THE VISIT TO TANGIER
Upon the refusal of an alliance by Russia, the German government, in the
early part of 1905, regarded its international situation and loss of
prestige with concern. The continued defeats of Russia by Japan in the
Far East, culminating in that at Mukden, February 23 to March 10, and
the outbreak of revolution in Russia had for the time neutralized the
effectiveness of the Dual Alliance. But the Anglo-German animosity
persisted. On February 2 at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, first civil lord
of the British admiralty, frankly explained the redistribution of the
fleet as follows:[561]
The balance and center of naval power in Europe had been shifted during
the last few years. They [Great Britain] had not so much to keep their
eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with more
anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. It was for that reason
that the Fleets had been distributed to enable them to deal with any
danger in that direction. . . . . If war should unhappily be declared,
under existing conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first,
before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had
been declared.
The German Emperor regarded those assertions as an “open threat of war”
by that “vengeance-breathing corsair.”[562] An Anglo-German press war
ensued. Count Bülow declared to Admiral Tirpitz that he would agree to
any sum for the German naval law for 1906.[563]
The state of the Triple Alliance also worried the German foreign office;
Austria-Hungary was in internal turmoil, Italy more unreliable than
ever. Irredentist troubles, which had flamed up again in the previous
November,[564] and Balkan rivalries had so antagonized those two allies
that during 1904 the main military force of Italy had been transferred
from the French to the Austrian frontier. During the winter, reports of
a Franco-Italian agreement nullifying the Triple Alliance and of the
activity of Ambassador Barrère in attempting to foment difficulty
between Austria and Italy came to the German government.[565] But when,
toward the end of February, 1905, Count Bülow mentioned these rumors to
the Italian Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel and his government both
formally denied that Italy had made any agreement “that is in
contradiction with the Triple Alliance or that may diminish the value of
our obligations toward our allies,” and asserted that M. Prinetti’s
declarations to France did not “vary, modify, or attenuate the bearing
or obligations that result from it [the Triple Alliance] for us.”[566]
Although the Chancellor did not believe these asseverations, he
continued to hold to Italy. As he wrote to the Emperor on March 5 and 9:
For times of peace and for all international combinations it is to our
interest to maintain the façade of the Triple Alliance as intact as
possible, if only because the Italians, so long as they remain in it,
will meet with mistrust from hostile sides. In case of complications,
however, we need have no illusions concerning active Italian co-
operation. Still, it is an advantage if Italy remains neutral instead of
siding with France. . . . . The general international situation is so
tense that we must endeavor to sacrifice as few tricks as possible.
Therein was expressed the German policy toward Italy until the latter’s
final entry into the World War. Upon reading this confession, the
Emperor, who already feared that King Edward VII was trying to establish
a Franco-Russo-British alliance, summed up the international position of
his country as follows: “The Triple Alliance loosened by the antagonism
of Austria and Italy, Russia unchanged or indifferent toward us, England
hostile, France revengeful.” As to Italy, he wrote severely to the
Chancellor: “Your Excellency is easily satisfied. My grandfather and I
looked upon the co-operation of the Italian army as a matter of course.
In case of a French attack on us that must be adhered to.”[567]
The diminution in Germany’s prestige was felt most acutely in her
relationship to France, whose Foreign Minister showed by the dispatch of
the French mission to Fez in January that he intended to establish
French control over Morocco without consulting Germany. Hence, after the
failure of the move toward Russia, the German government began, in
December, to turn its attention to the Moroccan question. Conveniently
disregarding its unsettled grievances against the Sultan, it responded
to certain overtures for a _rapprochement_ from that monarch by quietly
and unofficially encouraging him to resist the French demands.[568]
This action could the more easily be taken since the Sultan had already
begun to oppose the French by convoking an assembly of Moroccan notables
to consider the French proposals for reform. The Sultan selected two men
from each town, who were moderate conservatives, more or less amenable
to his influence, hostile to French control but not in principle opposed
to foreigners or to reforms.[569] Count Bülow, much pleased, advised the
Sultan about the middle of February to unite with the rebel, Bou-Amama
[_sic_], and to threaten a holy war in case France tried to prevent the
meeting of the assembly.[570] Early in February a German warship
appeared casually in Moroccan waters. A few days later Herr von Holstein
instructed Herr von Kühlmann, first secretary of the German legation in
Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France “until we are more
certain about the attitude of the Sultan”; for “according as the Sultan
shows himself firm or yielding, German policy will endeavor as much as
possible to strengthen his back or will confine itself to defending
German economic interests.”[571]
The Moroccan government lived up to the German hopes by convening the
assembly of notables on February 22 and by requiring M. Saint-René
Taillandier to explain the French program to it. To stiffen the Moroccan
resistance against France, Herr von Kühlmann suggested that the German
government send a note to the Sultan manifesting its disapproval of the
French policy.[572] Before following that suggestion, however, the
German government endeavored to interest President Roosevelt in the
Moroccan question.
