this Congress will be required to act. It is determining a question
which is connected with our finances, with the circulating medium of
the country, and with our agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing
interests; and, as such, it cannot but be interesting to every class of
our citizens.
The interests and prosperity of the United States are not only
intimately, but inseparably, connected with trade. The market of the
farmer depends greatly upon the merchant and the shipper. And the
price and demand of every article of produce are in a great degree
regulated by the difficulties or facilities of payment. Let the
difficulty of paying be increased, and the price of produce immediately
falls; for the demand for exportation becomes very limited, the markets
are overstocked, and prices reduced. Any sudden check to our commerce,
whether produced by our own municipal regulations, or the outrages of
foreign powers, checks the market and the price of produce; so that not
only the merchants, but the farmers feel its effects. I scarcely need
recur to the history of the times when trade was principally suspended
in this country, to show how severely the suspension operated upon
every class of our citizens, and in every part of the country. This
period in our political annals will be long remembered. So great was
the distress in some States, and agricultural States, too, that their
Legislatures deemed it necessary, for the protection of the debtor from
the power of his creditor, to stay the administration of justice, and
prohibit by statute the issuing of an execution for the collection of
any debt.
This proves the connection which subsists between the two great
agricultural and commercial interests of this country. Agriculture,
commerce, and manufactures constitute the source of our wealth,
revenue, and prosperity. To foster and cherish the principles upon
which rest our existing hopes and future prospects, can never be a
question of doubtful policy with a wise and patriotic legislature.
We have seen that commerce is essential to our interests; but commerce
will not flourish without credit. It never has prospered independent of
credit. As credit is essential to trade, so is punctuality to support
credit. Look at the business of any commercial people, and see how much
of it is done upon credit; and see the integrity and fidelity with
which punctuality is maintained in order to support their credit.
For several centuries past, banks have been the successful medium
through which credit has not only been preserved, but great wealth
acquired. This assertion is warranted by the history of these
institutions, and of the countries where they have been patronized. The
first bank established in Europe, was at Genoa, in 1407--four hundred
and four years ago; this was soon followed by one at Venice.
The Bank of Amsterdam was established in 1609, and shortly after those
of Hamburg and Rotterdam; and the Bank of England in 1694; the Royal
Bank at Paris in 1718; the Bank of North America in 1784--a memorable
period in our history--and the Bank of the United States in 1791.
All these different institutions show, that enlightened legislators
have entertained but one opinion upon this subject both in Europe
and America for the last four hundred years. They have seen and
acknowledged their utility. Banks have long since been considered not
only essentially useful in the transaction of commercial concerns, but
as highly necessary to aid the fiscal operations of Government. And a
more unanswerable argument cannot be urged in favor of their general
utility than their uniform success; to this may be added the prosperity
of the people and the countries where banks have been supported. Their
immediate advantages are, a convenient circulating medium; the safe
depository they afford for cash and funds. And they serve to keep
the standard of money steady and correct; to insure punctuality; to
preserve credit; to inspire confidence, and to promote a spirit of
industry and enterprise. They are not, as many have supposed, in their
nature hostile to Government and dangerous to liberty. They rather
form a barrier to tyranny and oppression. Their principal business
is to lend money at the common rate of interest, and thus prevent
usury. The owners of banks are generally rich men, who have not only
their personal liberty, but a large property to risk, by sedition,
treason, and rebellion. It is their interest to resist oppression.
We need scarcely point to the Continent of Europe for proof of the
fact, when we assert, that trade and banks cannot flourish where
despotism prevails. Despotic power generally ruins trade and banks,
but no instance occurs in history where banks, not under the control
of Government, have ruined a State. A bank owned by Government, and
under its command, would be an engine dangerous to the people. But when
owned by individuals, neither the people nor the Government have any
thing to fear from it. It is then dependent on both for its business,
prosperity, and usefulness.
With the evidence which both history and experience offer to our
reflection, we cannot doubt the utility of banks, nor deny but
that they have been beneficial to us. And we are justified in the
conclusion, that, under proper regulations, they may subserve the
best interests of the people of the United States. They are now in
successful operation in almost every State in the Union, and that
they have been useful, the present prosperous state of the country
abundantly proves. We enjoy as perfect security for life, liberty, and
property, as any people under any Government ever did. These are the
great objects of a good Government. And we may triumphantly ask, where
is the nation or people that enjoy these with more freedom and safety
than the American people? A parallel for our liberty and prosperity,
for the last twenty years, is not to be found in the history of man.
