THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904
Early in July, 1904, Herr von Holstein offered his resignation because
of personal differences with Baron Richthofen. In doing so, he stated
that the prestige of Germany had diminished during the past years “while
our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling us”; and as
“difficult situations” were to be anticipated, he was happy to be
relieved of responsibility. Count Bülow patched up the quarrel, but his
comment to Herr von Holstein’s remarks is illuminating:
Now he [Herr von Holstein] speaks of our shrunken prestige just as the
Bismarckian press does. But I cannot believe that Holstein, like that
press, attributes the decline of our authority to the dismissal of the
great Chancellor. Since that dismissal, from the non-renewal of the
Russian Reinsurance Treaty and the East Asiatic Triple Alliance to the
handling of the Moroccan and Egyptian questions, from the so-called
Urias letter to Vienna to the publication of the Swinemünde dispatch,
from the turn in 1896 against England to the Shanghai and Pauncefote
difference with that Power, nothing of significance has happened in our
foreign policy without Holstein’s advice.[481]
The results of those errors, so frankly confessed, were apparent: the
conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, the exclusion of Germany from the
entente movement and from the Moroccan settlement, the British efforts
to approach Russia,[482] animosity between Great Britain and Germany.
They all caused that attempt at a new orientation of policy which in
1900 Count Bülow had threatened in this eventuality.
One of the most favorable aspects of the German foreign relations was
the _rapprochement_ with the United States in 1903 and 1904. There was
cordial friendship between President Roosevelt and Baron Sternburg, the
German ambassador,[483] and the two governments both desired to maintain
the integrity of China during the current war.[484] The President
mistrusted Russia, about whom he could say nothing good, and France in
their policy toward China, and he met difficulty in trying to co-operate
with Great Britain.[485] As he was ambitious to mediate peace between
Russia and Japan when the time came, he turned to Germany for aid, in
August expressing the wish “to go hand in hand with Germany in East
Asia.”[486] The German government perceived in this co-operation a means
of protecting its interests in China, of issuing from its relative
international isolation, and of preventing France and Great Britain from
mediating peace—an event which might enable them to form a triple
grouping with Russia or even a quadruple combination with Russia and
Japan.[487] Count Bülow therefore cordially responded to the President’s
invitation,[488] seeking at the same time to increase the latter’s
suspicion of France and Great Britain.[489]
As the German government realized the limitations to this intimacy with
the United States, it sought a more effective association in an alliance
with Russia. In January, 1904, the Chancellor had been unconcerned about
such an alliance;[490] but by July he was waiting for the “psychological
moment” in which to propose a renewal of the former “League of the Three
Emperors.”[491]
The advent of that moment seemed highly probable. Since the beginning of
the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian people, government, and sovereign
had drawn closer to Germany.[492] On June 1, “dearest Nicky” wrote to
his cousin “Willy” (so they addressed each other), “I know that you feel
for us in this serious time and it is a comfort to realize that one’s
_real friends_ think and sympathize with one.”[493] And “Willy,” in his
replies, overflowed with affection and advice—advice that varied from
directing “Nicky” upon how to conduct war to lecturing him on the
“piratical” practices of his ships, from urging him to send his Black
Sea fleet through the Dardanelles in spite of British opposition to
reporting gossip which would antagonize him against Great Britain and
France.[494]
In October the opportunity arose for the German move toward an alliance.
A Russian company had given a contract to the Hamburg-American Line to
furnish coal for the Russian Baltic fleet which was to sail for the war
zone about the middle of that month.[495] As the German firm intended to
use mainly English coal, it had chartered a number of British ships and
had given a subcontract to a British firm to aid it in the
transportation. None the less, on learning of the transaction, the
British press bitterly attacked Germany for thus violating neutrality.
In view of this attack Count Bülow on October 4 instructed Baron
Romberg, first secretary of the German embassy in St. Petersburg, to
make a communication to the Russian government as follows: Baron Romberg
should state to Count Lamsdorff that this press campaign might provoke a
war but that the German government would not prevent the execution of
the coaling contract, that it “would run the risk of having the English
kindle fire-rockets in Japan.” If war did occur with Japan and Great
Britain, Germany would hold France also responsible; for not only would
a large element among the French advocate grasping the opportunity for
revenge against Germany, but also the arousing of the British zeal for
war would be a direct result of the Entente Cordiale. “So if we lose our
colonies, trade, merchant marine, and perhaps also a part of our war
fleet in an unequal battle on the sea . . . . a reckoning with France on
land would become unavoidable for us.”[496]
Count Lamsdorff showed no inclination to respond to this feeler. On
October 19, while thanking the German government for its friendship, he
refused to credit either Great Britain or Japan with bellicose
intentions against Germany. He interrupted Baron Romberg to assure him
that nothing was to be feared from France; not a word did he utter about
an alliance.[497]
Meantime, the Russian Baltic squadron sailed, and in the night of
October 21 occurred the Dogger Bank disaster which brought war between
Great Britain and Russia dangerously close.[498] The “psychological
moment” had come, reasoned Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein. Defeated
in the Far East, menaced by revolution, and excited by this new danger,
Russia should welcome the project of an alliance with the strongest
military power in Europe. So on October 24 Herr von Holstein, who
usually held aloof from all ambassadors, explained the German
proposition to Count Osten-Sacken,[499] the Russian representative.
