Signor G. Ferrero has studied what he terms “mental inertia” and
“the law of least effort,” as applied to the mind, and he finds
that the mental operation may stop short at certain points; thus he
distinguishes (1) _mental arrest_, (2) _emotional arrest, and_ (3)
_ideo-emotional arrest_.
(1.) The first is due to a deficiency in logic; as, for example, when
machinery was first introduced, the workmen smashed the machines,
regarding them as the cause of the fall in wages, and being ignorant
of the fact that the altered conditions were caused by complicated
economic conditions, and not by the machines.
(2.) An analogous phenomenon occurs in the domain of the emotions. An
emotion is not isolated, it is always one link of a chain. The emotions
are always associated with a more or less great number of images or
ideas which define them. But the image or the idea of the thing which
should define the emotion sometimes dwindles or entirely disappears;
it then follows that the emotion, instead of being associated with the
image or with the idea of this thing, is associated with the symbol
which represents this thing; it stops short at the symbol instead of
projecting itself beyond the symbol towards the thing represented.
This is the _emotional arrest_. It is notorious that in religion the
adoration which should be paid to God in heaven is often arrested at
the images which represent the divinity, as when the elders of Israel
said, “Let us fetch the ark of the covenant of the Lord out of Shiloh
unto us, that, when it cometh among us, it may save us out of the hand
of our enemies ... and the Philistines were afraid, for they said, God
is come into the camp.”[198]
[198] 1 Samuel iv. 3, 7.
(3.) There is yet a third psychological process by which the confusion
between the symbol and the thing symbolised is possible; it is the
_ideo-emotional arrest_. In an analysis of the mental state of a man
who performs acts of social ceremonial, this author finds (p. 133) that
“to each completed act there corresponds, in the spirit of man, three
states of consciousness, quite distinct and associated:—
“1. The desire to cause the man to be favourable to him in whose
presence the ceremonial act is accomplished (α);
“2. The idea that the ceremonial act can serve this purpose (β);
“3. The idea that the act can serve this purpose because the
suppliant understands that he who has put himself in the
position where he is unable to do harm cannot have any
dangerous intention (γ).
“The mental state of those who entreat the gods was, in this primitive
period, composed of the same three states of consciousness, quite
distinct but inter-related:—
“1. The desire to make the divinity favourable to oneself (α);
“2. The idea that certain acts or practices (prayers, visits,
etc., etc.) conduce to this result (β);
“3. The idea of the reason for which these acts have this
power—that is to say, the conviction that they are adapted to
the character attributed to the divinity (γ).
“It is evident that if we compare the mental state of men who are
in harmony with ceremonial observances in this primitive period of
ceremonial with the mental state of civilised men who still observe
ceremonial, social, and religious rules, we find that in the mental
state of civilised men the third state of consciousness—that is to
say γ, has been eliminated. In fact, we have remarked that, among
civilised man, the performance of a ceremonial act is determined by
the desire to render himself favourable to, or at least not to offend
another person or a God (α), and from the idea that these acts can
produce this effect (β); without knowing why (that is to say that γ
has been eliminated).
“We have seen that by the law of mental inertia, a state of
consciousness—image, idea, emotion—cannot last for ever, after the
exciting cause has ceased to act, for a state of consciousness is a
transformation of energy, and it finishes when it has exhausted its
initial quantity of force.
“Only the states of consciousness which, being necessary for the needs
of existence, are preserved by permanent excitation,—be this excitation
simple and direct or complex and indirect—can have an apparently
eternal persistence; the duration of useless states of consciousness is
limited.
“This is true for individuals or bodies of men. To each institution,
to each custom, etc., there correspond in the mind of man a certain
number of associated ideas, which have determined alike its birth and
transformation; but, according to this law, only the ideas which are
necessary should be preserved in this association of ideas; the others
should be gradually eliminated.
“This interesting psychological phenomenon of _ideo-emotional arrest_
concludes by profoundly modifying ideas and feelings. It modifies
ideas, for it induces what I have termed a _mental arrest_; the
ideation, in fact, by the loss of the state of consciousness γ, is
arrested at β; and the mind is contented to know that a certain act
will produce a certain effect, or will express a certain sentiment,
without troubling itself with the cause, without seeking for an
explanation. It modifies, and, so to speak, displaces the feelings,
for it produces that what I call an _emotional arrest_: in fact, when
the idea of the true character of the ceremonial act is lost, the act
is no longer a sign of certain inclinations of sentiment, but itself
becomes an object of veneration. We see men who pay attention only to
ceremonial and who neglect the feelings on which it should be based ...
they believe they have fulfilled their religious duties, even if love
and devotion are wanting, if they have not neglected the ceremonies.
It is the same with the social ceremonial; for the majority of men,
social duty does not consist in loyalty, in mutual affection, in a
spirit of justice towards others, but in ceremonial observances; and
when the ceremonial code is not violated they are persuaded that they
have nothing for which to reproach themselves. It is a true _emotional
arrest_, for the sentiments of social and religious duty are, so to
speak, arrested midway in purely external acts.”[199]
[199] _Loc. cit._, p. 139.