THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ
I
The visit to Tangier, because of its very unexpectedness, did not at
first alarm the French, who refused to credit the German Emperor with
hostile intentions.[597] Better-informed personages in Paris, however,
interpreted the event more accurately. They were asking seriously
whether war would ensue and were declaring that “no such critical moment
has occurred since the Schnäbele affair.” The Austrian Ambassador was
reminded by the Franco-German press war of the days immediately
preceding the conflict of 1870.[598]
The French government had been warned by both German and British
representatives of Germany’s interest in Morocco. As early as November,
1904, Herr von Kühlmann had declared to the French chargé d’affaires at
Tangier that Germany had expected France to acquaint her with the new
situation in Morocco created by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
accords, but that she had since realized that she was being
“systematically excluded.” “The Imperial Government is ignorant of all
the accords made over Morocco and does not consider itself bound in any
way on that question,” he said. The French chargé d’affaires had not
regarded these remarks as sufficiently significant to report until the
following February. Upon direct inquiry in Berlin the French government
had had them corroborated by the German foreign office.[599] On February
12, 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador at Madrid, had
remarked to his French colleague that “the attitude assumed by the
German Government in response to the petition of their subjects in
Morocco was an invitation to the French Government to initiate some
discussion with a view to obtain their concurrence with the provisions
of the Convention.”[600] M. Delcassé had not heeded this advice. By
March 22 he had become uneasy over the German policy, about which he was
so uncertain.[601] He was determined, however, to maintain intact
France’s accords with the other Powers and her position in Morocco.[602]
Ascertaining on the eve of the voyage to Tangier that Great Britain,
Spain, and Italy would hold loyally to their agreements,[603] he
declared in the Senate on March 31, the same day on which William II
spoke at Tangier, that
nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our execution of the accords
of April 8 and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German
press. . . . . You may legitimately hope that in the western basin of
the Mediterranean . . . . France will succeed, without ignoring any
right, without injuring any interest, in assuring her future.[604]
The semiofficial French press threatened the formation of a new Dual
Alliance between France and Great Britain supported by Italy and Spain
in case Germany attempted to gain any special advantages in
Morocco.[605] At the same time, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René
Taillandier, who since March 24 had been making substantial progress in
the negotiations with the Sultan,[606] to warn that monarch against
following the proposal of the German press for an international
conference over the Moroccan question.[607] He also informed the Italian
government, April 12, that France could not entertain such a
proposal.[608]
The Emperor’s move nevertheless forced M. Delcassé to open negotiations
with Germany for an understanding regarding Morocco. From March 28 he
endeavored indirectly to approach the German government.[609] On April 7
a threatened interpellation in the Chamber forced him to state publicly
that France was “ready to dissipate any misunderstanding which . . . .
may still exist.”[610] Under pressure from the French cabinet[611] as
well as from public opinion M. Delcassé, while dining at the German
embassy on April 13, repeated that statement directly to Prince Radolin.
He denied that M. Saint-René Taillandier had ever claimed before the
Sultan to have a mandate of Europe. He excused his failure to transmit
the Anglo-French agreement to the German government; and, while
admitting that the conversation of March 23, 1904, had been unofficial,
he declared that his intention had been to show special favor to Germany
by communicating the contents of the accord to her beforehand. He had
also believed, he said, that freedom of commerce for all nations had
been completely safeguarded in that agreement and in the one with
Spain.[612] Immediately thereafter the French government informally
asked the British government to “help to convince the Emperor that
German interests were in no way threatened” in Morocco.[613]
To carry out his policy, M. Delcassé needed the loyal support of all
France. That he did not have. Political jealousy because of his long
tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and
M. Rouvier (the premier), hostility because of his defending the Russian
government in the massacre of January 22, 1905[614]—all these forces of
opposition were now strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister
had blundered and that, aroused by the fear of complications, France
sought a victim whose sacrifice might dispel the danger. Quickly
deserting M. Delcassé, the nation pressed him on too rapidly to take the
initiative with Germany. As time passed with nothing settled, nothing
known, the French grew more and more alarmed, until on April 19 the
Chamber denounced the Foreign Minister for having neglected to consult
Germany, and demanded information. M. Deschanel declared that the
Foreign Minister should have heeded Germany’s well-known imperialistic
ambitions by negotiating with that Power about Morocco. “There are not
lacking in England people who desire to utilize the French power against
Germany,” he said. “And there are not lacking in Germany people who will
try to utilize the French power against England. We should not offer
ourselves to that play.” M. Tournade accused M. Delcassé of having hoped
that if he “juggled the question with Germany” and confronted her with a
_fait accompli_, she would venture no opposition. M. de Pressensé,
charging him with deliberately having avoided an official notification
to Germany of the Moroccan accords, asserted: “You have not followed an
exact conception of the interests of France. Your policy is unworthy of
a great country.” M. Delafosse, sensing the reason for the German action
in the Anglo-French entente rather than in Morocco, expressed the
general demand that “it is necessary to ask Germany what she wishes of
us.” No one, however, believed that Germany would question France’s
special position in Morocco.
Although not a voice was raised in his behalf, M. Delcassé refused to
impart any new intelligence in answer to these accusations and demands.
If M. Rouvier had not come to his rescue, he would have been repudiated
by all parties. In defending the Foreign Minister M. Rouvier declared
that not France but Germany had altered her Moroccan policy since the
previous year, attributing this change to the defeat of France’s
ally.[615] The initiative toward conversations with Germany, he said,
had already been made. “We have closed our ear to no proposal,” he
avowed; “anything which is in harmony with the formula . . . .: to
safeguard the honor of our country and to maintain peace, . . . . we are
ready to consider.” He made the retention of M. Delcassé a cabinet
question, but he assured the Chamber that in the future he would
supervise the foreign policy.[616]
Upon receiving this check, M. Delcassé would have resigned had it not
been for the appeals of President Loubet and of MM. Paul Cambon and
Barrère, both of whom were in Paris at the time.[617] His policy of
treating with Germany on an equal footing was checkmated. French public
opinion had forced an almost complete surrender in the face of the
German menace. It remained to be seen how far M. Rouvier could yield
before French desire for peace would conflict with French national
honor.
II
The Emperor’s injudicious assertions at Tangier compelled the German
foreign office to take some positive action in Morocco instead of
leaving the initiative to the Sultan. Herr von Holstein contended that
“a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmütz and cause Fashoda
to be forgotten.”[618] By April 2 the Chancellor decided upon the
following policy:[619] first, to continue denying any territorial
ambitions in Morocco; second, to demand economic equality for all
nations, the open door “in the widest sense”; third, and this he
considered Germany’s “trump card,” to advocate calling an international
conference like that at Madrid in 1880 for deliberating upon the entire
question of Moroccan reform.[620] Of course no separate negotiations
with France would be considered.
The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein believed that the proposal for a
conference would give Germany an unassailable position. Protected by the
appearance of absolute legality and disinterestedness, they hoped to
break the ententes and accords between France and the other Powers,
especially Great Britain, or at least to show that Germany could force
them to submit the results of their agreements to the consideration of a
general conference.[621] They did not doubt that the proposal would be
accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over to
France. For, they argued,
in case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic
support of America in favor of the open door. . . . . Austria will not
quarrel with us over Morocco . . . . Russia is busy with herself.[622] .
. . . The English Government—between Roosevelt and those English groups
which think as the _Morning Post_, _Manchester Guardian_, and Lord
Rosebery[623]—will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a
strong party in favor of the _status quo_. We shall certainly be able to
hold Italy in order, if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle
with France, Austria will perhaps settle the irredentist question. . . .
. If France refuses the conference, she will put herself in the wrong
toward all the signatory Powers[624] and thereby will give England,
Spain, and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.[625]
Immediately after the Emperor’s speeches at Tangier, Herr von Holstein
proposed advocating a conference in the semiofficial press. The
Chancellor approved; but Herr Hammann, director of the press bureau in
the foreign office, objected. Inasmuch as the Emperor and the Chancellor
had both declared that Germany would next communicate directly with the
Sultan, he argued, this abrupt change would expose German policy to the
accusation of unsteadiness. He advised preparing public opinion for a
conference, for, he maintained, the government had “to combat a much
stronger aversion to a serious conflict with France and England over
Morocco in the public than in the press.”[626] On April 7 he predicted a
“press storm” if the menace of war arose.[627] So, for the time a milder
note was sounded in the press. The grievances against M. Delcassé, who
was made personally responsible for Germany’s action,[628] the necessity
for defending the German economic interests in Morocco, and the intimacy
of German-American relations were emphasized. Little by little the
proposal for a conference was brought to the fore.[629]
The main basis for the optimism of the German government was its
friendship with President Roosevelt. Since the early part of the year
both the British and the German governments had been endeavoring to win
the President’s support and to arouse his suspicions by accusing each
other of aggressive intentions.[630] Needing the support of both to
effect peace between Russia and Japan, Mr. Roosevelt had refused to
believe the tales of either. He had diagnosed their trouble as a case of
“jumpy nerves,” and had tried in February and March, 1905, to bring them
together in a new triple entente.[631] The German government had
responded favorably to his suggestion; but the British government,
taxing the President with being hoodwinked by the Emperor, had replied
that better relations with that hostile Power were scarcely
possible.[632] This lack of success with Great Britain, combined with
mistrust of France, caused the President to draw closer to Germany.[633]
On April 3 the German government confidently asked Mr. Roosevelt to lend
“moral support” for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco and
for the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan difficulty by speaking
“calmly and academically,” particularly to Great Britain, for the equal
treatment of all Powers in the Sherifian Empire.[634] Ten days later it
asked the President to speak to Great Britain in favor of an
international conference on the Moroccan question.[635] Not delaying for
a definite reply or heeding the signs of the drawing together of Great
Britain and France,[636] the German government, on April 9, determined
to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the efforts of the French
mission and to win the Sultan’s approval of a conference. The Count had
telegraphed that this move was essential, since the Sultan was a
weakling, his advisers incompetent and venal, and since the French were
otherwise likely to gain the acceptance of their plans of reform.[637]
On the same date (April 9) upon which the German government made this
decision, it began to sound the other Powers concerning a conference.