Our wealth, population, and resources, have increased beyond what any
one would have calculated or imagined, and beyond what strangers and
foreigners now believe. Industry, wealth, and contentment, pervade
every quarter of our country, and poverty and oppression are unknown to
our citizens.
In 1791, the year this bank was incorporated, our exports amounted to
about eighteen millions of dollars; and in 1804, they had increased
to about seventy-six millions, gaining in thirteen years fifty-eight
millions; and our tonnage in about the same proportion.
Much of this prosperity is to be attributed to the active capital
which has excited industry, and a spirit of enterprise among us,
and the activity of this capital has been in a great degree created
and promoted by the Bank of the United States. Its operations have
been extensive in all our trading towns. It has aided in loans
and discounts, and assisted in the collection, safe-keeping, and
transmission of our revenues. It has been the depository of our
Treasury, and is now become incorporated with the administration of the
fiscal department of our Government. The connection which it has formed
with almost every branch of business in the country, is not slight and
trifling, and so easily to be severed as some seem to believe. Its
operations are deeply interwoven with the dealings and concerns of all
the men of business in the United States.
With a capital of ten millions, it has furnished accommodations of
fifteen millions a year. This has been employed principally in trade;
in making prompt and cash payments to our farmers for their produce.
This, again, has furnished to our citizens a ready and profitable
market for every article of produce. These high profits of a good
market have gone into the hands of the farmer, to cultivate, improve,
and enrich the country. And travel through any State in the Union, and
their effects may be readily seen, affording a prospect, consoling
and elevating to the philanthropist and the patriot. The land is
highly cultivated, good buildings, turnpike roads, bridges, and other
expensive improvement, indicate the wealth of our citizens, and the
prosperity of the country. Money has been freely circulated, trade has
been active, produce high, and our country has been improved by these
unexampled advantages to a degree far beyond what the most sanguine
calculations, twenty years ago, could have anticipated. And yet, sir,
we are gravely told that this bank has nearly ruined the country; that
it is threatening our best interests with destruction. As well might
gentlemen tell us that total darkness prevails at noon-day, or that the
sun, in his meridian splendor, affords neither light nor heat to any
part of this globe.
The principal portion of the trade and business of the United States
has been conducted by a paper medium; metallic has scarcely been
seen. The amount of this circulating medium is, say fifty millions.
Now what is proposed by denying a renewal of the United States' Bank
charter? That this bank shall close its concerns, and of course stop
all its accommodations. This must necessarily check and change at least
one-third of the circulating medium of the country. It will undeniably
require $24,000,000 to be directed to one operation, and for a time
to one point--for the capital is $10,000,000; this is to be collected
to divide among the stockholders. There are $19,000,000 due to the
bank; this must be collected. This will occasion a demand for this
amount from other sources; it must be paid. And the $5,000,000 in the
bank makes the sum of $24,000,000, which must be suddenly called in.
The effect this will have upon the various interests in the country
can neither be described nor conceived. It must inevitably give a
general and heavy shock to all paper credit; this credit, so much and
profitably in operation, must receive a severe, if not a mortal wound.
And what substitute have we for this when it shall be destroyed? Silver
and gold coin cannot be relied on. There is not from the best estimate
an amount to exceed $10,000,000 specie in all our cities and trading
towns, and this will be collected by this bank. The price of all
stocks, and every kind of produce and species of property must suffer
a great depression, for a scarcity of money enhances its value, and
consequently depresses the value of every other species of property.
That this sudden, if not total change in our system, must occasion
great embarrassment, produce failures, disappointments, and distress,
among our citizens, is certain.
Put down this bank, and how then are your revenues to be collected?
