THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905
The downfall of M. Delcassé was merely an incident in Germany’s drive
toward a conference. Prince Bülow, believing that the Minister’s
resignation ended the acute phase of the crisis,[724] immediately
dispatched a circular note to the signatory Powers[725] informing them
of Germany’s acceptance of the Sultan’s invitation to a conference and
asking them also to accept. In this note he argued as follows: Since
Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid[726] guaranteed to every Power
the same treatment as the most favored nation, the Moroccan reforms had
to receive the approval of all the signatory Powers. If the proposal for
a conference were refused, the legal status of Morocco would remain
unchanged, for the opposition of one Power alone would suffice to block
the execution of any reforms proposed. But aside from these legal
arguments, the conference was the best means of introducing reforms
without endangering the existing political and commercial interests of
the signatory Powers by concession of special rights to individual
states. Moreover, since the Convention of Madrid was a compact between
the Powers, France would have to obtain their sanction for a special
position in Morocco. While the details of the French program of Moroccan
reforms were unknown, it was evident that France sought, in violation of
Article XVII, to control the land as she did Tunis. Thus, to oppose the
French action was merely to defend the existing legal status of
Morocco.[727]
The attitude of the Powers toward this exposé was not at all
satisfactory to the German government. The Russian, Austrian, Italian,
Portuguese, and Danish governments evaded a reply, leaving the
initiative to the French and the British.[728] German relations with
Spain over the matter were complicated by reports that while M. Villa-
Urrutia, the Spanish foreign minister, had been in Paris during King
Alfonso’s visit, he had openly aligned himself with M. Delcassé’s
policy. After the French Minister’s downfall, the German government
notified the Spanish government on June 11 that, if M. Villa-Urrutia
remained in office, Germany would recall her Ambassador for an
indefinite leave of absence.[729] While waiting for the Minister to be
overthrown, the German government did not press Spain on the question of
the conference.
The British attitude was even more adverse. When Count Metternich handed
the German note to Lord Lansdowne, the latter interpreted it as meaning
that “the Conference, if it were to meet, would be expected to deal not
only with the introduction of reforms, but with the maintenance of the
independence and integrity of Morocco, and the preservation of the open
door.”[730] The Ambassador’s affirmative reply enhanced Lord Lansdowne’s
suspicion that Germany was endeavoring to break the Anglo-French
understanding. While questioning strongly the propriety of a conference,
the Foreign Secretary gave no definite answer. This note, however, and
the passing of M. Delcassé caused the British government to recede on
June 8 from its original refusal of the Sultan’s invitation and to
postpone its decision until it could consult with France.[731] But on
June 7, Herr von Flotow reported from Paris a rumor that Great Britain
had offered to France “an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at
Germany” which the latter was still considering.[732] Hence, it was
manifest to the German government that Great Britain was in complete
opposition to its policy.
President Roosevelt also gave a disappointing reply. On May 25 and 30
Prince Bülow had told the President that “the decision in the question
of a conference depended to a great extent upon him.” He maintained that
if the conference were refused as a result of Great Britain’s pressure
upon France, Germany would be forced to choose between a war with France
and perhaps Great Britain and an agreement with the former which would
serve as a prelude to a strong Continental _bloc_. Declaring that he was
averse to making the choice, the Chancellor asked Mr. Roosevelt to favor
the conference to the signatory Powers.[733] But the President replied
on June 8 that he could hardly participate in a conference without
exposing himself to the sharpest attacks, since American opinion was
opposed to interfering in the Moroccan affair and inclined to approve
reform by one Power.[734]
The attitude of M. Rouvier was equally unsatisfactory to the German
government. The Premier expressed to the German representative through
M. Betzold the hope that the fall of M. Delcassé would enable the two
countries to reach a direct understanding, and promised to show the
“greatest conciliation” toward Germany.[735] When the German note of
June 6 arrived, he immediately denied to the Powers the accusations made
therein.[736] He also instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier to suspend
action at Fez so as to avoid complications.[737] He endeavored to find
some way by which Germany could be satisfied, France’s position in
Morocco be preserved and her agreements with the other Powers be upheld,
and the humiliating conference be avoided. On June 7 he protested to
Herr von Flotow that France could hardly accept the conference, which
French public opinion rejected so completely, and remarked that Great
Britain, Spain, and Italy would probably refuse it.[738] Herr von Flotow
replied that Germany would not desert the Sultan. Two days later the
Premier offered through an intermediary to make a general agreement with
Germany not only over the Moroccan question but also over others, such
as those of the Bagdad Railway and far eastern affairs.[739] In a
conversation with the German Ambassador on June 10, M. Rouvier
persisted, in spite of threats, in his repugnance to the conference. Why
go there, he asked Prince Radolin, if Germany refused the reforms in
Morocco which France considered necessary? In the course of his defense
of France’s previous Moroccan policy, he said: “If an understanding
concerning the extension of permissible reforms could previously occur
with Germany, participation in the conference might be possible.” He was
so discouraged that he thought seriously of resigning, for, he declared
to the Prince, he could not defend before the French Chamber the German
demands as then formulated.[740]
At home Prince Bülow’s policy was encountering disapproval from the
Emperor William II, then in a pacific mood. Toward the end of May the
Emperor had rebuked the German Navy League for criticizing the naval
program as inadequate.[741] On June 3 he had started the movement which
culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and was co-
operating with President Roosevelt in that work—an act which Prince
Bülow would have prevented had he been aware of his master’s
intentions.[742] Even though the Emperor knew nothing of the French
offers,[743] he was entirely willing after the fall of M. Delcassé to
gratify M. Rouvier’s wish for an understanding.[744] At the wedding of
the German Crown Prince on June 6 he assured the French representative
that there would be no war over Morocco.[745]
The beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace had no effect
upon the German policy, for Russia’s force was broken both by defeat and
by the rapidly developing revolution.[746] But the attitude of France
was so uncompromising and that of the other Powers so unfavorable that
Prince Bülow doubted whether he would succeed in launching the
conference.[747] He endeavored to do so by a show of boldness coupled
with real concessions to France.