Austria-Hungary and Russia could be excluded from consideration although
both showed disapproval of Germany’s action.[638] When the Spanish
government was asked on April 12 to support the proposal for a
conference, the foreign minister, M. Villa-Urrutia, replied that he
could accept it only if France and Great Britain did so. He suggested
that the German desires be fulfilled not by a conference but by an
exchange of notes and declarations between the Powers.[639]
With Italy the German government was more brusque. While reassuring that
Power that Germany had no intention of becoming a rival in the
Mediterranean, Count Bülow demanded under threat of breaking the
alliance that Italy support the German policy in the Moroccan affair.
But on April 12 the Italian government, evading a definite position,
urged a direct settlement of the Franco-German discord. Count Monts,
German ambassador at Rome, reported that only in case Great Britain
showed coolness toward France might Germany expect any support from her
ally, who would otherwise endeavor to remain neutral.[640]
Since the German government thought that Great Britain had relinquished
her Moroccan interests, it intended to ignore her and deal solely with
France. On April 19 Count Metternich merely explained to Lord Lansdowne
the German views in the Moroccan affair without asking for any
expression of opinion. In this conversation he received the impression
that the British Foreign Minister disapproved of the German action and
that, against his desire, he could easily be forced to give France
diplomatic support.[641]
Without waiting for either the British or the American reply, the German
government, on April 18, responded to M. Delcassé’s offer “to dissipate
any misunderstanding” with the suggestion that “the simplest and most
natural means” of settling the question of Moroccan reform would be to
bring about “an exchange of ideas between all the signatory Powers” of
the Convention of Madrid.[642] At the same time, through messages to the
Sultan the Chancellor sought to prevent him from making any decisions
before the German mission arrived, and he pressed Count Tattenbach to
hasten his departure for Fez. Count Bülow realized that if the French
succeeded in gaining the Sultan’s acceptance of their program of
reforms, the entire German action would be rendered absurd. In fact,
until Count Tattenbach could persuade the Sultan to issue an invitation
for a conference, the latter held the fate of Germany’s policy in his
hands.[643]
III
The German Emperor’s visit to Tangier aroused bitter antagonism in Great
Britain, where government and people believed that Germany had struck as
much at Great Britain as at France in an effort to break the Entente
Cordiale. Alarm over a possible German attack upon the British Isles was
revived.[644] Public feeling was well expressed by King Edward who, on
April 15, wrote indignantly to Lord Lansdowne:
The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event
which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the
throne. It was also a political theatrical fiasco, and if he thinks he
has done himself good in the eyes of the world he is very much mistaken.
He is no more or less than a political “enfant terrible” and one can
have no faith in any of his assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish
to set every country by the ears.[645]
The Foreign Secretary’s criticism was also severe.
I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition [he wrote,
on April 9, to Sir Frank Lascelles] as an isolated incident. There can
be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French
Agreement, and probably even more so by our refusal to vamp up some
agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question.
We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails himself of
every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels. . . . .[646]
This staunch pro-French sentiment was not concealed. Early in April an
exchange of visits by the British and French fleets was announced for
the summer. King Edward had an interview with MM. Loubet and Delcassé on
April 6 while passing through Paris on his way south.[647] In Berlin at
the same time Sir Frank Lascelles spoke in private “very disapprovingly”
of the German action, and strongly opposed the idea of a
conference.[648] And British public opinion, the true guide of the
foreign policy, gave entire support to France.[649] So although the
British government admitted that M. Delcassé had blundered in his
handling of Germany[650] and although it knew that the secret articles
of the two Moroccan accords were not in keeping with the public ones, it
felt obliged both by honor and by interest to help France out of her
difficulty. Its official attitude was expressed by Lord Lansdowne to the
Ambassador at Berlin as follows:
My impression is that the German Government have really no cause for
complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco part of
the Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively
with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the other
Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for their
interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else does the
Kaiser want?[651]
Particularly since British policy aimed at preventing Germany from
obtaining ports anywhere in the colonial world[652] did the British
government desire to keep that Power out of Morocco. And, while Sir
Francis Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, reported the French
government as “solid on Morocco,” he added the ill-omened statement of
M. Delcassé, that the German government was “turning him out.”[653] Lord
Lansdowne did not follow up the French suggestion of intervening in
Berlin in favor of France for fear of doing more harm than good by
arousing the Emperor’s resentment.[654] But he did send the British
Minister at Tangier to Fez to offset the effects of the German
mission.[655] And on April 22 he instructed Sir Francis Bertie as
follows:
It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the
Moorish coast.
You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should
be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to
such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government
will afford us a full opportunity to conferring with them as to steps
which might be taken in order to meet it.
German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having
regard to M. Delcassé’s attitude and we desire to give him all the
support we can.
On April 25 the Ambassador handed M. Delcassé the following _aide-
memoire_ (dated April 24):
The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan
question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé’s attitude, and it
desires to give to His Excellency all the support in its power. It seems
not improbable that the German Government may ask for a port on the
Moroccan coast. In that event the British Government would be willing to
join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a
proposal, and it asks M. Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to
give to the British Government full opportunity to concert with the
French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that
demand.[656]
By inverting the order of the sentences, the Ambassador gave to Lord
Lansdowne’s communication a force and a meaning which were originally
lacking. He changed the emphasis from that of helping France to oppose
the German acquisition of a port to that of helping her to oppose
Germany in the whole Moroccan question. The one document limited the
scope of the support and stressed the point of conferring beforehand as
well as that of offering strong opposition. The other document began
with a blanket offer of aid, and then used the present instance as one
example of that offer. Moreover, the statement “to concert with the
French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that
demand” was stronger than the one used by Lord Lansdowne, “of conferring
with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.” Sir
Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ was so colored by his own very pro-
French feeling that it did not accurately reproduce his chief’s
proposal.
IV
M. Delcassé was “most grateful” for this support. He denied that Germany
had made any such request, although he remarked that some years ago
Count Hatzfeldt had approached the British government on the subject. He
promised to communicate with the latter if he heard of any German
aspirations for a port and to warn the Sultan against giving any
concession to Germany.[657] Thus, by virtue of the British offer, the
French Foreign Minister was able to hold to his policy in spite of
Germany’s refusal to consider his overture and in spite of his
unpopularity with the French Parliament. On May 2, he again attempted to
approach the German government, offering through M. Luzzati, Italian
minister of finance, to give “any satisfaction desired by Germany in
order to settle the Moroccan question in a way which would not wound
French honor too deeply.”[658] At the same time he continued the French
action at Fez. When on April 26 the Sultan, emboldened by the German
intervention, requested an international guaranty of the proposed
Franco-Moroccan agreement over military reforms, M. Delcassé immediately
refused. “You may declare peremptorily to Ben Sliman,” he instructed the
French Minister on May 3, “that there can no more be intermediate Powers
between France and Morocco than there are intermediate countries between
Morocco and Algeria.”[659]
The Foreign Minister’s policy was disapproved by the French Premier, who
since April 19 had assumed general control over foreign affairs. Whereas
M. Delcassé, a skilled diplomat, was secretive, pro-British, and anti-
German, the inexperienced M. Rouvier, a business man who sought to
employ business methods in the conduct of foreign relations, suspected
Great Britain of attempting to use France as a cat’s-paw against
Germany. Realizing that the British navy “did not have wheels,” M.
Rouvier favored treating Great Britain and Germany alike.[660] When the
German government, instead of replying to M. Delcassé’s proposal of
April 13, prepared to send a mission to Fez and the German newspapers
advocated an international conference on the Moroccan affair, M. Rouvier
intervened personally in an effort to reach a settlement.
On April 26, while Prince Radolin’s guest at dinner, the Premier brought
up the Moroccan question. Protesting that the French really preferred
the Germans to the English, he intimated that he appreciated Germany’s
defense of her Moroccan interests, and said: “We will do everything
possible and will give every desired explanation and satisfaction.”
