Here now come forward the Yogâkâras, who hold that cognitions (ideas)
only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view
that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things,
since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have
their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature
of ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called vâsanâ. Vâsanâ means a
flow of ideas (states of consciousness--pratyaya) of different character.
We observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the
idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar,
and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this
again by a similar cognition, and so on; this is what we call a stream
or flow of ideas.--But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have
the forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on?--
Even if real things are admitted, the Yogâkâra replies, their becoming
objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of
knowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference
between the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that
cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive
characteristics) must needs be admitted; for if they were without form
they could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form,
viz. that of the cognition; that this form at the same time appears to
us as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due
to error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things
together only, it follows that the thing is not something different from
the idea.
As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular
thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else,
requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and
the thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must
needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing; and
as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and
intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of
things in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute
reality; external things do not exist.
To this the Sûtra replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of
consciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be
maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the
knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to
particular _things_. For the consciousness of all men taking part in
worldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.'
Knowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify,
presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring
to an object; those therefore who attempt to prove, on the basis of this
very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit
subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in
detail in our refutation of those crypto-Bauddhas who take shelter under
a pretended Vedic theory.--To maintain, as the Yogâkâras do, that the
general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the
non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction;
for 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To
hold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of
which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into
common thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with
the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different
from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to
you, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently
persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions
form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one
(vâsanâ); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely
perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude
therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the
manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas)
as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with
by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each
cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a
particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction
(samyoga), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as
light (prabhâ), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation
of an attribute (guna), so knowledge stands in the relation of an
attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.--From
all this it follows that external things are not non-existent.
The next Sûtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the
baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to
the cognitions of a dreaming person.