To bring President Roosevelt back into active participation in the
affair, Prince Bülow reported to him the rumor of the British offer of
alliance to France and pictured the possibility of a war with France and
Great Britain “not because we want too much but because we desire
nothing.” The Prince added that if this war did occur, a new Triple
Alliance between France, Great Britain, and Japan, with which Russia
might also be associated, might be formed. To preclude this event he
urged the President to advise the Powers in favor of a conference or to
prevent British participation in a possible Franco-German war brought on
by French aggression in Morocco. By confronting the President with the
choice of facing the outbreak of a new war just at the moment when he
was endeavoring to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict or of supporting the
proposal for a conference, Prince Bülow obtained the desired result. On
June 12 Mr. Roosevelt agreed to advise the French government in favor of
accepting the Sultan’s invitation and against concluding an Anglo-French
alliance.[748]
At the same time the German government endeavored to restrain Great
Britain. Herr von Holstein asserted to the British Ambassador that “if
any one had told him two years ago that a war between England and
Germany was within the bounds of possibility he would have simply
laughed, but now things had reached such a point that it could no longer
be considered impossible.” Both he and the Chancellor cited the
bitterness of the British press toward Germany and the reported British
offer of a defensive and offensive alliance to France as proofs. Neither
of the two German officials believed that Great Britain would attack
Germany, but they argued that the popular fear of such an aggression in
their country was more plausible than that of a German invasion in Great
Britain. In like manner Sir Frank Lascelles credited Germany with
pacific intentions, but maintained that the British fears were more
justified than the German. Herr von Holstein assured the Ambassador that
“the Moroccan question would not lead to any serious complications,” and
Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted war or had offered an
alliance to France. As neither side believed entirely the pacific
asseverations of the other, the tension in Anglo-German relations was
only slightly relaxed.[749]
While making these efforts with the United States and Great Britain,
Prince Bülow yielded before the French resistance. Although he explained
away the Emperor’s conciliatory remarks to the French government with a
threat and although he warned M. Rouvier not to assume M. Delcassé’s
policy toward Morocco, he repeated his assurances that “the conference
can have no positive results which would injure the French future.” It
was “merely a question of etiquette and of delay,” he said, so that
Germany could hold faith with the Sultan and disengage herself from the
position into which M. Delcassé had forced her. Instead of demanding
that all consideration of the Moroccan question be left to the
conference, the Chancellor offered on June 12 to negotiate over the
program for that assembly if France would first accept the Sultan’s
invitation. In addition, he instructed Prince Radolin to state not
officially, but as his (Radolin’s) personal view, that from the very
nature of the affair the conference would have to adopt as fundamental
“for the present no prejudice to the independence of Morocco . . . . and
. . . . no injury to the prospects of France.” The Ambassador should
state that the items to be considered by that body, as logical
deductions from those two points were: police and military reforms, to
be limited in time and international in character; financial reforms,
likewise to be internationally executed; and the economic opening of the
land in accordance with the principle of the open door. He should warn
M. Rouvier against permitting Algerians to furnish the Moroccan
pretender with contraband supplies; for if the Sultan should request
German mediation in this affair, Germany would give it even at the risk
of grave difficulties.[750]
When the Ambassador carried out these instructions two days later, he
found M. Rouvier “angry, discouraged, sick” but still defending France’s
Moroccan policy. Nor did the Ambassador’s remarks change his mood.[751]
On June 16, in response to the Premier’s request for further
information, the Ambassador explained unofficially as further logical
deductions from the two fundamental points: first, that the military
reforms should be internationally ordered by a division of the mandate
among the Powers in such a way that France would receive it for the area
along the Algerian frontier; second, that to give an international
character to the financial reforms, a state bank should be organized in
which the capital and management should be divided as equally as
possible among the banks representing the various Powers.[752] The
Premier’s apparent relief at these remarks encouraged the German
government to believe that a solution was near.[753]
In the meantime, in accordance with Germany’s desires, President
Roosevelt intervened in Paris and London. Notwithstanding his conviction
that France was in the right, he advised her to avoid a war and help the
Emperor “save his face” by accepting the conference. He argued that
British support in case of a conflict would be of little value to
France, and predicted a French victory at the conference. He promised
the French government that if the United States participated, he “would
treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take
very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed . . . .
unjust and unfair.”[754]
In handling Great Britain the President took another line. He suspected
her of wishing to make trouble. For he was receiving no support from her
in his mediation between Russia and Japan; he knew that Lord Lansdowne
was opposed to the conference; and, so far as he could tell from the
British Ambassador at Washington, Great Britain was anxious for France
to humiliate Germany by refusing the conference and was willing to face
the possibility of war. He thought this sagacious on her part, but not
valorous; she would be assured a victory on sea, while France would have
to bear the brunt of the battle on land. So he warned Great Britain not
to put difficulty in the way of a peaceful settlement between France and
Germany, and otherwise ignored her.[755]
Neither Prince Radolin’s conciliatory remarks nor President Roosevelt’s
advice won the French Premier to accept the conference. While deeply
impressed by reports of German threats against France in other
capitals,[756] he inferred from his conversations with Prince Radolin
and from an assertion of the German Ambassador in Madrid that if France
agreed to the conference the German government would then be ready to
commence discussions with a view to an understanding which would make
the conference unnecessary.[757] M. Rouvier was also assured of the
entire support of the British government. On June 16 Lord Lansdowne, in
approving M. Paul Cambon’s returning to Paris to advise the
inexperienced Premier,[758] remarked to the Ambassador that he saw
nothing to be gained
by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference, except perhaps
to enable Germany, which had brought about M. Delcassé’s downfall, to
secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that
of the French Government, but if they maintained their refusal, so, most
certainly, should we.[759]
The French note to Germany of June 21 was therefore so composed by M.