Denying that France was seeking to change the _status quo_, he upheld
her right to suppress the anarchy in Morocco along the Algerian
frontier. He offered to drop the thirty-year limitation to freedom of
commerce, which, he added, was in fact already invalidated by the
existing treaties between Morocco and other states. At the close of the
conversation he exclaimed passionately: “It is impossible, it would be
criminal for two states that are intended to agree and to approach each
other to become embroiled, and especially over Morocco!” The Ambassador
coldly responded that a collective settlement of the question seemed to
him the simplest solution.[661]
On the following day M. Rouvier proposed indirectly to Prince Radolin a
settlement of the Moroccan problem by an exchange of notes between
France and the other Powers. If the majority of the Powers opposed the
French program of reform, it would not be carried out. M. Rouvier had no
objection to Count Tattenbach’s making new commercial treaties with
Morocco. But he did ask that, in case Germany were satisfied by his
offer, the Emperor, on his return from the Mediterranean, should
announce publicly the forthcoming settlement of the Franco-German
dispute.[662]
When these offers were made, the anxiety of the German government was
relieved. To be sure, on April 25, Prince Radolin heard from a “usually
well-informed person just returned from England” that King Edward would,
on his way home from the South, declare officially to the French
government that “Great Britain was ready to support the French policy in
Morocco and the execution of the Anglo-French accord with her whole
power.”[663] But at the same time the German government learned
definitely that the Sultan had made no final promises to the French and
that he had agreed to postpone all decisions until the arrival of Count
Tattenbach.[664] Equally satisfactory, the answer from Washington
arrived.
As the President had been absent on a hunting trip in Colorado, he had
not replied until April 20, when he had explained his policy to Mr.
Taft, acting secretary of state, as follows:
I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco
matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in
Morocco. . . . .
At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to
oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a
better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is
working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each
from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England
intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the
English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England.
Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France
over Morocco is positive proof that she has not the slightest intention
of attacking England. . . . . I do not wish to suggest anything whatever
as to England’s attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that
attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to
do so. . . . . If we find that it will make the English suspicious—that
is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why,
we shall have to drop the business. . . . . I should advise your being
absolutely frank with both Speck [von Sternburg] and the British people.
. . . . Remember . . . . that both parties are very suspicious. You
remember the King’s message to me through Harry White and his earnest
warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend
and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way
the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of
entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to
us—an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British
Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon.
In a letter to the German Ambassador on the same date, Mr. Roosevelt had
reiterated that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, had
offered to serve as mediator between Germany and Great Britain and to
advise the British “to arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to
work in harmony” with Germany.[665]
The German Chancellor regarded this statement as “satisfactory to a high
degree.”[666] On April 27 he instructed Prince Radolin to uphold the
project for a collective settlement and to postpone further negotiations
with the French government until Count Tattenbach could send exact
information from Fez concerning the actions of the French Minister.[667]
In other words, he put the French off until the Count could block their
efforts in Fez and secure the Sultan’s acceptance of a conference.
Otherwise, he feared, M. Delcassé might try to break the Moroccan
resistance by intimating to the Sultan that his supposed friend,
Germany, was now deserting him for a direct understanding with
France.[668]
This hazardous policy was not approved by either Prince Radolin or Count
Tattenbach. The former advised his chief to accept M. Delcassé’s offer
of April 13.[669] The Count also expressed his preference for a direct
agreement with France. “In my opinion,” he wrote to the Chancellor on
April 29,
the condition for a separate understanding with France would first be
given if the other Powers reject the idea of a conference and the Sultan
also acts unreliably and declines to heed our advice and wishes,—as is
to be expected. In this case we must receive Southern Morocco as our
sphere of influence. . . . . We must therefore decide whether we wish .
. . . to fight a long diplomatic battle of doubtful issue against
France, either through supporting the Sultan with money and weapons or
through relying upon the conservative, fanatically anti-French party in
Morocco, or whether we wish to gain through an understanding with France
a substantial pledge for a large-scale African colonial policy which
aims at the acquisition of all the French African possessions.[670]
The Chancellor’s reply to Count Tattenbach contained the explanation for
Germany’s proposal of a conference. He wrote:
Your last idea guided Germany’s Moroccan policy in the past and under
proper circumstances can guide it again in the future if you keep the
future free. For the present, the German policy must be governed by the
fact that His Majesty the Emperor . . . . declared to the King of Spain
that he has enough African possessions and wishes no territory in
Morocco but only the maintenance of commercial freedom. This declaration
naturally does not bind us forever; but in the year which has passed
since those remarks, the effect of the Southwest African events has been
of a nature to increase the antagonism to colonial acquisitions by
military force as well with His Majesty as with a great part of the
German people. Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to
conquer a part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a
position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are
confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to
France without adequate compensation to Germany or of working for the
extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn
of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to be in
holding the future free for the profit of German interests. I sum it up
in stating that you should bring the Sultan to declare that he could
consider the French demands only if they were advised by a conference of
all the signatory Powers. The reference to the conference I consider for
the Sultan the easiest and for us the most favorable form of refusal.
That the Sultan refuse the French demands is naturally the main
thing.[671]
This frank document furnished the key to the German refusal of the
French offers and to the persistent demands for a conference. Count
Bülow’s embarrassment was caused by the Emperor’s renunciations at Vigo
and even more by the temporary apathy if not antagonism of the German
people toward further colonial acquisition. Pursuing an objective
undesired by German public opinion, the Chancellor was still bent on
acquiring a share in Morocco or compensation elsewhere. To delay and
postpone, to “hold the future free” until public opinion veered into a
more chauvinistic channel, to relieve Germany of the restrictions
imposed by the Emperor’s assertions, Count Bülow thought that a
conference was the best means. The continuation of the crisis was a
logical result of this ambition.
On the same day upon which Count Bülow penned this dispatch M. Rouvier
made another offer. He was led to this move by the increasing excitement
in France. The lack of response from Germany and the uncertainty about
her objective, the publication of an article in the _Kreuzzeitung_ on
April 26 and of one in _Matin_ on the next day hinting at war,[672]
caused a panic on the Paris stock exchange on April 27.[673] M. Bihourd
telegraphed on April 28 of the presence of “bellicose counselors” in the
_entourage_ of the Emperor who would have an excellent opportunity “to
advocate the present time as propitious for war against France.”[674] So
in a conversation with Prince Radolin on April 30 M. Rouvier indorsed
the Emperor’s assertions at Tangier and the principles of the Convention
of Madrid, except with respect to the Algero-Moroccan frontier. He
offered to “make an agreement similar to the Anglo-French one, where all
doubtful points, including Morocco, would be settled.” The Ambassador
made no reply.[675]
The next day an intermediary explained to Prince Radolin that the
Premier regarded a conference as hardly acceptable since France had
engaged herself so fully in the Moroccan affair. M. Rouvier would be
willing, however, to include in a general settlement such questions as
those of boundaries in Africa and the Bagdad Railway. In return, the two
governments should agree upon a mode of adjusting the Moroccan affair
directly with the Powers. The German government refused the offer.[676]
On May 1 King Edward VII arrived in Paris where he remained for four
days. Strongly supporting M. Delcassé’s views, he assured the French
government that Germany would not dare a war; in case of conflict, he
said, France could rely on British support.[677] To the German
Ambassador he praised the French for seeking a direct settlement of the
Moroccan difficulty, abruptly demanding, “Why does not Berlin reply to
the last French overture?”[678] His interference, however, was of no
avail. In fact, French public opinion, suspecting the King and British
press of attempting to estrange France and Germany, was more than ever
anxious for an agreement with Germany.[679]
Distressed by refusals and silence from the German government and
fearful of war, M. Rouvier sought to restore connections with Germany by
sending his friend, M. Betzold, to Berlin to interview Herr von
Holstein, and by persuading Baron Eckardstein, then living privately in
England, to lay the French proposals directly before Count Bülow and the
Emperor at Karlsruhe. These men were to inform the German officials that
the French cabinet, disapproving of M. Delcassé’s secretiveness, hoped
to bring about the Minister’s downfall over some domestic difficulty in
the next three or four weeks. They were to state that while in case of
war the French Government knew for a certainty that Great Britain would
interfere in France’s favor, the cabinet, except M. Delcassé, preferred
not to seek this support. As an inducement for a direct settlement, the
two emissaries were to offer Germany “a coaling station and eventually
also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.” They were
especially to urge the Emperor against making any inflammatory speeches
on his return from the Mediterranean.[680]
Neither M. Betzold nor Baron Eckardstein had the least success. While
Herr von Holstein assured M. Betzold on May 2 of Germany’s desire for
good relations with France, he observed that for the time he saw no
possibility of making a direct agreement with her. For, even apart from
Germany’s official declaration in favor of a collective settlement of
the Moroccan question, the German government did not trust M. Delcassé
sufficiently to negotiate with France. That Minister’s policy toward
Germany, he asserted, had been “dishonest,” “hostile,” “insidious,” and
in this affair “disrespectful.” “Slow tempo, temporary truce, and
removal of Delcassé would be the next,” he concluded. In Karlsruhe, on
May 5, Count Bülow rebuffed Baron Eckardstein with the bold assertion:
“The English inciting does not impress us. In case of a conflict the
game would be played between Germany and France. . . . . We are in a
position to await further developments with composure.” The Baron was
not allowed to see William II at all.[681]
Thus every offer for a direct settlement was refused.[682] Indeed, the
German government even suggested to M. Rouvier on May 7 that France take
the initiative in calling a conference, arguing that “the advantage of a
conference lies in that it can have no positive results. It will neither
divide Morocco nor check her continuing decay. It will fulfil its object
in removing the danger of an acute conflict, at the same time holding
the future open.”[683]
M. Rouvier of course would not consider the suggestion. Nor was he any
longer so willing to eliminate M. Delcassé. On May 8 he informed the
German government through M. Betzold that while he had been unable to
convince the Foreign Minister of the faults of his policy, the latter
was needed in the work of mediating between Russia and Japan. It might,
therefore, take weeks or even months to achieve his dismissal. M.
