Nor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known

through the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter. The

letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character)

does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal;

for the stroke itself is real.--But the stroke causes the idea of the

letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this

'being a letter' is untrue!--Not so, we rejoin. If this 'being a letter'

were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter;

for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and

indefinable constitutes a means.--Let then the idea of the letter

constitute the means!--In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the

real does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow

therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one,

i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only.

Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is

_not_ the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the

sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as _not_

being _any_ letter.--But, in the same way as the word 'Devadatta'

conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke

apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular

letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be

the cause of the idea of a particular letter!--Quite so, we reply, but

on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke

and conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous

to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a

buffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing

depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said

(with a view to proving the pûrvapaksha by another analogous instance)

that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the

case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the

apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nâda).

For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far

only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in

various tones, with the different things indicated by those various

tones [FOOTNOTE 77:1]. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the

ground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant

sounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really

'sound.'--All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the

knowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture,

if Scripture--as based on Nescience--is itself untrue.

Our opponent may finally argue as follows:--Scripture is not unreal in

the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal; for antecedently to the

cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that

_is_, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At

this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman,

devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence; as long on

the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture _is_; for then we judge

'Scripture is.'--But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true),

the judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on

false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e.

Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist

being mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that

cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown

that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior

sublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the

one expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say

that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to

yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our

judgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all

further negation is impossible.--But there is no need to continue this

demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

[FOOTNOTE 77:1. And those manifestations of sound by means of various

tones are themselves something real.]

No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.

We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g.

'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there

truly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from

all difference.--This we cannot allow. For the section in which the

quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that

by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the

highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial

and also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing,

endowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the

inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that

distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self

of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu

that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have

fully set forth this point in the Vedârtha-samgraha and shall establish

it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called

ârambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge

is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,

5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,

and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,

subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with

regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain

that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not

prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the

co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so

far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For

'co-ordination' (sâmânâdhikaranya, lit.'the abiding of several things in

a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one

thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of

several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms,'

True','Knowledge','Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting

qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary

to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of

causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is

however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former

case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case

their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshanâ).

Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,

&c.(which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshanâ),

constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one

non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport

only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended

through one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless.

This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would

not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one

thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former

alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one

thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong,

and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several

things--a result which also could not be reconciled with

'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the

idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the

grammarians define 'coordination' as the application, to one thing, of

several words, for the application of each of which there is a different

motive.

You have further maintained the following view:--In the text 'one only

without a second', the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality

on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must

therefore, according to the principle that all Sâkhâs convey the same

doctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at

setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus

indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite

is Brahman,' contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be

defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the

text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman

to be without qualities and blemish.--But this also cannot be admitted.

What the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that

Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the

existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That

Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on,

'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,'

and so on.--But how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a

second' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in

general?--As follows, we reply. The clause 'Being only this was in the

beginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to create

constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some

further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally

presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added

clause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause.

If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the

eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You

in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--Sâkhâs

containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the

qualities attributed in all--Sâkhâs to Brahman as cause should be taken

over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration

teaches us that also the text 'True, knowledge', &c., teaches Brahman to

possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement

with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a

conflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities;

for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on

Prakriti.--Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare

indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does

not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For

knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only

which is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps,

and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject

all scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1,

9); 'It thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (Ch. Up.

VI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. Âr. II,4, 1,

2); 'He who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal,

as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13);

'There are two unborn ones--one who knows, one who does not know--one

strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest

of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of

masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable

one' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or

instrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is

revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge,

strength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from

sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose

wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These

and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is

knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of

being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all

evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from

qualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have

really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the

passages quoted above; the earlier part of which--'free from sin,' up to

'free from thirst'--denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its

latter part--'whose wishes are true,' and so on--asserts of its certain

excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two

classes of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of

them has for its object something that is false.--With regard to the

concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech,

together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it [FOOTNOTE 82:1],'

we point out that with the passage 'From terror of it the wind blows,'

there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the

next section 'one hundred times that human bliss,' &c., makes statements

as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied

souls; the concluding passage 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman

from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to

reach it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite

nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the

chapter under discussion--viz. 'he obtains all desires, together with

Brahman the all-wise' (II, 1)--which gives information as to the fruit

of the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the

qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the

auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man

who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it.

The expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary

importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-

vidyâ (Ch. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same

character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the

chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal

point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text

'According to what a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after

he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). If it be said that the

passage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought', 'not

understood by those who understand' (Ke. Up. II, 3), declares Brahman

not to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so,

certain other texts would not teach that final Release results from

knowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II,

1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text

'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he

who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (Taitt

Up. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self

dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has

Brahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts

enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This

knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what

is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from

the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:--) We are informed by the

passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable

to reach it', that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences

cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and

from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought

and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely

limited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not

mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that

Brahman is _not_ thought and _not_ understood, and other parts, that it

_is_ thought and _is_ understood.

Now as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer

of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III,

5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different

from mere seeing and thinking--This view is refuted by the following

interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the

erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does

not constitute the essential nature of the knower, but belongs to it

only as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think

the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have

seeing and thinking for its essential nature.'--Or else this text may

mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker

of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self--the

inner Self of all beings--should be meditated upon.--Otherwise a

conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self,

such as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).

Your assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1)

proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is

already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge

(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman

being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we

understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as

'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the

essential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of

the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so

much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages

teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is

at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of

Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere

bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman'

(Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II,

9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a

conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our

opponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality

as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from

death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);

'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom,

should he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny

is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world

which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and

having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They

do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which

depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the

text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our

opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality

contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;

for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at

first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as

suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to

Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!

Nor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest "antaram" (i.

e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up.

II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear.

For the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm

mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman'

(Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality

of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that

peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as

springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and

thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman

constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of

gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause

of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view

surely cannot be a _cause_ of fear!--But how then is it that the Taitt.

text declares that 'there is fear for him'?--That text, we reply,

declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of

fearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is

invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained

fearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place

when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the

great Rishi says 'When Vâsudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even

a moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that

is change.'

The Sûtra III, 2, ii does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a

Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing

attributes--as we shall show in its place. And the Sûtra IV, 2, 3

declares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'Mâyâ' because they

differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state; from

which it follows that the latter things are real.

[FOOTNOTE 82:1. Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman,

whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--'Satyam

jñanam,' &c.--has a similar purport.]

Nor do Smriti and Purâna teach such a doctrine.

Nor is it true that also according to Smriti and Purânas only non-

differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.--'He who

knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the

worlds' (Bha. Gî. X, 3); 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them.

Nay, the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power. My Self

bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha.

Gî. IX, 4, 5); 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world;

higher than I there is nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls

on a thread' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6, 7); 'Pervading this entire Universe by a

portion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42); 'But another, the highest

Person, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds

supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and

am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the

Veda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17, 18).

'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications,

properties and imperfections; he transcends all investing (obscuring)

influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the

interstices of the world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities

constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a

small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he

bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength,

dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in

him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high

and low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and

manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest

Lord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless

homogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended--that is

knowledge: all else is ignorance' (Vishnu Purâna VI, 5, 82-87).--'To

that pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is

applicable, the cause of all causes, the name "Bhagavat" is suitable.

The letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter; the letter ga

the leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six

attributes--dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion.

That in him--the universal Self, the Self of the beings--all beings

dwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va.

Wisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities,

are all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the

name of Vâsudeva who is the highest Brahman--and of no one else. This

word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its

primary sense with reference to Vâsudeva only; in a derived sense with

regard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.); 'Where all these

powers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form: that is

the great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed

with all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of

benefiting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action

of the unfathomable one; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-

71); 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading,

imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishnu, the highest abode' (Vi.

Pu. I, 22,53); 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the

highest Self, founded on himself; who is devoid of all the

distinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like; who is

exempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can

only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything

abides; hence he is called Vâsudeva by those who know. He is Brahman,

eternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying; of one essential nature and

ever pure, as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,

comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Unevolved; and also

existing in the form of the Person and in that of time' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,

10-14); 'The Prakriti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as

Unevolved, and the Person--both these are merged in the highest Self.

The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord; as Vishnu he

is praised in the Vedas and the Vedânta-texts' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39).

'Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial.

These two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the

imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole

world. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around,

so the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world' (Vi.

Pu. I, 23,53-55). 'The energy of Vishnu is the highest, that which is

called the embodied soul is inferior; and there is another third energy

called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of

the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly

existence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is

characterised in the different beings by different degrees of

perfection' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).

These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free

from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious

qualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing,

pervading, and ruling the universe; that the entire complex of

intelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their

different estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of

the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it

with Brahman by means of terms such as sarîra (body), rûpa (form), tanu

(body), amsa (part), sakti (power), vibhûti (manifestation of power),

and so on;--that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power

exist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion

with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetrajña);--and that the

embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and

evil works, do not recognise their essential nature, which is knowledge,

but view themselves as having the character of material things.--The

outcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying

plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of

his power, as something real.

