Mr. PITKIN said he had heretofore stated that he had some objections
to the bill, which he had intended to have stated to the House when
the bill was capable of amendment, but that he had not an opportunity
so to do. I have stated, said Mr. P., that it was probable there would
be some difficulty between Orleans, when it becomes a State, and the
United States, respecting the extent of the State westward. I stated
that the United States, in consequence of the purchase of Louisiana
with the same extent that it had when Spain and France possessed it,
had claimed the territory as far as the river called Rio Bravo; that
the negotiations on this subject between the Governments of the United
States and Spain were probably unknown to many members of the House,
and that it required a pretty accurate knowledge of them, of the extent
of the claim, and of the geography of the country, to understand
precisely what I meant. I stated that there was an extent of country
between a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches and Rio Bravo,
of four or five hundred miles in width, which the United States had
claimed as being their property. In the negotiations between the two
countries, the United States offered to cede all the country between
the Rio Bravo and the Colorado running east of it to Spain, on the
condition that Spain would cede to the United States all the territory
west of the Perdido. This proposition was rejected. Our Commissioners
were instructed to assert our title as far as the Rio Bravo, or at
least to the Bay of St. Bernard. It is so stated by the President of
the United States in the introduction to the compilation of the land
laws, in which he states that we unquestionably have a right to the
country as far west as the sources of the rivers which fall into the
Mississippi, to the sources of the Red River, Arkansas, and Missouri;
that with respect to the territory immediately bounding on the Gulf
of Mexico, we have claims to the "province of Texas," which it is well
known is a very large province. By the bill before us, according to
this construction, jurisdiction is extended over this very province;
and it may be, and in fact will be, in the power of the State of
Orleans to say that our limits extend so far, and therefore to extend
their jurisdiction in like manner. In my apprehension, therefore,
it is important, while we are making this Territory a State, where
the boundaries are disputed, to retain in our own hands the power of
settling them. It is known that, by the law which passed providing for
the government of the Territory of Orleans, we had liberty to alter the
boundary before we made them a State, but not after. Will it not be in
the power of the new State to insist on their right to jurisdiction
over the territory, at least as far west as the Colorado, and to
prevent the United States from ceding any part of it? For instance,
sir, the United States may wish, as we have taken Florida as far as the
Perdido, subject to future negotiation, to make this arrangement: to
cede to Spain a certain proportion west for East Florida. Now, sir, I
ask when we have made this country a State if we can do this? I believe
it will be said by every person that we cannot, after she becomes
a State, alter the boundaries without her consent. I do apprehend,
therefore, there will be difficulties on the subject hereafter, if
the United States should attempt to settle the boundary in a manner
disagreeable to the State; because, if they cannot extend their
jurisdiction west of a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches, the
territory will be in extent east and west but about one hundred miles,
and north and south about one hundred and twenty, and this will make
them comparatively a small State.
As the United States have settled a provisional line, to wit: a
meridional line through Nacogdoches, it should not be in the power of
the new State to extend its jurisdiction beyond that line. Provision
might be made in this way: The western boundary might be made to
conform to the provisional line; and a provision might then be made
that there should be reserved to the United States the privilege
of adding to it whatever land it should acquire westwardly. Such a
provision would leave us at liberty to settle the limits without the
interference of that State, and without, I apprehend, much difficulty.
This was done in relation to the State of Ohio. Unless the right had
been reserved, the consent of the State would have been necessary to
a cession, or other alteration of its boundary. Such a course in this
case will be perfectly safe for the United States, as well as for the
new State. I wish we may so regulate the Territory as there may not
in future be any collision between the State and the United States.
The province of Texas is in the viceroyalty of New Spain. We know that
the Viceroy sent his troops to oppose the passage of our troops, and a
provisional line was established. New Spain is very powerful, and I
should be very sorry that the new State should have power to embroil
the United States with it. I would ask the chairman of the committee
who reported this bill, what were his views respecting the western
boundary, and how far it was his idea that the new State should extend,
and whether it would not comport with his ideas that the change which
I have suggested should be made? I could have wished that the bill was
in such a state of its progress that I could have moved an amendment;
but, as it is, unless I am satisfied that we shall not be involved in
difficulty by the consequences I have stated, I shall be unwilling to
pass the bill, and must vote against it.
Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I address you, sir, with an anxiety and
distress of mind with me wholly unprecedented. The friends of this bill
seem to consider it as the exercise of a common power; as an ordinary
affair; a mere municipal regulation which they expect to see pass
without other questions than those concerning details. But, sir, the
principle of this bill materially affects the liberties and rights of
the whole people of the United States. To me, it appears that it would
justify a revolution in this country; and that, in no great length of
time, may produce it. When I see the zeal and perseverance with which
this bill has been urged along its Parliamentary path, when I know the
local interests and associated projects, which combine to promote its
success, all opposition to it seems manifestly unavailing. I am almost
tempted to leave, without a struggle, my country to its fate. But, sir,
while there is life, there is hope. So long as the fatal shaft has not
yet sped, if Heaven so will it, the bow may be broken, and the vigor of
the mischief-meditating arm withered. If there be a man in this house,
or nation, who cherishes the constitution under which we are assembled,
as the chief stay of his hope, as the light which is destined to
gladden his own day, and to soften even the gloom of the grave, by the
prospect it sheds over his children, I fall not behind him in such
sentiments. I will yield to no man in attachment to this constitution,
in veneration for the sages who laid its foundations, in devotion to
those principles which form its cement and constitute its proportions.
What, then, must be my feelings; what ought to be the feelings of a man
cherishing such sentiments, when he sees an act contemplated which lays
ruin at the root of all these hopes? When he sees a principle of action
about to be usurped, before the operation of which the bands of this
constitution are no more than flax before the fire, or stubble before
the whirlwind? When this bill passes, such an act is done, and such a
principle usurped.
Mr. Speaker, there is a great rule of human conduct, which he who
honestly observes cannot err widely from the path of his sought duty.
It is, to be very scrupulous concerning the principles you select
as the test of your rights and obligations; to be very faithful in
noticing the result of their application; and to be very fearless in
tracing and exposing their immediate effects and distant consequences.
Under the sanction of this rule of conduct, I am compelled to declare
it as my deliberate opinion, that, if this bill passes, the bonds of
this Union are virtually dissolved; that the States which compose it
are free from their moral obligations, and that, as it will be the
right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for
a separation--amicably if they can, violently if they must.
Mr. QUINCY was here called to order by Mr. POINDEXTER.