Three days later the Emperor’s influence with the Czar, who was thought
to be more pliable and more favorably inclined than his Foreign
Minister, was brought into play. In a letter to Nicholas II the Emperor
wrote:
For some time English press has been threatening Germany, on no account
to allow coals to be sent to your Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is
not impossible, that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a
joint protest against our coaling your ships coupled with a _sommation_
to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would
be absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its
destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in
community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind
your ally France of the obligations she has taken over in the treaty of
Dual Alliance with you, the _casus foederis_. It is out of the question,
that France on such an invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty
towards her ally. Though Delcassé is an Anglophile _énragé_, he will be
wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to
save Paris! In this way a powerful combination of 3 of the strongest
continental Powers would be formed to attack, whom the Anglo-Japanese
group would think twice before acting. . . . . My news from London say,
that the Press and mob make a noise, the Admiralty some fuss, but that
Government, Court and Society look with greatest calm at the event as an
unhappy accident, arising from to great nervousness.[500]
This broad hint, amounting almost to a proposal of alliance itself, was
immediately effective. The Czar replied two days later:
As you say . . . . Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon
an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would
you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me
know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally.
This combination has often come to my mind. It will mean peace and rest
for the world.[501]
On the next day a draft of a treaty and a long explanatory letter, both
composed by the Chancellor and Herr von Holstein,[502] were sent by the
Emperor to the Czar. This draft, which was intended to test how far the
Russian government would go, provided for a “defensive alliance . . . .
to localize as far as possible the Russo-Japanese War.” The first
article was the most important:
In case one of the two Empires shall be attacked by a European Power,
its ally will aid it with all its force on land and sea. The two allies,
in that case, would make common cause for the purpose of recalling to
France the obligations which she has assumed by the terms of the Franco-
Russian treaty of Alliance.
By the second article neither Power was to conclude a separate peace
with a common adversary. The third article was designed to safeguard
Germany in the coaling affair and to continue the alliance after the
current war was over. It read:
The engagement of mutual aid is equally valid in case acts performed by
one of the high contracting parties during the war such as the delivery
of coal to a belligerent should give place after the war to reclamations
of a third Power, as pretended violations of the right of neutrality.
In the letter the Emperor emphasized the defensive and the purely
European character of the alliance. “It is very essential that America
should not feel threatened by our agreement,” he wrote. He denounced
France, “this republic of miserable civilians,” “the French radicals,
Clemenceau and all the rest of the tag-rag and bobtail” for not
fulfilling France’s obligations to her ally.
I positively know that as far back as last December the French Finance
Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another power, France
would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, even though England
sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the English have handed Morocco
over to France. The certainty, that France intends to remain neutral and
even to lend her diplomatic support to England, is the motive, which
gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard
of state of things will change as soon as France finds herself face to
face with the necessity of eventually choosing sides. . . . . The
radical party . . . . abhors war and militarism, while the nationalist
party while not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England
and against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to
bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The main
result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that France
must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her treaty-
obligations toward Russia. . . . . This consummation once reached, I
expect to maintain peace and you will be left an undisturbed and free
hand to deal with Japan. . . . . Of course, before we can take any steps
in this question and approach France that tiresome North Sea incident
must first have been brought to a close.
For, he continued, the French foreign office had already accepted the
British view of the incident, and in case of difficulty over this
matter, France would choose the British side. At the close of his letter
the Emperor wrote that only he and Count Bülow knew of the project, and
that when they had finished the draft the Chancellor had said: “May
God’s blessings rest upon the work of the two monarchs and may the
mighty three-Power group, Russia, Germany, France, preserve forever the
peace of Europe. God grant it!”[503]
The real object of this extravagant show of devotion to Russia was of
course to inveigle her into an alliance. It did not signify a desire for
a general conflict; the German government appreciated the British naval
power too keenly for that.[504] Moreover, since it knew how averse the
Russian government and especially the Czar were to an extension of the
war, it emphasized the pacifying influence which the proposed alliance
would exercise. The German leaders doubtlessly realized, however, that
they were running a big risk, since Count Bernstorff, first secretary of
the embassy in London, had warned them that Great Britain would regard
an alliance between Germany and Russia, no matter how defensive in
character, as an aggression directed against the security of the British
Empire.[505]
The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein considered the risk worth while,
because, if the alliance could be concluded, they expected France, under
the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, to enter the new grouping.
If she did so, they no doubt reasoned, the Entente Cordiale would be
destroyed, the work of M. Delcassé would be blocked, and, instead of
Great Britain, Germany would be the center of the new combination.