As Mr. Roosevelt and the German government were co-operating so
cordially for the preservation of the open door in China, Count Bülow
sought to extend this effort to Morocco and to involve the United States
against France and Great Britain, or at least to prepare the President
for isolated German action on the Moroccan question. On February 25,
after calling Mr. Roosevelt’s attention to the Franco-Spanish
monopolistic plans, the Chancellor invited him to unite with Germany in
advising the Sultan that the calling of the assembly was a correct move
toward fortifying his government and inaugurating reforms. This action,
argued the Chancellor, would stop the French advance and make possible a
peaceful solution of the Moroccan question. Even if the United States
did not participate, he continued, France would scarcely risk a Moroccan
war with a silent Germany on her frontier.[573]
Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to instruct the
American representative in Tangier to keep in close touch with his
German colleague.[574] The answer satisfied the German government, which
now felt assured of Mr. Roosevelt’s moral support in case Germany took
action alone. On March 10 the note was sent.
Through this note and the supplementary statements of the German
representatives in Morocco the German government informed the Sultan
that, although he must reorganize his country, Germany
hopes that the rumors of a prospective change in the existing conditions
in Morocco—equal rights and freedom for all nations—are unfounded.
Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States
are favorably inclined toward the maintenance of the present conditions;
. . . . the attitude of the other Powers is not definitely known. In
England the Government has bound itself to a certain extent in favor of
France, even though in the English commercial world a current in favor
of the maintenance of the independence of Morocco and in favor of equal
rights of the Powers is present.[575]
Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the whole French action
and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing herself to
any definite policy.
Immediately after the dispatch of the note the German government heard
that at the opening session of the assembly of notables on February 22
M. Saint-René Taillandier had claimed to have “the assent of other
foreign representatives at Tangier” to the French program of
reform.[576] Considering this a deliberate misrepresentation for the
purpose of overawing the Moroccans, the German government sought further
means for blocking French efforts. The Chancellor intimated in the
Reichstag on March 15 that Germany intended taking steps to defend her
economic interests in Morocco.[577] Five days later the newspapers
announced the forthcoming visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.[578]
When Count Bülow saw the strong opposition which this proposed visit
aroused in the French and English press, he immediately determined to
put it to a political use.[579] He wrote to the Emperor: “Your Majesty’s
visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, thwart his plans, and be of
benefit to our economic interests in Morocco.” For, he wrote a few days
later,
apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French
merchants and promoters from Morocco according to the example in Tunis
would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want
of appreciation of our power when M. Delcassé has not considered it
worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M.