Mr. QUINCY repeated, and justified the remark he had made, which, to
save all misapprehension, he committed to writing, in the following
words: "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is
virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States
from their moral obligation, and, as it will be the right of all, so
it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation,
amicably if they can, violently if they must."
After some little confusion,
Mr. POINDEXTER required the decision of the Speaker whether it was
consistent with the propriety of debate, to use such an expression. He
said it was radically wrong for any member to use arguments going to
dissolve the Government, and tumble this body itself to dust and ashes.
It would be found, from the gentleman's statement of his language, that
he had declared the right of any portion of the people to separate----
Mr. QUINCY wished the Speaker to decide, for if the gentleman was
permitted to debate the question, he should lose one-half of his speech.
The SPEAKER decided that great latitude in debate was generally
allowed; and that, by way of argument against a bill, the first part
of the gentleman's observations was admissible; but the latter member
of the sentence, viz.: "That it would be the duty of some States to
prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they
must," was contrary to the order of debate.
Mr. QUINCY appealed from his decision, and required the yeas and nays
on the appeal.
The question was stated thus: "Is the decision of the SPEAKER correct?"
And decided--53 yeas; 56 nays.
So the decision of the speaker was reversed; Mr. QUINCY'S observations
were declared to be in order; and he proceeded.
I rejoice, Mr. Speaker, at the result of this appeal. Not from any
personal consideration, but from the respect paid to the essential
rights of the people, in one of their representatives. When I spoke
of a separation of the States as resulting from the violation of
the constitution, contemplated in this bill, I spoke of it as of a
necessity, deeply to be deprecated; but as resulting from causes so
certain and obvious, as to be absolutely inevitable when the effect of
the principle is practically experienced. It is to preserve, to guard
the constitution of my country, that I denounce this attempt. I would
rouse the attention of gentlemen from the apathy with which they seem
beset. These observations are not made in a corner; there is no low
intrigue; no secret machinations. I am on the people's own ground--to
them I appeal, concerning their own rights, their own liberties, their
own intent in adopting this constitution. The voice I have uttered, at
which gentlemen startle with such agitation, is no unfriendly voice. I
intended it as a voice of warning. By this people, and by the event, if
this bill passes, I am willing to be judged, whether it be not a voice
of wisdom.
The bill, which is now proposed to be passed, has this assumed
principle for its basis--that the three branches of this National
Government, without recurrence to conventions of the people, in the
States, or to the Legislatures of the States, are authorized to admit
new partners to a share of the political power, in countries out of
the original limits of the United States. Now, this assumed principle
I maintain to be altogether without any sanction in the constitution.
I declare it to be a manifest and atrocious usurpation of power; of a
nature, dissolving, according to undeniable principles of moral law,
the obligations of our national compact; and leading to all the awful
consequences which flow from such a state of things.
Concerning this assumed principle, which is the basis of this bill,
this is the general position on which I rest my argument--that if the
authority, now proposed to be exercised, be delegated to the three
branches of the Government, by virtue of the constitution, it results
either from its general nature, or from its particular provisions.
I shall consider distinctly both these sources, in relation to this
pretended power.
Touching the general nature of the instrument called the Constitution
of the United States, there is no obscurity--it has no fabled descent,
like the palladium of ancient Troy, from the heavens. Its origin is
not confused by the mists of time, or hidden by the darkness of past,
unexplored ages; it is the fabric of our day. Some now living, had a
share in its construction--all of us stood by, and saw the rising of
the edifice. There can be no doubt about its nature. It is a political
compact. By whom? And about what? The preamble to the instrument will
answer these questions:
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution, for the
United States of America."
It is, "we, the people of the United States, for ourselves and our
posterity;" not for the people of Louisiana; nor for the people of
New Orleans, or of Canada. None of these enter into the scope of the
instrument; it embraces only "the United States of America." Who those
are, it may seem strange, in this place, to inquire. But truly, sir,
our imaginations have, of late, been so accustomed to wander after new
settlements to the very end of the earth, that it will not be time
ill-spent to inquire what this phrase means, and what it includes.
These are not terms adopted at hazard; they have reference to a state
of things existing anterior to the constitution. When the people
of the present United States began to contemplate a severance from
their parent State, it was a long time before they fixed definitely
the name by which they would be designated. In 1774, they called
themselves "the Colonies and Provinces of North America." In 1775,
"the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America." In
the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United
States of America." And finally, in the Articles of Confederation,
the style of the confederacy is declared to be "the United States of
America." It was with reference to the old articles of confederation,
and to preserve the identity and established individuality of their
character, that the preamble to this constitution, not content, simply,
with declaring that it is "we, the people of the United States," who
enter into this compact, adds that it is for "the United States of
America." Concerning the territory contemplated by the people of the
United States, in these general terms, there can be no dispute; it is
settled by the treaty of peace, and included within the Atlantic Ocean,
and St. Croix, the lakes, and more precisely, so far as relates to the
frontier, having relation to the present argument, within "a line to be
drawn through the middle of the river Mississippi, until it intersect
the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to
the river Apalachicola, thence along the middle of this river to its
junction with the Flint River, thence straight to the head of the St.
Mary's River, and thence down the St. Mary's to the Atlantic Ocean."
I have been thus particular to draw the minds of gentlemen, distinctly,
to the meaning of the terms used in the preamble; to the extent which
"the United States" then included; and to the fact that neither New
Orleans nor Louisiana were within the comprehension of the terms of
this instrument. It is sufficient for the present branch of my argument
to say, that there is nothing in the general nature of this compact
from which the power contemplated to be exercised in this bill results.
On the contrary, as the introduction of a new associate in political
power implies, necessarily, a new division of power, and consequent
diminution of the relative proportion of the former proprietors of
it; there can, certainly, be nothing more obvious, than that from the
general nature of the instrument no power can result to diminish and
give away to strangers any proportion of the rights of the original
partners. If such a power exists, it must be found, then, in the
particular provisions in the constitution. The question now arising is,
in which of these provisions is given the power to admit new States,
to be created in territories, beyond the limits of the old United
States. If it exists anywhere, it is either in the third section of
the fourth article of the constitution, or in the treaty-making power.
If it result from neither of these, it is not pretended to be found
anywhere else.
That part of the third section of the fourth article, on which the
advocates of this bill rely, is the following: "New States may be
admitted, by the Congress, into this Union; but no new States shall
be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State,
nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or
parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned, as well as of the Congress." I know, Mr. Speaker,
that the first clause of this paragraph has been read, with all
the superciliousness of a grammarian's triumph. "New States may be
admitted, by the Congress, into this Union." Accompanied with this
most consequential inquiry: "Is not this a new State to be admitted?