Paul Cambon as to accept the conference in principle while at the same
time inviting Germany to negotiate further in order to obviate that
assembly—the position which M. Rouvier had taken for two weeks. Since
Prince Radolin’s explanations on June 14 and 18 had been made in such an
unofficial and confidential manner, the Premier did not know whether
they represented the German view or not, and did not mention them in the
note.[760] Hence that document of June 21 ran as follows:
The Imperial Government will not fail to recognize the inconvenience
which would result for it as for us from the acceptance of the
Conference without a previous accord, an accord which would not infringe
upon those already concluded and which would not harm in any way the
interests of which the Imperial Government is solicitous. . . . . The
Government of the Republic is deeply impressed by the double
consideration that the Conference may be dangerous if it is not preceded
by an entente, and useless if it follows one. [Nevertheless, the French
government did not refuse the conference.] It desires solely to know
what are, in the mind of the Imperial Government, the precise points
which will be treated at the Conference and the solutions which it will
offer there.
Thus they could arrive at the entente which both governments
wished.[761]
The Premier acquainted the British and American governments with the
contents of the note and of the German threats, and asked them to
recommend this solution to Germany. He emphasized to Mr. Roosevelt
especially the menace of a German attack. Declaring that the President
could avert that danger, he urged him to exert influence with the
Emperor in favor of peace. Mr. Roosevelt immediately agreed to do so in
energetic terms.[762]
The German reaction was hostile. As the Chancellor realized that the
crisis had arisen in Franco-German relations, he endeavored by a mixture
of enticements and threats to bring the impressionable and pacific M.
Rouvier to accept the German terms.[763] Refusing the French request,
Prince Bülow warned the Premier on June 21, 22, and 23 against resuming
M. Delcassé’s policy and against permitting the Algerians to aid the
Moroccan pretender. While promising the French government “seriously and
loyally” to work for a result satisfactory to all parties and especially
for an understanding with France at the conference, the Chancellor
declared to the French Ambassador: “The situation is serious. With a
little good will and decision we may emerge from it.” But “one should
not play with fire”; “it is a dangerous game which might lead further
than you and I wish.” Threatening to make a defensive alliance with the
Sultan if French policy forced him to, he refused the overture for
negotiation and advised a quick acceptance of the conference.[764]
The German policy was not as successful as the Chancellor had expected.
By June 21 Italy had, in spite of German pressure, accepted the
conference only conditionally.[765] The British government, loyally
following the lead of France, fully approved the French note (June
23).[766] In Spain, although a ministerial crisis on June 20 had
eliminated M. Villa-Urrutia as Germany had demanded, the new Liberal
government refused Germany’s request for support; it declared on June 25
that it would remain loyal to the Franco-Spanish accord.[767]
Furthermore, it was apparent that M. Rouvier would not accept the German
demands in their existing form.[768] The Premier was staunchly supported
by the French press, which was quickly coming to credit Germany with the
intention not of making friends with France but of teaching her a lesson
and of setting limits to her foreign policy.[769] More discouraging
still, on June 24 Baron Sternburg telegraphed the following statement
from President Roosevelt:
The French Government informs me unofficially . . . . that it has ceased
its opposition to a conference. . . . . It seems as a matter of course
that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in
accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be
arranged between France and Germany. . . . . Let me congratulate the
Emperor warmly on his diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude.[770]
The German government retreated. Replying to the French government on
June 24,[771] it asserted the right of the other Powers to participate
in the work of Moroccan reform. It refused to negotiate a program for
the conference beforehand, but admitted “that France has a very
legitimate interest in maintaining order in the territory bordering on
the frontier.” In the verbal explanations made upon the delivery of the
note, the Chancellor, denying that the conference was intended to
procure for Germany a “miserable satisfaction for her _amour-propre_” or
to humiliate France, declared that international reform should be
attempted in Morocco first. Then if this work broke down, he said, “the
future is free,” and “in that future, which is perhaps not so distant,
we shall again be able to become opportunists.” He was profoundly
surprised, he said, that the French note took no cognizance of the
overtures made by the German Ambassador. He urged the acceptance of the
conference so that the two countries might escape from this “perilous
and dangerous situation” into “a path which leads to appeasement,
conciliation, and peace.”
The Chancellor also instructed Prince Radolin to inform M. Rouvier that
if France accepted the conference, Germany would then be willing to work
out an agreement with her on the bases mentioned previously (June 14 and
18) for a prospective program to be submitted to the Sultan.[772] If the
Ambassador thought that M. Rouvier would refuse to accept the conference
before the program was agreed upon, the Chancellor would permit him to
propose that the French and German representatives work out a program
with the Sultan in Fez. If M. Rouvier refused the conference altogether,
Prince Radolin should warn him that Germany would aid the Sultan against
any French aggressions. The Ambassador was to tell M. Rouvier that the
Moroccan government had made offers to Germany which would insure her a
leading position in that land, but that Germany would refuse them as
long as the possibility of an accord with France remained.[773]
By June 27 the advantage again shifted to the German side. In Paris the
more anti-British and pro-German element, led by M. Dupuy, owner of
_Petit Parisien_ and an intimate friend of M. Rouvier, was gaining
greater influence. M. Dupuy informed the German Ambassador on June 26
that M. Rouvier, whom he represented as a rather well-meaning simpleton,
now regretted having dispatched the French note and that he now sought
some phrase by which the German and French views could be harmonized and
the conference accepted. In fact, M. Dupuy stated that he expected the
French government to make the acceptance in a day or so. Both he and M.