Through the medium of the State banks? You do what no prudent man, in
his individual concerns, would think of doing. You discard a faithful,
honest, responsible agent, whose integrity and fidelity you have known
for twenty years, and you place your estate in the hands and at the
disposal of twenty or thirty entire strangers, of whose character
and responsibility you know nothing, nor have the means of acquiring
any knowledge, and over whose conduct you have no control. Should an
individual act thus with his property, he would be deemed to have lost
all regard for it, if not considered a madman. In resorting to the
State banks, we are offering the amount of our revenue as a bounty for
intrigues, cabals, and factions, through the country. In almost every
State there are a number of banks, and each will endeavor to get the
revenue collected in that State, to keep and trade with. It must be
given to one, or divided among them all. If one is selected as the
favorite, all the rest become jealous, dissatisfied, and exert their
capital and influence against the favorite bank and its patron, the
Government. This will awaken a spirit of faction in every State, yet
unknown in this country. If all are to be gratified in their request
for the deposits, the Government must open separate accounts with all
the different banks in the country, to the amount of fifty or sixty;
and new companies will be formed, and new applicants request to divide
the business, and share the profits. Indeed, there will be no end to
the scenes of speculation and intrigue, which will soon appear, if this
course is adopted by the Government.
Mr. SEYBERT.--It may be said that this subject has been exhausted
by the discussions of the ablest politicians of the country. I will
premise, the remarks which I shall offer are intended solely to
justify the vote which it is my intention to give on this momentous
occasion.
The question pending the United States' Bank has excited a peculiar
interest throughout this nation, more especially in our seaports.
The dissolution of this institution, which from its limitation, will
expire on the fourth of March next, has been portrayed in colors of
the darkest shades, and the distresses which many maintain will be
consequent to that event, call seriously for a fair and deliberate
investigation. I hope, sir, I shall be pardoned for imposing on the
patience of the House, when it is recollected that the community which
I represent have employed four-tenths of the capital stock of the
United States' Bank. If evil consequences are to attend the dissolution
of this establishment, or if beneficial results proceed from its
continuance, in either case I must feel myself essentially interested;
it is therefore my wish to be distinctly understood upon the important
principles which have connection with the great question now before us.
At the last session of Congress, I presented the memorial of the
President, Directors, and Stockholders of the Bank of the United
States; at that time I entertained no positive opinion on the subject;
the discussions which took place in the committee to whom the memorial
was referred, necessarily, as a duty on my part, excited that attention
which the importance of the question imperiously demanded. Under
circumstances of doubt, I voted in favor of reporting a resolution in
support of the bank, for the purpose of giving to the establishment
every chance which reason could urge; at the same time reserving to
myself the right to pronounce a final decision, according as policy
and expediency, but more especially as principle should dictate. I
will admit, sir, that this is not the time or place to institute the
general inquiry, whether banks are or are not beneficial to a nation?
Because, whether the charter of the United States' Bank be renewed
or not, the several States, who have the unquestioned authority to
incorporate bank establishments, have already created many, which it is
not in our power to control. I do not hesitate to declare, though many
persons in the United States are decidedly opposed to a banking system,
under every possible circumstance, I am not of this class. Experience
has proved, in a manner very satisfactory to my mind, the advantages
which are derived from the banks when they are impartially directed,
and when the accommodation afforded by them is prudently employed; the
great difficulty seems to be to confine the system within its proper
limits. I understand the proposition as applicable to the agricultural,
manufacturing, and commercial interests of the United States.
For my proofs of this proposition, I will not rely upon the famous Bank
of St. George, at Genoa, whose authority, by a gentleman from New York,
(Mr. FISK,) has been considered of much weight. I will recall to the
mind of my friend the remark of an intelligent traveller, who, when
he visited this bank of antiquity, exclaimed: Here lies concealed the
enigma, whether the bank possesses millions of millions, or whether it
is indebted millions of millions! He concludes, Upon this important
secret rests the safety of the State. Unhappy State, say I, whose
safety depends upon a secret concealed within the vaults of a bank.
Perhaps to a development of this secret may we attribute the present
servile condition of the people of the once far-famed and powerful
Republic of Genoa.
Sir, I am decidedly opposed to a prominent, and what to me appears
to be a very dangerous feature in the bill now under consideration.