And is not here an express authority?" I have no doubt this is a full
and satisfactory argument to every one, who is content with the mere
colors and superficies of things. And if we were now at the bar of some
stall-fed justice, the inquiry would insure victory to the maker of it,
to the manifest delight of the constables and suitors of his court.
But, sir, we are now before the tribunal of the whole American people;
reasoning concerning their liberties, their rights, their constitution.
These are not to be made the victims of the inevitable obscurity of
general terms; nor the sport of verbal criticism. The question is
concerning the intent of the American people, the proprietors of the
old United States, when they agreed to this article. Dictionaries
and spelling-books are, here, of no authority. Neither Johnson, nor
Walker, nor Webster nor Dilworth, has any voice in this matter. Sir,
the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this
constitution, to every State in the Union. Have the three branches of
this Government a right, at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence,
respectively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing,
at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United
States? The question has not relation merely to New Orleans. The great
objection is to the principle of the bill. If this bill be admitted,
the whole space of Louisiana, greater, it is said, than the entire
extent of the old United States, will be a mighty theatre, in which
this Government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled
power. And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be
exercised. Nor will it stop, until the very name and nature of the
old partners be overwhelmed by new comers into the Confederacy. Sir,
the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the
present members of this Union. The real intent of this article is,
therefore, an inquiry of most serious import; and is to be settled
only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of
this people and their constitution. These, I maintain, support this
position: that the terms "new States," in this article, do intend new
political sovereignties, to be formed within the original limits of
the United States; and do not intend new political sovereignties with
territorial annexations, to be erected without the original limits
of the United States. I undertake to support both branches of this
position to the satisfaction of the people of these United States. As
to any expectation of conviction on this floor, I know the nature of
the ground and how hopeless any arguments are, which thwart a concerted
course of measures.
I recur, in the first place, to the evidence of history. This
furnishes the following leading fact: that before, and at the time
of the adoption of this constitution, the creation of new political
sovereignties within the limits of the old United States was
contemplated. Among the records of the old Congress will be found
a resolution, passed as long ago as the 10th day of October, 1780,
contemplating the cession of unappropriated lands to the United
States, accompanied by a provision that "they shall be disposed of for
the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed
into distinct Republican States, which shall become members of the
Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, as the other States." Afterward, on the 7th of July,
1786, the subject of "laying out and forming into States" the country
lying northwest of the river Ohio, came under the consideration of
the same body; and another resolution was passed recommending to the
Legislature of Virginia to revise their act of cession, so as to permit
a more eligible division of that portion of territory derived from
her; "which States," it proceeds to declare, "shall hereafter become
members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, as the original States, in conformity with
the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780." All the
Territories to which these resolutions had reference, were undeniably
within the ancient limits of the United States.
Here, then, is a leading fact, that the article in the constitution
had a condition of things, notorious at the time when it was adopted,
upon which it was to act, and to meet the exigency resulting from
which, such an article was requisite. That is to say: new States,
within the limits of the United States, were contemplated at the
time when the foundations of the constitution were laid. But we have
another authority upon this point, which is, in truth, a cotemporaneous
exposition of this article of the constitution. I allude to the
resolution, passed on the 3d of July, 1788, in the words following:
[Here the resolution was read.]
In this resolution of the old Congress, it is expressly declared,
that the Constitution of the United States having been adopted by
nine States, an act of the old Congress could have no effect to make
Kentucky a separate member of the Union, and that, although they
thought it expedient that it should be so admitted, yet that this
could only be done under the provisions made in the new constitution.
It is impossible to have a more direct contemporaneous evidence that
the case contemplated in this article was that of the Territories
within the limits of the United States; yet the gentleman from North
Carolina, (Mr. MACON,) for whose integrity and independence I have very
great respect, told us the other day, that "if this article had not
territories within the limits of the old United States to act upon,
it would be wholly without meaning. Because the ordinance of the old
Congress had secured the right to the States within the old United
States, and a provision for that object, in the new constitution, was
wholly unnecessary." Now, I will appeal to the gentleman's own candor,
if the very reverse of the conclusion he draws is not the true one,
after he has considered the following fact: That, by this ordinance
of the old Congress, it was declared, that the boundaries of the
contemplated States, and the terms of their admission, should be, in
certain particulars, specified in the ordinance, subject to the control
of Congress. Now, as by the new constitution the old Congress was about
to be annihilated, it was absolutely necessary for the very fulfilment
of this ordinance, that the new constitution should have this power
for the admission of new States within the ancient limits, so that the
ordinance of the old Congress, far from showing the inutility of such
a provision for the Territories within the ancient limits, expressly
proves the reverse, and is an evidence of its necessity to effect the
object of the ordinance itself.
I think there can be no more satisfactory evidence adduced or required
of the first part of the position, that the terms "new States" did
intend new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United
States. For it is here shown, that the creation of such States,
within the territorial limits fixed by the treaty of 1783, had been
contemplated; that the old Congress itself expressly asserts that the
new constitution gave the power for that object; that the nature of
the old ordinance required such a power, for the purpose of carrying
its provisions into effect, and that it has been from the time of
the adoption of the federal constitution, unto this hour, applied
exclusively to the admission of States, within the limits of the old
United States, and was never attempted to be extended to any other
object.
Now, having shown a purpose, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, sufficient to occupy the whole
scope of the terms of the article, ought not the evidence be very
strong to satisfy the mind, that the terms really intended something
else, besides this obvious purpose; that it may be fairly extended to
the entire circle of the globe, wherever title can be obtained by
purchase, or conquest, and the new partners in the political power may
be admitted at the mere discretion of this Legislature, any where that
it wills. A principle thus monstrous is asserted in this bill.