Rouvier hoped, said M. Betzold, to settle the Moroccan and other
difficulties with Germany after Count Tattenbach convinced himself of
the French Minister’s proper conduct at Fez and after M. Delcassé had
been eliminated.[684]
More unfortunate words could hardly have been chosen. The German
government was opposed to an early peace between the warring
Powers,[685] and its mistrust of M. Delcassé was increased by his
continued justification of his policy. Since French public opinion had
repudiated the Minister, since M. Rouvier, known to be weak and easily
influenced, had practically offered the Minister’s head, the German
government determined to press the frightened and pacifically inclined
French Premier until the objectionable Foreign Minister was overthrown.
To that end, on May 16, Prince Radolin announced to M. Rouvier “that the
prerequisite for the _rapprochement_ desired by him [M. Rouvier] is for
us [Germany] to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . . .
After what has happened, this trust is lacking.” The Premier replied, “I
understand you fully. Leave it to me.” But through M. Betzold he urged
the German government to wait until he could accomplish the act by some
internal crisis.[686]
Meanwhile, the German government was pressing Spain, Italy, and the
United States for support. Early in May Herr von Radowitz warned the
Spanish government against sending a mission to Fez at that time, and
remarked that “it would be wise for Spain not to intervene in the
present Moorish difficulties, and that it was to her interest to be on
friendly terms with Germany, who could be of greater assistance to her
than any other Power.”[687] At the same time Count Monts in Rome was
using “menacing language,” hinting at “the possibility of war.”[688] In
both places this talk made a deep impression.
To President Roosevelt the German government asserted that, although
certain voices had been raised in France in favor of a conference, Great
Britain still resisted the project. It asked the President to inform the
British government that its attitude justified the suspicion that “in
the accord with France they [the British] had wished to dispose not only
of English rights but also of the rights of the other signatory Powers.”
The German government further informed Mr. Roosevelt that if the
proposal for a conference became hopeless, it would then think of its
interests alone and would be forced to choose “between the possibility
of a conflict with France and the consideration of conditions which
France might perhaps propose to avoid a conflict.”[689]
Criticizing sharply the British hostility to the conference, Mr.
Roosevelt promised to repeat his advice to the British government to
settle its differences with Germany. Upon doing so he was again accused
by the British leaders of being under German influence. He stoutly
denied this accusation, writing to Senator Lodge, then in England, on
May 15, as follows:
It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am under the
influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do not understand
that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of or enter into close
alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of
action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends
or steadfastly hostile to an enemy. Undoubtedly with Russia weakened
Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe. I
intend to do my best to keep on good terms with Germany, as with all
other nations, and so far as I can to keep them on good terms with one
another; and I shall be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every
one. But as for his having any special influence with me, the thought is
absurd.[690]
Nevertheless, the British government rejected his advice. On May 19 Mr.
Roosevelt had to report to Baron Sternburg that “the British Government
had given him to understand that it did not wish better relations with
Germany,” and that “it had even hinted broadly to the secretary of state
that Great Britain could take care of her affairs alone.” He could not
do more, he said, without exposing himself to an incivility.[691] The
German government was well pleased with the result, however, for it
placed Mr. Roosevelt on the German side.
On May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez. He found that the French
party was still strong, with some of the Moroccan ministers bought over
to that side. He accomplished his object with some difficulty. He
reported immediately that the Sultan himself affirmed the accusation
against the French Minister of having claimed to enjoy a mandate of
Europe.[692] A few days later the Count telegraphed that upon his
arrival the French Minister, under instructions from M. Delcassé, had
issued a veiled threat of violence against Morocco if the Sultan agreed
to a conference.[693] Upon receiving these dispatches Count Bülow
immediately warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé’s “stormy and violent
. . . . Moroccan policy.”[694] As that Minister still remained in
office, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor at the
German embassy in Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that
the Foreign Minister would have to go, that Franco-German relations
would not improve as long as he remained in office. Indeed, if M.
Delcassé’s anti-German and bellicose policy became known to the German
people, he was to state, it would have an effect for which Count Bülow
refused to be responsible. “A change in the present situation is above
all to be made possible by a change in the direction of the French
foreign policy.”
When Herr von Miquel carried out these instructions on May 30, the
Premier realized the necessity for eliminating the Foreign Minister. In
his despair he cried: “I cannot cause M. Delcassé to fall because
Germany frowns. I would be reproached always . . . . always.”[695] The
German pressure, however, did not cease. In a telegram on May 25 Count
Tattenbach reported French assertions to the Moroccans that in the face
of the united action of the Mediterranean Powers, “who would never
suffer an interference by Germany in Mediterranean questions,” Germany
would desert the Sultan. In sending this report to Rome, on May 31, the
German Chancellor requested the Italian government to favor publicly the
collective settlement of the Moroccan question. “No matter what turn
Moroccan affairs take, Germany will follow up the consequences of the
advice which His Majesty sent to the Sultan,” he wrote. “Thus the
possibility that the Sultan will remain isolated in this difficulty need
not be considered.” The Italian Foreign Minister immediately denied
France’s right to speak of a common policy of the Mediterranean Powers,
and, as Count Bülow probably intended, he passed on the German warning
to the French government.[696]
On May 28 Count Tattenbach telegraphed the Sultan’s official rejection
of the French proposals and his approval of an international
conference.[697] Thereupon, through M. Betzold, the Chancellor warned
the French Premier, June 1, that in as much as the Sultan had accepted
the German point of view, Germany “would follow up the consequences if
France continued the policy of intimidation and violence hitherto
pursued by M. Delcassé.”[698] On June 3 Prince Radolin described the
situation to M. Dupuy, an intimate friend of M. Rouvier’s, as “very
serious.”[699] Thus the German government struck blow after blow to
force an immediate dismissal of the French Foreign Minister.[700]
On the French side, M. Delcassé remained as adamantine as the Germans.
Fearing an intention on the part of Germany to force his dismissal,
hearing of Germany’s pressure on Spain and Italy and of bellicose talk
by the German Ambassador at Rome,[701] he made a bid on May 17 for
British support. On that date M. Cambon apprised Lord Lansdowne of
Germany’s endeavor to arouse discord between Great Britain and France
“all over the world.” Although he did not regard the relations with
Germany as “profoundly dangerous,” he pictured them as serious enough to
cause him “much preoccupation.”
Lord Lansdowne wished to lend the pro-British Foreign Minister all
possible support. Late in April, for the sake of France and the Entente
Cordiale, he had run the risk of antagonizing President Roosevelt by
instructing the British Ambassador in Washington not to give him an
opportunity to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. He realized
that the President’s interference encouraged Germany and worked to the
detriment of France and Great Britain. He had therefore denied to the
President that there was any “subject of dispute” between Great Britain
and Germany, and had expressed his inability to see “why any
international complication should be created [over Morocco], unless
German Gov[ernmen]t is determined to take advantage of what was at most
a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the
_status quo_, e.g. . . . ., by demanding cession of a Moorish
port.”[702] But Lord Lansdowne also sought to correct any erroneous
impression which Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ of April 25 may
have made. Lord Lansdowne said to M. Cambon:
The moral . . . . seemed to me to be that our two Governments should
continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should
keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their
knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any
contingencies by which they might in the course of events find
themselves confronted. As an instance of our readiness to enter into
such timely discussions, I reminded H[is] E[xcellency] of the
communication which had recently been made to the French Gov[ernmen]t by
you [Sir Francis Bertie] at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany
might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish Port.[703]
To avoid all misunderstanding this communication was put in writing in
an exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary and M. Cambon
on May 24-25. When the former perceived that M. Cambon still interpreted
the British policy in the light of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-
memoire_,[704] he reiterated his correcting statement as follows:
I do not know that this account [of their conversation of May 17]
differs from that which you have given to M. Delcassé, but I am not sure
that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there
should be full and confidential discussion between the two
Gov[ernmen]ts, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked
aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any
complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period
through which we are at present passing.[705]
At some time in this crisis, the British fleet was commanded to be “in
readiness to make a descent on the German coast at short notice,”[706]
and conversations were begun between the French and British military and
naval officers looking toward active co-operation in case of war.[707]
When news arrived of the Sultan’s proposal for a conference, M. Delcassé
opposed it vigorously. At his instigation the British government on June
5 ordered Mr. Lowther, who had just arrived in Fez, to advise the Sultan
against the idea and to refuse the invitation.[708] The French Minister
also reported Mr. Taft’s remark that the American government would
probably not be favorably disposed toward a conference. Thereupon Lord
Lansdowne on June 5 added his support in trying to convince the American
government that “the proposal was unsound and should not be
entertained.”[709] To bring Spain into closer intimacy with the Entente
Cordiale, the British Foreign Secretary offered early in June to effect
an understanding with her over the Spanish interests in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere.[710]
In spite of Lord Lansdowne’s correcting statements about the British
policy, M. Delcassé apparently continued to interpret the British
communication of May 17 in the sense of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-
memoire_ of April 25. He was impressed by the practical identity of that
communication with the political clauses of the Franco-Russian
alliance.[711] Reassured by the British support and by the adverse
attitude of the British, Spanish, and American governments toward the
project of a conference, and believing with the British that Germany was
bluffing, he was in no mood to recede. M. Rouvier, who was receiving all
the German threats, took a different view of the situation. With some of
the other members of the cabinet, he prepared for the retirement of the
offending Minister.[712] During the visit of the King of Spain to Paris,
May 30-June 4, little could be done. But by June 3 M. Delcassé’s
resignation was anticipated in parliamentary circles.[713] On June 5 the
Chamber was thrown into excitement bordering on panic by the rumor of a
report from M. Barrère at Rome that if an Anglo-French alliance were
concluded Germany would attack France.[714] On the same day M. Rouvier
explained the gravity of the situation to President Loubet;[715] on June
6 he laid his controversy with M. Delcassé before the cabinet.
