But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections,

which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are

destroyed by sublative acts of cognition!--Not so, we reply. Those

affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by

themselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the

cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a

momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in

immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not

otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the

stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would

give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that

there would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear (and this

we know not to be the case).--In conclusion we remark that in defining

right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity,

different from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof

of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of

an entity that it is different from nonentity?--For all these reasons

Inference also does not prove an ajñâna which is a positive entity. And

that it is not proved by Scripture and arthâpatti, will be shown later

on. And the reasoning under Sû. II, 1, 4. will dispose of the argument

which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be

false.

We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its

object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.--Nor can such an

inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous

apprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is

actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and

sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states

of consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any

other state of consciousness.--'But in the case of the shell, &c.,

silver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the

sublating consciousness "this silver is not real," and it is not

possible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are

driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually

apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be

defined neither as real nor as unreal.'--This also we cannot allow,

since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as

another. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition,

all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not

reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless.

The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something

'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the

former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of

sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to

seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva-kaniyatva-vâdin) also must

admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.

Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under

discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance)

must--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their

theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-

called asatkhyâti-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing;

the âtmakhyâti-view, that the Self--which here means 'cognition'--

appears as a thing; and the akhyâti-view, that the attribute of one

thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as

one, and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non-

existing appears as existing [FOOTNOTE 118:1].

Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new

inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination.

This cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception

has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the

origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception,

having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes

it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent

reasoning!--Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the

sense-organ.--This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the

percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.--Nor can the

organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they

are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the

sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can

only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.

And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false ajñâna constituting the

general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted

above.

How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing (which you

assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us

the object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and

term, e.g. of a jar?--If you reply that this is due to its similarity to

silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting

themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.'

Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver

because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask

whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former

alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what

is unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot

belong to what is real.

But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-

founded theory.

[FOOTNOTE 102:1. 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of

Brahman, and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous

cognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be

altogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the

object either of mental apprehension or of sublation.]

[FOOTNOTE 106:1. If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself

of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should

have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness--which is contrary to the

fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the

other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the

imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i.e. unreal,

we are landed in the view of universal unreality.]

[FOOTNOTE 111:1. Allowing the former view of the question only.]

[FOOTNOTE 112:1. Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.]

[FOOTNOTE 118:1. For a full explanation of the nature of these 'khyâtis,'

see A. Venis' translation of the Vedânta Siddhânta Muktâvali (Reprint

from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).]

All knowledge is of the Real.

'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its

object what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike teach that everything

participates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account

of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said

that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite

constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red

colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white

colour from water, the black colour from earth--in this way Scripture

explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all

things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Purâna, in its

account of creation, makes a similar statement: "The elements possessing

various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination,

produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined,

therefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations--

beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the

gross elements--they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This

tripartiteness of the elements the Sûtrakâra also declares (Ve. Sû. III,

1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Putîka sprouts when

no Soma can be procured; for, as the Mîmâmsakas explain, there are in

the Putîka plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pû. Mî. Sû.); and for the

same reason nîvâra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains.

That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part

of that other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells,

&c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is

called "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative

preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are

similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements

of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that

owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not

the shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver,

moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from

such defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from

action. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the

same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another

explains itself through the preponderant element, according as the

preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its

totality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its

object the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made

in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on

the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'

In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or

demerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a

certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which

they are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to

the state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses,

no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no

delights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss.

There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes,

and rivers. For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning of

this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived

by other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the

dreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency

belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his

wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person

who is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after

another, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is

called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes

beyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).--The Sûtrakâra also, after having in two

Sûtras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul

creating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that

wonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the

individual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul

is in the samsâra state, its true nature--comprising the power of making

its wishes to come true--is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot

practically exercise that power. The last clause of the Katha text ('all

worlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self

only is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his

chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various

results of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king,

having at another time his head cut off, and so on--is possible in so

far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the

body resting on the bed.

The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as

follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the

bile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the

shell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is

overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended;

the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its

yellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the

bystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person

suffering from jaundice, to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues

from his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by

the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension,

it is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.--In an

analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended

as red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the

brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its

close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.--In the

same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always

exists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect

of the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of

merit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while

the water _is_ apprehended.--In the case again of the firebrand swung

round rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through

the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all

points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the

intervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real

wheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no

intervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of

the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement.