But I think it may be made satisfactorily to appear not only that the
terms "new States" in this article did mean political sovereignties
to be formed within the original limits of the United States, as has
just been shown, but, also, negatively, that it did not intend new
political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created
without those original limits. This appears first from the very tenor
of the article. All its limitations have respect to the creation of
States within the original limits. Two States shall not be joined; no
new State shall be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State,
without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as
well as of Congress. Now, had foreign territories been contemplated,
had the new habits, customs, manners, and language of other nations
been in the idea of the framers of this constitution, would not
some limitation have been devised, to guard against the abuse of a
power, in its nature so enormous, and so obviously, when it occurred,
calculated to excite just jealousy among the States, whose relative
weight would be so essentially affected, by such an infusion at once
of a mass of foreigners into their Councils, and into all the rights
of the country? The want of all limitation of such power would be a
strong evidence, were others wanting, that the powers, now about to be
exercised, never entered into the imagination of those thoughtful and
prescient men, who constructed the fabric. But there is another most
powerful argument against the extension of this article to embrace
the right to create States without the original limits of the United
States, deducible from the utter silence of all debates at the period
of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, touching the power here
proposed to be usurped. If ever there was a time in which the ingenuity
of the greatest men of an age was taxed to find arguments in favor of
and against any political measure, it was at the time of the adoption
of this constitution. All the faculties of the human mind were, on
the one side and the other, put upon their utmost stretch, to find
the real and imaginary blessings or evils, likely to result from the
proposed measure. Now I call upon the advocates of this bill to point
out, in all the debates of that period in any one publication, in any
one newspaper of those times, a single intimation, by friend or foe to
the constitution, approving or censuring it for containing the power
here proposed to be usurped, or a single suggestion that it might
be extended to such an object as is now proposed. I do not say that
no such suggestion was ever made. But this I will say that I do not
believe there is such a one any where to be found. Certain I am, I have
never been able to meet the shadow of such a suggestion, and I have
made no inconsiderable research upon the point. Such may exist--but
until it be produced, we have a right to reason as though it had no
existence. No, sir. The people of this country at that day had no
idea of the territorial avidity of their successors. It was, on the
contrary, an argument, urged against the success of the project, that
the territory was too extensive for a republican form of government.
But, now there is no limits to our ambitious hopes. We are about to
cross the Mississippi. The Missouri and Red River are but roads, on
which our imagination travels to new lands and new States to be raised
and admitted (under the power, now first usurped) into this Union,
among undiscovered lands in the west. But it has been suggested that
the Convention had Canada in view, in this article, and the gentleman
from North Carolina told this House, that a member of the Convention,
as I understood him, either now, or lately a member of the Senate,
informed him that the article had that reference. Sir, I have no doubt
the gentleman from North Carolina has had a communication such as he
intimates. But, for myself, I have no sort of faith in these convenient
recollections, suited to serve a turn, to furnish an apology for a
party, or give color to a project. I do not deny, on the contrary I
believe it very probable, that among the coursings of some discursive
and craving fancy, such thoughts might be started; but that is not
the question. Was this an avowed object in the Convention when it
formed this article? Did it enter into the conception of the people
when its principles were discussed? Sir, it did not, it could not.
The very intention would have been a disgrace both to this people
and the Convention. What, sir! Shall it be intimated; shall it for a
moment be admitted, that the noblest and purest band of patriots this
or any other country ever could boast, were engaged in machinating
means for the dismemberment of the territories of a power to which
they had pledged friendship, and the observance of all the obligations
which grow out of a strict and perfect amity? The honor of our country
forbids and disdains such a suggestion.
But there is an argument stronger, even, than all those which have
been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed
to be exercised. Is it possible that such a power, if it had been
intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon
the effect of general expressions; and such too, as were obviously
applicable to another subject; to a particular exigency contemplated
at the time? Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp? Nothing
less than a power, changing all the proportion of the weight and
influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union. A
stranger is to be introduced to an equal share, without their consent.
Upon a principle, pretended to be deduced from the constitution--this
Government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign
partners in power, at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible
pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or
ambitious views may suggest. It is a power that, from its nature, never
could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the
proportions of power guarantied by the constitution to the States,
upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the
moral force of this political contract. Would this people, so wisely
vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power
to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much
more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States at its
pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope
of the constitution or the conception of the people, at the time of
passing it?
This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty,
as it is who shall be sovereign. Whether the proprietors of the good
old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or
whether they, and their constitution, and their political rights, shall
be trampled under foot by foreigners introduced through a breach of the
constitution. The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign
State, constituting this Union, depends upon the number of the States
which have a voice under the compact. This number the constitution
permits us to multiply at pleasure, within the limits of the original
United States; observing only the expressed limitations in the
constitution. But when in order to increase your power of augmenting
this number you pass the old limits, you are guilty of a violation of
the constitution in a fundamental point; and in one, also, which is
totally inconsistent with the intent of the contract, and the safety
of the States which established the association. What is the practical
difference to the old partners, whether they hold their liberties at
the will of a master, or whether, by admitting exterior States on an
equal footing with the original States, arbiters are constituted, who
by availing themselves of the contrariety of interests and views which
in such a confederacy necessarily will arise, hold the balance among
the parties which exist and govern us, by throwing themselves into the
scale most conformable to their purposes? In both cases there is an
effective despotism. But the last is the more galling, as we carry the
chain in the name and gait of freemen.
I have thus shown, and whether fairly, I am willing to be judged by the
sound discretion of the American people, that the power, proposed to
be usurped, in this bill, results neither from the general nature, nor
the particular provisions, of the Federal Constitution; and that it is
a palpable violation of it in a fundamental point; whence flow all the
consequences I have intimated.
The present President of the United States, when a member of the
Virginia Convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares
that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as
one, "that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here
an essential right to be alienated? The right to that proportion of
political power which the constitution has secured to every State,
modified only by such internal increase of States as the existing
limits of the Territories at the time of the adoption of the
constitution permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon
the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old States.
It was agreed, at that time, that by this power old States within the
ancient limits could not be sold from us. And I maintain that, by it,
new States without the ancient limits cannot be saddled upon us. It
was agreed, at that time, that the treaty-making power "could not cut
off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to
clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions devised by the
constitution are in both cases marred, and the fate and felicity of
the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence
of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended, by the most
enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treaty-making power, that
it exceeded that of the King of Great Britain. Yet, I ask, suppose that
monarch should make a treaty, stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan
should have a right of representation on the floor of Parliament, would
such a treaty be binding? No, sir; not, as I believe, if a House of
Commons and of Lords could be found venal enough to agree to it. But
although in that country the three branches of its legislature are
called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified
in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind; the limits of
our power are distinctly marked; and when the three branches of this
Government usurp upon this constitution in particulars vital to the
liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.
I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able
to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant--I had almost said
indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply
anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain,
however, that when the dissension of this day is passed away, when
party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States
from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and
deceptive attachments and antipathies, that the ground here defended
will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and that the
principles here advanced will be appreciated.
I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The
provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates that it shall be
"admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation
of the constitution. There are ways in which this may constitutionally
be effected--by an amendment of the constitution, or by reference to
conventions of the people in the States. And I do suppose, that, in
relation to the objects of the present bill, (with the people of New
Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important
accommodation to the Western States, there would be no violent
objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects
to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is
intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up
into independent States, to counterbalance and to paralyze whatever
there is of influence in other quarters of the Union. Such a power, I
am well aware that the people of the States would never grant you. And
therefore, if you get it, the only way is by the mode adopted in this
bill--by usurpation.
