THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow

and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical

alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular

qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person

revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the

impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the

nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them,

and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods

depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge.

The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through

texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound

reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance

devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a

proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for

their object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his

stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a

substance free from all difference (does not require any further means

of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we

reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of

the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of

consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some

difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And

should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as

implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be

devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means

of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and

owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends,

that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by

difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only

be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other

differences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the

existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any

rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for

the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the

illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the

states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with

difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail.

Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong

different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.

), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general.

And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes

place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove

your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own.

It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference

well established by valid means of proof.

Sabda proves difference.

As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses

the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference.

Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates

from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two

elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word

itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further,

the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence

therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special

combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to

denote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound

cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.

Perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of

non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka)

perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of

difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things

affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished

by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has

for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the

basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by

generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate

perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object

in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference.

Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever

to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all

apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction

'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some

special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped

dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate

and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the

first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class,

while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on,

individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the

perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape

which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to

the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in

the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception

of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is

determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the

perception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain

outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier

perception (of the first individual); such determination being

ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such

extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other

hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and

perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is

such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic

character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of

sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first

individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be

perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the

apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of

structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In

the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we

apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the

structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the

generic character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all

this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is

devoid of all difference.

The bhedâbheda view is untenable.

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and

absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedâbheda view).

Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the

non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and

such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the

'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the

non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate

consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as

separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the

fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us

say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such

and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of

distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two

clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.

Somethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a

separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they

present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or

beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other

entities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so

far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present

themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both

cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing

distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely

different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only

that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being

apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic

characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The

assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by

immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form

of consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is

expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same

point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.

Inference also teaches difference.

Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference,

inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is

distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and

other means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as

to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid

of difference could not be established by any of them since the

instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same

object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains

the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of

differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without

knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts

that his own mother never had any children.

Perception does not reveal mere being.

In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of

pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object;

and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of

being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these

charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of

perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and

that generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once

rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the

things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of

knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds

good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another

thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same

may therefore be admitted with regard to difference [FOOTNOTE 44:1].

For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical

seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive

cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment

the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference

of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character

of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in

a second moment.

Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being judgments

clearly referring to different objects--such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There

is a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning. And if through

perception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic

character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing, why

should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a

buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions,

why should we not remember, in the case of each particular cognition,

all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further,

if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only,

the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was

apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of

cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of

cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is

admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that

perception has for its objects things affected with difference.

If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything

would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would

follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!

Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for

what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other

qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with

colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things

palpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their

object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or

taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to

apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere

Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has

the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the

function of a mere anuvâda, i.e. it would merely make statements about

something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other

means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.

Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the

instruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the

imperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature,

perishableness and so on.--From all this we conclude that perception has

for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting

itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or

structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing

else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not

perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as

constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals

possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently

accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as

moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different

from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure,

we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but

structure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and

we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different

classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being

different from one another can be explained on the basis of the

apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is

observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such

an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further

conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (jâti).--

But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately

follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter

is apprehended! Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment

of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as

to generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means

just the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is

apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures

belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on

also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only

that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

[FOOTNOTE 44:1. Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has

colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so

difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.]

Plurality is not unreal.

Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our

cognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because

such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether

erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between

persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation

between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two

cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds

good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces

of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are

separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a

thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its

existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,

and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes

to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some

place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some

other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the

one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing

absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places

also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of

non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is

contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated

cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is

seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in

another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,

and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason

for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because

it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further

proof.

Being and consciousness are not one.

Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the

distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on

this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by

perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is

also disposed of.

The true meaning of Svayamprakâsatva.

We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness

(above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds

good for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.

constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule

as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For

common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become

the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on

the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again

that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of

his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'

It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'

(above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of

consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would

follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--

because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.

Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of

the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion

of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of

all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible

for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the

reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The

general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object

is in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or

knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,

through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to

give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own

object by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].

Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of

consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the

object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in

the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,

do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of

consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated

above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence

of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the

conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are

things--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at

the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that

a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an

object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we

rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not

being contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their

not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse

to their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an

object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory

of Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive

even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is

non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of

consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a

general principle that something which is an object of consciousness

cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'

[FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions

runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term

'anubhûti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as

is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With

reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars

also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine

forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like

the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'

not to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes

of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are

revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge

different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own

being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of

knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of

consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge

(representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text

adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in

order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented

by another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present

moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to

the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the

definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to

another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first

definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain

the svayamprakâsatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a

second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and

'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition

also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,

and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'

(Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight

does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this

notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the

words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense

organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as

they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and

'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as

in the first.]