At that meeting, although well aware of his isolation, M. Delcassé
valiantly defended his policy of the past seven years, a policy which he
declared had been opposed by Germany alone.[716] He claimed that in a
very recent exchange of notes, one of which he read, France had received
from Great Britain assurance of support in case of a German attack.
Asserting the possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he
urged acceptance of the British offer.[717] He proposed that the French,
British, and Spanish governments should address identical notes to the
Sultan declining the conference. He assured the cabinet that Germany
confronted by this Anglo-French-Spanish opposition with Italy neutral
would not fight. But M. Rouvier declared that the German government had
threatened war if France accepted the British offers. Turning to the
ministers of war and of navy, he asked if France were prepared for that
contingency. They both replied emphatically “No.” As M. Delcassé was not
supported by a single minister, he resigned, and M. Rouvier took over
his position. Before leaving M. Delcassé prophetically warned the
cabinet that after this abdication before the demands of Germany, that
Power would become “more insolent and more exacting than ever”; it had
not opposed his person, he said, but rather the French policy of
accords. He declared that the cabinet’s pusillanimity would give rise to
new dangers.[718]
French public opinion was almost unanimous in its approval of M.
Delcassé’s downfall. This approbation was noted by Herr von Flotow,
first secretary of the German embassy in Paris, who on June 7 reported
to his government as follows:
The history of the downfall of M. Delcassé shows that without a doubt
there is a latent under-current in France which wishes . . . . a
satisfactory understanding with Germany. It is after all significant
that in the entire press of all parties there is hardly a paper which
does not censure the anti-German policy of M. Delcassé. The second
interesting point in the history of the past few days is the fact that
in spite of the continued and almost importunate offers of English aid,
. . . . French public opinion has never shown a real inclination to
accept this support. Wherever one has opportunity here . . . . to
observe public feeling, one meets the view that England is only
endeavoring to engage the French power for her differences with Germany,
and that in case of a crisis France would have to pull the English
chestnuts out of the German fire.[719]
Great Britain was disgusted. The British government had made strenuous
endeavor to save M. Delcassé, for it was certain of his loyalty to the
entente, whereas it was dubious of the more pro-German M. Rouvier. It
had intimated its willingness to oppose by force the German
aggression;[720] but so far had met with no encouragement.
Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German
Government [stated Mr. Balfour to King Edward on June 8] displayed a
weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not at
present be counted on as an effective force in international politics.
She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the crucial
moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of
obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a
menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French
assistance that we must look for our protection.[721]
In spite of M. Rouvier’s public assertion, June 6, that his policy
toward the Anglo-French understanding would remain the same as
before,[722] the Entente Cordiale had received a hard blow.
While expressing satisfaction that France had repudiated the anti-German
Minister, the German press, under official guidance,[723] kept its
discussion of the affair within the bounds of propriety. But German
obtuseness to the feelings of other nations was manifested when on the
day of M. Delcassé’s fall the German Emperor made Count Bülow a prince.
Thus, the first period of the crisis was closed. Germany had gained her
objective in winning the Sultan’s acceptance of the project of a
conference and in overthrowing M. Delcassé. While playing with war, the
German government had had no desire to start one, and, gauging correctly
French sentiment toward M. Delcassé and war, it had achieved success in
Paris merely by a liberal use of threats. In the Moroccan affair the
German foreign office had reached the peak of its power. But it had
aroused so many complications that the crisis continued as acutely as
before.
[Footnote 597: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 516.]
[Footnote 598: Radolin to F. O., April 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 317, No.
6612; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622.
After having talked with President Loubet early in April, Edward VII
wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “President Loubet was most amiable . . .
. but I could see from his manner that he considers the German conduct
at Tangier, if not a direct menace to France, at any rate a covert
insult” (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 341). The Schnäbele affair brought
France and Germany almost to war in 1887.]
[Footnote 599: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 232 ff., No.
6536; Chérisey to Delcassé, Feb. 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 196, No. 225;
Delcassé to Bihourd, Feb. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 196 f., No. 226; Bihourd to
Delcassé, Feb. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 227; Lowther to Lansdowne,
April 26, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 81.]
[Footnote 600: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. Feb. 12, 1905, R. March 4,
1905, _B.D._, III, 59, No. 66.]
[Footnote 601: Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 60, No. 67.
For the uncertainty about the Emperor’s proposed action see Lascelles to
Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 61, No. 69; Nicolson to Lansdowne,
March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 62, No. 70.]
[Footnote 602: Delcassé stated to Bertie, June 10, that “his policy had
been to be ready to make commercial concessions to Germany if she were
willing to discuss with the French Government the question of Morocco,
but not to yield anything politically or territorially” (Bertie to
Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 78, No. 96).]
[Footnote 603: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 206 f., 231;
Imperial Foreign Office, _Reports of the Belgian Representatives in
Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Brussels, 1905-1914. European Politics during the Decade before the War
as Described by the Belgian Diplomatists_ (. . . ., 1915), No. 3
(hereafter cited as _Belg. Docs., 1905-1914_); _Quest. dipl. et col._,
XIX, 517; Henry Wickham Steed, _Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A
Personal Narrative_ (London, 1924), I, 229. Delcassé also made strenuous
efforts during the succeeding weeks to mediate peace between Japan and
Russia so that the latter Power could resume its obligations as France’s
ally. See Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635;
Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 19, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 76 f., No. 68;
Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 176 f.]
[Footnote 604: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._ (Sénat, March 31,
1905), pp. 540 f.]
[Footnote 605: Articles in _Temps_ of April 3, and in the _Dépêche de
Toulouse_ of April 10. Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé,
asserts that the latter article was based on the “best” information (pp.
218 ff.).]
[Footnote 606: By April 13 the Sultan had expressed his general approval
of the French proposals, and the details for military reorganization in
six of the Moroccan towns were ready for final formulation and signature
(Mévil, p. 200 n.; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 339
ff., No. 6631; and the various dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to
Delcassé during Feb., March, April, 1905, in _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos.
228-31, 233, 240, 243, 248, 266).]
[Footnote 607: Delcassé instructed the Minister to make the following
statement to the Sultan: “We cannot conceive that, changing from the way
of accords which he [the Sultan] has followed for several years, he will
decide to assume an attitude which will oblige us to consider strict
right alone as the basis of our relation with him” (Delcassé to Saint-
René Taillandier, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 208, No. 239).]
[Footnote 608: Egerton to Lansdowne, April 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66,
No. 78. The French government was afraid that Spain would not loyally
uphold their agreement if some other Power intervened in Morocco
(Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 59, No. 66). But with M.
Villa-Urrutia at the foreign office, Spain remained entirely on the
French side (Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 66, No.
79).]
[Footnote 609: On March 22 Bihourd advised Delcassé to “establish by an
exchange of notes the bearing of the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
accords on the commercial and industrial interests of Germany,” adding
that “until then we shall remain under the menace, very clearly
formulated by the German press, of some inopportune surprise” (Bihourd
to Delcassé, March 22, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 202 f., No. 232). On March
28 an article by André Tardieu, a journalist with close governmental
connections, stated that the French Foreign Minister would give
satisfaction to Germany if she wished it on the subject of Morocco,
“provided it is a question solely of commercial interests” (Flotow to F.
O., March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 282 f., No. 6584). On April 4 Billy, a
press writer in the French foreign office, sounded Theodor Wolff, Paris
correspondent for the _Berliner Tageblatt_, upon how the German
government would receive a French overture (_ibid._, p. 305 n.). On
April 7 Hedeman, London correspondent of _Matin_, talked with Hammann to
the same effect (memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 310 ff., Nos.
6608 f.).]
[Footnote 610: Quoted in _Quest. dipl et col._, XIX, 511 f.]
[Footnote 611: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 331, No.
6622.]
[Footnote 612: Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 ff., No.
6621; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622;
Mévil, pp. 238 ff.; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 14, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_,
pp. 211 f., No. 244; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18 and 25, 1905,
_ibid._, 214, Nos. 246 f.; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 332 f., No. 6623. Saint-René Taillandier’s denial that he had ever
claimed to have a mandate of Europe must be balanced against the
Sultan’s personal assertion that he had claimed it. The truth would seem
to be that the French Minister had sought to make more out of France’s
international accords over Morocco than the facts justified by speaking
vaguely and by not clearing up misunderstandings in the Sultan’s mind
(_L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 214, 231, 238, 263; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6621, 6631,
6658, 6662, 6551 n.; _Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905_, Nos. 1, 3). Cf.
the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris, Dec. 19, 1905, _Zur
europ. Politik_, II, 96.]
[Footnote 613: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67,
No. 80.]
[Footnote 614: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe 1891-1917_, pp. 117 ff.]