The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy
to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the
Legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire
belief of the fact, that our present Minister in Russia, then a member
of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration
of the Senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed
great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our
control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the
principles on which they could be admitted into the Union. And it does
appear that he made two several motions in that body, having for their
object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in
the constitution, to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that
convention.
I will add only a few words in relation to the moral and political
consequences of usurping this power. I have said, that it would be
a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great
sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not
the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a
moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable
to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a
contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the
other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a
partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without
the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option
to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of
their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the
admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant
with obvious dangers and evils! Again: it is settled as a principle of
morality, among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged,
beyond his intent at the time of the contract. Now, who believes,
who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they
adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans and
Louisiana, a portion of their political power, and to invest all
the people those extensive regions might hereafter contain with an
authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the
weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise
contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture
to affirm that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now,
by construction, give it; or can it be concealed that, beyond its
fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If
gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let
them abandon a measure which sooner or later will produce them. How
long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell;
but it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you
suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought
to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from
the Red river and Missouri pouring themselves upon this and the other
floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at
least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils,
into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted?
I have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor
ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee
danger, and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into
this House under the plausible appearance of giving content to that
important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control
the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can
be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By
the course of nature, and conformable to the acknowledged principles
of the constitution, the sceptre of power in this country is passing
towards the Northwest. Sir, there is to this no objection. The right
belongs to that quarter of the country; enjoy it; it is yours. Use
the powers granted as you please; but take care, in your haste after
effectual dominion, not to overload the scales by heaping it with
these new acquisitions. Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your
speed after uncontrolled sway, trample not down this constitution.
Already the old States sink in the estimation of members, when brought
into comparison with these new countries. We have been told that "New
Orleans was the most important point in the Union." A place out of the
Union the most important place within it! We have been asked, "What are
some of the small States when compared with the Mississippi Territory?"
The gentleman from that Territory (Mr. POINDEXTER) spoke the other day
of the Mississippi as "of a high road between" ----. Good heavens,
between what, Mr. Speaker? Why, "the Eastern and Western States." So
that all the Northwestern Territories, all the countries once the
extreme western boundary of our Union, are hereafter to be denominated
Eastern States.
[Mr. POINDEXTER explained. He said that he had not said that the
Mississippi was to be the boundary between the Eastern and Western
States. He had merely thrown out a hint, that, in erecting new States,
it might be a good high-road between the States on its waters. His
idea had not extended beyond the new States, on the waters of the
Mississippi.]
I make no great point of this matter. The gentleman will find, in
the National Intelligencer, the terms to which I refer. There will
be seen, I presume, what he has said, and what he has not said. The
argument is not affected by the explanation. New States are intended
to be formed beyond the Mississippi. There is no limit to men's
imaginations, on this subject, short of California and Columbia river.
When I said that the bill would justify a revolution, and would produce
it, I spoke of its principle and its practical consequences. To this
principle and those consequences, I would call the attention of this
House and nation. If it be about to introduce a condition of things
absolutely insupportable, it becomes wise and honest men to anticipate
the evil, and to warn and prepare the people against the event. I
have no hesitation on the subject. The extension of this principle to
the States, contemplated beyond the Mississippi, cannot, will not,
and ought not to be borne. And the sooner the people contemplate the
unavoidable result, the better; the more likely that convulsions may be
prevented; the more hope that the evils may be palliated or removed.
Mr. Speaker: What is this liberty of which so much is said? Is it to
walk about this earth, to breathe this air, and to partake the common
blessings of God's providence? The beasts of the field and the birds
of the air unite with us in such privileges as these. But man boasts
a purer and more ethereal temperature. His mind grasps in its view
the past and the future, as well as the present. We live not for
ourselves alone. That which we call liberty, is that principle on
which the essential security of our political condition depends. It
results from the limitations of our political system, prescribed in
the constitution. These limitations, so long as they are faithfully
observed, maintain order, peace, and safety. When they are violated in
essential particulars, all the concurrent spheres of authority rush
against each other, and disorder, derangement, and convulsion are,
sooner or later, the necessary consequences.
With respect to this love of our Union, concerning which so much
sensibility is expressed, I have no fear about analyzing its nature.
There is in it nothing of mystery. It depends upon the qualities of
that Union, and it results from its effects upon our and our country's
happiness. It is valued for "that sober certainty of waking bliss"
which it enables us to realize. It grows out of the affections, and
has not, and cannot be made to have, any thing universal in its
nature. Sir, I confess it, the first public love of my heart is the
commonwealth of Massachusetts. There is my fireside; there are the
tombs of my ancestors--
"Low lies that land, yet blest with fruitful stores,
Strong are her sons, though rocky are her shores;
And none, ah! none, so lovely to my sight,
Of all the lands which heaven o'erspreads with light."
The love of this Union grows out of this attachment to my native soil,
and is rooted in it. I cherish it, because it affords the best external
hope of her peace, her prosperity, her independence. I oppose this
bill from no animosity to the people of New Orleans, but from the deep
conviction that it contains a principle incompatible with the liberties
and safety of my country. I have no concealment of my opinion. The
bill, if it passes, is a death-blow to the constitution. It may,
afterwards, linger; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant
period, be consummated.
TUESDAY, January 15.
_Orleans Territory._
The House resumed the consideration of the bill authorizing the people
of Orleans Territory to elect a convention to form a constitution
preparatory to its admission into the Union as a free and independent
State--Mr. QUINCY'S motion for indefinite postponement still under
consideration.
Mr. WRIGHT.--Sir, this bill is not, in my judgment, a violation of the
constitution, nor have I a fear that it is fraught with those direful
consequences with which the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY)
threatens us. It will neither justify a dissolution of the Union, nor
lead any citizen attached to it, even amicably, much less forcibly,
to the contemplation of it, notwithstanding the predictions of that
gentleman. That we are authorized to erect new States, I will prove
both by theory and practice, and for that purpose I will first invite
your attention to the articles of Confederation. By one section it
is _expressly_ declared that Canada may be permitted to enjoy all
the benefits of the Confederation on the same terms with the other
States of the Union. The thirteen States under this Confederation
conducted themselves safely through the war; but finding, in 1787,
that their requisitions had not been duly respected, and that New York
had rejected some necessary commercial regulations, whereby their
fiscal affairs were deranged, Congress, by a resolution, resolved
that a convention of States should be held for the express purpose
of amending the articles of Confederation. Under this resolution the
Convention met, and proceeded to form the present constitution. Thus it
will appear that they were to form the new constitution not _ex pari
materia_, but out of the very materials of the Confederation.