Betzold said that the Premier still mistrusted Great Britain.[774]
Even more valuable for the German government was Mr. Roosevelt’s change
in attitude. When the German government explained to Mr. Roosevelt that
France had not agreed to the conference except under conditions which
Germany had persistently refused,[775] the President immediately advised
France on June 26 to accept unconditionally. He stated that the question
of a program was a minor one, that the important thing was for the
conference to meet. In answer, the French Ambassador protested that in
view of the German Emperor’s erratic temperament France could not go to
the conference
without previously having drawn up a program, or at least without an
understanding, indicating that which we might have reason to expect and
guaranteeing in particular that solemn international undertakings, which
have for a long time been public property, should not be brought into
question.[776]
Thereupon Mr. Roosevelt proposed the following compromise: “Let France
and Germany go into the conference without any programme or agreement;
but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where
either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another
power.”[777]
In reporting to Baron Sternburg what he had done, the President said
that if France and Germany agreed upon this or any other compromise, he
himself would accept the invitation to the conference and would advise
Great Britain to do likewise. On June 27 he offered to telegraph his
greetings to the Emperor William II. He also expressed to the British
Ambassador his strong hope that Great Britain would drop her objections
to the conference.[778]
The President’s intervention was beneficial to both the French and the
German governments; it brought them into a frame of mind which permitted
a compromise. The German government was elated over his action; for even
though it diminished any hope of breaking the French accords over
Morocco, it did seem to assure a peaceful issue of the crisis by the
acceptance of the conference. Hence Prince Bülow telegraphed to
Washington on June 27 that “if after the acceptance of the conference by
France we negotiate with the French and differences arise, I shall be
ready at all times to support before His Majesty the Emperor that
decision which President Roosevelt recommends as practical and
fair.”[779]
This success, however, was offset by a report from Baron Eckardstein on
June 27 that M. Delcassé had received an offer of an offensive and
defensive alliance from Great Britain, but that M. Rouvier had refused
to consider it. Within the past ten days, the Baron continued, the
British government had informed the French Premier “that he could rely
upon its diplomatic support under all circumstances, but that if he
wished to make an alliance with England, the English fleet would also
uphold the French policy in case of necessity.”[780] After frankly
repeating those statements to Lord Lansdowne on the following day, Count
Metternich added that “at no moment had the German Government desired to
fasten a quarrel upon France,” as the British seemed to think. Lord
Lansdowne replied that “the language attributed to some of the German
representatives had certainly suggested the idea that it was desired to
do so.” He then made this important statement:
. . . . British diplomatic support was assured to the French by the
Anglo-French accord. . . . . As a natural result questions which
concerned that agreement would have been discussed between the two
Governments and proper ways and means conferred upon to maintain intact
the individual points of the accord. The question of an alliance with
France has never been discussed by the British cabinet nor has an
English alliance ever been offered to France. . . . . However, he would
not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany “lightheartedly”
made war upon France, which he considered entirely improbable, it was
not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the
Government to support France.[781]
To this alarming information was added the report from Paris that the
British were exerting all possible pressure to prevent France from
accepting the conference.[782] Furthermore, when Prince Radolin carried
out his instructions, June 27, M. Rouvier continued to refuse the
conference without a previous understanding. To that end he offered two
proposals. One, a suggestion which he took from a German newspaper, was
that the French and German representatives at Fez work out a program in
co-operation with the Sultan prior to French acceptance of the
conference. The other was that in providing for the international
regulation of the police and financial reforms France should be assured
the right to execute the police reforms along the Algerian frontier
while nothing definite should be stated about the organization of the
police in the rest of Morocco. This agreement, M. Rouvier added, could
become valid as soon as France officially accepted the conference. He
also desired the recall of the three ministers from Fez so as to prevent
complications.[783]
As already seen, the Chancellor was willing to accept the first
proposal, although, fearing that upon further delay the Sultan might
throw over the project of a conference and undermine the entire German
policy, he preferred some other solution. Since he mistrusted the
Sultan, he refused to recall Count Tattenbach from Fez until the
conference actually met. He also held to his formula of “first
acceptance, then negotiations”; but to counteract the British pressure
he retreated further by agreeing on June 28 for the Premier to declare
publicly that
the French Government has dropped its objections to the conference after
becoming convinced from the declarations of Your Highness [Prince
Radolin] that Germany would pursue no goals at the conference which
would stand in opposition to the just interests of France.
He refused, however, to permit M. Rouvier to make public anything
further about the German concessions of June 14 and 18.[784] On the same
day he declared to M. Bihourd that once the conference met, Germany
would be freed from her obligations to the Sultan and could follow her
own interests. Let international reforms first be tried in Morocco, he
said; if they failed, Germany would have to consult only her own
interests, among which Morocco occupied “an infinitely small place.” If
France, in conformity with the views of the British government, refused
the conference, there would obtain a condition of _la paix armée_. If
she accepted, there would be “neither victor nor vanquished.”[785]
Learning that the German government regarded Prince Radolin’s assertions
of June 14 and 18 as official and despairing of any other solution, M.
Rouvier was more inclined to accept the conference. He justified this
course to the British chargé d’affaires on June 28 as follows:
He [M. Rouvier] considered that under the conditions a conference was
perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor
had made it a point of personal honour: France would go into it with the
support of England, Spain, and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be
alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French
interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to
arrive at some solution as the present situation was excessively
dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany
considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was
very very [_sic_] active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions,
ports, cables, etc., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands the
situation both for France and England would become far more critical.
Monsieur Rouvier hinted that once the present difficulties had been more
or less tided over at the Conference, it would be possible to see that
Germany did not get too much in Morocco.[786]
Before approving the proposal for a conference, however, M. Rouvier
intended to include in the agreement with Germany some mention of
France’s accords with Great Britain and Spain over Morocco.[787]
While M. Rouvier delayed, the German government grew apprehensive.