I allude to the eighth section, which admits of an increase of the
present capital stock of the bank. Adopt this provision, you will
thereby create an Herculean power, which will have at its mercy
all the minor institutions of the States; thus constituted, it can
oppress and destroy them, as whim or interest may dictate. The steps
which have been taken preparatory to a dissolution of the present
bank, it is said, occasion much embarrassment, and threaten with ruin
many of our citizens; if the present capital of ten millions can
thus affect society, who will pretend to accumulate present evils,
or risk entailing misery on posterity, solely for the purpose of a
temporary gain to the Government? In this question Pennsylvania is
deeply concerned; she has several millions of dollars invested in her
banks; this to her is a valuable source of revenue; upon this may she
predicate much of her future prosperity; hence will she derive the
funds requisite for future internal improvements; but if you fill up
the blanks in this section with a considerable sum, all these prospects
will be blasted forever; you will thereby destroy the tree from whose
ramifications were to emanate the blessings of peace and the sinews
of war. Those of her representatives who may deem it politic and
constitutional to vote for a continuance of the charter of the United
States' Bank, ought surely to oppose any increase of the present
capital; we have been told that that which now exists has been found
sufficient for all purposes, at a time when our commerce was much more
extensive than we have reason to suppose will soon again be the case.
The history of the banks in our country informs us, that the one
usually termed the Bank of North America was the first establishment
of the kind which received the sanction of the Government. This
institution was incorporated by an act of Congress, in the month of
May, 1781, under the authority of the "Articles of Confederation."
The present Bank of the United States was incorporated by an act of
Congress, on the 25th of February, 1791, during the operation of the
present Constitution of the United States.
Without an attempt to examine every hypothesis, which has been or
which might be proposed, respecting the constitutionality of the
principle, I will content myself with the statement of the case, such
as it appears to my mind. The first public act which I performed as a
member of the Congress of the United States, was, to swear solemnly
that I would support the Constitution of the United States. It
therefore is my duty to examine and consider its precepts, according to
the best of my ability.
The "Articles of Confederation" and the present Constitution of the
United States do not differ as regards any power delegated by the
States to Congress, touching charters of incorporation. I can never
persuade myself that the constitution was intended other than to have
a definite meaning; or that it was ever contemplated to speak an
equivocal language; ambiguity arises solely from the misconceptions
of its interpreters; it is very plain and of easy comprehension,
especially as it relates to the present question, since it is totally
silent on the right to create corporations--its wisdom is further
illustrated by the special provision for the only exclusive privilege
which is consistent with a free and equal government, and that is in
favor of genius.
The powers delegated by the States are special and defined, and,
it is expressly declared by the constitution, that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." This language needs no interpretation. I cannot for a moment
permit myself to suppose, that the patriots who were tested during
the long-continued uncertainty of the most important events of our
Revolutionary period, and to whom was ultimately assigned the right
and power to construct the instrument which is to guide us in the
political labyrinth--that they intended this their great work should
alone be explicable by that refined reasoning to which common sense is
a stranger, I never can admit. Surely that which they framed for the
good and security of every individual in the nation, must be expressed
in a manner to be understood by ordinary men, and those whom it was
intended to direct. Sir, if simplicity was not originally contemplated
by the framers of the constitution, why the imposition on the people
in publishing it to the world? Was it not a prodigal waste of labor
and materials, to furnish every citizen of our country with a copy
of that which can only be understood by professional men, or such as
are eminently skilled in scholastic research? It had better remain a
secret, concealed amongst the musty rolls in the archives of State,
than be a puzzle for mankind. As long as this instrument is preserved
pure and untarnished, it will receive a becoming respect from your
fellow-citizens--it will be regarded as "the stupendous fabric of
human invention." Remember, the present argument, in several important
points of view, affects posterity in common with ourselves. You had
better commit the unintelligible jargon to the flames, than by the
agency of construction, neutralize wisdom by folly. Sir, if we have a
constitution which the people cannot understand, I then say, cut the
original into slips, and provide the means for a better; or, if that
is not to be done, and we are to be ruled by the iron hand of power,
in that case, as one of the American people, I will pray you to be
graciously pleased to grant a plain bill of rights for our better
government.