As a conclusive evidence, you will find a number of the articles in
each instrument literally or substantially the same, and thereby be
justified in giving a construction of the letter of the constitution,
so as to respect the spirit of the Confederation. By the third section
of 4th article of the constitution, "New States may be admitted by
Congress into the Union;" and by the next member of the same section,
"the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States"--hence I can have no doubt that
Congress have the power to admit new States into the Union, that power
being expressly given. It is however contended, that that power is
limited to the admission only of those States that may be established
within the limits of the United States, as demarcated by the Treaty
of Peace. And the preamble to the constitution is relied on to
establish that doctrine. "We, the people of the United States, &c.,
do establish this constitution for the United States of America." If
this preamble is so imperious as to limit the positive provisions of
the constitution, it will certainly limit itself to the States that
formed the constitution--the negative of which has been determined. To
prove which, here let me call your attention to the fact, that Vermont
was not a member of the Confederation, nor was she a member of the
convention that formed the constitution; she therefore was not one of
the United States--was foreign as to them, and as distinctly governed
as any other foreign power; she in 1791 was admitted into the Union,
and the laws of the United States extended to her. She was not one of
the old States, and was correctly admitted under the power to admit
new States. Vermont was so repulsive to a confederacy with the United
States, as not to be mentioned in the articles of Confederation. Can it
be for a moment doubted that Canada, expressly mentioned, might be now
received as a new State, by becoming independent, or by purchase, when
Vermont has been admitted, who was not mentioned in the Confederation?
Can there be an opinion that the framers of the constitution intended
Canada should be excluded from the benefits of the constitution, when
before invited into it? When, by the express letter of the instrument,
"new States may be admitted," and when Vermont, not mentioned in the
Confederation, has been admitted? Such a conclusion can never be the
rational result of such premises. But it is objected, that, as this
Territory was obtained by treaty, and after the formation of the
constitution, it cannot be admitted into the Union as a State.
I have shown that new States may be admitted, that Vermont has
been admitted, and that Canada was expressly entitled under the
Confederation, and by the terms of the constitution may be admitted as
a new State. "Congress may admit new States into the Union, and make
all needful rules and regulations with respect to the territory or
other property of the United States." This is certainly a territory,
the property of the United States, and Congress as certainly may, if
needful, that is, expedient, admit it into the Union. We are told,
I presume to retard this measure, that the limits are in dispute,
and that, if made a State, they cannot afterwards be settled by the
United States. That this is not the case, I will prove by theory and
by practice. By the treaty-making power vested in the President and
the Senate, they may treat on all subjects within the treaty-making
power, with foreign nations; and where the limits of any foreign power
adjoining the territory of the United States are not ascertained to
their mutual satisfaction, they certainly may settle them by a treaty
of limits. This is the practice and usage of all nations, and the
United States by a treaty of limits with Great Britain, did settle the
beginning of their northeastern limits, at the river St. Croix, whereby
they gave up seven miles to Great Britain, which was taken from a
State--hence I presume no difficulty can arise on the subject.
The question was then taken on the motion for indefinite postponement,
and lost: yeas 28, nays 78.
The main question was then taken that the said bill do pass, and
resolved in the affirmative--yeas 77, nays 36.
WEDNESDAY, January 16.
_Bank of the United States._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to
renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.
Mr. BURWELL moved to strike out the first section.
I have made this motion, sir, said Mr. B., because it allows the
greatest latitude of discussion upon the important points which are
preliminary to the examination of the details. It tries the principle
of the bill, and may save much tedious and useless labor. Should a
majority decide in favor of the Bank of the United States, as an honest
man I will aid in forming a system best adapted to the state of the
country, and most subservient to the purposes of such an institution.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. MOSELY) has done justice to my
conduct, and the fairness with which the subject has been treated. I
have been anxious to present the question fairly, not from any doubt or
indecision as to the course I should pursue, but from its magnitude,
and the sensibility it has excited. It will be recollected by the
committee, when the gentleman from Pennsylvania presented the memorial
upon which the Secretary of the Treasury founded his report, on that,
as on all subsequent occasions, my opposition was manifested; and I
will add that the particular attention which my duty has compelled me
to bestow on the bank, has confirmed more strongly former impressions.
The remarks I shall make are intended to show that Congress possesses
no power to incorporate a bank; to show its effect on the government,
and to satisfy the committee that the exercise of the power, even
if possessed, is inexpedient. While, sir, I feel the most ardent
desire to consult the convenience of the government and promote the
prosperity of the community in general, I have not lost sight of the
limits within which I am restrained by the Constitution of the United
States and considerations of sound policy. It is my most deliberate
conviction that the constitution of the country gives no authority
to Congress to incorporate a bank and endow the stockholders with
chartered immunities; and even if its dissolution should produce ruin
to the merchants, and, what is of equal importance, embarrassment to
the government, they would not be paramount to the sacred obligation of
supporting the constitution; though I am persuaded the dreadful evils
which have been predicted from the annihilation of the bank will soon
vanish, and that no material shock will be produced by that cause. The
construction which the constitution has received by the various persons
who have at different times administered it, has been rigid or liberal
according to the confidence in the General or State Governments. The
unqualified extent given to its general powers, and the inclusion
of incidental powers, as flowing from and belonging to particular
enumerated grants, have constituted the essential points of difference
among those who have divided upon the principles of the constitution.
This has been the case not only in the exercise of authority where the
right was questionable, but in cases where the right was undeniable,
tending by its operation to increase the weight of the General
Government. In giving to the constitution that construction which
sound policy requires, and a just regard to the harmony of the States
and the perpetuation of their Union dictates, I cannot find any part
of it authorizing the exercise of a power which, from its nature, is
obnoxious, its tendency alarming, and its influence in the hands of
those who manage its concerns irresistible. The power to establish a
bank cannot be deduced from the general phrases "to provide for the
common defence and general welfare," because they merely announce the
object for which the General Government was instituted. The only means
by which this object is to be attained are specifically enumerated
in the constitution, and if they are not ample, it is a defect which
Congress are not competent to supply. I think this inference the
stronger, inasmuch as those means were granted to us by those who had
acted under the confederation and experienced its defects, and knew
precisely to what extent power was requisite to provide for the common
defence and general welfare. In relation to this particular subject,
the proceedings of the convention itself furnish the plainest evidence,
by rejecting the proposition to vest in Congress the right to grant
incorporations. I readily admit the motive of deliberative bodies
cannot always be known. Various considerations might have operated.