Delcassé has completely ignored us in this affair.[580]
William II was lukewarm about the project. He had persistently opposed
interfering in the Moroccan question both for reasons of general policy
and for lack of interest in Morocco itself. At the insistence of the
Chancellor he agreed to execute the _coup_; but Count Bülow had to
employ every means to hold him steady. When the Emperor learned from the
papers that the natives and the German and British colonies in Morocco
intended to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote to the
Chancellor on March 20 as follows: “Telegraph immediately to Tangier
that it is _highly_ doubtful whether I shall land and that I shall only
travel incog[nito] as a tourist, that is, no audiences, no
receptions.”[581] Count Bülow overcame his objections by arguing that
otherwise M. Delcassé would spread the rumor that the program of
reception for the Emperor had been curtailed after remonstrances had
been made in Berlin.[582]
Aside from the communication with President Roosevelt, the German
government made no diplomatic preparation for this action.[583] Direct
contact with the French government was cut off as early as March
22.[584] Two days later the Chancellor issued general orders to play the
sphinx on the subject of Morocco.[585] A Franco-German press war alone
revealed the tension of the situation.[586]
With the performance ready to start, the chief actor began to suffer
from stage fright. Learning of an attempt at Tangier a day or so before
to assassinate Mr. Harris of the _London Times_, the Emperor telegraphed
Count Bülow from Lisbon on March 28 as follows: “In Tangier the devil is
already loose. Yesterday an Englishman almost murdered. I consider the
affair there as very doubtful.”[587] Furthermore, he learned that at
Tangier he would have to disembark in an open boat, and that after he
was in the town he would have to walk through the narrow streets or be
carried in a sedan or ride some unknown Berber horse. The first two ways
were decidedly beneath imperial dignity, while the last one, on account
of the Emperor’s crippled left arm, might be too dangerous. Not only the
anxious sovereign, but members of his company as well, were inclined to
advise against the attempt. But Count Tattenbach, former minister at
Tangier and at the time minister at Lisbon, whom the Emperor had brought
along from Portugal, and Prince Eulenburg clung to the plan and kept up
their master’s courage,[588] while from Berlin the Chancellor sent one
telegram after the other to effect the visit. To the Emperor he
telegraphed that it would be a “historic act,” that the attention of the
world was focused on him, that “if the visit . . . . turns out as
desired, Delcassé with his anti-German policy will stand there as a
disgraced European,” and that the French Foreign Minister would probably
then be overthrown by his enemies in France. He agreed with Count
Tattenbach that since press and people were discussing the matter so
fully the Emperor could not recede without exposing himself to the
accusation of cowardice. He likewise sent a telegram of four pages to
the Emperor on March 26 with instructions about his speeches at Tangier.
It read in part as follows:
Naturally it is not to German interest for the Sultan to be discouraged
now at the beginning of the French negotiations and to place himself
under a French protectorate. To oppose this . . . . Your Majesty should
receive the Sultan’s representative expressly as a representative of a
sovereign, and should . . . . express the hope that he [the Sultan]
would soon suppress the rebellion of Bou-Amama. . . . . Your Majesty
might ask where the rebel Bou-Amama obtains the means for his long
resistance. If the representative should reply, “Probably from France,”
Your Majesty might answer, “It is difficult to believe the French
capable of such baseness.”
. . . . Without saying an unfriendly word about France, Your Majesty
should ignore her in Morocco, should not mention at all the French
advance against Morocco, and should honor the French chargé d’affaires
with . . . . only a silent greeting.
It is improbable that any diplomat will mention France’s Moroccan policy
to Your Majesty. If that subject should be brought up, Your Majesty
might reply that the French policy is entirely unknown to you. The case
is different, however, if the Sultan’s representative at his master’s
command . . . . asks Your Majesty’s advice. On the reply will depend
whether the Sultan will continue to defend the independence of Morocco
or will submit to France. The question whether Your Majesty can risk a
war with France for the sake of Morocco cannot be considered at all. But
on the other hand it is more than doubtful whether the present civil
Government of France . . . . would risk a war with Morocco so long as
the least possibility exists that Germany might sooner or later
interfere. Therefore we must for the present leave our goal uncertain.
We cannot conveniently make an alliance with the Sultan. But if we
withdraw our moral support entirely from him and destroy all hope, we
shall relinquish important German interests. Therefore I conceive Your
Majesty’s reply to the Sultan’s minister somewhat as follows: “It is
known that I desire no Morocco territory, but that I value equality of
treatment with other nations in trade and commerce with Morocco. Other
commercial nations have the same interest. As my view is known, the
English colony greeted me joyfully today. It is to the interest of the
Sultan as well as of almost all seafaring and commercial peoples that he
preserve his independence and therewith freedom to permit them all equal
rights in his empire. The main strength of every ruler lies in having
his people back of him at decisive moments. In that case no foreign
Power will attack him lightly. Therefore the Sultan should make certain
that the notables whom he has summoned to Fez for advice are of one mind
with him and should direct his policy in accordance therewith.”