Consciousness is not eternal.

It was further maintained by the pûrvapakshin that as consciousness is

self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that

this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove

something not proved by something else that is equally unproved;

comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind

man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent

non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to

make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us

apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at

the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence

which is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does

not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same

time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor

the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there

is an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,

if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we

ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And

if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous

non-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person

in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of

consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of

perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this

limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are

actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend

to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we

observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis

apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of

apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the

means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not

without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge

is connected with its object in that way that it is not without

something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the

instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form

in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and

time.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no

external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such

things also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.

The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by

perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.

It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since

there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be

based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably

accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we

meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent

non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of

knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be

established at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside

the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take

your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must

request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby

to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid

non-perception (anupalabdhi).

Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be

it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,

not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or

subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due

to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that

consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as

non-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended

under the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established

consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;

but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and

other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,

they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and

these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in

nature to their respective forms of consciousness.

There is no consciousness without object.

Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this

kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,

by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential

nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness

of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature

which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according

to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another

consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself

being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.

Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,

senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any

object, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid

non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in

those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of

waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there

is no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something

of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence

of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we

reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite

obliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the

absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous

consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of

consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is

also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from

sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it

be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance

would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the

distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of

the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of

some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other

thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in

question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be

shown further on.

But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep

sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--

True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the

Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.

At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure

consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we

admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the

consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a

substrate.

It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of

consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness

itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself

may be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged

impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.

Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness

can be proved.

Consciousness is capable of change.

Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness

at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other

changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this

conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent

non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,

although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of

'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your

own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is

the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise

of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all

unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is

real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a

sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].

Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within

itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self

is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is

avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from

the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask

whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with

origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is

not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.

You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the

difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted

knowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts

of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.

And if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing

only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and

that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot

be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would

apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of

'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid

means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged

attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they

are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we

understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own

substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.

the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or

'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being

manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms

'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these

definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and

speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or

non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';

oneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that

these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of

non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that

they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a

nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as

attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative

kind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning

proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the

like.

We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is

either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it

possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,

like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.

[FOOTNOTE 54:1. The Sânkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of

real and unreal division, because according to his theory all

distinction is unreal.]

Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.

Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhih) itself. Proof

of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be

given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as

'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps

reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that

Self'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'

True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if

it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'

'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how

can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the

thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character

of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders

things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and

speech. This consciousness (anubhûti), which is also termed jñâna,

avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self

and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the

testimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I

know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the

presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of

consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its

self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents

itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it

would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself

the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of

action is the agent.

For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is

permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not

differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some

time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject

is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly

apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other

hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I

know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer

have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the

conscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment

were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be

impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw

yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by

another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious

subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for

the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject

persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely

consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a

former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a

conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,

you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a

pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have

already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have

absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of

us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And

we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove

that mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is

raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be

conceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in

the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the

absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the

Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is

established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the

_I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure

intelligence, something objective or external?

By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of

attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,

as implied in the thought 'I know.'

Consider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the

inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness

of the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.

'"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of

endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of

release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a

settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the

same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I

myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different

from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.

'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness

at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;

when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be

established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when

there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain

that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'

This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'

(Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, 'Him who knows this they call the

knower of the body' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 1). And the Sûtrakâra also, in the

section beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'

(II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,

18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.

What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while

the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that

the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,

'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own

mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing

subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is

self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for

one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential

nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is

analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the

circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it

does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness

depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of

luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things

also. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists

in a double form, viz. as light (prabhâ), and as luminous matter.

Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in

itself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.

whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses

colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those

of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining

power, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).

Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other

things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because

it always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.

This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is

really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the

substance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in

the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp

consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be

apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles

should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four

fingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves

uniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact

is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew

every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the

successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and

wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely

consumed.

Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-rûpa),

and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially

intelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts

declaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor

outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has

neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.