They might have supposed the power already vested. But, it is incumbent
on those who can place faith in an interpretation so repugnant to the
cautious and guarded phraseology of the instrument, to demonstrate it.
If the right to incorporate exists, it is a general grant of power,
equally applicable to all the objects of incorporation, and cannot
be assumed as a means to carry into effect any particular grant of
authority. To my mind, it is much more natural to suppose a power to
create monopolies had been surrendered, to quiet the fears of those who
saw in the constitution the germ which would sooner or later palsy the
vitals of the State authority. If the general phrases are not explained
in the manner just mentioned, and powers so extensive and important are
derived from them, it would be ridiculous to consider the jurisdiction
of Congress restricted; they would confer equal authority to establish
monopolies in all the various branches of individual industry and
commercial enterprise. Sir, I will conclude this part of the subject by
reminding you how essential it is, when we are giving an interpretation
to the constitution, to which the States are parties, to assume only
what clearly belongs to us. Moderation will inspire confidence,
selfishness will excite disgust and suspicion.
The parts of the constitution which bear any analogy to this subject,
are
1st. Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defence and general welfare, &c.
2d. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
3d. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian tribes. And
4th. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the constitution in
the General Government, into effect.
It will not be denied that, if the establishment of a bank comes
within the meaning of the power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the
debts of the United States, and to regulate commerce, or is necessary
and proper to carry the foregoing powers into effect, it would be a
fair subject for legislation by Congress. But can any one pretend
that a bank would be a mode contemplated by the constitution to lay
and collect taxes on the people for the purpose of raising revenue?
Would it comport with that wise principle of uniformity, and those
guarded restrictions against unequal burdens on the people, which
constitute the most valuable safeguard to the citizen? To understand
these terms we must give them a meaning which has been affixed by their
usual import. When we speak of the power to lay taxes, we understand
by it a demand of money from the community, regulated by fixed and
equitable principles, indiscriminate as to persons, and the species
of property taxed. To suppose that every law which imposed burdens or
brought money into the Treasury was constitutional, would destroy our
equal system of government, and substitute a capricious despotism. It
would revive the exploded doctrine of free gifts, benevolences, and
that shameful train of extortions practised by the old governments of
Europe. Does it fall within the power to pay the debts of the United
States? This clause relates entirely to the application of the funds
after they have been accumulated; it is in conformity with that article
which pledges the public faith for debts which had been contracted,
as well as those which might be created in pursuance of the authority
to borrow money upon the faith of the United States. If the power to
incorporate a bank grew out of the obligation to pay the debts of the
United States, its charter should be so worded as to cease whenever
they were extinguished; and it would be no longer for Congress to fix
a definite period for its expiration. If the right of incorporation
was ever meant to be given, it would most naturally follow from the
regulation of commerce; yet, no one has contended Congress could create
insurance companies within the States. Those who contend the bank is
constitutional, consider it as necessary and proper in collecting the
revenue. That it may be an useful instrument, I do not deny. It forms
depositories convenient to the government; but, you should recollect,
depositories equally safe and convenient can be procured without being
purchased at the expense of exorbitant and invidious privileges to a
particular class in the community. I apprehend the constitution means
something extremely different when it empowers the General Government
to collect taxes; it relates exclusively to the authority thus given
to Congress of employing compulsory process in coercing the payment
of taxes; it enables Congress to create, within the jurisdiction of
the States, officers of the revenue, and, through them, to exercise
over the property of the citizens a concurrent jurisdiction, from
which they otherwise would be precluded, and from which they had been
precluded before the adoption of the constitution; it enables them
to impose penalties and forfeitures, and to inflict punishment for
resistance to their authority. But, sir, admit for a moment the bank
may be formed to collect the revenue, ought it not to be exclusively
used for that object? Whence the power to make it an instrument of
commerce? Why invest it with a capital immense in amount, and sovereign
in its control over the external and internal commerce of the country?
Sir, I must again call your attention to the limited nature of our
Government; we must administer it as we find it, and not as we think it
ought to be. Under this view of the subject, so long as I understand
the right to "lay taxes" to consist in drawing supplies from the people
for public purposes, and not to tax one portion of the community for
the benefit of another, and "to collect them," the right to enforce
payment, I cannot construe them to authorize the establishment of a
bank. Sir, a bank has been improperly considered a means of executing
some power exclusively given to Congress. The nature of incorporations
is so clearly a distinct class of political power, that, before they
can be converted into means incidental to an object without the
jurisdiction of the General Government, they must be shown to be
absolutely necessary. Permit me to ask, how has it been ascertained
that a bank is necessary to the operations of the Government? Has
the experiment been tried? Upon a question involving a breach of
the constitution, it would be safer to be guided by experience than
conjecture.
Sir, I am well aware that I can add nothing new upon the constitutional
points. The subject was more thoroughly examined in 1791, and more ably
elucidated than any other since the adoption of the Government. The
celebrated speech of Mr. MADISON, to which I ascribe my conviction, has
been recently presented to us in the newspapers, and gentlemen must be
familiar with it. I cannot give additional weight to the arguments, but
I thought it proper to call the attention of the committee to that part
of the subject by the remarks I have made.
I said, sir, it must be shown that the bank is necessary to the
operations of the Government--without its aid our fiscal concerns
cannot be managed. So far from subscribing to the necessity of the
bank, I believe the revenue would be equally safe in the State banks,
and could be distributed with inconsiderable difficulty. The revenue
received in most of the States is nearly equal to the expenditure
within them, and when a deficiency occurred in any one, it could be
supplied by arrangements with the different banks, by transportation,
or inland bills of exchange, in the manner that the public engagements
are fulfilled abroad. I will venture to assert the Secretary of the
Treasury will find no difficulty in contracting with individuals and
corporate institutions, upon the most ample security, to transfer
the public revenue upon terms equally advantageous to the United
States. Among the several States commercial intercourse is great, and
daily increasing; the constant traffic which the different portions
of the country maintain with one another, will give facility to the
operations of the Government, and obviate the obstacles which are
anticipated; the very commerce which enables the Treasury to remit
with ease immense sums to every part of Europe is the result of this
interchange among the States, and insures equal facility at home.
Where, then, is the necessity for this bank? The accommodation of
the bank to the Government in times of emergency, and the use of its
resources to support public credit, have been urged as motives for
its establishment; how far such considerations weaken constitutional
objections, it is needless to state. If, sir, the bank becomes a source
of supply to the Government to an adequate extent, it ceases to be
one to the merchants. It therefore cannot answer in both capacities.