France, as the weakest member of the firm, would have to take orders
from both her partners. In fact, the German government openly expressed
to the Czar the expectation that in case of a war the control over the
French army and navy would be put into German hands. If France, refusing
to enter the alliance, elected to range herself with Great Britain and
if the Russo-German alliance alone were made, the German statesmen
apparently thought that the Dual Alliance would be broken, France would
again be at the mercy of the German military power, and the possibility
of an Anglo-Russian accord would be destroyed. The gains, both positive
and negative, to be derived by Germany from such an alliance would be
enormous. Its completion would constitute a far-reaching diplomatic
revolution.[506]
In Russian governmental circles opinion was divided. The Czar, who had
proposed the alliance without consulting his Foreign Minister,[507] was
its staunchest supporter. Weak and dependent, he usually agreed with his
most recent adviser. His imagination, which could be vivid at times, was
given freer rein because of his indolence. In 1903 he had succumbed to
the arguments and ambitions of the adventurer, M. Bezobrazov, about
Manchuria and Korea and had brought on the war with Japan. As the
necessary European part of that program, M. Bezobrazov had advocated an
understanding between the Dual and the Triple alliances. This aspect had
not been achieved, probably owing to Count Lamsdorff’s opposition.[508]
But the war was taking a disastrous course for Russia, revolution was
threatening, and the German Emperor’s telegram arrived while the crisis
with Great Britain was still acute and when Russia, according to the
British Ambassador, would have welcomed a war with that Power.[509] The
forlorn and troubled Czar returned readily to the idea of an alliance
when William II suggested it.
Count Lamsdorff was wary of this move from the start. Not a very strong
personality, he was unable at times to maintain control of the foreign
policy, yet he was a capable and loyal official who, when necessary,
spoke frankly to his master. The Czar was actuated chiefly by sentiment
and emotion; his Minister by shrewd diplomatic calculations. Although
the one did not grasp the German motives, the other did; and the
prospect of feeling “the heavy weight . . . . of the iron bands” of a
German alliance was not to his liking. Count Lamsdorff did not believe
that Russia needed this alliance as he felt certain that Great Britain
would not attack her.[510] Furthermore, the conclusion of an agreement
of neutrality about Balkan affairs with Austria-Hungary late in October
relieved his country from danger in that quarter.[511]
On the other hand [he wrote to Count Osten-Sacken], we manifestly need
the friendship of our powerful neighbor for the security of our
extensive frontier, for our provisioning with coal and other
contrabands, etc. All this must be seriously considered and we must
endeavor not to permit our relations with Berlin to deteriorate,
although Paris must also not be disregarded. Only through the
preservation of this balance will Russia succeed in obtaining all
possible advantages from both sides.[512]
When the German draft of the treaty arrived, the Dogger Bank crisis was
over, but the Russian government remained embittered because Great
Britain had made special naval preparations and a detachment of British
cruisers, cleared for action, had followed the Russian fleet from Vigo
to Tangier.[513] Still, that was no reason to assume the “iron bands” of
a German alliance. The Czar and his Foreign Minister immediately set to
work to make the terms more favorable for Russia.[514] They modified the
first and third articles.[515] In the latter, to be kept secret, they
incorporated a _quid pro quo_ by which Russia should receive German
support in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace. The revised first
article was the more important. The first sentence remained as before;
but, instead of stipulating that Russia and Germany both advise France
to enter the alliance, the second sentence was changed to read: “His
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias will take the steps necessary to
initiate France into this accord and to invite her to associate herself
in it as ally.” The Czar told the Emperor that the revised Article I
must stand without change.[516]
When the Russian government had been brought to this point, the German
leaders revealed their real aim. They were, of course, obliged to accept
the new first article; but the Emperor, in his reply to Nicholas II,
November 17, made it plain that France would have to choose sides, even
though, as he frankly wrote, “doubtless the French would much prefer any
other grouping of Powers to that of the Alliance _a trois_ as in 1895.”
The chief revisions asked by the German government were in the
introduction and in Article III. The former was changed to read: The
Emperor and the Czar “for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of
peace in Europe have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of
defensive alliance.” According to an entirely new Article III the treaty
should remain in force until denounced one year in advance; however, it
was left to the Czar to set any time limit he wished.
These revisions transformed the basis of the negotiation. They made the
alliance a general one to continue after the war. The changes were
explained on the ground that, in the previous version, the treaty had
been aimed too openly at Great Britain, and that, while this was the
case, it was not politic to make the fact too evident.
The Russian _quid pro quo_ in Article III was also rejected. Germany
preferred not to help Russia in the negotiations for peace for fear of
antagonizing the United States and of driving her into British arms,
although the Emperor excused this refusal by explaining that if this
secret clause became known, public opinion might consider the treaty an
aggressive one binding Germany to defend the Russian conquests. Instead,
he proposed that the previous Article III be made into an extra secret
article in which the second sentence should read: “It follows from the
the terms of the first sentence of Article I that Germany will associate
herself with no action whatever that might imply hostile tendencies to
Russia.” That clause, wrote the Emperor, would safeguard Russia against
the repetition of any such congress as that of 1878, whereby she had
been deprived of her Turkish conquests.