[Footnote 615: As already shown, the Russian defeat at Mukden had
nothing to do with the change of Germany’s policy.]
[Footnote 616: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, April 19,
1905), pp. 1543 ff. Cf. Bertie’s estimate on April 25: “The general
feeling in Paris is that the chief object which the German Emperor has
had in view in his recent proceedings is to show to the French people
that an understanding with England is of little value to them and that
they had much better come to an agreement with Germany. To this end ‘il
fait la guerre à l’Angleterre sur le dos de la France’ and the French
Public realizing that the Emperor’s wrath is against England for
enabling France to carry out her Morocco policy and not against France
for taking advantage of her agreement with England feel that if they
keep their heads nothing really serious will come of His Majesty’s ill
temper which they believe is not entirely shared by the German
Government and still less so by the German people” (Bertie to Lansdowne,
April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 75, No. 93).]
[Footnote 617: Mévil, pp. 257 ff.]
[Footnote 618: Memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 304, No.
6601. Olmütz signified the humiliation of Prussia by Austria in 1850;
Fashoda, that of France by Great Britain in 1898.]
[Footnote 619: Memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 297 ff., No.
6597.]
[Footnote 620: The suggestion of a conference was first made by Kühlmann
in a dispatch of March 2 (_ibid._, p. 293 n.). On March 27 Bülow still
thought it possible of execution only in case Great Britain accepted it
(Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, 293 f., No. 6591). After
the Emperor’s visit, however, he accepted the proposal. In Feb., 1904,
Lascelles had reported a conversation with Bülow in which the latter had
opposed calling a conference on the Macedonian question, arguing as
follows: “A Congress was excellent at the end of a war when both
belligerents were more or less exhausted and desired peace, but it was a
most dangerous thing at any other time, and would only accentuate more
strongly any difference of opinion which might exist and thus cause
greater complications, unless indeed the Great Powers should have
decided beforehand exactly what was to be done, and should have appealed
to the Congress, to give the sanction of Europe to the decisions they
had already taken” (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1904, _B.D._, V,
72). A year later Bülow had apparently forgotten this very accurate
judgment. Or possibly he saw no other way out, and faced the facts with
his usual optimism.]
[Footnote 621: In a memorandum by Hammann on April 7, this statement
appeared: “Naturally the result would be greater if there followed from
a conference a breach in the Anglo-French accord over Morocco.” Bülow’s
minute to that assertion was: “We do not desire that at all, or at least
we should in no instance show such an aim. We only wish to preserve our
rights in Morocco” (_ibid._, XX, 312 f., No. 6609; cf. Chirol, _Fifty
Years in a Changing World_, p. 300).]
[Footnote 622: When the _Nowoje Wremja_ denounced the German action
Bülow, on March 27, protested strongly to Lamsdorff against this anti-
German attitude. Russia was expected to remain neutral in this affair,
he declared (Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, _G.P._, XX, 277 f., No.
6577).]
[Footnote 623: Those three had criticized the Anglo-French accord.]
[Footnote 624: The signatory Powers were those which had participated in
the conference of Madrid in 1880 over Moroccan affairs.]
[Footnote 625: Quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, April 4,
1905, _ibid._, 303, No. 6599; and from a memo. by Holstein, April 4,
1905, _ibid._, 304 f., No. 6601.]
[Footnote 626: Memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No.
6598.]
[Footnote 627: Memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311 f., No.
6609.]
[Footnote 628: On April 8 Bülow sent Hammann the following instructions
for directing the press: “All criticism and attacks should, under the
greatest possible consideration for the French national feeling, be
directed against the systematically anti-German, insolent, and inept
policy of Delcassé” (minute by Bülow to a memo. by Hammann, April 7,
1905, _ibid._, 313, No. 6609). On April 4 he had issued instructions to
restrain the German press from war with the British press (Mühlberg to
Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 603 and note, No. 6839).]
[Footnote 629: That Holstein wished to turn loose a _Kriegsfanfare_, as
Hammann later asserted, seems unlikely, for German policy at that time
was not bellicose. But Holstein did propose to exert great pressure by
vigorous words and threats, and his program might very likely have had
the result which Hammann foresaw. On this controversy between the two
men see Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 35 f.; Otto
Hammann, _Der neue Kurs. Erinnerungen_ (Berlin, 1918), pp. 104 ff.;
Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 210 f.; memo. by
Holstein, April 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 297 ff., No. 6597; memo. by
Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. 6598; memo. by Holstein,
April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 308 f., No. 6606; memo. by Hammann, April 7,
1905, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 6607.]
[Footnote 630: Durand to Lansdowne, March, 1905, quoted in Brigadier
General Sir Percy Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A
Biography_ (London, 1926), p. 280; Spring Rice to Roosevelt, undated
though written in the first half of Jan., 1905, quoted in Dennett, pp.
152 f.; Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 ff., No.
6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293;
Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 576 ff., No. 6290; and
others in _ibid._, chap. cxxxix; Dennett, pp. 45, 73 ff.; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 393; Joseph B. Bishop, _Theodore
Roosevelt and His Times_ (New York, 1920), I, 378 f., 468 f., 473;
Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 406
ff., and chap. xiii.]
[Footnote 631: Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 f.,
No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293.]
[Footnote 632: So Roosevelt asserted to Sternburg. See Sternburg to F.
O., April 1, 1905, _ibid._, 590, No. 6300; Sykes, p. 280; Dennis, pp.
397 f.; Gwynn, Vol. I, chap. xiii; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 322.]
[Footnote 633: On March 21 Roosevelt declared to Sternburg: “My earnest
wish is that we use as much as possible the four years which stand
before me in office to improve the relations between our countries. I
believe in the German people” (Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1905,
_G.P._, XIX, 583, No. 6295).]
[Footnote 634: Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 592 ff., No.
6302; Bishop, I, 468 f.]
[Footnote 635: Bishop, I, 469.]
[Footnote 636: See below.]
[Footnote 637: In the absence of a regular minister at Tangier,
Tattenbach had remained there after the Emperor’s visit. See Tattenbach
to F. O., April 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 313 f., No. 6610; Bülow to
Tattenbach, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 315 f., No. 6611. O’Conor, British
ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Lansdowne, May 1, 1905, that
Germany was trying to induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco
with a view to establishing closer relations. The Sultan eventually
refused. On Feb. 12, 1906, O’Conor was able to state why. The Sultan had
sent secret emissaries to Morocco, but the Sultan of Morocco became
suspicious and refused either to send a formal mission to Constantinople
or to receive one thence. O’Conor also heard that the Sultan had written
to Abd-el-Aziz recommending the German Emperor as the friend and
protector of Islam whose advice was well worth following. See O’Conor to
Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 248, No. 277. Tardieu states that the
Sultan’s letters to his Moorish colleague were written in Feb.-March,
1906 (_La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 259 n.). Nothing further is known of this
affair.]
[Footnote 638: No. 6612; Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, 1905, _ibid._,
277 f., No. 6577.]
[Footnote 639: Radowitz to F. O., April 12, 1905, _ibid._, 326 f. and
note, No. 6619; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_, p.
165.]
[Footnote 640: Bülow to Monts, April 3, 11, 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 295
f., No. 6594; 318 ff., No. 6613; 322 f., No. 6616; Monts to F. O., April
12, 1905, _ibid._, 324 ff. and notes, Nos. 6617 f. Tittoni, the Italian
foreign minister, had to feel his way carefully. On April 14 he sounded
the Spanish government on its attitude, and was informed that Spain
would remain loyal to her agreement with France and would accept the
conference only if France and Great Britain did (Nicolson to Lansdowne,
April 14, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, No. 79).]
[Footnote 641: Bülow to Metternich, April 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 605 ff.,
No. 6843; Metternich to F. O., April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 608 f., No.
6845. On April 10, however, Radolin reported a statement by Eckardstein,
which he himself seemed to think correct, to the effect that “in case of
a serious Franco-German conflict England would undoubtedly stand
actively on the French side and would even advance with enthusiasm
against Germany” (_ibid._, 607 f., No. 6844).]
[Footnote 642: By that answer Bülow aimed to show the French government
that “we do not consider separate Franco-German negotiations as adequate
to the situation.” See Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328
ff., No. 6621; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 332 f., No.
6623; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f. and note, No.
6624.]
[Footnote 643: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f., No.
6624; Tattenbach to F. O., April 21, 1905, _ibid._, 335, No. 6625; Bülow
to Tattenbach, April 22, 1905, _ibid._, 336 f., No. 6626; Tattenbach to
F. O., April 23, 1905, _ibid._, 337 f., No. 6627; Bülow to Tattenbach,
April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 338, No. 6628.]
[Footnote 644: On April 3 Balfour repeated his denial in the House of
Commons of the likelihood of a German attack.]
[Footnote 645: Lee, II, 340.]
[Footnote 646: Newton, p. 334.]
[Footnote 647: Radolin to F. O., April 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 311, No.
6608.]
[Footnote 648: Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No.
6840; Metternich to Bülow, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. 6841; memo.
by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311, No. 6608.]
[Footnote 649: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6, 1905, _ibid._,
601 ff., Nos. 6837, 6841.]
[Footnote 650: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 602, No.
6837; Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19, 1905, _ibid._, 261 f., No. 6562;
Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 61, No. 69.]
[Footnote 651: April 9, 1904 (Newton, p. 334).]