The same necessity which throws the Government upon the charity of
the banks renders it incapable of discharging the obligation, and
while the funds of the institution are locked up in the Government,
its commercial functions must cease. The relief which sudden and
temporary embarrassments require, can, at all times, be administered
by the State banks, and, therefore, supersedes the necessity of aid
from this bank. Whenever, by disasters, the ordinary sources of supply
are exhausted, or the unavoidable objects of expenditure exceed the
revenue, a more copious and permanent aliment will be found in the
wealth and capital of the citizens than by loans from banks. Instead
of diverting the active and productive capital from useful channels,
the sluggish and inert mass will be drawn forth in its aid, to support
public credit and cherish private enterprise. But, sir, is it prudent
to rely upon an institution that may refuse you assistance? What
will be the influence of such an institution on the Government, and
the country at large? It cannot escape your recollection that the
establishment of the Bank of the United States was the origin of a
system which assumed as its basis the enlargement of the national
jurisdiction. Whether the principles of expediency to which it owes its
birth be regarded, or the overweening influence it established over
the moneyed institutions and merchants of the States, the charge, to
say the least, is plausible. The close and intimate connection between
the Government and bank--the dependence of the former for loans, and
the latter for public deposits, have given the Executive branch its
full share of influence and odium--shows incontestably it was created
to augment the power of the General Government, and the Executive
in particular. Yes, sir, it was the commencement of those political
animosities which have poisoned the sources of social intercourse; it
was the origin of that doctrine of constructive power which abrogates
the constitution and nullifies the restrictions imposed upon Congress.
So long as it exists, the body politic will experience the agitations
and convulsive throes of well-grounded jealousy in the States.
Sir, in the administration of this Government two things alone are
necessary to insure its durability. You must first avoid every measure
which will produce uneasiness among the States, or, second, that will
extend the jurisdiction of the United States Government to subjects
purely local. I do not mean that the rightful authority of Congress is
to be abandoned for fear of giving offence, but, whenever called on
to take a step which will produce uneasiness, you should be perfectly
satisfied the letter and spirit of the constitution bear you out.
Do not gentlemen perceive the tendency of this measure to involve
us with the States upon delicate points? Has not the United States'
Bank produced serious alarm? Will not the alarm be increased by its
continuance at this time? Yes, sir, some of the States have already
taxed this institution, others have waited under the expectation we
shall render a collision unnecessary. Suppose the charter renewed,
and the stockholders should be taxed in such a manner as to destroy,
virtually, the privileges you have guarantied to them. Are you to
leave them unprotected, or will you draw the sword in their behalf?
While you have time, avoid a situation not less perilous than the
most serious foreign war. Since the establishment of the bank, the
States have created banks--their people have accumulated capital, and
they will not tamely witness the perpetuation of an institution whose
strength can at any moment overthrow whatever State bank they may
mark for destruction. However paradoxical it may appear, I consider
the General Government strengthened by narrowing its jurisdiction; it
will produce disunion whenever they interfere with local concerns. The
habits, local interest, and passions of this country vary, and no one
is a competent judge of what will suit the feelings of the State out
of which he lives. But, sir, there are general principles in which
our feelings and interests are identified; there are subjects upon
which we may safely act, and trust to the co-operation of every man
and State in the Union. Does the bank affect the people locally? The
answer is obvious: it not only undertakes to fix the amount of capital,
but interferes with the rights of property most essentially--it may
change the fundamental principles of State law as to the liability of
property for debts, and the mode of recovering them. Let me caution
you against the renewal of the charter; it is pregnant with the most
baneful consequences to the tranquillity of the country. Is it not
better to sacrifice this golden calf upon the altar of concord, restore
confidence and harmony among individuals as well as States, and to
reunite the lovers of the constitution?
In the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the convenience
of obtaining loans from the bank is mentioned as an inducement to
establish a National Bank. To me the abuse of this convenience is
more dreaded than any other evil which will follow from the measure.
Where have you seen a National Bank, connected with the Government,
which has not ultimately ruined the circulating medium of the nation?
It is a notorious fact that money has depreciated seriously, from
the unlimited circulation of paper, and if the Government should be
compelled, by necessity, to use the funds of the bank, they must permit
the increased circulation of its paper, although its money capital
remains stationary. In this situation the Government must tolerate
an operation which will increase the evil of which we complain. The
example of England is a salutary monition to us, and we ought to profit
from it. In that country there was a time when the stability of the
bank was a national phrase, "As good as the Bank of England." How is it
now? The funds of the bank have been borrowed by the Government--its
paper circulation increased, and Parliament has been compelled to make
it a tender for the payment of all contracts. Who, sir, can estimate
the complicated mischiefs of a depreciated paper currency, without
specie for its redemption? Should we be involved in war, or our
property seized abroad, nothing can present universal bankruptcy--one
wide-spread ruin will pervade the continent. At this time the country
is inundated with paper bottomed upon the whole floating and real
property of the community: should an alarm exist, can these funds be
converted into money to redeem its credit? Certainly not. Will it not
be prudent to diminish the extent of this evil by putting down this
bank which is the fountain from which the whole system flows? It is
of little importance, as it regards the internal trade of a country,
what constitutes the representation of property. Paper, iron, or any
thing else, which passes current, will answer every purpose of barter
and trade; but, in its commerce abroad, it is indispensable that the
circulating medium should be equally valuable and readily acknowledged
among all commercial nations; otherwise, all the operations of
commerce, carried on with money, will be abandoned or prosecuted under
disadvantages equal to the difference in the value of the currency at
home and abroad. In countries actively engaged in business, this branch
of trade is not only great in amount, but by far the most profitable.
How unwise, therefore, not only to substitute for the precious metals
paper currency, whose value is confined to the United States, but to
augment the quantity until it depreciates even among ourselves.
THURSDAY, January 17.
_Bank of the United States._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for
renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States--the motion for
striking out the first section still under consideration.
Mr. FISK.--Mr. Chairman: I regret that we are called upon to vote
for or against striking out the first section of this bill, at this
time. I could have wished that, upon a bill of so much interest and
importance, we could have proceeded to have filled the blanks, and
made such amendments as would have obviated many objections which may
be urged against it in its present form. I am not prepared to give my
vote in favor of a renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United
States, either upon the terms upon which it was originally granted,
or in the manner contemplated by this bill; yet, upon conditions
less objectionable, I should feel myself bound to vote in favor of a
renewal. But the question presented upon this motion, is not upon what
terms this charter shall be renewed, but whether it shall be renewed
upon any terms, subject to any conditions Congress may impose.