Since it is well known that the Moorish delegates at present assembled
at Fez are entirely hostile to the Sultan’s conciliation toward France,
definite advice would herewith be imparted to the Sultan. If the
representative should ask whether Your Majesty would support the Sultan
in a war against France, Your Majesty might reply: “In case I promised
today to support you, you would attack the French at once. But I desire,
if possible, to maintain peace, although I have a very strong army.
Therefore I must reserve decision until it really comes to war between
France and Morocco. I do not expect this event. France will try to see
how far she can advance with threats. But France knows that her
situation would be dangerous if she attacked Morocco without having
assured herself of Germany’s neutrality.”
Next in importance to the conversation with the Sultan’s representative
is Your Majesty’s reply to a probable short English greeting. . . . .
There Your Majesty might well stress the common interest in equality for
all nations. By emphasizing this principle at that place Your Majesty
will make it half impossible for the English Government in later Franco-
German discussions about Morocco to place itself on the French side.
Finally, in case Your Majesty has to reply to a question from a non-
Moroccan source about what attitude Germany would take in case of a
Franco-Moroccan war, Your Majesty might reply somewhat as follows:
“Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from being guided in
that case by her own interests.” This reply sounds disquieting for our
opponents but binds us to nothing.
Thus, Count Bülow instructed the Emperor to encourage the Moroccans in
their resistance to France, to make France uneasy by his actions and
words, but not to bind Germany to anything definite.
At the same time, to assure his master’s safety, the Chancellor
telegraphed to Herr von Kühlmann that German and Spanish secret police
should be present in abundance, that the visit should perhaps be
shortened, and that “a horse, guaranteed gentle, which should be
exercised early in the morning for several hours by some trustworthy
rider in order to quiet it, would be best and could obviate all
difficulties as well as any curtailment of the program.”[589] Then, to
cut off any possibility of retreat, the Chancellor declared on March 29
to the Reichstag that Germany had no aggressive intentions toward
Morocco, but that she did aim to defend her economic interests and the
open door.
The speech and attitude of a diplomat . . . . must vary according to
circumstances [he stated]. The moment suitable . . . . for the
preservation of our interests I shall choose as I think best. But in
this case the tendency of the German policy has not changed. Whoever
seeks a _fait nouveau_ will not find it in the German policy. In the
same degree as it is attempted to change the international position of
Morocco or to control the open door in the economic development of the
land, we must also to a greater degree than before be heedful that our
economic interests in Morocco remain safe. For this reason we are
entering into relations with the Sultan of Morocco.[590]
When the Emperor’s boat arrived at Tangier early in the morning of March
31, a stiff east wind made landing impossible.[591] Herr von Kühlmann
and the captain of one of the French warships stationed in the harbor
succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in coming aboard. The
Emperor immediately drew the latter into conversation about the weather
prospects. It looked as if the “historic act” would not occur. A few
hours later, however, the wind died down, and General Scholl, a member
of the Emperor’s party, went ashore to make a tour of inspection. He
returned with an enthusiastic report of the reception in view from the
natives, declared the horse to be trustworthy, and said that if one did
not mind getting wet, one could make the landing. So the Emperor
intrusted himself to the wind and the waves, the Moroccans, and a Berber
horse. The landing was made; the horse, which at first shied at the
splendor of the imperial costume, was quieted; and
followed by about twenty attendants all on horseback [according to Herr
von Schoen’s account], the Emperor entered the town, the narrow streets
of which, filled with the joyous, noisy masses, permitted only a slow
advance. The flat roofs of the houses were thickly packed with Moorish,
Christian, and Jewish women who hailed the Emperor in the most varied
tones and scattered flowers. Finally the procession arrived at the Soko,
the open place before the garden of the legation, filled with a
turbulent sea of human beings who expressed their enthusiasm in
deafening cries and wild shooting. The confused din was increased still
more by a military band sent by the Sultan which endeavored in vain to
drown out the uproar of the people. The restlessness of the horses
caused me to ask the French officer, apparently leading a command,
whether he could not stop the wild shooting. He replied dejectedly that
he had some influence only over the handful of regular troops entrusted
to his instruction but not the least over the sportively shooting, half-
wild Kabyle.
However, the company reached the legation in safety where the German
colony, the diplomatic corps, and the representative of the Sultan were
received.