In his accompanying letter to the Czar, for which Count Bülow and Herr
von Holstein furnished the rough draft, the Emperor urged a quick
signing of the agreement, adding the extraordinary proposal that Russia
make some military demonstration on the Persian-Afghan frontier. “Even
should the forces at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on
India itself,” he wrote, “they would do for Persia—which has no army—and
a pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will do wonders in England
and have remarkably quieting influence on the hot headed Jingoes in
London.” He also warned the Czar against Anglo-French ambitions to
mediate at the desire of Japan.[517]
In St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff persuaded the Czar to proceed slowly
with the negotiations, and, more important still, to consult France
before concluding any agreement. So on November 23 Nicholas II
telegraphed the German Emperor to that effect, adding:
As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications on the
text; whereas if allready approved by us both, it will seem as if we
tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might
easily happen, which I think is neither your wish.[518]
The Germans realized that this answer spelled defeat for them; because
if the treaty became known to the French government that government
would of course strenuously resist its completion. In fact, the Emperor
was sure that M. Delcassé would at once publish the news of the proposed
alliance, that a war cry in England would then burst forth, and that the
timid Czar would back out. As he aptly expressed it, Count Lamsdorff and
M. Witte had “spat in the German soup.”[519] On November 26 he replied
with a refusal to let France know a word of the affair; it would be
better to drop the whole matter until a more suitable moment, he
declared. Although disgusted at this display of “cold feet,” as he put
it, William II showed no especial anger or uneasiness in his answer and
asked Nicholas II to continue their intimacy as before.[520]
On the receipt of that reply Count Lamsdorff had to persuade his master
all over again, because the latter was more anxious to make the alliance
than he was to be considerate of his ally.[521] Certainly his letter of
October 29 to William II was such as to warrant confidence that he would
be willing to force the alliance upon France whether she wished it or
not. Count Lamsdorff argued that the relations of Russia and Germany
were sufficiently close to hold them together without an alliance. He
declared that France’s intimacy with Great Britain had not caused her to
be disloyal to her ally. While he doubted whether she could be won to
the proposed combination, he urged her right to be consulted beforehand
and denied that she would disclose the secret. She must be won
gradually, he said, and not confronted with a _fait accompli_ which
might force her back upon Great Britain.[522]
It is obvious that Count Lamsdorff sought by this method to quash the
project or render it harmless. He succeeded only partly in winning over
his master. In the reply to the Emperor on December 7 Nicholas II once
more asked permission to obtain the French reaction to the main lines of
the alliance, even though the original document itself be kept secret
from her. “In case of a negative answer,” he wrote in conclusion, “the
second phase of Art. I of the draft of the treaty ought to be left out I
think.”[523] Thus, even in case Germany refused his request, the Czar
was still apparently willing to make an alliance with her to the entire
exclusion of France.
While the Russian government was preparing this answer, the Germans lost
patience. Prospects for success seemed doubtful if not entirely
hopeless. The declarations of the French press that the Dual Alliance
remained as firm as ever and that Germany’s attempts to win Russia had
failed caused the Chancellor to suspect that news of the negotiations
had leaked out. Threats to seize the German vessels coaling the Russian
fleet appeared in the Japanese press; the British government laid
restrictions upon the shipping of coal to that fleet. In November and
December Germany began to fear a British attack.[524]
Since October the British press had returned to its campaign of
calumniation against Germany, seeing a German plot behind every British
difficulty. In the autumn a redistribution of the British naval forces
had weakened the Mediterranean fleet and concentrated the main strength
in home waters. Germany perceived in this rearrangement a tangible proof
of the new alignment of Great Britain with France and of the growing
British animosity toward her.[525]
Hence when in November several articles appeared in _Vanity Fair_ and in
the _Army and Navy Gazette_ proposing that the German fleet be
“Copenhagened”[526] as useless for any other purpose than to attack
Great Britain,[527] German public opinion took these threats seriously.
The Emperor wrote to Count Bülow on November 23 that “the situation
assumes more and more the aspect of that immediately preceding the Seven
Years’ War.”[528] The German navy department began hurried measures to
recall the vessels in foreign waters.[529] Taking a saner view, the
Chancellor, by means of an interview published in the _Nineteenth
Century_ for December and a speech in the Reichstag on December 5,
sought to calm both his own and the British people by an absolute
disclaimer of the thought of war between the two countries and by a
denial that in the construction of her fleet Germany intended any
hostility toward Great Britain.[530] But by December 5 Herr von Holstein
himself came to credit the possibility of a British attack.[531]
While this situation seemed serious, the Chancellor was more concerned
by the fact that the completion of the coaling of the Russian fleet
would soon deprive Germany of her hold over Russia.[532] On December 6
he instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to inquire
peremptorily of the Russian government whether Germany could rely upon
its full support in case the coaling led to war. The Ambassador was to
state that if no satisfactory answer were received by the time the
Russian fleet reached Madagascar the Hamburg-American Line would be
forbidden to continue its task. This telegram, which was followed on the
next day by a similar one from the Emperor to Nicholas II,[533] forced
the negotiations back to the very point from which they had started.