But in the latter case also the cognition is true.--Again, in the case

of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own

face is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays

(proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by

the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face,

subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in

this case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no

apprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face

presents itself as being in the mirror.--In the case of one direction

being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be

where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i.

e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other

direction (for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of

another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements

of direction; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus

likewise true. Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either

through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal

affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the

double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating,

becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus

apprehends the moon in her proper place; the other which moves somewhat

obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the

moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.

Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished

by connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to

the double apparatus of vision--yet, owing to the difference of

apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object

apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a

double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is

viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the

apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended

in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the

apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished

by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness

of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e.

the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the

true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which

ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually

seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute

one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some

defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from

the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes

place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper

place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time

quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual

apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to

a doubleness of the object of apprehension.

We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of

other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length

by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What

need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the

validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and--

what is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest

Brahman--free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence,

comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing,

immediately realising all its purposes--, what should they not be able

to prove? That holy highest Brahman--while producing the entire world as

an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their

respective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature

as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or

unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are

created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and

to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction--viz. of

things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are

not so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things

sublating' and 'things sublated.'--Everything is explained hereby.

Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purâna teach Nescience.

The assertion that Nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor

as that which is not--rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In

passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word

'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is

different from 'rita,' and this latter word--as we see from the passage

'enjoying the rita' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)--denotes such actions as aim at no

worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and

thus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anrita' therefore

denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results

and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement

with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are

carried away by anrita' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then

there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 1), the terms

'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in

their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that

intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the

origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6),

are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective

totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term

'darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to

something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms

'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at

different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective

totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural

passage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable

(akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one

with the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle

condition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the totality of non-

intelligent things; but this very Prakriti is called Mâyâ--in the text

'Know Prakriti to be Mâyâ,' and this proves it be something

'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word

'Mâyâ' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'Mâyâ' is

synonymous with 'mithyâ,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the

Undefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'Mâyâ' does

not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such

things as the weapons of Asuras and Râkshasas, which are not 'false' but

real. 'Mâyâ,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces

various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakriti is

called Mâyâ. This appears from the passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that

the "mâyin" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by

mâyâ.' For this text declares that Prakriti--there called Mâyâ--produces

manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called

'mâyin' because he possesses that power of mâyâ; not on account of any

ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text

expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual

soul is bound up by mâyâ; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When

the soul slumbering in beginningless Mâyâ awakes' (Gaud. Kâ.). Again, in

the text 'Indra goes multiform through the Mâyâs' (Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18),

the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what

the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashtri': for an unreal

being does not shine. And where the text says 'my Mâyâ is hard to

overcome' (Bha. Gî. VII, 14), the qualification given there to Mâyâ, viz.

'consisting of the gunas,' shows that what is meant is Prakriti

consisting of the three gunas.--All this shows that Scripture does not

teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined

either as that which is or that which is not.'

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise

the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning.

For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the

individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason,

founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word

'that'--which is all-knowing, &c.--Nescience, which is contradictory to

Brahman's nature.--Itihâsa and Purâna also do not anywhere teach that to

Brahman there belongs Nescience.

But, an objection is raised, the Vishnu Purâna, in the sloka, 'The stars

are Vishnu,' &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and

comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka

that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c.,

is sprung out of the 'ajñâna' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'jñâna,'

i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung

from ajñâna by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its

own nature, is free from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two

slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of

this world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that

is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of

that ajñâna which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold;

thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be

free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches

(45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-

called reality of the world is merely conventional.--This is not, we

reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at

the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the

world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of

another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be

understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-

intelligent beings, the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by

mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only,

and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the

differences due to Prakriti--is, owing to its imperishable nature,

denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part

which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes

manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is

not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vâsudeva, i.e. Brahman, and

hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From

the waters which form the body of Vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped

earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire

Brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which

Vishnu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of

the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars

are Vishnu,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in

numerous previous passages of the Purâna ('all this is the body of Hari,'

&c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are

Vishnu's body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the

Lord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of

the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential

nature is knowledge only--while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part

in it--, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine,

hills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in

the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose

various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since

non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the

actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the

souls are 'being.'--This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge

is pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the

distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies,

human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.--all which are objects of fruition

for the different individual souls--pass away.' Non-intelligent matter,

as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called

'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent

knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists

(41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform

nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and

which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence;

while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly

passes over into different states, each later state being out of

connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-

intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth

is made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes

on to say that there _is_ nothing but knowledge. This fundamental

knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold

individual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The

one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds

differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl 43, second half).

Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes

the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter--these

two together constitute the world, and the world is the body of Vâsudeva;

such is the purport of sloka 44.--The next sloka sums up the whole

doctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding

verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the

sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.

Now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the

doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called

Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which

is nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,

owing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is

not' (sl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; sl 45), can in no

way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By

'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what

is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is

changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent

matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl 42: the jar is

something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated

by true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is

observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other

moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction

between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at

different times; and hence there is no reason to call it something

futile (tuchcha) or false (mithyâ), &c.

Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-

qualified Brahman.--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi.'

Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of

avidyâ to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all

difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the

following: 'I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness;

knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other path to go' (Svet.

Up. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person--none is

lord over him, his name is great glory--they who know him become

immortal' (Mahânâ. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is

characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release

results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those

texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting

forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.

In texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the

constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity

of a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and

'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that'

refers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the

general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section,

such as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-

ordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having

for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter.

This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is

meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such

doubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no

difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,

and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it

would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be

taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor

is there any need of our assuming implication (lakshanâ) in sentences

[FOOTNOTE 130:1] such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me

from former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition

of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and

the present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference

of place being removed by the accompanying difference of time. If the

text 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,

moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz.

'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the

same section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be

known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not

possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of

'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge,

which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within

itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that

it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which

spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination

('thou art that') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong

notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that'

and 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the

one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the

different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus

implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to

this interpretation as well. And there would be even further

difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,'

the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this

is a shell': in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would

not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be

assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further,

there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does

not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate.

To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously

concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that'

to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously

to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object

of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object

either of an error or its sublation.--Nor can we allow you to say that,

previously to sublation, the substrate was non-concealed in so far as

(i. e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed'

aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect

shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.--The

outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real

attribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is

for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or

sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man

there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only

possible on condition of a real additional attribute--e.g. the man's

princely birth--being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that

error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely

birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter

fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it

sublates no error.--If, on the other hand, the text is understood to

refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words

('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus

making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects,

the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved, On this

interpretation the text further intimates that Brahman--free from all

imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is

the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power.

It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the

previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all

things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having

for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross

state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in

their subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict

with other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest

of Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold'

(ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose

purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.

But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on your interpretation

of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original

assertion with regard to the other?--The question does not arise, we

reply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,

the truth which it states having already been established by the

preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause

does make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that

'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other

means'--that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world

together with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the

Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage,

'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling

and their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an

earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is

Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning,

ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Ch. Up. III. 14, 1). Similarly other

texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as

the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings

constitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings,

the Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth,

whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the

earth within--he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. He who

dwells in the Self,'&c. (Bri. Up. III, 7,3; 22); 'He who moving within

the earth, and so on--whose body is death, whom death does not know, he

is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Nårâyana'

(Subâl. Up. VII, 1); 'Having created that he entered into it; having

entered it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the

section under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this

living Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only

through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman,

that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with

the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in

connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 'sat' denotes the individual

soul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self,

owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.--From all this it

follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-

intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes

Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman

derives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any

term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has

its proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms

whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different

things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use

of speech and etymology.--The text 'that art thou' we therefore

understand merely as a special expression of the truth already

propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'

This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the

absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the

doctrine of bhedâbheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and

those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up

all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal

Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is

only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity

refer?'--The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'--But,

we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature

of Brahman [FOOTNOTE 134:1], and there is nothing left to be determined

by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.--But

those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!--This, we

reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating

universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-

ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and

thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.--The bhedâbheda view

implies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts

(upâdhi) all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly

belong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in Brahman

itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is

constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising

within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that

doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory

be held in that form that 'bhedâbheda' belongs to Brahman by its own

nature (not only owing to an upâdhi), the view that Brahman by its

essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections

no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in

conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with

Brahman free from all imperfections.--For those finally who maintain

absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has

no meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be

one--and this implies the abandonment of all Vedânta-texts together.

Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine,

proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of

Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity

of the world with Brahman. For as genus (jâti) and quality (guna), so

substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining

attributes (viseshana), in so far namely as they constitute the body of

something else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to

its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,'

show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to

be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is

also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of

'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to

substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the

ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies

bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far

only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination

such as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are

in every way appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is

thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another,

not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of

an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination

with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of

subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that

those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances--

as when from danda, 'staff,' we form dandin, 'staff-bearer'; in the case,

on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being

apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of

attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-

ordination.--But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in

sentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body

of a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode,

in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the

cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the

relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are

grammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous

cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of the

body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the

generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is

not the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal

body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form

'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement

not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).--This is not

so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous

to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in

which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and

their final cause (prayojana), and they are modes of the Self. That the

Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self

separates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone

is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end

that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they

are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere

attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like.

These are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow'

extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to

comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as

in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position

is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative

forms--such as dandin (staff-bearer), kundalin (adorned with earrings).

In the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the

essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which

constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic

language express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of

co-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class

characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due

to the fact of both being objects of visual perception; the Self, on the

other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while

the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is

hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by

itself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the body's

essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is

proved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its

having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to

it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are

invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their

being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise.

Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these

qualities are not perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which

perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of

the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason

of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the

Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that

essential nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential

nature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,'

&c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of

something being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with

this relation.--But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to

mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to

the Self!--Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode

of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things,

the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as

'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,''quality,' are used

in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a

white thing, of which it is the prakâra, and so on). Words such as

'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the

Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with

aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity,

divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and

hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend

in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent

and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman,

and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-

ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.--This point has been

demonstrated by me in the Vedârthasamgraha. A Sûtra also (IV, 1, 3) will

declare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation

of body and Self; and the Vâkyakâra too says 'It is the Self--thus

everything should be apprehended.'

[FOOTNOTE 130:1. Which are alleged to prove that sâmânâdhikaranya is to

be explained on the basis of lakshanâ.]

[FOOTNOTE 134:1. Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.]

Summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are

to reconciled.

The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare

a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent

beings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the

souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From

that the Lord of Mâyâ creates all this; in that the other one is bound

up through that Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakriti to be Mâyâ, and

the great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ' (10); 'What is perishable is the

Pradhâna, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the

Perishable and the Self' (Svet Up. I, 10)--In this last passage the

clause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying

individual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati)

towards itself the pradhâna as the object of its enjoyment.--' He is the

cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither

parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradhâna and of

the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of

the Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mahânâr. Up. XI, 3);

'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a

ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. 1, 9); 'The eternal among the

non-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one

fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer,

the object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them

eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV,

6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him

he reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female

being, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring.

There is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is

another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On

the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his

impotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory,

then his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).--Smriti expresses itself

similarly.--'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature;

other than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes

the individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. Gì. VII, 4,

5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again

at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own

Nature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which

has no power of its own, being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. Gî.

IX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and

the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. Gî.

IX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning'

(XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,

and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last

passage means--the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-

intelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called Prakriti; with

this I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this

contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,

there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless

things.

Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative

positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing

in multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently

connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body,

and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting

their Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth

and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth

is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,

the immortal,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the

earth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose

body death is,' &c.(Subâla Up. VII, 1). In this latter passage the word

'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent

matter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same

Upanishad,'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also

'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. Âr.

III, 24).

Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-

intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and

hence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well

as in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its

double aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was

in the beginning, one only without a second--it desired, may I be many,

may I grow forth--it sent forth fire,' &c., up to 'all these creatures

have their root in that which is,' &c., up to 'that art thou, O

Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 2-8); 'He wished, may I be many,' &c., up to 'it

became the true and the untrue' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections also

refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent

matter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by

other scriptural texts; so in the Chândogya passage, 'Let me enter those

three divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names

and forms'; and in the Taitt. passage, 'Having sent forth that he

entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and

(what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,' &c. These two

passages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul's having

its Self in Brahman--which view is implied in the Ch. passage--must be

understood as resting thereon that the souls (together, with matter)

constitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the Taitt. passage ('it

became knowledge and that which is without knowledge,' i.e. souls and

matter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described

elsewhere also, 'All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form

and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in

its causal or in its 'effected' condition, according as it has for its

body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or

their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause,

and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result

is that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our

view be well established. In the clause 'I will enter into these three

divine beings with this living Self,' &c., the term 'the three divine

beings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the

text declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering

into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it

follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified

by individual Selfs, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient

matter. A term which denotes the highest Self in its causal condition

may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting

the highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their

primary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-

intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes

effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause

(upâdâna). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential

constituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-

coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black,

&c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one

colour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even

in the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of

non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the

material cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of

the essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment,

and the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is

indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are

capable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally

combined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes

exists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-

sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of

the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on

which account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term

whatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists

a distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the

constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that

the highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition,

remains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different--

and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz.

its abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in

their gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an

effect means entering into another state of being.

Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities,

explain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of

evil. For the passage, Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5--which at first negatives all

evil qualities 'free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief,

from hunger and thirst', and after that affirms auspicious qualities

'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in

other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil

qualities only.--Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the

essential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of

Brahman--which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a

mass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as

knowledge (intelligence) only--which also follows from the 'self-

luminousness' predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as 'He

who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is revealed as

manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8);

'Whereby should he know the knower' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the

highest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as 'The

True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), declare

knowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be denned through

knowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as 'He desired, may

I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'It thought, may I be many; it evolved

itself through name and form' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), teach that Brahman,

through its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again,

negative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not

having their Self in Brahman. 'From death to death goes he who sees here

any plurality'; 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);

'For where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14). But these

texts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages

such as 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--which springs from Brahman's

will, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved

by clauses in those 'negativing' texts themselves, 'Whosoever looks for

anything elsewhere than in the Self', 'from that great Being there has

been breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).--On

this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the

essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient

beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the

world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in

any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form

the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal

condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of

names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject

to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any

opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience,

or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upâdhi)--such and

similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict

Scripture.

There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare

the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their

mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that

other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause

and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this

by an analogous case from the Karmakânda. There six separate oblations

to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative

injunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (viz. the new

moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those

groups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the

entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a

certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedânta-texts give instruction

about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is

the pradhâna, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., Svet Up. I, 10; and

others); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their

different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the

latter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally

another group of texts teaches--by means of words such as 'Being,'

'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs--

that the one highest Self in its causal and effected states comprises

within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation

('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self;

'All this is Brahman').--That the highest Self with matter and souls for

its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more

objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested

with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul--as when we

say 'This is a happy soul.'

Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as

the universal self.

The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of

Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is

something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can

any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of

pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of

various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is

something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be

obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the

devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the

cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of

things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only

effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts

such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17), and

'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6),

teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different

from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e.

final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge

which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for

another act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said

that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole

aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away

itself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply.

Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike

fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of

destroying that avidyâ which is the cause of the fiction of its

destruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman

itself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow,

we reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for

that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not

originate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising

subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of

everything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is

himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be,

we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negatived,

and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not

therefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that

the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you

mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that

'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that

it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case

that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist,

because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a

further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would

possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject

knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of

knowing subjects. If, on the other band, the essential nature of Brahman

itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with

the one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the

terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things

separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is

to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less

absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth

has been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that

Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the

things cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according

to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower

superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an

act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is

impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be

said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very

nature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can

assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidyâ

as the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz.

that since bondage springs from ajnâna in the form of an eternal stream

of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind

maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due

daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste

and âsrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying

thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of

propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited

and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not

aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person,

bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby

the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the

Self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into

the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described--

which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached.

For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon _after_

the enquiry into the nature of works.

[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not jñânam, but jñâtri.]

[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's

highest aim.]

The Vedântin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture,

need not be disconcerted by the Mîmâmsâ-theory of all speech having

informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another primâ facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself.