When now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi.

Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the

different effects of Prakriti, such as divine, human bodies, and so on,

yet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not

the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but

to be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and

not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (yogayuj);

this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.--

But how is this known?--As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Purâna

in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be

the remedy of all the afflictions of the Samsâra; thereupon explains the

different stages of Yoga up to the so-called pratyâhâra (complete

restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in

order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (subhâsraya)

required for dhâranâ, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu,

possesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a denned one (mûrta)

and an undefined one (amûrta); and then teaches that a portion of the

'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (kshetrajña), which is

distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience--

that is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect.

The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which

is free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and

possessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect

object,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally,

declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form

which is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three powers,

viz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined

form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary

(apara) power, and Nescience in the form of work--which is called the

third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of

the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined

form (which is the 'perfect object') is proved by certain Vedânta-texts,

such as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. III, 8). We

hence must take the sloka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c., to

mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not

capable of constituting the 'perfect object.' Analogously two other

passages declare 'Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner

in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins-

the highest abode.' 'That in which all these powers have their abode,

that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)

Visva form.'

In an analogous manner, Parâsara declares that Brahmâ, Katurmukha,

Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot

constitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in Nescience;

after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Samsâra are in

the same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they

reach their true nature, only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has

arisen in them--; and finally teaches that the essential individual

nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect

object.' 'From Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, all living beings that

dwell within this world are in the power of the Samsâra due to works,

and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them

objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and

stand within the sphere of the Samsâra; knowledge arises in them only

later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge

does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them

through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses

essential knowledge,' &c. &c.--All this proves that the passage 'in

which all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the

world.

Nor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential

nature' (Vi. Pu. 1,2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different

from knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the

Self--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods, men, and so

on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl

as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver

in the world is unreal!--But if, on the ground of an insight into the

oneness of Brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two

appear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view

Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material

things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is

false!--By no means, we rejoin. As our sástra distinctly teaches that

the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections

whatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and

reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's

reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness

of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of

either of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on.

Hence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of

the world.

'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live,

into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is

Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain

that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world.

After this we learn from a Purâna text ('He should make the Veda grow by

means of Itihâsa and Purâna; the Veda fears that a man of little reading

may do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihâsa and

Purâna. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation

of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts,

promulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents,

and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic

truth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport

of the entire Veda with all its Sâkhâs cannot be fathomed by one who has

studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we

cannot arrive at any certitude.

The Vishnu Purâna relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of

Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parâsara, who through the favour

of Pulastya and Vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature

of the highest divinity, began to question Parâsara, 'I am desirous to

hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again

originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate

and inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into

what it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions

asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of

the manifestation of its power, and the different results of

propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category,

the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to

the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause

'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to

what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation,

sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in

the words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this

clause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the

world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not

founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world

pervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect

(so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which

this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be

needless. Nor does the--maya express, as it sometimes does-e.g. in the

case of prana-maya [FOOTNOTE 92:1], the own sense of the word to which it

is attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is

He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishnu) would be

inappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishnu only.'

What 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance, prevailingness, in

agreement with Pânini, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman

prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body.

The co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on

that relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of

Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we

maintained that the sâstra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one

substance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those

questions and answers, and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the

explanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one

question only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination

of a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure

consciousness devoid of all distinction!'--And if the co-ordination

expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the

absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held

that Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed

to all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure.

All this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in

that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation

between a Self and its body.--The sloka, 'From Vishnu the world has

sprung: in him he exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and

dissolution of this world: and the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35),

states succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest

of the high' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10)--sets forth in detail. Now there the

sloka,'to the unchangeable one' (I, 2, 1), renders homage to the holy

Vishnu, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own

nature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form

as Hiranyagarbha, Hari, and Sankara, as Pradhâna, Time, and as the

totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here

the sloka, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (I, 2, 6),

describes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the

state of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be

understood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the

sâstra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold

world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced

intelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I,

3, I ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman

which is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the

refutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the

objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore

there belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of

creating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially

belongs to fire [FOOTNOTE 94:1].' In that case the objection would rather

be made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without

qualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the

world?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something

real, but something erroneously imagined.'--The purport of the objection

as it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative

and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness,

and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then

can agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid

of qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable

of any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing

unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described

above, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess

manifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and

all other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other

qualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art

real' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is

unreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter

viewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,

'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are

pervaded.' This means--because all things movable and immovable are

pervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and

hence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the Self of

all art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth,

the text rightly says, 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy

greatness'; otherwise it would have to say, 'it is thy error.' Were this

latter view intended, words such as 'Lord of the world,' 'thou,' &c.,

could not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would

arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz.

