixed upon as one, who has been already trusted by the Court of France
in this business, and on whose attachment they can depend.
Mr Lee must beg leave to wait his Majesty’s pleasure at Burgos, or
Vitoria, not at Bayonne, because he is persuaded, upon reflection, that
he should incur the highest displeasure of his constituents, if he
were to leave Spain without a definitive answer to the object of his
mission.
TO THE COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.
Burgos, March 8th, 1777.
Gentlemen,
A person of high rank having been sent to confer with me here, I am
authorised to assure you, that supplies for the army will be sent to
you by every opportunity from Bilboa. I can say with certainty, that
a merchant there has orders for that purpose; he is now here with
me to have a list from me, and to contract for blankets, which are
manufactured in this part of the country. I am also desired to inform
you of ammunition and clothing being deposited at New Orleans and the
Havanna, with directions to _lend_ them to such American vessels as may
call there for that purpose.
I am trying to get a sum of money put into our hands immediately,
that we may the more assuredly answer your bills, should you find it
necessary to draw, and may pay for some ships of war in Europe. It will
also be my endeavor to procure some able veteran officers from the
Irish brigades in this service.
From the best authority here I am told, that the German agreement is
for seven thousand recruits, and eight hundred Hessian Chasseurs. They
are to sail from some German port towards the end of this month.
News is just arrived here of the death of the king of Portugal.
Considerable bodies of troops have been for some time marching from
Madrid towards the frontiers of that kingdom.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ARTHUR LEE.
MEMORIAL,
_Presented to the Court of Spain_.
Burgos, March 8th, 1777.
The present state of the dispute between America and Great Britain does
not seem to be so fully understood, as to render a clear representation
of it unnecessary.
America has declared herself independent, and has defeated all the
efforts of Great Britain to reduce her during two campaigns. In this
resistance she has hitherto stood alone and almost unassisted. Her
infant and unprepared state has been compensated by her ardor, her
indignation, her enthusiasm.
Great Britain, however, is determined to redouble her efforts to make
this campaign decisive of the fate of America. In this situation,
America offers her commerce and her friendship, which she has withdrawn
from Great Britain, to Spain and France. This offer ought to be deemed
of double value, because it takes from their rival and foe, what it
gives to _them_. It is, therefore, taken for granted, that this is an
object of the first magnitude, and worthy of the highest attention of
both these Courts. It is also taken for granted, that Spain and France
do not wish Great Britain should prevail in the contest, or regain
America by conquest or conciliation. There remains, therefore, but
this single question; whether it be more politic for the two powers to
declare immediately, or to wait the event of the next campaign?
To judge of this, it will be necessary to consider what will be the
probable event of the next campaign. As Great Britain is resolved to
put forth her utmost strength, it is probable that the event will be,
either the total reduction of America, or an accommodation founded upon
a mutual conviction of each other’s strength; and this accommodation
must be hastened by America being left destitute of any material
assistance from Europe.
It is manifest, that the neutrality of Spain and France leaves
the field open to the operations of the British force, and to the
production of one of those events, either of which must be highly
prejudicial to both nations and advantageous to their enemy. If Great
Britain should be victorious, America will become a powerful instrument
in her hands, to be wielded at her will against these countries; and
that it will not remain long unemployed, no one will doubt, who knows
that the Court of Great Britain is well informed of the countenance, at
least, given to what they call a most dangerous rebellion, and that the
head of that Court is of a temper that never forgives or forgets.
If an accommodation should produce a reunion, the same advantages will
be lost, and almost all the same consequences are to be feared. The end
of the campaign cannot, therefore, promise so favorable a moment for
the interposition of Spain and France as the present; and in all human
probability it will be then fruitless.
In truth, what moment can be wished more favorable than the present,
when Great Britain is so equally matched by what were her Colonies,
that the scales hang doubtful? Nor can it be questioned, that the
interposition of Spain or France, and much more of both, would make
that of America decidedly preponderate, and separate her from Great
Britain forever. And what object can be more important, than to deprive
her of this great and growing source of her commerce and her wealth,
her marine, and her dominion?