The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but

by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such

speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done

(kârya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to

be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things

to be done. From this it follows that the Vedânta-texts cannot claim the

position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman,

which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against

this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive

of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea

of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of

certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance--

which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the

possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in

number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth

having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one,

&c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the

denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be

ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word

from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical

part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the

fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words

known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some

particular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person,

afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear

on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we

determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-

existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account

for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing

incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the

particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to

determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being

invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that

the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All

words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a

sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence

it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting

their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words

of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not

the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it;

for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action

only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is

evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even

present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does

not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means

towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of

mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he

does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of

things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda

also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a

position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and

permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is

(not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on

the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result

('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the kâturmâsya-sacrifices,'

and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into

Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and

permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent,

is an altogether unjustified proceeding.

To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known

mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to

assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those

things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which

men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight

regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in

the following way. The father and mother and other people about him

point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well

as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to

the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms

they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again

make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such

things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of

themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time

observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any

person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion

that the application of such and such words to such and such things is

based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by

his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first,

have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the

meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain

meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.

And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things

can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some

expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing

well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing

well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various

gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows

him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he

therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a

meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in

relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedânta-texts tell us

about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on

Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to

undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating

only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.

For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be

meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we

must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brâhmana having

known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that

small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.

VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'

(Mahânâr. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,

viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman

attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is

meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such

meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established

thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.

There are analogous instances in the Karmakânda of the Veda. When an

arthavâda-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is

no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to

those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of

the heavenly world. Where another arthavâda says that 'those who perform

certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm

establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for

those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform

the râtri-sattras' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a

person threatening a Brâhmana is to be punished with a fine of one

hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the

prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brâhmana'(Pû. Mî. Sû. III,

4, 17).

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words

depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not

even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are

quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done

'(kârya). You understand by 'kârya' that which follows on the existence

of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by

action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of

action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action

(according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to

obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of

some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be

accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and

begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at

by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending

on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to

objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment

depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it

be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is

'agreeable' (anukûla) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable

to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is

'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain

is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable

(pratikûla), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is

agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that

a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor

pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor

does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential

nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve

of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by

action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha),

while itself it holds the position of something principal to be

subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no

proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that

which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to

something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin;

for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which

is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And

moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action

proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is

just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and

moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhâna') is capable of

action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does

something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last

criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the

master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own

advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a

view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of

'kârya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is

correlative to kârya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.--

Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that

which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an

action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes

the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus

'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is

desired, kârya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and

stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhâna or

seshin).

(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the

apûrva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces

the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of

the action.--But) the apûrva also can, as it is something different from

the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain,

be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as

something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very

reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the

action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing

to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and

imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in

accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as

svargakâmah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means

of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the

(sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an

altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apûrva) effect of it which (later

on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apûrva'

can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of

bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to

assert that the apûrva, which is assumed to the end of firmly

establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first

recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of

realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of

the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakâmah'

(desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an

independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise

an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation

of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover,

do you understand by the apûrva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will

perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apûrva

a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then

define the apûrva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by

that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the

first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any

pleasure springing from consciousness of your apûrva, which could in any

way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the

objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative

doctrine gives us the notion of an apûrva as something beneficial to man,

we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the

authoritative doctrine establishing such an apûrva beneficial to man?

Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has

for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in

the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the

means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor

again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional

obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apûrva only

on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apûrva as intimated by

Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakâmah. And we, moreover, do

not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this

life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apûrva, in

addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the

work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom

from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apûrva being a

pleasure. The arthavâda-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying

certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not

anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apûrva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which

is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the

meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the

effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz.

the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of

pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other

divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that

through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is

accomplished, we shall show later on, under Sû. III, 2, 37--It is thus

finally proved that the Vedânta-texts give information about an

accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on

Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand,

Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the kâturmâsya-

sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this

imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely

teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere

works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman

is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an

enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate

determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of

'Enquiry.'

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should

be enquired into?--To this question the second Sûtra gives a reply.

[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prâbhâkara Mîmâmsakas.]