In the speeches which the excited Emperor delivered, he permitted his
tongue to become looser than usual. Whereas he had previously been
opposed to intervention in the Moroccan affair, he now fixed the German
policy with respect to Morocco more tightly than the Chancellor had
wished and exposed himself to the criticism of having taken another
backward monarch under his wing. In reply to the greeting of the
Sultan’s representative, Abd-el-Melik, the Emperor declared that
he . . . . had great interest in the welfare and prosperity of the
Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an independent ruler, and
that he hoped that under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco
would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without
monopoly or exclusion.
The Sultan’s representative read to the Emperor a message from his
master in which the latter stated that
he remembered the friendship which had always existed between his
predecessors and Germany and that he was filled with the wish to
strengthen and extend those friendly relations in every way. In reply
the Emperor William expressed his thanks for this cordial message. He
shared the feelings of the Sultan [he said] and agreed with Abd-el-
Melik’s assertations concerning the divine power and wisdom which
directs the fate of peoples. He wished sincerely for the development and
welfare of the Moroccan Empire for the sake of his subjects and for that
of the other European nations who traded there, as he hoped, on the
basis of full equality.
The Emperor then decorated Abd-el-Melik and his three companions. Later,
he said to Abd-el-Melik that
his visit to Tangier aimed to assert that German interests in Morocco
would be protected and preserved. Concerning the best means to achieve
this, he would enter into direct relations with the Sultan, whom he
regarded as an independent ruler. The Emperor closed with the remark
that prudence was necessary in the reforms which the Sultan planned and
that regard should be paid to the religious feelings of the Moroccan
people in order to avoid disturbing public order.[592]
After the speeches were over, the imperial party hurried back on
shipboard before some accident should occur or a contrary wind arise.
Count Bülow was so relieved upon learning that his master was safe on
board that, as he later confided to the Emperor, he had a “nervous fit
of tears.”[593] The Emperor himself did not at first realize the great
political significance of his act. When he met Prince Louis of
Battenberg at Gibraltar on April 1, he expressed the time-honored
shibboleth, that “Germany, Great Britain and the United States must make
common cause and march shoulder to shoulder.”[594] When he received the
reports from the press several days later, he awoke from his
illusions.[595] For, although the whole event smacked of a comic opera,
it none the less threw down the gauntlet to M. Delcassé and French
policy in Morocco[596] and ushered in a long period of crisis in
international relations. The echoes which the Emperor’s speeches aroused
in Europe reverberated like the distant rumblings of cannon.
[Footnote 561: Reported in the _London Times_, Feb. 4, 1905. When Lee
saw how the German press took offense at his words, he published a
“correct version” of these passages in a somewhat milder form (_ibid._,
Feb. 7, 1905; _Annual Register, 1905_, pp. 21 f.).]
[Footnote 562: Von Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, I, 14.]
[Footnote 563: _Ibid._, pp. 17 ff.]
[Footnote 564: Monts to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 85 ff., No.
6423.]
[Footnote 565: Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 88 f. No. 6424;
report of Military Attaché Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 18, 1904,
_ibid._, 89 ff., No. 6424 Anlage; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 12, 1905,
_ibid._, 93, No. 6425. The relation of Italy to France and Germany was
well shown in the following incident. Shortly after Loubet’s visit to
Rome, an Italian officer was caught delivering to the French important
documents dealing with the Italian plan of mobilization. At about the
same time the Italian chief of staff gave to the German government
photographs of the French border fortifications (_ibid._, Nos. 6423-24,
6426).]
[Footnote 566: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 93 f., No. 6426;
Monts to F. O., Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., No. 6427; Bülow to
William II, March 5, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 6428 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 567: Bülow to William II, March 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 95
ff., Nos. 6428 f., and the Emperor’s minutes.]
[Footnote 568: The German representatives in Morocco unofficially
assured the Sultan early in February that Germany had a political
interest in the Moroccan question, that Germany as well as several other
Powers had not yet taken the question in its existing form into
consideration, that Germany would not actively support Morocco, but
that, with a silent Germany on her frontier, France would not attack the
latter (see _ibid._, Nos. 6538-40, 6544-47, 6550, 6553).]
[Footnote 569: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 248, No.
6552.]
[Footnote 570: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 251 ff., No.
6554.]