If we look back, and attentively view the occurrences which took place,
when the law incorporating the present bank of the United States
was enacted, we shall find our reasoning supported and confirmed by
many important circumstances; we shall then perceive, that the act
of incorporation was opposed on constitutional ground, by men who
were and continue to be esteemed for their talents, political skill,
judicial knowledge, probity and patriotism; and it has been admitted,
that the arguments formerly urged are unanswerable. That the power to
create corporations was never intended to be ceded on the part of the
United States, is proved beyond all manner of contradiction; for we are
told by the highest authority, by one who was a member of the General
Convention, that it had been proposed to cede to Congress the power to
create corporations, and that the proposition was rejected, after a
deliberate discussion. In my opinion this decision is in proof of the
sagacity and wisdom of those who made it; it was highly justifiable to
retain this power to be exercised by the States; because, corporations
are generally founded on circumstances, which are entirely local--as
such, they can be better understood by the Legislatures of the
respective States, than by that of the General Government.
The experience of every session proves that the decisions of Congress
vary with the men who at different times compose that body; therefore,
the act of February, 1791, can have no force in settling the principle
contended for.
I have heard it urged, that the States have recognized the
constitutionality of the United States' Bank, by their laws. I
know of no law in any of the States, which declares this charter
constitutional. Were it even proved, that several of the States
had published this declaration, with me it would signify nothing,
unless the sanction of two thirds of the States was thus had. On a
former occasion, several of the States were induced, from peculiar
circumstances, to relinquish for a time their right in favor of a
particular case--I allude to the first establishment of the Bank of
North America. If this had been intended to decide this very important
question, without any reservation of their power in other cases, they
would have expressed it in the most positive and unequivocal manner.
Sir, it may be asked, how did the Congress, whilst acting under the
"Articles of Confederation," incorporate the Bank of North America,
though their powers were no more extensive than those of the present
Congress? We shall not lose by this investigation--they declared
that "the exigencies of the United States rendered it indispensably
necessary that such an act be immediately passed," and, at that
period, the Board of War confessed they had not money sufficient to
pay the expense of forwarding an express to the Commander-in-chief
of the Army! Notwithstanding such urgent necessities on the part of
the General Government, they were too conscious of the rights of the
States to attempt a usurpation of authority, or to pretend to force
this act without their sanction; accordingly, we find the resolution by
which this bank was established followed by another, which recommended
to the Legislature of each of the States the necessity to pass such
laws as they judged requisite for giving the ordinance, by which the
subscribers to the Bank of North America were incorporated, its full
operation; every provision in the charter of this bank, to have full
effect, was recommended to the Legislatures of the several States for
their approbation. (_See Journals of Congress for 1781, vol. 7th, pp.
257 and 258._)
It is a well-known and an important fact, that the subscribers to
the Bank of North America did not rest satisfied of the authority of
Congress to incorporate them; subsequently to the original act of
incorporation, they accepted from the Legislature of Pennsylvania a
charter by which their privileges were very much abridged.
Some maintain, the States having made it penal to pass counterfeits of
the notes of the United States' Bank, is in proof of their recognizing
the constitutionality of the institution. No one will pretend that
these laws were intended other than to guard the people against fraud.
These statutes were enacted without any connection with or reference to
the principle upon which the original act was founded. It is but too
well known, notwithstanding these salutary provisions, that counterfeit
bank notes of every denomination are in daily circulation. I will ask,
what would be the case if such laws had not been passed by the States?
Sir, if it requires all our care to prevent an inundation from such
bank paper as is acknowledged to be genuine, for Heaven's sake do not
risk the security of the people, by an indirect sanction of such as is
known to be spurious!
FRIDAY, January 18.
A motion was made by Mr. FISK, that the House do now adjourn; and the
question being taken thereon, it was determined in the negative--yeas
6, nays 59.
_Bank of the United States._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.
Mr. BURWELL'S motion for striking out the first section being still
under consideration.
Mr. P. B. PORTER.--Mr. Chairman: As this bank has excited so
extraordinary an interest in every part of the United States, and
particularly in the State which I have the honor to represent; as
I am apprehensive, from what took place yesterday, that I shall be
found, on this question, in opposition to a majority of my colleagues;
and, (what will always be an imperative motive with me,) as I think
this bill aims a deadly blow at some of the best principles of the
constitution, I feel it my duty to state to the House the grounds on
which I shall be constrained to vote for striking out the section now
under consideration.