There is nothing of which the Court of Great Britain is more persuaded,
than that the loss of America would be the inevitable consequence of a
war in Europe; nor is there a man in the nation that is ignorant of it;
hence it is, that the king finds himself obliged, in all his speeches,
to assure his Parliament of the tranquillity of Europe, that they may
be emboldened to support his war against America. Hence it is, that
they have labored to prevent a rupture between Spain and Portugal, and
have, at length, renounced the latter. It is therefore certain, that
Great Britain would endure any insult, short of an open and outrageous
act of hostility, rather than engage in a European war during her
contest with America.
During the last war, America contributed twelve thousand seamen, and
twenty thousand troops to the assistance of Great Britain. These
are now tripled against her. The commerce of America, according to
the declaration of Mr Pitt, who conducted it, carried Great Britain
triumphantly through it. The full tide of that commerce is now turned
against her. From America, all the expeditions against the islands of
Spain and France were then supplied. Now these supplies are ready to
assist in seizing her islands.
Deprived of all those aids, which ministered to her success and
her triumphs during the last war, what could prevent her now from
experiencing the bitter reverse of her former fortune? What policy can
withhold two Sovereigns, whose prosperity is incompatible with her
power, to let slip such an opportunity of humbling her as may never
return?
If Great Britain should be again united to America by conquest or
conciliation, it would be in vain to menace her with war. America
has been felt like Hercules in his cradle. Great Britain, knit again
to such growing strength, would reign the irresistible, though hated
arbiter of Europe. This then is the moment in which Spain and France
may clip her wings and pinion her forever. One of the most respectable
bodies in England told their Sovereign some two years since, with a
kind of prophetic spirit, that his Ministers were precipitating his
dominions into a situation in which their existence would depend upon
the forbearance of their enemies. That situation is now certainly
occurred. The rest as certainly remains in the arbitration of Spain and
France.[12]
ARTHUR LEE.
[12] Although the above Memorial purports to have been _presented to
the Court of Spain_, it would appear, that it was put into the hands of
the Marquis de Grimaldi while he was at Burgos, and that he returned
an answer probably without consulting the Court, when he met Mr Lee
shortly afterwards at Vitoria.
ANSWER,
_To the Memorial, by the Marquis de Grimaldi at Vitoria_.
You have considered your own situation and not ours. The moment is not
yet come for us. The war with Portugal,--France being unprepared, and
our treasure from South America not being arrived,--makes it improper
for us to declare immediately. These reasons will probably cease within
a year, and then will be the moment.[13]
[13] This answer seems to have been a verbal one.
TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA, MINISTER TO THE KING OF SPAIN.
Vitoria, March 17th, 1777.
Mr Lee wishes to state to his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca,
what he has understood from his Excellency, the Marquis de Grimaldi,
to be the intentions of his Majesty relative to the United States of
America.
That for very powerful reasons his Majesty cannot at this moment
enter into an alliance with them, or declare in their favor; that
nevertheless, they may depend upon his Majesty’s sincere desire to see
their rights and liberties established, and of his assisting them as
far as may be consistent with his own situation; that for this purpose
the house of Gardoqui at Bilboa would send them supplies for their
army and navy from time to time; that they would find some ammunition
and clothing deposited for them at New Orleans, the communication with
which would be much secured and facilitated by their taking possession
of Pensacola; that their vessels should be received at the Havanna
upon the same terms with those of France, and that the Ambassador at
Paris should have directions immediately to furnish their Commissioners
with credit in Holland. The Marquis added, that his Majesty would do
these things out of the graciousness of his royal disposition, without
stipulating any return, and that, if upon inquiry any able veteran
officers could be spared from his Irish brigade, the States should have
them.