[Footnote 571: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 255, No. 6556.
The dispatch was written by Holstein.]
[Footnote 572: Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 255 f., No.
6557.]
[Footnote 573: Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 245, No. 6547;
Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 6558.]
[Footnote 574: Sternburg to F. O., March 9, 1905, _ibid._, 258 f., No.
6559; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 83 f.]
[Footnote 575: Only a summary of the note is given in _G.P._, XX, 260 n.
The quotations are taken from this summary and from a telegram from
Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260 f., No. 6561.]
[Footnote 576: Report from Vassel, German vice-consul at Fez, Feb. 23,
1905. According to a second report from him, March 7, the French
Minister had claimed to have “the approval of his proposals by the
foreigners” (_ibid._, pp. 255 f. n.; Auswärtiger Amt, _Aktenstücke über
Marokko, 1905_ [Berlin, 1905], No. 3). The latest communication received
by the German government from Vassel, before the dispatch of the note of
March 10, was of Feb. 17. See Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 255, No. 6557; Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260, No.
6561.]
[Footnote 577: The Chancellor declared as follows: “I understand
entirely the attention which is given here to the events in and about
Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German Government to see that . .
. . our economic interests in Morocco are not injured. But the present
moment is unsuitable for further explanations” (Bülow, _Reden_, II, 186
f.). As a matter of fact, German economic interests ran a very poor
third behind those of France and Great Britain (_Zeitschrift für
Kolonialpolitik_, Dec., 1904, pp. 885 ff.).]
[Footnote 578: The information was given out to the _London Standard_,
_London Times_, and the _Kölnische Zeitung_, at Tangier on March 19. The
origin of the visit is obscure. Theodor Wolff relates that Kühlmann and
Hornung, correspondent in Tangier of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, were
responsible for proposing in February that the Emperor include Tangier
in his itinerary (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, p. 156). The plan for the
Emperor’s voyage in the Mediterranean submitted to the Chancellor on
March 13 included a stay of four hours in Tangier (editor’s note,
_G.P._, XX, 263). Probably Bülow aimed to use this visit politically
from the start, just as he had intended using the dispatch of a warship
to Tangier in the previous year. But only after he saw the effect of the
announcement upon public opinion did he realize the full political
significance of the visit (cf. _ibid._, pp. 262 ff.). Crozier’s story of
the origin of this voyage is unsubstantiated by any evidence (_Revue de
France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 279 f.).]
[Footnote 579: Editor’s note, _G.P._, XX, 263 f.; Bülow to William II,
March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 262, No. 6563; 264 f., No. 6565.]
[Footnote 580: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 263, No.
6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, _ibid._, 274 f., No. 6576. It
was reported in the German foreign office soon after the Anglo-French
accord was made that Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je
viens de rouler Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur
d’Allemagne” (Guibert et Ferrette, _Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905_
[Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from
Fashoda to Serajevo_, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord Sanderson,
permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, wrote
as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany entirely when he
commenced operations in Morocco. The action of France and her demands on
the Sultan were undoubtedly much exaggerated and misrepresented. But in
addition there is no doubt that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a
series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening
her alliances. The German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are
extremely sensitive about being ignored or neglected in the discussion
of important questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion
they should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on
France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us from
France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an alliance, and
to obtain any share they could in the eventual development of Morocco is
no doubt also true. The methods adopted were characteristic of German
policy, and as on some other occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord
Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _B.D._, IV, 421). Whether the German
government knew the exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a
question. Tardieu says that it did know them (_La conf. d’Algés_, p.
156). Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main
content” (_Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 200). It also
suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for the
exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial division
of Morocco (_ibid._, p. 201). See also the dispatch from Stumm to Bülow,
Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024, and the Emperor’s minute
thereto: “And the rascals [the Spanish government] will not even admit
what sort of a pact they have made with the devil [France].” See also
Veit Valentin, _Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum
Ende des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, Dec.
10, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 126 f. However, the German government
did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so
Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office admitted to Cartwright of the
British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233,
No. 252). The probability is therefore that it also learned in good time
the terms of the other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge
or even denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive
proof that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign
office.]
[Footnote 581: William II to Bülow, undated, _G.P._, XX, 263, No. 6564.