[Footnote 652: Viscount Grey of Falloden, _Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916_
(New York, 1925), I, 115.]
[Footnote 653: Lee, II, 342.]
[Footnote 654: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67,
No. 80; Lansdowne to Bertie, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, p. 73.]
[Footnote 655: Tattenbach to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 348, No.
6639.]
[Footnote 656: Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 72 f.,
No. 90; and following documents; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_,
II, 248; Grey, I, 106 f.]
[Footnote 657: Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 74 f.,
Nos. 92 f.]
[Footnote 658: The offer was so stated by Monts (Monts to F. O., May 2,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 362, No. 6648).]
[Footnote 659: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 26, 1905,
_L.j., 1901-5_, 215, No. 248; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, May 3,
1905, _ibid._, 217, No. 251; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les
responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 309. Ben Sliman was Moroccan
minister of foreign affairs.]
[Footnote 660: On Rouvier see Mévil, pp. 253 ff.; Victor Bérard, _La
France et Guillaume II_ (Paris, 1907), p. 296; Radolin to F. O., April
27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905,
_ibid._, 373 f., No. 6657. Rouvier’s policy was certainly more in
keeping with French opinion.]
[Footnote 661: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 344 f., No.
6635. To Rouvier’s assertion that “France would do everything necessary
to live on the best terms with Germany” Bülow commented as follows:
“Then the French Government should cease its efforts to isolate us, to
break up the Triple Alliance, to incite England against us” (Bülow’s
minute to the foregoing dispatch).]
[Footnote 662: Radolin to F. O., April 27 and 28, 1905, _ibid._, 346,
No. 6636; 348 f., No. 6640.]
[Footnote 663: Radolin to Bülow, April 25, 1905, _ibid._, 615, No.
6847.]
[Footnote 664: Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 24, 25, 1905, _ibid._, 337
f., No. 6627; 339, No. 6629; 341, No. 6632; Vassel to Tattenbach, April
21, 1905, _ibid._, 339 ff., No. 6631.]
[Footnote 665: Bishop, I, 469 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., April 25, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 342, No. 6633.]
[Footnote 666: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 342, No.
6634.]
[Footnote 667: Bülow to Radolin, April 28, 29, 1905, _ibid._, 346 f.,
No. 6637; 349 f., No. 6641.]
[Footnote 668: Holstein to Mühlberg, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 339, No.
6630; Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634.]
[Footnote 669: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No.
6622. Monts also regarded Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati as signifying
victory for Germany in her Moroccan campaign and as giving the
opportunity “for a definitive friendly agreement with France” (Monts to
F. O., May 2, 1905, _ibid._, 362, No. 6648).]
[Footnote 670: Tattenbach had on the previous day talked to Lowther,
British minister at Tangier, and had found him strongly opposed to a
conference and in favor of a direct Franco-German settlement (Tattenbach
to F. O., April 29, 1905, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 6642).]
[Footnote 671: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30, 1905, _ibid._, 352, No.
6643.]
[Footnote 672: The article was by Professor Schiemann, who was known to
be in close touch with the German government (reprinted in Schiemann,
_Deutschland und die grosse Politik 1905_, pp. 110 f.).]
[Footnote 673: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 347, No.
6638; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 576 ff.]
[Footnote 674: Bihourd to Delcassé, April 28, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 215,
No. 249.]
[Footnote 675: Rouvier also assured Radolin that “he disapproved of much
that had happened” and that he himself had taken over the general
control of foreign affairs. It had cost him some effort to save Delcassé
in the Chamber, he said, but he had thought it wiser to do so (Radolin
to Bülow, April 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 360 ff., No. 6647).]
[Footnote 676: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 355 ff., No.
6645; Bülow to Radolin, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 6644.]
[Footnote 677: Eckardstein was informed to this effect on May 4, 1905,
by Rouvier’s intimate friend, Armand Levy, a Parisian financier
(Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III,
106; Lee, II, 342).]
[Footnote 678: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 616 f., No.
6848. The King may have put this question to Radolin at the desire of
Delcassé, who was complaining of Germany’s lack of response (Bertie to
Lansdowne, April 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 68, No. 84). On May 11, 1905,
Lansdowne wrote to Knollys, King Edward’s private secretary, as follows:
“The King’s Mediterranean tour left matters in excellent shape so far as
we are concerned” (Lee, II, 342).]
[Footnote 679: _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 4.]
[Footnote 680: Wilhelm Betzold was an international financier with wide
political connections (Eckardstein, I, 243 ff.). The instructions were
given to Eckardstein, May 4, by Armand Levy, like Betzold, an intimate
friend of Rouvier, just after an interview between the two and the
Premier, Levy had made a note of the various points which he now laid
before Eckardstein, explaining that naturally Rouvier could not speak
directly to him of these delicate affairs but adding that his statements
were “rigorously exact” (Eckardstein, III, 100 ff.). Only Eckardstein’s
account of the interview with Bülow contains anything about the Moroccan
proposal, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statement
(see also Prince Lichnowsky, _My Mission to London, 1912-1914_ [London,
1918], p. 3).]
[Footnote 681: Memo. by Holstein, May 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 357 ff., No.
6646. Paul von Schwabach’s account of arranging the interview for
Betzold is given in _Berliner Tageblatt_, March 21, 1922. See also Bülow
to F. O., May 5 and 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 368 ff., Nos. 6652 f.]
[Footnote 682: On May 2 the Chancellor also refused to consider
Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati; and when a few days later he heard
that Barrère wished to be sent to Berlin to arrange affairs, he
immediately advised Rouvier that he would not be received. See Bülow to
Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Radolin to Holstein,
May 8, 1905, _ibid._, p. 372 n.; Bülow to Radolin, May 9, 1905, _ibid._,
372, No. 6656.]
[Footnote 683: Bülow to Radolin, May 4, 1905, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6650;
Radolin to F. O., May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 371 f., No. 6655.]
[Footnote 684: The British and the Russian governments were also
supporting Delcassé. See Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 373
ff., No. 6657 f.; Betzold to Eckardstein, May 9, 1905, quoted in
Eckardstein, III, 204.]
[Footnote 685: Sternburg to F. O., June 2, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 607, No.
6311, Bülow’s minute.]
[Footnote 686: Radolin to Bülow, May 13 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 376 f.,
No. 6659; 378 f., No. 6661.]
[Footnote 687: So related by the Spanish Foreign Minister to Nicolson
(Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., No. 87).
Although there is no account of the conversation in _G.P._, the language
is entirely in keeping with German policy. The episode referred to the
possible departure of Spain’s new minister in Morocco to Fez.]
[Footnote 688: So reported by Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905,
_ibid._, 71, No. 88. Cf. Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363
f., No. 6649; Bülow to F. O., May 6, 1905, _ibid._, 368, No. 6651.]
[Footnote 689: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, May 10 and 16, 1905,
_ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634; 620 ff., No. 6851; XIX, 600 ff., No. 6306;
Bishop, I, 469 f.]
[Footnote 690: _Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt
and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918_ (New York, 1925), II, 123. See also
Dennett, pp. 88 ff.]
[Footnote 691: The President’s statements were so formulated by
Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., May 13 and 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 622
f., No. 6852; _ibid._, XIX, 603 f., No. 6308; Dennett, pp. 184 f., 88
ff., 75 f.]
[Footnote 692: Tattenbach to F. O., May 15, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 379 f.,
No. 6662.]
[Footnote 693: Tattenbach’s version of the threat was as follows: “The
French Government would consider it an injury to France’s interests if
the French proposals for reform were submitted for consideration to the
signatory Powers. No Power possessed the right to intervene in the
Moroccan affair, especially in the frontier question. . . . . The French
Government would continue to watch sharply the affairs in Morocco, and
reserved the right to act according to circumstances.” See Tattenbach to
F. O., May 17, 1905, _ibid._, 380, No. 6663. Cf. with the original
threat quoted above. See also Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, 1905,
_ibid._, 399 f., No. 6676.]
[Footnote 694: Bülow to Radolin, May 22, 1905, _ibid._, 382 f., No.
6665.]
[Footnote 695: Miquel was chosen for this work because he was just being
transferred to St. Petersburg. See Bülow to Radolin, May 30, 1905,
_ibid._, 388 ff., No. 6669; memo. by Miquel, May 30 and 31, 1905,
_ibid._, 393 ff., Nos. 6674 f.]
[Footnote 696: Bülow to Monts, May 31, 1905, _ibid._, 390 f., No. 6670,
and note citing a dispatch from Monts of June 2, 1905; Mévil, p. 272.
Egerton was informed by Barrère that Monts had said to Tittoni that “if
the French Minister maintained his threat of military measures against
the Sultan of Morocco, a German army would cross the French frontier”
(Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 95, No. 122).]
[Footnote 697: Tattenbach to F. O., May 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 392, No.
6672.]
[Footnote 698: Bülow to Radolin, June 1, 1905, _ibid._, 392 f., No.
6673; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407, No. 6685.]
[Footnote 699: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _ibid._, 401, No. 6678.]