Upon receipt of this message the Czar, highly agitated, immediately
telegraphed that his letter of the same date (December 7) had evidently
crossed the other on the way and would explain everything.[534] But when
that letter arrived, William II demanded that they settle the coaling
affair by signing a convention concerning it at once.[535] Thus, Germany
herself destroyed the possibility of continuing the previous
negotiations and of concluding, perhaps, a defensive alliance with
Russia alone. The Czar could only acquiesce.[536] On December 12 Count
Lamsdorff gave written assurance to the German government that Russia
would make common cause with it in case the coaling led to war.[537]
The promptness with which the Russian government agreed to the German
demand showed how essential to Russia was the continued coaling of her
fleet, which within about a week would reach Madagascar. Count Lamsdorff
felt entirely safe in making the assurance of support, for, as he
frankly said to the German Ambassador, he did not believe that either
Great Britain or Japan would let things come to war.[538] Also he
particularly wished to avoid antagonizing Germany while she was
permitting a Russian loan of 231,000,000 rubles to be made in
Berlin.[539] The Minister was elated over the turn which the Russo-
German negotiations had taken. By changing the basis of discussion from
that of a defensive alliance to that of a specific agreement limited to
a definite eventuality, the German government had adopted his own policy
of close friendship and co-operation without an alliance. His battle
with both Germany and the Czar was won by the German government itself.
On riper thought the German foreign office perceived that this Russian
promise did not cover all cases in which war might arise as a result of
German friendliness. It had no doubt had time since the arrival of the
Czar’s letter of December 7 in which to appreciate its mistake in
hastily changing the basis of negotiation. Hence on December 12 it
instructed Count Alvensleben to propose to the Russian government a
general defensive agreement. By its terms Russia would be bound to aid
Germany in case of a conflict arising: first, because of any German act
of “benevolent neutrality” in favor of Russia during the current war;
or, second, because of the coaling affair during and after the war. The
Ambassador was to declare that if Russia did not accept this agreement
the coaling would be discontinued.[540] What was here proposed amounted
practically to Articles I and III of the first German treaty draft with
the parts pertaining to France omitted, and was in keeping with the
Czar’s letter of December 7.
Since the instructions arrived after Count Lamsdorff had accepted the
earlier German demand, the exasperated Ambassador consulted his
government before executing them.[541] Count Bülow then realized that
the Russian Minister would not receive the proposal favorably and that
the German government would seem not to know its own desires if it
persisted in this new demand. Furthermore, on December 18, he was
assured by Count Metternich that, although a Dogger Bank affair between
Great Britain and Germany or the passage by Germany of a stronger naval
law might precipitate a crisis, the British did not seek a war and had
no intention of starting one.[542] Hence the Chancellor canceled the
instructions. Instead, he notified the Russian Minister, December 26,
that “within the limits which care for our own safety prescribes, we
shall be glad to aid Russia as previously.”[543] The coaling was
continued without mishap.[544]
On December 21 William II repeated to the Czar his refusal to permit the
consultation of France about the project of alliance, hoping thereby to
reopen the discussion.[545] But Nicholas II, in his reply of December
25, did not mention the matter.[546]
Just at this moment of profound disappointment to the German government
another outlet seemed to open up. On December 26 it learned that the
Japanese government was thinking of sending Viscount Aoki to Berlin in
the next year in order to establish closer contact with it on the
questions to be considered in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for
peace.[547] The German government reacted cordially to this project. The
Emperor William, still unable to comprehend the failure of the Russian
negotiations, had visions of Germany’s so mediating peace between Russia
and Japan as to form an agreement _à trois_ with them.[548] Apparently
without consulting the foreign office he appealed to the Czar on January
2 “as your faithful friend” for a statement of his plans for the future,
“so that if possible, I make myself useful to you and be enabled to
shape the course of my policy.”[549] As Nicholas II ignored this
request—the third rebuff from Russia within two months—the Emperor
wanted to cultivate Japan so zealously that Count Bülow had to hold him
back for fear of antagonizing Russia.[550]
The German government, particularly Herr von Holstein, continued to
apprehend that France and Great Britain would endeavor to mediate peace
and form a new quadruple grouping with Russia and Japan by partitioning
China.[551] To obviate that possibility it had attempted during the past
months to draw closer to President Roosevelt[552] and to keep check upon
the Russian views about peace. But since Russia had rebuffed this
endeavor[553] as well as an alliance, Count Bülow turned late in
December, 1904, to Japan and the United States in order to escape from
“the sulking-corner in which not only England but also Russia is seeking
to hold us.”[554] In January, 1905, the German government intensified
its campaign to arouse President Roosevelt’s mistrust of Great Britain
and France. Articles in the semiofficial press in Paris, assertions by
M. Doumer, president of the French Chamber and intimate friend of M.
Delcassé, and discreet soundings by French, British, and Russian
diplomats gave body to the German fears. Count Bülow emphasized to the
President the menace of this new quadruple alliance to both the United
States and Germany. At the Count’s suggestion in January Mr. Roosevelt
obtained from the Powers an assurance of the territorial integrity of
China during the negotiations for peace.[555] This move brought the
German government and Mr. Roosevelt into greater intimacy. The latter
suspected France and Russia, but not Great Britain.[556] He refused to
believe rumors of a Russo-German agreement, and credited the German
denials of those reports.[557] With Japan, however, the German
government was not so successful; hearing those same rumors, the
Japanese government decided in February not to send Viscount Aoki to
Berlin.[558]
In the same month the German government tried once more to make an
agreement with Russia, this time over Austria-Hungary. Torn by national
conflicts, that empire was not expected to survive the death of the aged
Emperor Francis Joseph. Count Bülow therefore proposed to the Russian
Foreign Minister that they sign a public treaty of territorial
disinterestedness in case of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire.