The editors of _G.P._ presume the date of this communication to have
been March 21; but Bülow’s reply to it was dated March 20. See Bülow to
William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 264, No. 6565. The Emperor had
dined at the French embassy on March 17 and had said nothing about his
proposed visit. Furthermore, just before leaving on his trip he made at
Bremen one of his half-militaristic, half-pacific speeches which did not
indicate what was to follow (Schulthess, _Europäischer
Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 67 f.; Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p.
275; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 193 ff.).]
[Footnote 582: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 264 f.,
No. 6565.]
[Footnote 583: The unexpectedness of this action was shown by the
remarks made on March 21 by Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy
in London, to a reporter of the _Daily Chronicle_. He asserted that
Germany had only economic interests in Morocco over which it ought not
to be difficult for France and Germany to agree (Bülow to Metternich,
March 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 268 f., and note, No. 6569).]
[Footnote 584: Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No.
6568; Flotow to F. O., March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 269, No. 6570; Flotow to
F. O., March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6578; Bülow to Flotow, March
28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6579; Mévil, pp. 197 f.]
[Footnote 585: Memo. by Bülow, March 24, 1905, _G.P._, 271, No. 6573.]
[Footnote 586: Mévil, p. 205; _G.P._, XX, 262 f., n. 266 n., Nos. 6570,
6584, 6590; _Quest. dipl. et. col._, XIX, 442 ff.; Schulthess, _1905_,
pp. 78 f.]
[Footnote 587: William II to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 279, No.
6580.]
[Footnote 588: Tattenbach to F. O., March 29, 1905, _ibid._, 283, No.
6585; Freiherr von Schoen, _Erlebtes. Beiträge zur politischen
Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921), pp. 19 ff.]
[Footnote 589: See his telegrams from March 26 to March 30, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 272 ff., Nos. 6574 ff.]
[Footnote 590: Bülow, II, 209 f.]
[Footnote 591: For a description of the visit see Schoen, pp. 19 ff.;
Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 285 ff., Nos. 6588 ff.;
Tardieu, pp. 69 f.]
[Footnote 592: The foregoing is the official version of the speeches
published in the German press (see _Allgemeine Zeitung_ [Munich], April
4, 1905). There were various versions of the speeches since the Emperor
spoke extemporaneously. Schoen on March 31 sent to the foreign office a
report of William II’s assertions as follows: When Count de Chérisey
attempted to greet the Emperor in the name of Delcassé in such a way as
to imply a French predominance in Morocco, William II replied sharply
that his visit “signified that Germany demanded free trade there and
full equality with other nations.” When the Count admitted this, the
Emperor remarked that “he would treat directly with the Sultan as a
peer, as a free ruler of an independent land, that he would know how to
assert his just claims and expected that these also be respected by
France.” Those words crushed the Count. To the Sultan’s representative
the Emperor spoke as follows: “He regarded the Sultan as the ruler of a
free and independent Empire, subject to no foreign suzerainty. He
expected for German trade and commerce the same advantages as for all
other commercial nations. He would always negotiate with the Sultan
directly. Reforms which the Sultan planned to introduce ought always to
be executed within the limits of the customs and views of his people and
without violation of the precepts of the Koran, in honest administration
and strengthening of peace and order that would make the best impression
outside. European customs and usages would not be taken over without
further consideration. Let the Sultan therein listen carefully to the
counsel of the great ones of his land” (Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 286 f., No. 6589. It was also stated in the press, although
not in the official version of the speeches, that the Emperor replied to
the greetings from the German colony at Tangier that that colony “could
rely on the support of the German Government to prevent any obstacle in
that free country [Morocco] from hindering the success of its efforts in
favor of the national commerce” (Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX,
504). Schoen made no mention of this assertion. Cf. Schoen, pp. 20 f.;
Mévil, pp. 210 ff.; _B.D._, III, 62 f., Nos. 71 f.; 64, No. 74; Prince
Louis of Battenberg’s report of a conversation with the Emperor, April
1, 1905, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 333 f.]
[Footnote 593: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 497, No.
6237.]
[Footnote 594: Memo. by Prince Louis of Battenberg, April 1, 1905,
Newton, p. 333.]
[Footnote 595: Schoen, p. 22.]
[Footnote 596: Mévil, p. 210.]