Prince Radolin heard on June 29 that M. Paul Cambon, Sir Francis Bertie,
and the British government were making every effort to prevent the
French acceptance, arguing that Germany was endeavoring to nullify the
Anglo-French agreement. On the next day M. Dupuy informed the Ambassador
that the British “were sitting powerfully on M. Rouvier’s back” to
obstruct it and that Sir Francis Bertie was pressing the French Premier
to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain. When M.
Cambon reached Paris on June 30, M. Dupuy thought that there was grave
danger of M. Rouvier’s being overthrown.[788]
In this situation the German government denied on June 30 to the French
government that it meant to question the Anglo-French accord. On the
next day it was prepared to give way still further, but M. Rouvier
accepted the conference.[789] The Premier proposed that he and the
German Ambassador make an exchange of notes and sign a declaration
incorporating the concessions which the German government had made to
France.[790] M. Rouvier then submitted the bases of the agreement to
Lord Lansdowne, who approved them.[791] After much bickering over the
formulation of the agreement, during which a liberal repetition of
German threats mixed with enticements was made, accord was finally
reached on July 8.[792]
By that agreement Germany promised to pursue no goal at the conference
which would compromise the “legitimate interests” of France in Morocco
or
that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties
or arrangements and harmonizing with the following principles:
sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire;
economic liberty without any inequality; utility of police and financial
reforms the introduction of which will be regulated for a short period
by way of an international accord; recognition of the situation created
for France with reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long
stretch, of Algeria and the Sherifian empire, by the particular
relations which result therefrom between the two neighboring countries,
as well as by the special interest which results therefrom for France
for order to obtain in the Sherifian empire.
The two governments agreed to work out a program for the conference
which they would submit to the Sultan for acceptance. The French and
German missions were to be recalled from Fez as soon as the conference
met. Prince Radolin also stated specifically that the Anglo-French and
Franco-Spanish agreements remained untouched by this understanding.[793]
The French, British, and German presses greeted this accord with relief
and with the sincere hope that the crisis was past.[794] The Powers also
signified their acceptances.[795]
The agreement marked Germany’s first reverse in her Moroccan campaign.
She had been compelled to recognize France’s special interest in Morocco
and had failed to nullify the French ententes. Germany could have placed
herself on the same basis with reference to France that Great Britain
occupied, both in regard to European and to colonial affairs. Instead,
however, of weakening the Entente Cordiale, instead of making a valuable
colonial accord by accepting the French offers, the German government
had preferred both to keep its promises to the Sultan and to free itself
from those promises by forcing a conference upon an unwilling world.
Caught in the toils of its own tangled policy and determined to have a
share in Morocco even though the German people were uninterested, it had
refused present offers of colonial gain with the hope of bringing about
their renewal in the future. Its virtue, not appreciated by any other
Power, was greater than its common sense.
Although the German government had receded, it had done so only after
embittering the French nation and arousing it to the united defense of
its national honor. As Ambassador Jusserand wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on
July 11:
I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement
arrived at is in substance the one which we had considered and the
acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just
received by me from Paris . . . . confirm what I guessed was the case,
that is, that there was a point where more yielding would have been
impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently
in view of possible great events.[796]
Germany’s actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him to the
Entente Cordiale. M. Rouvier remarked to the British chargé d’affaires
as follows:
His Majesty [the German Emperor] had expected a complete climb-down to
follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
but as His Excellency [M. Rouvier] said, there was no reason because he
parted with Monsieur Delcassé that he should throw himself “dans les
bras de l’Empereur et sur son cou.”[797]
M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne that
after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of
the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country
[Great Britain]. It was, in his view, essential that the two Governments
should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no
further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us.
While holding this opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed
with caution in dealing with the German Government and thought we should
avoid parading a desire to run counter to them.
These assertions met with Lord Lansdowne’s entire approval, for they
signified the success of the British struggle to maintain the Entente
Cordiale and to keep Germany out of Morocco. The Foreign Secretary
assured M. Cambon that Great Britain had no intention of withdrawing her
support. But he added: “. . . . The apparent sacrifice of M. Delcassé in
the face of German pressure had created an unfavourable impression in
this country, and I therefore thought there was a good deal to be said
for M. Rouvier’s view that it would be as well to avoid any action
calculated to bring about fresh complications.”[798] In other words,
Lord Lansdowne intimated that British public opinion would not be so
willing to support France as it had been before that display of French
weakness.
In spite of this remark, signs were not lacking of close intimacy
between the two countries. On July 12 _Gaulois_ published the
information that at the cabinet meeting on June 6 M. Delcassé had
favored an alliance with Great Britain in order to hold Germany in
check. Without definitely stating so, the article left the impression
that the Foreign Minister had been certain of an alliance.[799] When the
French and British fleets exchanged visits in July and August, the press
compared the visits to that of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 which
had sealed the Franco-Russian alliance.[800]
The German government was thus furthering that process which it called
Germany’s encirclement and isolation.
[Footnote 724: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 418 f.,
No. 6692.]
[Footnote 725: The signatory Powers were as follows: Austria-Hungary,
Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Russia, United States, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany.]
[Footnote 726: Art. XVII read as follows: “Le droit au traitement de la
nation la plus favorisée est reconnu par le Maroc à toutes les
Puissances representées à la Conférence de Madrid” (Leon Deloncle [ed.],
_Statut international du Maroc_ [Paris, 1912], p. 51). The French
refused to accept this interpretation of the Convention of Madrid and of
Art. XVII. Tardieu replied to the German arguments as follows: “That
convention aimed to limit at the demand of Morocco the right of
protection of the legations to certain Moroccan subjects which some
Powers tended to abuse. It had regulated the exercise of that right,
determined the conditions of naturalization for the Moroccans, those for
the acquisition of landed property by foreigners, and had established
the basis of the agricultural tax. Concerning general policy or
stipulations about the tariff, not a word. Article XVII, which Germany
invoked as the charter of international equality in Morocco, applied in
reality only to the right of protection. . . . . Article XVII is not a
promise of the Powers among themselves never to touch the diplomatic or
economic terrain. It is a promise by Morocco never to differentiate
between them within the limits of 1880 and within those limits alone,
that is (following the preamble of the convention) in the exercise of
protection” (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 39). Lansdowne also
challenged the German interpretation. “Any rights which other countries
may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco would not . . . .
preclude the possibility of a privileged position being in certain
respects accorded to France in her dealings with the Moorish Government.
Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously interpreted in different
countries. But no Power has, I believe, ever contended that the
obligation to give such treatment debars one country from invoking the
assistance of another in improving its domestic administration, and it
is obvious that such assistance can be most conveniently and effectually
given when the Power which affords it is the immediate neighbour of that
which receives it, nor was there any desire or intention on the part of
France to deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which
they were justly entitled under Treaty” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 11,
1905, _B.D._, III, 117 f., No. 150; cf. Metternich to F. O., June 6,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 f., No. 6690).
The German interpretation was based upon a loose construction of that
convention while the French interpretation was based upon a strict
construction. Although from a legal standpoint the French view was
correct, yet the precedent of an international conference over Moroccan
affairs, no matter what they were, favored the German argument.
Moreover, the fact remained that France had tried to change the existing
status in Morocco without consulting Powers who had as much right to be
considered as the three with whom she had come to terms.]
[Footnote 727: Bülow to Flotow, June 5, dispatched June 6, 1905, _G.P._,
413 ff., No. 6687; _L.j., 1901-5_, 230 f., No. 268, annexe.]
[Footnote 728: Alvensleben to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 419, No.
6693; Wedel to F. O., June 6, 1905, _ibid._, 417 f., No. 6691; Monts to
F. O., June 6, 9, 12, 1905, _ibid._, 415 f., No. 6688; 424 f., No. 6699;
435 ff., No. 6709; de Bunsen to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 91
f., No. 115; Smith to Lansdowne, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 101, No. 129;
Lansdowne to Goschen, June 21, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 127; Egerton to
Lansdowne, June 9, 10, 13, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., Nos. 119 ff.; Hardinge
to Lansdowne, June 14, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 123.]
[Footnote 729: Bülow to Radowitz, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 425 f., No.
6701.]
[Footnote 730: Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 92 f.,
No. 117.]
[Footnote 731: Metternich to F. O., June 6 and 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 416
f., No. 6690; 422 ff., No. 6697 f. King Edward also refused to permit
the Prince of Wales to attend the wedding of the German Crown Prince on
June 6 (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 335 f.). Lowther had communicated
the British refusal to the Sultan when on June 8 new instructions
arrived for him to await further developments. See Lowther to Lansdowne,
June 9, 1905, _B.D._, III, 94, No. 118; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8,
1905, _ibid._, 92, No. 116.]
[Footnote 732: The information came from M. Bunau-Varilla, owner of
_Matin_ (_G.P._, XX, 623 f., No. 6853).]
[Footnote 733: Bülow to Sternburg, May 25 and 30, 1905, _ibid._, 385 f.,
Nos. 6667 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 470
f.]
[Footnote 734: Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 421, No.
6696. Durand reported that Roosevelt had said to Sternburg that “so long
as the French Government object, the United States Government could not
adhere to the proposal for a Conference of the Powers” (Lansdowne to
Cambon, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90 f., No. 112).]
[Footnote 735: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 402 f., No.
6680; Flotow to F. O., June 6 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 404, No. 6682; 425,
No. 6700. In these negotiations Rouvier leaned on the advice of Révoil,
who in June without holding any office was given a desk in the foreign
office (Tardieu, p. 84).]
[Footnote 736: _L.j., 1901-5_, 230, No. 268; 231, No. 269; 233, No.
271.]
[Footnote 737: Rouvier to Saint-René Taillandier, June 10, 1905,
_ibid._, 230 f., No. 269.]
[Footnote 738: Flotow to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 420, No.
6694.]
[Footnote 739: Flotow to F. O., June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 425, No. 6700.]
[Footnote 740: Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 427 f., No.
6702; Radolin to F. O., June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 6705;
Rouvier to Bihourd, June 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 232, No. 270.
Immediately after that interview Rouvier declared to some of his
friends: “They are putting a knife to my throat. I do not know where
they wish to drive us” (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 174 f.).]
[Footnote 741: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p.
92.]
[Footnote 742: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp.
370 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6193, 6196 f., 6311 ff., 6318; _B.D._, Vol.
IV, chap. xxiii, Part. V.]
[Footnote 743: The absence of minutes by him to the dispatches during
this crisis points to this fact (also see Eckardstein,
_Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167). The
Emperor first learned of Rouvier’s offer of a general colonial agreement
at this time in 1907. His comment was as follows: “If I had known of
that, I would have accepted it and the whole stupid conference of
Algeciras would have been avoided” (Brandenburg, _Von Bismarck zum
Weltkriege_, p. 215).]
[Footnote 744: See the Emperor’s minutes, one of the very few instances
in which they are to be found, to the dispatch from Radolin to Bülow,
June 11, 1905 (_G.P._, XX, 409, No. 6685).]
[Footnote 745: On this episode see Eckardstein, II, 139 f.; Zedlitz-
Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, p. 174; Bülow to
Radolin, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 429 f., No. 6704.]
[Footnote 746: This was General Schlieffen’s opinion. Schlieffen
believed that the condition of the Russian army would grow worse instead
of better. See Bülow to Schlieffen, June 4, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 422, No.
6194; Schlieffen to Bülow, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 423 f., No. 6195.]
[Footnote 747: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _ibid._, 418 f., No.
6692.]
[Footnote 748: Bülow to Sternburg, June 9 and 10, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 421
f. n.; 626 ff., No. 6856; Bishop, I, 476 f.; Sternburg to F. O., June
12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707.]
[Footnote 749: Metternich to Bülow, June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 625 f., No.
