So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the
Vaibhâshikas as well as the Sautrântikas--both which schools maintain
the reality of external things.--Now the Sautrântika comes forward and
opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the
view of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of
cognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense-
organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.--It is
not, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition
which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an
object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the
origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense-
organs also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is
held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the
cognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a
thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and
on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is
inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogâkâras do) that the form of
subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and
not to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be
explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour
there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold
character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold
character of real thing.--To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this
not being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour,
and so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and
therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not
observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its
attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the
thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for)
reflections also are only of persisting things, not of mere attributes.
We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result
from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing
persisting at the time of cognition.--The Sûtras now set forth a further
objection which applies to both schools.
26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active
people also.
Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from
the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that
persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is
a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of
things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all
existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special
attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the
like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do
not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort.
And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even
perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this
and in the next life, including final release. Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the aggregates.'