Up. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no

destruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He

who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who

is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the prânas,

within the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is

he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person

whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the

knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not

see death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest

person not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,

12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the

person; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,

5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self

consisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sûtrakâra also will

refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the

self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure

light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where

there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a

lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians

moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,

are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such

as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who

knows.

With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,

because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what

you understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply

'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing

which is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly

include lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise

to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,

different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define

ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without

any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,

and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,

although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent

for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to

something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in

reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?

Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':

there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'

and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of

appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence

it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is

proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of

light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is

due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to

that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The

Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'

The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the

ahamkâra, cannot be maintained.

We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in

reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to

error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears

as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an

erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place

apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were

as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate

with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the

shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But

the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something

apart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the

stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am

conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare

that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere

attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries

a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the

idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of

him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error

expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that

account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness

which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents

itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that

consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that

cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the

knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublatcd.

You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the

agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;

that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent

kind (jada), and residing in the ahamkâra which is the abode of change

and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakriti); that being an agent

and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is

objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object

of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the

body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But

all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,

non-intelligent, an effect of Prakriti, an object of knowledge,

something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a

knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent

beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,

outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses

the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for

the same reason the ahamkâra also--which is of the same substantial

nature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkâra is

no more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would

be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the

ahamkâra, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be

ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be

maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to

be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as

the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of

the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in

the Sûtra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'jña' (knower) will show

that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of

knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the

substrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are

the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.

Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of

contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called

kshetrajña--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence

of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts

itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the

different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as

due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self

possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,

essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.

This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self

whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent

ahamkâra. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamkâra, although of non-

intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to

intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in

return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take

place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkâra, or does

the ahamkâra become a reflection of consciousness? The former

alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness

the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained

above, the non-intelligent ahamkâra can never become a knower. Moreover,

neither consciousness nor the ahamkâra are objects of visual perception.

Only things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that

as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of

being a knower is imparted to the ahamkâra through its contact with

Intelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow

real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of

knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkâra by contact with

Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of

it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-

intelligent ahamkâra. Nor can we accept what you say about

'manifestation.' Neither the ahamkâra, you say, nor Intelligence is

really a knowing subject, but the ahamkâra manifests consciousness

abiding within itself (within the ahamkâra), as the mirror manifests the

image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkâra

evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said

'That the non-intelligent ahamkâra should manifest the self-luminous

Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'

The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous

consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the

non-intelligent ahamkâra--which itself depends for its light on

consciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never

rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever

knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The

relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and

the ahamkâra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction

in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not

to be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,

owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be

manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor

is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams

(above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the

hand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,

while manifesting the ahamkâra, is at the same time itself manifested by

the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at

all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed

(reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and

hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the

multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.

What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self

consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamkâra?

It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-

established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be

'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--

according to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same

reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of

consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It

would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known

with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the

apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between

the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.

Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind

of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-

restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending

the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that

consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be

maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is

effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any

obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to

the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which

impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case

under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is

nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of

the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the

ahamkâra.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!

Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamkâra cannot be

admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can

consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience

would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.

In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of

knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (sâkshin)--Nescience

cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience

because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,

and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of

Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of

Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness

being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence

knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.

For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own

objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this

would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be

destroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as

that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show

later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On

the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-

existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of

knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as

promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it

follows that the ahamkâra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of

consciousness.'

Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential

nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter

have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in

the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).

The essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they

promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the

nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it

even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the

cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays

of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the

face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And

it is evident that the ahamkâra is not capable of producing an

irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness

which is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous

instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through

the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the

general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not

because the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,

either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness

of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkâra,

and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of

that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkâra. Hence, what constitutes

the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves

itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'

could not be established for consciousness.

The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep

sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no

consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear

presentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents

itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the

latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed

by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;

for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his

state of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure

consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything

else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From

this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.

the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you

urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I

feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly

_not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the

non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep

cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent

as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep

recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such

and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,

you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was

conscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies

a negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was

conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is

negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of

nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure

consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment

'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i.

e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the

words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of

that 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means

of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed

at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may

address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our

opponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then

was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I'

did not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that

this denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state

of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of

myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is

denied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable

question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment

is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,

condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We

must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under

discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by

class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the

object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a

uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is

then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore

means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of

his special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view

that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing

principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sâkshin) we

understand some one who knows about something by personal observation

(sâkshât); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly,

in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not

mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend

Pânini also agrees when teaching that the word 'sâkshin' means one who

knows in person (Pâ. Sû. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but

the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then

should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which

itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that

also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth

appears as the 'I.'

[FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure

refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of

reflection.]

The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the

state of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact

amounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words--

that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a

mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the

essential nature of the Self might persist--as it persists on the

cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self.

Such judgments as 'I know', 'Knowledge has arisen in me', show, on the

other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of

the Self.--Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind--

whether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation

to pain--'I am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may

once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy

a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having

arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other

hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the

loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as

somebody began to tell him about 'release'. And the result of this would

be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole

scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative

character.--Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of

release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves

your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the

idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity

termed 'pure light!'--What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I',

the knowing subject.

This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an

'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever

being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present

dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such

appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I', does

not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self

does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I'. Nor does

this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is

subject to Nescience and implicated in the Samsâra; for this would

contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness

of the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience

(ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition

of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a

person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of

what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is

mistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of

the Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the

consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in

Nescience, or, in the Samsâra? The fact rather is that such

consciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially

opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the

rishi Vâmadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had

totally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the

personal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the rishi Vâmadeva

understood,_I_ was Manu and the Sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And the

highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience

and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous

way; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3,

3); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He thought,

shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, 'Since I

transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible,

therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest

Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 18); 'I am the Self, O Gûdâkesa.' (Bha. Gî. X, 20);

'Never was I not' (Bha. Gî. II, 12); 'I am the source and the

destruction of the whole world' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6); 'I am the source of

all; from me proceeds everything' (Bha. Gî. X, 8); 'I am he who raises

them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gî. XII, 7); 'I am the

giver of seed, the father' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 4); 'I know the things past'

(Bha. Gî. VII, 26).--But if the 'I' (aham) constitutes the essential

nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of

egoity (ahamkâra) to belong to the sphere of objects, 'The great

elements, the ahamkâra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved'

(Bha. Gî. XIII, 5)?--As in all passages, we reply, which give

information about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I',

we conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward

Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahamkâra--a

special effect of the Unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of

the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahamkâra, because

it causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs

to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahamkâra also designated as

pride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to

themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something

evil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by

anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand,

such consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere

Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parâsara has said, 'Hear

from me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of

Selfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness

then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing

subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self

wrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the

Self is nothing but the knowing 'I'. Thus it has been said, 'As is

proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition,

and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a

knowing 'I'. And again,'That which is different from body, senses, mind,

and vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent,

pervading, divided according to bodies-that is the Self blessed in

itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and

'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to

excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'

In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not

stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.

With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which

depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence

admits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is

sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on

which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.--'

The beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply.--

But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means

that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner

analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of

an altogether perverse view of things?--If you reply that this is known

just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we

point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the

defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that

Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at

the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover,

if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on

the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case--for

it is based on the very same view.--If against this you urge that

Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far

as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality

apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than

Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of

Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being

later is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes

for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom

he considers to be in error himself, tells him 'This is no snake, do not

be afraid.' And that Scripture _is_ founded on something defective is

known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which

follows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness

of Brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality

apprehended through the first hearing of the Veda.--We further ask, 'By

what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot

possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be

ascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness--self-proved

and absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this

point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and

incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the

source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it

gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge;

for they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no

acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.

But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical

means and objects of knowledge!--What, we ask in reply, do you

understand by 'empirical'?--What rests on immediate unreflective

knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical

reasoning!--But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If

logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of

knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!--Now you

will possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is

founded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by

Scripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one

and without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior

cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as

the sole Reality.'--But here too you are wrong, since we must decide

that something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain

unrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let

us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of

vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some

remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound

eyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the

same defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge

bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these

people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their

primitive cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its

object, viz., the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect

of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.--

And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based

on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz.

Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.--This

conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. 'The Brahman

under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has

sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.'

'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world

is.' 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise

of which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.'

You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming

consciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's

dreams--are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real

things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence

there is no reason why Scripture--although unreal in so far as based on

Nescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is

real, viz. Brahman.--The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The

conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only their

objects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states,

are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 'the cognitions

of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually

think is 'the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.' In the

same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces

in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and

hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also

are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the

object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and

hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination

which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man

though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is

the representation of the imagined poison, for it may be the cause of

actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is

real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real

face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from

their having a beginning and actual effects.--Nor would it avail you to

object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of

them cannot be real. For ideas require only _some_ substrate in general;

the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an

appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect.

The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is

non-sublated, and therefore real.