These most gracious intentions Mr Lee has communicated to the Congress
of the United States, in terms as guarded as possible without
mentioning names, so that the source of those aids, should the
despatches fall into the enemy’s hands, can only be conjectured from
the matter, not determined from the manner in which they are mentioned.
And for further security, the captain has the strictest orders to throw
the despatches into the sea should he be taken.
Mr Lee is sensible that these intentions are measured by the
magnanimity of a great and opulent prince, and becoming the character
of so illustrious a monarch as the king of Spain. He is satisfied they
will raise the strongest sentiments of gratitude and veneration in the
breasts of those whom they regard. At the same time he trusts, that
the Spanish nation will receive no inconsiderable retribution from the
freedom of that commerce, the monopoly of which contributed so much
to strengthen and aggrandize her rival and her foe; nor can anything
give more lasting satisfaction to the royal mind, than the reflection
of having employed those means which God has put into his hands, in
assisting an oppressed people to vindicate those rights and liberties,
which have been violated by twice six years of incessant injuries and
insulted supplications; those rights which God and nature, together
with the convention of their ancestors and the constitution of their
country, gave to the people of the States. Instead of that protection
in these rights, which was the due return for the sovereignty exercised
over them, they have seen their defenceless towns wantonly laid in
ashes, their unfortified country cruelly desolated, their property
wasted, their people slain; the ruthless savage, whose inhuman war
spares neither age nor sex, instigated against them; the hand of the
servant armed against his master by public proclamation, and the very
food which the sea that washes their coast, furnishes, forbidden them
by a law of unparalleled folly and injustice. _Proinde quasi injuriam
facere id demum esset imperio uti._ Nor was it enough that for these
purposes the British force was exhausted against them, but foreign
mercenaries were also bribed to complete the butchery of their people,
and the devastation of their country. And that nothing might be wanting
to make the practices equivalent to the principles of this war, the
minds of these mercenaries were poisoned with every prejudice, that
might harden their hearts and sharpen their swords against a people,
who not only never injured or offended them, but who have received with
open arms and provided habitations for their wandering countrymen.
These are injuries which the Americans can never forget. These are
oppressors whom they can never again endure. The force of intolerable
and accumulated outrages has compelled them to appeal to God and to the
sword. The king of Spain, in assisting them to maintain that appeal,
assists in vindicating the violated rights of human nature. No cause
can be more illustrious, no motives more magnanimous.[14]
ARTHUR LEE.
TO THE COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.
Vitoria, March 18th, 1777.
Gentlemen,
I had the honor of writing to you on the 8th from Burgos, since which
I have had another conference at this place for greater secrecy and
despatch.
In addition to the supplies, which I informed you were to be furnished
through the house of Gardoqui by every opportunity, and the powder
and clothing which are at New Orleans, and will be advanced to your
order, I am assured of having credit from time to time on Holland, and
that orders will be given to receive your vessels at the Havanna, as
those of the most favored nation, the French, are received. They have
promised to examine whether there are any veteran Irish officers fit
for your service, and if there are to send them.
I have avoided stipulating any return on our part.
As to an immediate declaration in your favor, they say this is not
the moment, and for reasons, which, if I might venture to commit them
to this paper, I think you would deem satisfactory. The same reasons
render an explicit acknowledgment of your independency, and a treaty of
alliance with you, inadmissable at present; but I am desired to assure
you of their taking a sincere and zealous part in the establishment of
your liberties, which they will promote in every way consistent with
their own situation.
I cannot help thinking that the postponing of a treaty is happy for us,
since our present situation would raise demands, and perhaps enforce
concessions, of which we might sorely repent hereafter. I am sensible,
that in consequence we shall be obliged to make greater exertions,
and to search deeper for resources within ourselves; but this must in
the end be highly beneficial to a young people. It was in this manner
the Roman republic was so deeply rooted; and then _magis dandis, quam
accipiendis beneficiis, amicitias parabat_. The liberties and benefits
which are hardly earned will be highly prized and long preserved.