I acknowledge that I had not, until lately, paid any particular
attention to the question of the constitutionality of this institution.
I stand, therefore, in this respect, on safer ground than the
respectable member from North Carolina (Mr. MACON,) for I have no
reason to suspect myself of any long-rooted prejudices on the question.
The Bank of the United States was established at a time when I was
not in the habit of troubling myself with such questions. I had been
accustomed to think of it as an institution, the constitutionality of
which was conceded by common consent. But, sir, when the question was
again stirred, I felt it my duty to give it a thorough investigation
before I should sanction it by my vote. I have given it, if not a
thorough, at least a candid and impartial examination; and the result
has been, a full conviction that we have no right to incorporate a
bank upon the principles of the bill on the table, or rather, upon
the principles of the original charter, which this bill proposes to
renew. The ground of my objection is, that it assumes the exercise of
legislative powers which belong exclusively to the State Governments.
I shall not touch the question of the expediency of this bank, much
less the expediency of banking generally. If I were competent, which I
confess I am not, to the task, I should think it a very unprofitable
one, to follow the gentleman through all the mazes of the banking
system--a system, sir, about the various and important operations
and effects of which on civil society, aside from a few obvious
truths which it furnishes, I have found that those gentlemen who have
professed to understand them best, have differed most. As I propose to
confine myself to the constitutional question solely, I hope I shall
be allowed to take a little broader range on this point, than has been
taken by the gentlemen who have preceded me.
I am aware how ungracious constitutional objections to the powers of
this House are with those, and there are many such, who believe that
the powers of the Federal Government are, at best, too contracted; and
who would be glad to see all the State rights merged and sunk into a
consolidated government. Whatever may be my speculative opinions on
this subject, I can never be influenced, by motives of expediency,
to swerve from my allegiance to the constitution. This sentiment
is indelibly fixed on my mind, and I trust it is a common one to
the members of this committee. That, in adhering strictly to the
obligation we have taken to support the Constitution of the United
States, we not only perform a sacred duty to ourselves, but we render
a better service to the real and permanent interests of our country
than we could possibly render by a departure from that obligation;
even though that departure were to avert so serious a calamity as a
general bankruptcy--a calamity which, in order to alarm the timid, has
been held out as the inevitable consequence of a refusal to renew this
charter.
I should be surprised at the general acquiescence which seems to have
been yielded to the constitutionality of this institution, did I not
believe that others had been as superficial in their examination
of the subject as I had myself. When objections are made to the
constitutionality of the law, the people, in the cursory views which
they are accustomed to take of such objects, are apt to adopt, as the
tests of its constitutionality, the powers of the State and Federal
Governments collectively; and if they find nothing in the law offensive
to the principles of civil liberty, nothing uncongenial with the spirit
of a Republican Government, they rest satisfied, and do not trouble
themselves with nice distinctions between the powers peculiar to the
one or the other of these Governments. Such reasoning would, however,
ill become the sagacity of this House.
One of the most serious dangers with which our Government is
threatened, and it is a danger growing out of the very nature and
structure of the Government itself, consists in its tendency to
produce collisions between State and Federal authorities. The Federal
Government, as was observed by my learned colleague, (Mr. MITCHILL,)
is _imperium in imperio_, a government within a government; and the
misfortune is, that there exists no friendly third power to decide the
controversies which may arise between these two great, independent,
and, in many respects, rival authorities. The public peace must be
kept, if kept at all, by the conciliatory dispositions of the parties
themselves. As then we have a common interest in the preservation of
both these Governments--as we are as well the subjects of the _imperio_
as of the _imperium_, we ought to act with great circumspection and
delicacy in the assumption of powers which do not clearly belong to us.
It is better to forego the exercise of powers to which we are entitled,
if the exercise of them is not very important, rather than hazard
the assumption of doubtful ones, the fatal consequences of which my
honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. BURWELL) has so justly deprecated.