[Footnote 700: The _Gaulois_ published articles on June 9 and 17, 1905,
asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck had also been sent by the
German government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcassé
must be dismissed (Mévil, pp. 273 ff.; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 310). The
editors of _G.P._ state that this story is “exaggerated”; Donnersmarck
was mentioned only once in the documents, they assert—in a dispatch from
Radolin on June 17, 1905, describing the assertions of Donnersmarck
given in _Gaulois_ as apocryphal (_G.P._, XX, 390 n.). According to
Eckardstein, Rouvier declared to him on May 4 that some time previously
Donnersmarck had asserted to him, apparently at Bülow’s request, that
there were only two possibilities, a Franco-German alliance or war. On
the other hand, Eckardstein saw Donnersmarck in Berlin on June 6 and
found him eager for news from London and Paris (Eckardstein, III, 103
f., 127 f.). It seems clear that Donnersmarck’s assertions, whatever
they were, were made on his own responsibility; that, as the editors of
_G.P._ state, Bülow issued his warnings directly to Rouvier (_G.P._, XX,
390 n.).]
[Footnote 701: Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f.,
No. 87; Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _ibid._, 71, No. 88;
Lansdowne to Bertie, May 3, 1905, _ibid._, 69 f., No. 86.]
[Footnote 702: Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, _ibid._, 67 f., No.
82; Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 68, No. 83. Durand did
not follow that line exactly. He left the impression with Roosevelt that
the Anglo-German opposition was bitter, but that nevertheless Great
Britain did not want Roosevelt interfering—thus letting the latter think
that Great Britain was more bellicose than she was (see above). One
reason for the British government’s slowness about helping Roosevelt
mediate between Russia and Japan was, no doubt, that it wished to
exclude all opportunity for the President to mediate between Great
Britain and Germany. On April 26 Spring Rice asked Roosevelt not to
support the idea of a conference (Gwynn, I, 469).]
[Footnote 703: Lansdowne added: “I had heard fears expressed that, in
order to put an end to a state of things which could not fail to be
highly inconvenient to them, the French Government might be induced to
purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we
were not likely to regard with favour, in other parts of the world. I
had myself no such misgivings, and felt convinced that each side might
continue to rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the
other. His Excellency [M. Cambon] expressed his entire concurrence in
what I had said.” See Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, _B.D._, III,
76, No. 94; Spender, II, 248; _Cambridge History of British Foreign
Policy_, III, 342 f.]
[Footnote 704: “During our last conversation about Morocco you . . . .
added that . . . . if circumstances demanded it, if for example we had
serious reasons to believe in an unjustified aggression on the part of a
certain Power, the British Government would be entirely ready to concert
with the French Government on the measures to take” (Cambon to
Lansdowne, May 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 77, No. 95, inclosure).]
[Footnote 705: Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25, 1905, _ibid._, 77 f., No.
95, and inclosure.]
[Footnote 706: Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 199. Nothing more was
heard of this order, which probably came from Sir John Fisher. Fisher
was in favor of “Copenhagening” the German fleet and also of landing
soldiers in North Germany in case of a war (_Memories_; Newton, pp. 334
f.). In 1922, Lord Sanderson wrote as follows concerning the events of
this time: “There were no doubt preparations by our military authorities
for defending Belgium in case of an attack by Germany on France through
Belgian territory, and these preparations must have been known to the
French military attaché in London. There was also a good deal of loose
talk in naval circles and some high quarters of a possible expedition to
Schleswig in the possible event of war. I do not believe such a measure
was ever seriously entertained, and I looked upon the report as put
about for the purpose of a warning” (Sanderson to Temperley, Aug. 17,
1922, _B.D._, III, 87, No. 105).]
[Footnote 707: Grey, I, 74. The British press supported the French
loyally for the sake of maintaining the balance of power. See O.
Eltzbacher, “The Balance of Power in Europe,” _Nineteenth Century and
After_ (May, 1905); Steed, I, 230 ff. It is difficult to state exactly
what were the British motives for supporting France so whole-heartedly
in this crisis. One has to deduce them from acts, for, unlike the
Germans, the directors of the British policy did not write down their
reasons. As to King Edward’s view of the international situation,
especially of the German danger, see Spring Rice to Lansdowne, D. May 7,
1905, R. May 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 77 f., No. 69, and King Edward’s
minute thereto. On July 10 Spring Rice, in a memo. written after talking
with Lansdowne, stated that British policy aimed at maintaining the
balance of power (Gwynn, I, 476).]
[Footnote 708: Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX,
399, No. 6676; 400, No. 6677; Metternich to F. O., June 8, 1905,
_ibid._, 422, No. 6697; Lowther to Lansdowne, D. May 31, 1905, R. June
3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 88, No. 106; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1 and 5,
1905, _ibid._, 88, No. 107; 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5,
1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 108.]
[Footnote 709: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 109;
Lansdowne to Durand, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 90, No. 110.]
[Footnote 710: Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 29, 1905, _ibid._, 109, No.
136. The editors of _B.D._ promise to publish more information about
this offer in a later volume.]
[Footnote 711: That treaty read in part as follows: “The two Governments
declare that they will take counsel together upon every question of a
nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case that peace should be
threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an
understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption
would be imposed upon the two Governments by the realization of this
eventuality.” See _Livre jaune: L’alliance franco-russe_, p. 16, No. 17,
annexe; Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 213;
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914,”
_American Historical Review_, XXIX, 459 f.]
[Footnote 712: Thayer, _The Life and Letters of John Hay_, II, 404 f.;
Eckardstein, III, 115 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX,
497 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78,
No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date.]
[Footnote 713: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 400 f., No.
6678.]
[Footnote 714: Delcassé’s formal denial of the rumor had no effect. See
Mévil, pp. 284 f.; Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No.
6684.]
[Footnote 715: Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407 ff., No.
6685; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770.]
[Footnote 716: Delcassé informed Bertie, June 10, that the Spanish
Foreign Minister “had told him that he thought that Spain, France and
England, should reply to the Government of Morocco in identic terms
declining the proposal” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._,
III, 78, No. 96).]
[Footnote 717: The report spread in 1905 that at the French cabinet
meeting on June 6 Delcassé had stated that the British government had
offered an alliance to France. Lansdowne and Sanderson denied to the
German government that Great Britain had ever done so. See Metternich to
F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 630 ff., No. 6858; Metternich to F.
O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 635 ff., No. 6860; see also _B.D._, III, 87,
No. 105; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No.
6873. According to Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, just
before the arrival of the King of Spain in Paris on May 30, the British
government assured Delcassé that “the British military forces were ready
to march with us [France] against Germany if that Power attacked us.
Moreover, the principle of defensive co-operation once admitted, the
English Government declared itself ready to sign in the shortest time an
accord which would definitely fix that co-operation” (Mévil, p. 268). In
a letter of March 20, 1922, Delcassé wrote as follows: “From the Entente
it was possible for us in 1905 to proceed to a formal alliance with
England. . . . . On June 6th the British offer of assistance had been
only forty-eight hours in my possession” (quoted in the _London Times_,
March 27, 1922). In connection with the Grey-Cambon correspondence of
1912, Poincaré has written: “Thus to make a joint study of the situation
was the sole engagement which was made [in that correspondence]. In
communicating to me the result obtained, M. Paul Cambon wrote me that at
the time of Lord Lansdowne an entente of that kind would have been only
a beginning. Now, however, it was the last word for the Liberal cabinet.
The forced resignation of M. Delcassé had perhaps made us lose in 1905,
stated M. Cambon, the opportunity for a real alliance with England. All
that we were able to obtain today was this engagement to confer in the
presence of danger and this hypothetical approval of the programs drawn
up by the general staff.” See also J. A. Farrer, _England under Edward
VII_ (London, 1922), pp. 127 f.; Mévil, pp. 269 f.; _G.P._, XX, 632 n.,
664 n.; Raymond Poincaré, _Au service de la France. Neuf années de
souvenirs: I. Le lendemain d’Agadir, 1912_ (Paris, 1926), p. 221. Later
Lansdowne wrote on his dispatch to Bertie of May 17, 1905, as follows:
“I suppose this was the origin of the offensive and defensive alliance”
(_B.D._, III, 76, No. 94). His inference is probably correct only in
part. The exchange of notes between Cambon and Lansdowne was sent to
Bertie on May 31, 1905, and received by him on June 3. It is not
apparent whether he communicated that exchange to the French government,
although the “offer of assistance” which Delcassé has written of as
having received only forty-eight hours before the cabinet meeting on
June 6 may have been the notice of this exchange from Bertie. Word to
Delcassé through the Governor-General of Algeria from King Edward, who
was then cruising in the Mediterranean, urging the Foreign Minister not
to resign also strengthened the latter’s hand. The King took that step
on his own initiative (Newton, p. 342).]
[Footnote 718: On that cabinet meeting see the following: Mévil, pp. 293
ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 164 f.; Radolin to Bülow, June
11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 407 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8,
1905, _B.D._, III, 91, No. 114; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905,
_ibid._, 78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that
date; Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 167 ff. Cf. Bertie’s explanation of
Delcassé’s fall (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15, 1905, Newton, pp. 341
f.).]
[Footnote 719: Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. 6684;
625, No. 6854. Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris to his
government, June 8, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 62 f. See also
_Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770 ff.]
[Footnote 720: Cf. _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III,
341.]
[Footnote 721: Quoted in Lee, II, 344. See also a letter from John Hay,
who was then in London, to Henry Adams, June 7, 1905, quoted in Thayer,
II, 405; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96.
Lansdowne’s reaction is expressed in Newton, p. 341.]
[Footnote 722: Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90, No.
111.]
[Footnote 723: Bülow’s minute to a dispatch from Flotow, June 5, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 403, No. 6681.]