the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted

in play the entire earth.--Because this entire world is thy form in so

far as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge;

therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to

view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting

only of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next

sloka, 'this which is seen.'--And it is an error not only to view the

world which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so

on, but also to consider the Selfs whose true nature is knowledge as

being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like;

this is the meaning of the next sloka, 'this world whose true nature is

knowledge.'--Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into

the essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by

devotion--the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self--,

they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of

primeval matter--as thy body--a body the Self of which is constituted by

knowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the

following sloka: 'But those who possess knowledge,' &c.--If the

different slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere

unmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in

their primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of

the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the purport of the

entire sâstra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in

one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II,

14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the

different Selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence

of knowledge--are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by

their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are

modifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But

this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between

matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is

that the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men,

and so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said,

'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same';

'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. Gî. V, 18, 19).

And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own

and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the

body is distributed among one's own and other bodies.

Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)

from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for

in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning

only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'

there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word

'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure

intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self

distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure

knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a

different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are

equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the

sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.

Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs

is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in

different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.

The different portions of air, again, passing through the different

holes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said

to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character

in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different

names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them

because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an

analogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,

viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the

substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they

consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those

different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the

scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purâna further says 'He

(or "that") I am and thou art He (or "that"); all this universe that has

Self for its true nature is He (or "that"); abandon the error of

distinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the

intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,

and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that

intelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';

'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the

difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding

difference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but

absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the

references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.

Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the

instruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,

having recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this

decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach

absolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic

of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the

body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the

section, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'

&c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that

knowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)

teaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the

individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the

highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that

the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture

says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of

them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.

III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their

own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those

who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And

in this sâstra also (i.e. the Vishnu Purâna) there are passages of

analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the

causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.

The Sûtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,

1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several

places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over

against each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the

Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the

Self from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent

Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).

Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing

itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for

that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite

incapable of it. So the Purâna says, 'It is false to maintain that the

individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one

substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'

Accordingly the Bhagavad Gîtâ declares that the released soul attains

only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,

they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come

forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general

destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purâna says, 'That Brahman leads

him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own

being (âtmabhâva), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.

Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means

'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him

with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one

with the body attracting.

The same view will be set forth by the Sûtrakâra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,

3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to Sû. IV, 4, 17) 'with the

exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state

of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the

author of the Dramidabhâshya says, 'Owing to its equality (sâyujya) with

the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'

The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who

depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,

for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He

who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains

all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);

'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in

these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'

(Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);

'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any

one perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to

their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed

from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the

high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,

reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).

The objects of meditation in all the vidyâs which refer to the highest

Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all

those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sûtras declares

that there is option among the different vidyâs--cp. Ve. Sû. III, 3, II;

III., 3, 59. In the same way the Vâkyakâra teaches that the qualified

Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of

vidyâs; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the

meditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the

Bhâshyakâra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on

the knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes

Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be

taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him

who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine

Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the

highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the

highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,

4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and

all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform

character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of

Brahman.--Our Purâna also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),

'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the

highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of

imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,

is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to

be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-

called karma-bhâvanâ, brahma-bhâvanâ and a combination of the two. See

Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of

the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--

whereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the

Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has

accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all

imagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its

being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is

founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the

released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,

of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because

in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the

sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when

the soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed

itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the

highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the

highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The

difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,

&c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests

on the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation

on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an

end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another

text says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the

investing agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,

&c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,

14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge

which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who

then will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold

difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate

things: compare the saying of Saunaka:'this fourfold distinction is

founded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential

nature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold

distinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through

meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the

distinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in

the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called

karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Purâna (st.

61--avidyâ karmasamjña).

The passage in the Bhagavad Gîtâ, 'Know me to be the kshetrajña' (XIII,

2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the

inward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict

with other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the

unchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person'

(Bha. Gî. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as

inward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all

creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15).

and 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20).

The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of

body, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text

expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there

is any one separate from him,'There is not anything which is without me'

(X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a

glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood

accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there

is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung

from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion

of mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).

All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do _not_ teach the

doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do _not_ teach that

the universe of things is false; and that they do _not_ deny the

essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and

the Lord.

[FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Prânamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]

[FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in

ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain

special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be

accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]

The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.