While Count Lamsdorff agreed to make the accord, he stipulated that it
be kept secret, and left its formulation to the proposer. Thereupon the
German foreign office, fearing that the existence of a secret Russo-
German treaty might become known and might make Japan and the United
States mistrustful of Germany and doubting whether the Russian Minister
would really conclude the accord, decided to drop the project.[559]
Thus the negotiations between Germany and Russia worked only to the
detriment of Germany’s international relations. They were in large part
responsible for the acuteness of British anger at Germany and for the
collapse of the proposed Aoki mission. And had it not been for President
Roosevelt’s ignorance of Continental affairs, they would no doubt have
turned him against Germany. Although protestations of friendship were
exchanged between the German and Russian rulers and governments, the
German Emperor and his government were greatly chagrined at their
failure.[560] They had found the bonds of the Dual Alliance tighter than
they had expected, and had suffered a rebuff by a Power in the very
worst straits. Believing that another opportunity to solve Germany’s
international problems in this way would likely not be offered, the
German foreign office next attempted the employment of force.
[Footnote 481: Both letters, the one by Holstein, the other by Bülow,
dated July 11 and July 13, respectively, are given in Hammann, _Bilder
aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 33 ff.]
[Footnote 482: It is of course apparent that the German government
anticipated no immediate success from these British efforts. Signs of
Anglo-Russian antagonism were too numerous (see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap.
cxxxi).]
[Footnote 483: Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, p. 36.]
[Footnote 484: _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxx, A; Gwynn, _The Letters and
Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 397 f.]
[Footnote 485: Dennett, pp. 36 ff., 42; Sternburg to F. O., Sept. 27,
1904, _G.P._, XIX, 542, No. 6266.]
[Footnote 486: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 536, No.
6264.]
[Footnote 487: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 535 ff., No.
6264; Bülow to Bernstorff, Sept. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 6051;
Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 218 ff., No. 6052.
Eckardstein informed Bülow in August, 1904, of attempts being made by
Witte to introduce negotiations for peace with Hayashi. Bülow was not in
favor of an early peace. See Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und
politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 76 ff.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an
den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. 341; Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_, p. 297;
memo. by Bülow, Nov. 2, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 387 f., No. 6167.]
[Footnote 488: Bülow to Sternburg, Sept. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 541, No.
6265.]
[Footnote 489: See _ibid._, Nos. 5977, 6259 ff.]
[Footnote 490: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 5943;
memo. by Holstein, Dec. 23, 1903, _ibid._, 73 ff., No. 5967.]
[Footnote 491: Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 202, No.
6043. Richthofen opposed the project (memo. by Richthofen, undated
although probably written early in July, 1904, _ibid._, 194 ff., No.
6042. This intention did not prevent Bülow from negotiating a commercial
treaty with Russia in July, 1904, which Witte, Russian minister,
declared exacted a tribute from Russia “much greater than any war
indemnity on record” (Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 196
ff., No. 6043; Dillon, pp. 323 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 413 f.).]
[Footnote 492: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff.,
No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No.
6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, May 11, 1904, _ibid._, 177 ff., No. 6033,
and following documents.]
[Footnote 493: Nicholas II to William II, June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 181,
No. 6034.]
[Footnote 494: See their correspondence in Goetz, pp. 337 ff.; also in
_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6028 n., 6034, 6035, 6037, 6039, 6056, 6057, 6062 and
n., 6064 and n., 6073 and n. The Emperor’s letters were dated Feb. 11,
March 29, June 6, June 12, June 28, July 17, July 23, Aug. 19, Oct. 8,
Oct. 10; the Czar’s replies were dated June 1, July 20, July 31, Sept.
28, 1904.]
[Footnote 495: Bernhard Huldermann, _Albert Ballin_ (Berlin, 1922), pp.
146 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6077 ff.]
[Footnote 496: Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 257 ff., No.
6084.]
[Footnote 497: Romberg to F. O., Oct. 19, 1904, _ibid._, 259, No. 6085.]
[Footnote 498: See above.]
[Footnote 499: Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 456 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections
of a Russian Diplomat_, p. 97.]
[Footnote 500: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 27, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
303 f., No. 6118. Their correspondence was entirely in English, in the
use of which they made frequent mistakes. Osten-Sacken reported on Nov.
4 a conversation with Bülow in which the latter, repeating the remarks
of Holstein, declared that in case the British government objected to
the coaling of the Russian ships by the German firm, “we should
apparently be forced to ask the St. Petersburg cabinet whether we should
refuse this objection and thus assume the risk of a war with England and
become your [Russia’s] ally; or would Russia prefer to dispense with . .
. . the coaling . . . . which in this case we should have to prohibit as
incompatible with Germany’s neutrality” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, p. 463).]
[Footnote 501: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
305, No. 6119.]
[Footnote 502: Bülow and Holstein were the proponents of the alliance.
Richthofen and Tirpitz, secretary of the Navy Department, opposed it
(Alfred von Tirpitz, _Erinnerungen_ [Leipzig, 1920], pp. 143 ff.).]
[Footnote 503: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 30, 1904, Goetz, pp. 346
ff.; Bülow to William II, Oct. 30, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 305, No. 6120, and
Anlage I and II.]