6855; Bülow to Metternich, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 628 ff., No. 6857;
Metternich to F. O., June 15 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 441 f., No. 6712;
630 ff., No. 6858; Lascelles to Lansdowne, June 12, 1905, _B.D._, III,
79 ff., Nos. 97 f.; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 82
f., No. 99. See also Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 335 f.]
[Footnote 750: Bülow to Radolin, June 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 431 ff., No.
6706. The accusation that Algerians were helping the pretender was made
by a German army officer who in June returned from the Algerian border.
Governor Jonnart of Algeria denied it and asserted that the contraband
came, not from Algeria but from the Riff. Although Jonnart’s statement
was undoubtedly correct, yet the report came in so handily that the
German government used it as a weapon of intimidation against France
(_ibid._, Nos. 6724, 6746; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 275 f., 281, 283 f.).]
[Footnote 751: Radolin to F. O., June 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 438 f., No.
6710.]
[Footnote 752: Bülow to Radolin, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 439 ff., No.
6711; Radolin to Rouvier, June 16, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 234 ff., No.
272.]
[Footnote 753: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 448 ff.,
No. 6718.]
[Footnote 754: Sternburg to F. O., June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 442 f., No.
6713; Bishop, I, 477 f.]
[Footnote 755: On Roosevelt and Great Britain see Bishop, I, 474 f., 481
ff., 408; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, 37 f., 210
ff.; Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand_, p. 285;
Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 17, 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707;
442 f., No. 6713; 473 ff., No. 6738; Lansdowne to Durand, June 16, July
12, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 89, No. 85; 91, No. 87; Spring Rice’s
correspondence with Roosevelt, June-July, 1905, Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 472 ff.]
[Footnote 756: Threats by the German ambassadors in Paris, Rome, and
Madrid (_B.D._, III, 97, No. 126).]
[Footnote 757: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 124;
Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 97, No. 125.]
[Footnote 758: Barrère, the two Cambons, and Jusserand, all firmly in
sympathy with Delcassé’s policy, were holding Rouvier in line. See
Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 122.]
[Footnote 759: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96 f., No.
124. In Rome Egerton was working to hold Italy in line with this policy.
See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 94, No. 120.]
[Footnote 760: Radolin to F. O., June 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 484, No.
6745.]
[Footnote 761: Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 235
ff., No. 273; Radolin to F. O., June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 452 f., No.
6720. The note was composed mainly by Paul Cambon. See Radolin to F. O.,
June 30, 1905, _ibid._, 494, No. 6752.]
[Footnote 762: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 f.,
No. 126; Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 463 f., No.
6727; Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23 and 25, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I,
478 ff. Dennis relates that while in France in May, 1926, he heard a
story to the effect that Roosevelt had written to the German Emperor at
this crisis warning him that “it would be a crime against civilization
for Germany to declare war against France.” Dennis was unable to find
any such letter, and presumes that the one thought to have contained
this warning was one from Roosevelt to Sternburg on June 26 [_sic_],
1905 (Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 495). The truth
seems to be that Roosevelt, who had not been so schooled in diplomacy as
to choose his words carefully, spoke to Jusserand as if he would use
such language to the Emperor, and then softened down his words greatly
when he did write to Sternburg. Cf. Jusserand’s letter to Rouvier on
June 25, 1905, with Roosevelt’s letter to Sternburg on the same date,
quoted in Bishop, I, 480 f., 483 ff. Rouvier gave Roosevelt credit for
his acceptance in principle of the conference. The French Premier also
asked Eckardstein to intervene again, but the latter refused since he
was in such bad odor with his government (Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.).]
[Footnote 763: “Rouvier . . . . we know does not wish a conflict with
us,” . . . . “the Chamber of Deputies wishes above all to avoid war”
(quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, June 22, 1905, _G.P._,
XX, 456, No. 6723). “The sooner we make it clear to him [Rouvier] what
results the French refusal of the conference and the further support of
the pretender must have, the more we diminish the dangers of the
situation” (Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466, No. 6730).
That the German government was playing with war but did not intend to
start one is also evident from a confidential letter from Holstein to
the editor of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, June 28, 1905, which expresses
completely the nature of the German policy. “. . . . In brief, I
consider the danger of war for Germany at the present moment vanishingly
small. It will be still more diminished if a conviction of our firmness
prevails. We know now for certain that in the last ministerial council
Delcassé declared: ‘Germany will not dare to fight, it is all bluff.’
This doubt about our determination could have led to a conflict if the
other ministers had shared Delcassé’s views” (reprinted in _Kölnische
Zeitung_, April 2, 1922).]
[Footnote 764: Radolin to F. O., June 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 457 ff., No.
6724; memo. by Bülow, June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 459 ff., No. 6725; Bülow
to William II, June 22 and 24, 1905, _ibid._, 455 ff., No. 6723; 464 f.,
No. 6729; Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 465 f., No. 6730;
Bihourd to Rouvier, June 23, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 240 f., No. 277;
Lansdowne to Lister, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 105 ff., No. 133;
Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., No. 135.]
[Footnote 765: Monts to Bülow, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 454 f., No.
6722.]
[Footnote 766: Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 463 f., No.
6727; Lee, II, 344; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97
f., No. 126.]
[Footnote 767: Bülow held out prospects of aiding Spain to acquire
Tangier and the surrounding territory in case of a future break-up of
Morocco if Spain would uphold the German policy. The insincerity of the
statement is proved by a letter from Holstein to Radolin on July 2,
1905. In regard to the Moroccan affair he wrote: “We need have no
consideration for the wishes of others, at any rate not for those of
Spain who has never caused other than anger or embarrassment for us.”
See Bülow to Radowitz, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 453 f., No. 6721;
Radowitz to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473, No. 6737; Holstein to
Radolin, July 2, 1905, _ibid._, 503, No. 6757.]