We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.--According to the view

of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of

Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect,

fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous

Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience,

which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot

be denned either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must

necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such

as 'Hidden by what is untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because

otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman--which is

taught by texts such as 'Thou are that'--cannot be established. This

Nescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the

object of erroneous cognition (bhrama) and sublation (bâdha); nor is it

'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of

apprehension and sublation [FOOTNOTE 102:1]. Hence orthodox Philosophers

declare that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite

categories.

Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place

we ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the

great error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual

soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is

fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for

Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence

contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by

knowledge.

'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if

Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge,

invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'

'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure

knowledge!'--'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the

nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.--And

if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is

an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching,

implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'

To explain the second of these slokas.--If you maintain that what

sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's

essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the

truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these

kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light,

which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no

reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is

contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it

otherwise--that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through

the cognition that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in

consequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no

right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes

Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to

maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.--Moreover

(and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman,

which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another

consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its

object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge

(Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence

cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which

by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature

are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for

the termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the

knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose

essential nature is established by its own consciousness, is

contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not

depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other

knowledge.--If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the

falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-

knowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other

than Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of

Brahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the

reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible;

because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a

different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and

therefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge

are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same

object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the

knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-

knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the

former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while

the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.--

Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-

knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman

being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the

cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the

true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.--

But this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true

nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there

is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge

which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-

knowledge.--Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the

essential nature) of Brahman!--This too we refuse to admit; for you

yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free

from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.--From all this it

follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the

substrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat

contradiction.

When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is

homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you

thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing

light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or

else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light

(consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear'

of light can only mean its destruction.--Consider the following point

also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without

object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an

imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected

with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects.--Is then, we ask, that

imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something

unreal?--The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by

yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we

should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject,

or an object of knowledge, or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,'

as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing;

and that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot

be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the

Mâdhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void [FOOTNOTE 106:1].

And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those

two are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental

imperfection, and are thus driven into a _regressuss in infinitum_.--To

avoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness

itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.--But

if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the

basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an

additional avidyâ to account for the vorld. Moreover, as Brahman is

eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever

take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from

Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.

What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the

inexplicability (anirvakaniyatâ) of Nescience? Its difference in nature

from that which _is_, as well as that which _is not_! A thing of such

kind would be inexplicable indeed; for none of the means of knowledge

apply to it. That is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered

according to our states of consciousness, and every state of

consciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing

or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of

states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the

object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then

anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness

whatever.

Against this our opponent may now argue as follows:--There is, after all,

something, called avidyâ, or ajñâna, or by some other name, which is a

positive entity (bhâva), different from the antecedent non-existence of

knowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the

material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold

external and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition

of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For

this avidyâ is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.

Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidyâ, is the material cause of

the erroneous superimposition--upon the inward Self, which in itself is

changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this

superimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamkâra, all

acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of

this defect (i.e. avidyâ) there are produced, in this world superimposed

upon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting

themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as

snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and

the like. Avidyâ constitutes the material cause of this entire false

world; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That

this avidyâ or ajñâna (non-knowledge) is an object of internal

Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as 'I do not know',

'I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to

the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-

knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such

absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof

(anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which presents its object directly,

and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment 'I

am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that 'absence of something'

(abhâva) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness

under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its

object. For at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists;

or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of

knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is

there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence

of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of

non-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the

absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the

latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it

presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as

an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz.

knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of

knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the

special means of proof called 'abhâva' (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the

other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a

positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as

there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by

non-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge;

and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of

consciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-

knowledge which is a positive entity.--But, a Nescience which is a

positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature

consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! Not so, we reply.

Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of

things, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the

consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has

for its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that

non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between kaitanya and

ajñana).--But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity,

Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far

as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the

particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their

proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience,

which is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do

not know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?--There

is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of

Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while

the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all

those things which, as being non-intelligent (jada), can be proved only

in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such

mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (ajada) inner

Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in

all cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing

Consciousness always gives definition to Nescience.--From all this it

follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend

Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive

entity, is also proved by Inference, viz. in the following form: All

knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded

by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-

existence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is

terminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;

because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not

illumined before;--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines

things.--Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that

darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or

else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence

darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving

Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered

a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense,

and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.

To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor

Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity,

Nescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know

neither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above

against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of

knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge

viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents

itself--the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which

gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its

substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for

Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the

cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand,

it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience

in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate

or of the object of Nescience?--Let it then be said that what is

contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature

of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of ajñâna) we

have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things

being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the

substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness

of ajñâna on the other.--Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side

also. Even if ajñâna means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can

say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for

its object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no

difference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate!

Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent

non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word

indicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of

knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is

contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit

that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge.

Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require

the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered

under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the

cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in

its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore

presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does,

according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge.

Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and

is an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore

is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,'

&c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both

admit.

It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is

constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the

consciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is

consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although

having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious

of non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask

in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden.

You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we

ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose

very nature consists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination?

If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be

in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we

point out that as according to you light cannot be considered us an

attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would--

illumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature

of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already

remarked.--Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-

knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature

hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other

hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness

on the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw.

You will perhaps say [FOOTNOTE 111:1] that it hides Brahman in so far

only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the

consciousness of ajñâna takes place on the part of a Brahman whose

nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's

nature loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to

the nature of ajnâna; for if Brahman may be conscious of ajnâna (without

a previous obscuration of its nature by ajnâna) it may as well be held

to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is

considered to be an effect of ajnâna.

How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of ajnâna on Brahman's

part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former

case this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature,

and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of

ajnâna constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure

consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is

terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some

terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's

essential nature itself.--On the second alternative we ask what that

something else should be. If you reply 'another ajnâna,' we are led into

a _regressus in infinitum_.--Let it then be said [FOOTNOTE 112:1] that

ajnâna having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its

consciousness. This, we rejoin, would imply that ajnâna acting like a

defect of the eye by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then

ajnâna could not be sublated by knowledge. Let us then put the case as

follows:--Ajnâna, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same

time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and

Brahman's nature being hidden; in this way the _regressus in infinitum_

and other difficulties will be avoided.--But this also we cannot admit;

for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a

witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.--Let then

Brahman be hidden by some other cause!--This, we rejoin, would take away

from ajnâna its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead

to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness,

without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess--what

yet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness

of Self.--If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidyâ, does it then not

shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former

alternative the not shining forth of Brahman--whose nature is mere light--

reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative

we ask, 'of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which

part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that

substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction,

there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light

cannot abide in it together.--Let us then say that Brahman, which is

homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by

avidyâ, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.--But how, we ask, are

we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature

is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and

distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it

appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when

some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing

which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and

hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts

on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the

object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where

there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,

indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their

distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is

not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the

essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which

consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be

conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidyâ.

We, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness

which you consider an effect of avidyâ put an end to by the rise of true

knowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final

release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.

'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature

then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If

it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect

of avidyâ, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then

Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-

eternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no

definable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds

the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult

to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if

the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place

even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this

would be the theory of a general Void.

The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved

by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set

forth!--True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed

for proving ajñâna is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the

contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is

not desired and what is different from ajñâna (for what it proves is

that there is a certain _knowledge_, viz. that all knowledge resting on

valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with

regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-

knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this

argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent

existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to

be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent

non-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the

non-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of

consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of ajñâna as an entity

becomes useless.

The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving

power; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of

illumining things not illumined before. Everywhere illumining power

belongs to knowledge only; there may be light, but if there is not also

Knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only

causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power.

The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely

auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the

organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with a view

to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally

ascribed to the lamp.--But in using the light of the lamp as a proving

instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power

equal to that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to the

illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of

what obscures its object!--We refuse to accept this explanation.

Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is

antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering

them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech; and this

belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow

the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors

also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most

eminent factors of that kind; and as in their case there exists no

different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing

analogous to the ajñâna to be terminated by knowledge), this whole

argumentation is beside the point.

There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the

pûrvapakshin.--Of the ajñâna under discussion, Brahman, which is mere

knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is ajñâna; as shown by

the case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and

similar cases; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.--

The ajñâna under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it

is ajñâna; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-

knowledge hides the object.--Ajñâna is not terminated by knowledge,

because it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-knowledge

is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide the object of knowledge;

as e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.--Brahman is not the substrate of

ajñâna, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject; like

jars and similar things.--Brahman is not hidden by ajñâna, because it is

not the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the

object of knowledge; so e.g. shells and similar things.--Brahman is not

connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it

is not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with non-knowledge

to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge; as e.g. shells

and the like. Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its

antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of

knowledge; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that

valid knowledge which proves the ajñâna maintained by you.--Knowledge

does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of

some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying

things is--whether it be knowledge or ajñâna--strengthened by some

specific power; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as

the ajñâna consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).

Ajñâna which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed

by knowledge; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and

similar things.