[Footnote 504: Mühlberg to Tschirschky, Aug. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 238
f., No. 6069; Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 204, No.
6043.]
[Footnote 505: Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 220, No.
6052.]
[Footnote 506: “It is a matter here of a really great and, for the
onlooking world, wholly unexpected transformation [_Weichenstellung_],”
wrote Bülow to the Emperor, Nov. 16, 1904 (_ibid._, 312, No. 6125).]
[Footnote 507: See the report from Lamsdorff to the Czar of Holstein’s
conversation with Osten-Sacken on Oct. 24, and the Czar’s minute to it
(_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 455 f. and n.; cf. Savinsky, p.
97).]
[Footnote 508: Langer, _Europ. Gespr._, June, 1926, pp. 397 f.; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 354 f.]
[Footnote 509: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 35, No.
26.]
[Footnote 510: A. Savinsky, “Guillaume II et la Russie. Ses Dépêches à
Nicholas II, 1903-1905,” _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 790 f.;
_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6044 ff.; Savinsky, p. 97. Savinsky was an official in
the Russian foreign office in the confidence of Lamsdorff, _G.P._, XIX,
505, editor’s note).]
[Footnote 511: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clviii.]
[Footnote 512: Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10, 1904,
_Kreigsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 464 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 99.]
[Footnote 513: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV,
25, No. 24; 34 f., No. 26.]
[Footnote 514: On receipt of that draft the Czar wrote to Lamsdorff:
“To-day I received the Emperor’s letter with the treaty draft. As I read
it, I laughed aloud. The content of the three articles touches France
mostly. The last point concerns the particular object of dissatisfaction
of the German Government with the British action in the coaling
operation. This, however, is a private affair of both states. . . . .
The matter must be considered from all sides, and a more desirable
counterproposal for us must be composed” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, p. 461).]
[Footnote 515: Lamsdorff to Nicholas II, Nov. 4, 1904, _ibid._, pp. 462
f.]
[Footnote 516: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 310
ff., No. 6124 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 517: William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 17, 1904, Goetz, pp. 349
ff.; Savinsky, p. 102; Bülow to William II, Nov. 16, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
312 ff., No. 6125 and Anlage. The treaty draft is given in Goetz, pp.
146 f. See also Alexander Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign
Minister_ (New York, 1921), pp. 34 f.]
[Footnote 518: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
317, No. 6126, Anlage; Savinsky, pp. 102 f.]
[Footnote 519: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f.,
No. 6126.]
[Footnote 520: Bülow to William II, Nov. 24, 1904, _ibid._, 318 f., No.
6127 and Anlage; William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 471 f.; Savinsky, pp. 103 f.]
[Footnote 521: Iswolsky makes an attempt to exonerate the Czar of the
charge of disloyalty to France, but his argument is not convincing
(Iswolsky, pp. 27, 36 f.).]
[Footnote 522: Report of Lamsdorff for Nicholas II, Nov. 23, 1904,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 473 ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux
mondes_, XII (1922), 789 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 104 ff.]
[Footnote 523: He inclosed a draft of the proposed communication to
France. See Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 322
ff., No. 6131.]
[Footnote 524: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No.
6088; _ibid._, chap. cxxxvi.]
[Footnote 525: Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20, 1904, _ibid._, 652, No.
6349, and following documents; Flotow to Bülow, Oct. 26, 1904, _ibid._,
286 f., No. 6105 and following documents.]
[Footnote 526: This was the expression used.]
[Footnote 527: Memo. by Metternich for Bülow, Dec. 25, 1904, _ibid._,
367 ff., No. 6156; report of Marine Attaché Coerper, Jan. 15, 1905,
_ibid._, 379 f., No. 6161; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 329; Admiral Sir
Edward E. Bradford, _Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet
Wilson_ (London, 1923), p. 197.]
[Footnote 528: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f.,
No. 6126; Graf Robert Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen
Kaiserhof_ (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 86 f.]
[Footnote 529: On this war scare see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi.]
[Footnote 530: J. L. Bashford, “Great Britain and Germany: A
Conversation with Count von Bülow, German Chancellor,” _Nineteenth
Century_, Dec., 1904, pp. 873 ff.; Bülow, _Reden_, II, 123 ff.]
[Footnote 531: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 358 f., No.
6153.]
[Footnote 532: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No.
6088.]
[Footnote 533: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 320 f., No.
6129; William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 322, No. 6130.]
[Footnote 534: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII ( 1922), 794 f.;
Savinsky, p. 107.]
[Footnote 535: William II to Nicholas II, undated, _G.P._, XIX, 325, No.
6132.]
[Footnote 536: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 11, 1904, _ibid._, 325
f., No. 6134.]
[Footnote 537: On December 11 Lamsdorff stated to Alvensleben that as
soon as the Czar had made a decision he would be ready to agree with
Germany on the “modality of co-operation” in case of a conflict. On the
next day in his note to that government he did not mention this matter,
and as Germany seemed satisfied, he never returned to it. See
Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 11 and 12, 1904, _ibid._, 325 ff., Nos. 6134
ff.; Lamsdorff to Alvensleben, Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 329, No. 6137;
Savinsky, p. 108.]