[Footnote 768: See Rouvier’s reply to the Prince of Monaco, which the
latter immediately handed to the German government (William II to Bülow,
June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 464, No. 6728).]
[Footnote 769: Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.; report from Paris, June 18,
1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 60; _Bulletin_, June, 1905, pp. 235 ff.
“There appear to me to be indications that the feeling is growing in
France that it is necessary to treat the Morocco question in as
conciliatory a spirit as possible, but that when further demands are
made by Germany they should be met by a firm refusal. . . . . The
feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action
is very strong and the spirit of the ‘revanche’ is reawakening; the
French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first
panic and they now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war
in the future should the pretensions of Germany continue.
“There is I think no doubt that Monsieur Rouvier could at present
command a very large majority in the Chamber on any question of Foreign
policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by conciliation so far as
conciliation can go without loss of dignity, will only enhance his
position in the eyes of his countrymen, and assure him their unanimous
support in the event of such a policy being rendered impossible” (Lister
to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., No. 134).]
[Footnote 770: Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466 f., No.
6731; Bishop, I, 482.]
[Footnote 771: The note was dated June 24, but was handed by Bülow to
Bihourd on June 25 and by Radolin to Rouvier on June 27, 1905. See
Radolin to Rouvier, June 24, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 242 ff., No. 278;
Bihourd to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 244 f., No. 279; Bülow to
Radolin, June 25 and 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 470 f., No. 6734; 472, No.
6736; Bülow to William II, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 476 ff., No. 6740.]
[Footnote 772: However, the Sultan and the other Powers should not be
precluded thereby from proposing other matters for the consideration of
that body.]
[Footnote 773: Bülow to Radolin, June 25, dispatched June 26, 1905,
_ibid._, 470 f., No. 6734.]
[Footnote 774: Radolin to F. O., June 25 and 26, 1905, _ibid._, 472, No.
6735; 479, No. 6741; Radolin to Bülow, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f.,
No. 6743.]
[Footnote 775: Bülow to William II, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 467 ff., No.
6732; Sternburg to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473 ff., No. 6738;
Bülow to Sternburg, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 475 f., No. 6739; Bishop, I,
483 f.]
[Footnote 776: Bishop, I, 485 f.]
[Footnote 777: Sternburg to F. O., June 26, 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 479
ff., No. 6742 f.; Bishop, I, 485.]
[Footnote 778: Sternburg to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 480 f.,
No. 6743.]
[Footnote 779: Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, _ibid._, 481, No.
6744. Sternburg inadvertently changed the wording of that promise to
read as follows: “The Emperor has requested me [Sternburg] to tell you
that if during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise
between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up
the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most
practical” (Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I,
487). The latter promise bound the German government more tightly than
did the former, and was to cause it embarrassment later.]
[Footnote 780: Metternich to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 634 f.,
No. 6859.]
[Footnote 781: Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 636, No.
6860; Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 103, No.
132_a_.]
[Footnote 782: Radolin to F. O., June 26, dispatched June 27, 1905,
_G.P._, XX, 479, No. 6741.]
[Footnote 783: Radolin to F. O., June 27, dispatched June 28, 1905,
_ibid._, 485 f., No. 6746.]
[Footnote 784: Bülow to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 487 f., No.
6748; Bülow to William II, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 488 ff., No. 6749.]
[Footnote 785: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 495 ff., No.
6753 and Appendix; Holstein to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 490 ff.,
No. 6750.]
[Footnote 786: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f.,
No. 134.]
[Footnote 787: Lansdowne entirely approved of this suggestion, remarking
that “it [the Anglo-French declaration] might be usefully cited for the
purpose of showing that the policy of both France and Great Britain had
been in favour of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco
and preserving commercial equality” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905,
_ibid._, 110 f., No. 137). The rancor back of Lansdowne’s statement is
apparent.]
[Footnote 788: Radolin to F. O., June 29 and 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 492
ff., Nos. 6751 f.; Lee, II, 344.]
[Footnote 789: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 495 ff., No.
6753 and Anlage; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249,
No. 285.]
[Footnote 790: Radolin to Bülow, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 499, No.
6754; 501 f., No. 6756; Radolin to F. O., July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 499 f.,
No. 6755.]
[Footnote 791: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 110 f.,
No. 137.]
[Footnote 792: On those negotiations see _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6754 ff.;
Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.]
[Footnote 793: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 287 f.; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6767 f.;
_B.D._, III, 115 f., No. 147.]
[Footnote 794: See Rouvier’s speech in the Chamber on July 10, 1905
(_Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ [Chambre, July 10, 1905], pp. 2825
f.). Lansdowne’s speech of acceptance in the House of Lords, July 11,
1905, 4 Hansard, Vol. CIXL, col. 241. Richthofen to Radolin, July 9,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 516 f., No. 6769. The German government prohibited
Jaurès from coming to Berlin to speak before a socialist congress on
July 9, but as the prohibition was based on internal reasons, it had
little effect upon Franco-German relations (Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 104
f.; _L’année politique, 1905_, p. 388).]
[Footnote 795: The French and British governments were particularly
anxious for Russia and the United States to attend. See Lansdowne to
Lister, July 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 114, No. 143; see also _ibid._, Nos.
149 ff., 154, 159 f., 164.]
[Footnote 796: Quoted in Bishop, I, 488.]
[Footnote 797: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 108, No.
134.]
[Footnote 798: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 118 f., No.
152. On June 28 Lowther reported a conversation with Tattenbach in which
the latter gave him to understand that “what he [Tattenbach] desired the
Conference should do, would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo-
French Convention of April 8th, 1904.” King Edward’s minute to this
dispatch was, “In plain English—Germany ousts France fr[om] Morocco and
puts herself in her place!” See Lowther to Lansdowne, D. June 28, 1905,
R. July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 101 f., No. 191.]
[Footnote 799: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 217 f.]
[Footnote 800: Lee, II, 344 f.]