[Footnote 538: Alvensleben, to F. O., Dec. 11, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 325
f., No. 6134.]
[Footnote 539: M. A. de Wolfe Howe, _George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life
and Public Services_ (New York, 1920), pp. 121 f.; Schulthess
(_Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_), p. 255.]
[Footnote 540: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 326 f.,
No. 6135; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 342 f. Nos. 6142
f.]
[Footnote 541: Editor’s note giving a summary of a dispatch from
Alvensleben on Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, p. 342.]
[Footnote 542: On Dec. 13 Metternich was called to Berlin for
consultation as to the effect which a Russo-German agreement of any sort
would have on Anglo-German relations. Schulenburg and Eulenburg, of the
German embassy in London, also were asked about the attitude of the
British toward Germany. They all believed that the British would not
tolerate as much from Germany as they would from Russia. See memo. by
Bülow, Dec. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 331 f., No. 6139, and editor’s note;
memo. by Metternich, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 332 ff., No. 6140;
Schulenburg to Bülow, Dec. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 359 ff., No. 6154; memo.
by Eulenburg, Dec. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6155; Alfred von
Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, Band I; _Der Aufbau der deutschen
Weltmacht_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924), pp. 13 f. A few days later
Lascelles tried to argue with both Bülow and Holstein that the British
fear of the German navy was more reasonable than the German fear of the
British navy. And on Dec. 26 Holstein declared to Lascelles as follows:
“In the present instance a situation had been created by the action of
the Press which was fraught with the gravest of all dangers, viz.: that
of two great nations being involved in war, for if any untoward incident
had arisen which gave rise to an acrimonious discussion between the two
Governments it would have been almost impossible to have settled it
owing to the atmosphere which the Press campaign had created.”
Nevertheless both parties agreed that Anglo-German relations had become
easier. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec. 28, 1904, _B.D._, III, 56 ff.,
No. 65. At about the same time King Edward, Lansdowne, and Balfour all
branded the German fears of a British attack as foolish; and the British
condemned them as hypocritical. But the press war continued into January
as bitterly as before. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _G.P._,
XIX, 372 f., No. 6157; and following documents. See also Schulthess
(1905), p. 3; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 331 f.; Friedrich Thimme,
“Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz: Aus den Papieren Paul H. von
Schwabach’s,” _Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1929, p. 307.]
[Footnote 543: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 342 f.,
Nos. 6142 f.; Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 343 ff., No.
6144.]
[Footnote 544: Mühlberg to Tirpitz, Jan. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 265 ff., No.
6089, and following documents.]
[Footnote 545: William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 340
f., No. 6141; also Goetz, p. 354. The letter was written by the foreign
office.]
[Footnote 546: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 25, 1904, _G.P._, XIX,
346, No. 6145.]
[Footnote 547: Memo. by Eckert, Nov. 18, 1904, Received Dec. 26, 1904,
_ibid._, 395 ff., No. 6176.]
[Footnote 548: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No.
6178.]
[Footnote 549: William II to Nicholas II, Jan. 2, 1905, _ibid._, 404 f.,
No. 6180.]
[Footnote 550: William II to Bülow, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 411, No.
6187; Bülow to William II, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 412, No. 6188. On
Jan. 16, 1905, the Emperor wrote: “The action of Delcassé and Lamsdorff
is unspeakably treacherous and common. This trio [France, Great Britain,
and Russia, who he thought desired to divide China] must be opposed by a
German-American-Japanese league. That must be done quickly and
energetically. Above all America’s mistrust of France and Russia be
nourished” (Emperor’s minute to the dispatch from Bülow to William II,
Jan. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 562, No. 6280).]
[Footnote 551: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 551 ff., No.
6275. The Emperor also suffered from the “nightmare of the coalitions,”
but his suffering assumed more varied forms. At one moment he feared a
Franco-Anglo-American-Japanese grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-
Russian grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-Russo-Japanese grouping
(see _ibid._, Nos. 5925, 5945, 6187, 6280).]
[Footnote 552: See _ibid._, chap. cxxxix.]
[Footnote 553: Romberg to Bülow, Dec. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 394 f., No.
6175.]
[Footnote 554: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 402 f., No.
6178.]
[Footnote 555: See Dennett, pp. 77 ff., 162, 171 f.; Dennis, pp. 392 f.,
397; Bülow to William II, Dec. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 547 ff., No. 6274,
and following documents.]
[Footnote 556: See, among others, Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 3 and 9,
1905, _G.P._, XIX, 567 f., No. 6285; 570, No. 6287.]
[Footnote 557: Dennett, pp. 73 ff., 50; Dennis, pp. 367 f., 385 ff. The
anonymous document which Dennis quotes must have been written some time
early in 1905, for it refers to events which occurred in January, 1905.]
[Footnote 558: Arco to F. O., Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 407, No. 6183;
Arco to Bülow, March 16, 1905, _ibid._, 413 ff. No. 6190.]
[Footnote 559: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clix.]
[Footnote 560: Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 343
f., No. 6144; William II to Bülow, Dec. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 346 f. No.
6146; Bülow to Alvensleben, Jan. 1, 1905, _ibid._, 347 f., No. 6147;
Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. 6178.]