The great line of demarcation between the powers of the State and
Federal Governments is well understood. The powers of the State
Governments extend to the regulation of all their internal concerns:
those of the Federal Government to the management of all our external
relations--external as regards the individual States, as well as the
States in their collective capacity. The general ideas upon which our
Republic is founded, are these: That small territories are better
adapted to the successful administration of justice than large ones. In
a Republic, where the people are the sovereigns and source of power,
it is important that, in order to enable them to execute this power
discreetly, they should possess correct information in relation to
the character and conduct of their rulers, and in relation also to
the character of the measures which they pursue, or ought to pursue;
and this information is better attained in a small than in a large
territory. The individual States have therefore reserved to themselves
the exclusive right of regulating all their internal, and, as I may
say, municipal concerns, in relation both to person and property.
But a single State may be inadequate to its own protection against
foreign violence; it may also be unable to enforce the observance of
proper rules and regulations for carrying on its foreign trade and
intercourse. The Confederacy of the States is therefore formed for the
purpose of attaining these two objects, namely, the regulation and
protection of the trade and intercourse of the States with each other
and foreign nations, and their security against foreign invasion. It
has some other objects in view of minor consequence, and immediately
connected with these principal ones. The Constitution of the United
States is the basis of this confederacy; and it is only necessary
to read the constitution to perceive that it is nothing more than a
delegation of specific powers for these specific purposes, and that the
general sovereignty of the States over their respective territories is
expressly retained by the States.
But, sir, independent of these specific powers and duties of the
Federal Government, it has another and distinct set of powers and
duties to perform and execute. The national domain, as it has been
called, embracing the lands acquired by the Revolutionary conflict; the
lands since purchased of foreign nations; and the lands ceded by the
several States to the General Government, belong to the United States
in their federate capacity; and no individual State, as such, has any
claim to or jurisdiction over them. As to these lands the powers of
the United States are sovereign, independent, and complete: and the
Congress of the United States is the only legitimate authority for the
exercise of this sovereignty. The powers of Congress, then, in relation
to these territories, include the powers of both the Federal and State
governments, in relation to the States. I have adverted to this branch
of the powers of the Federal Government as a means of dispelling the
obscurity which has been thrown over the constitutional question, to
which I shall soon come, by confounding the powers of Congress over the
States, with their powers over the territories. Arguments, to which
I shall have occasion to advert in the course of my observations,
have been used to justify the exercise of particular powers within the
limits of the States, from our acknowledged right to and practical
exercise of similar powers within the Territories.
In discussing constitutional questions, then, we lay down these
axioms:--That in relation to the territories, the powers of Congress
are supreme and exclusive; that in relation to the States, they are
specifically defined and limited by the constitution--and that we
have no right to exercise, within the limits of a State, any power
as resulting from the general rights of sovereignty; because that
sovereignty belongs to the States and to the people, and not to the
Federal Government. To show that these two last positions are correct,
I will read the tenth article in the amendment of the constitution:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or the people."
As, then, the incorporation of this bank involves the exercise of
legislative powers within the jurisdiction of the States, in relation
to the rights of property between the citizens of those States; and
as no power to incorporate a bank, _eo nomine_, is to be found in the
constitution, it would seem sufficient for us to rest the argument
here, by a mere denial of the power, and to call on the advocates
of the bank to show its constitutionality. An attempt to prove this
constitutionality has been made--not, however, sir, by arguments
advanced by gentlemen on the other side of the House in their places,
(for they have, so far, observed, and I understand that they will
continue to observe, a profound silence on this question,) but by
arguments which have been gratuitously introduced, by the agent of the
bank. I allude to the pamphlet which has within a few days past been
printed and distributed among the members, containing the celebrated
argument of General Hamilton, "on the constitutionality of a National
Bank." As that pamphlet is _de facto_, if not _de jure_, before the
committee, I will, if the committee will indulge me, attempt to examine
some of the principal arguments contained in it, and I will also notice
some additional ones, advanced yesterday by my honorable friend and
colleague on my left, (Mr. FISK.) In the course of the observations
which I have to submit, I shall, without doubt, repeat arguments and
remarks made by the gentlemen who have preceded me, and others which
are familiar to the members of the committee. My excuse must rest in
the difficulty of taking a connected view of the subject, without such
repetitions. If I shall be so fortunate as to throw a single new ray of
light on this important question, I shall feel amply remunerated for
my trouble, and I shall think the time of the committee not altogether
misspent.
The first argument in this pamphlet is founded on the sovereignty of
the powers of Congress. The Federal Government is said to be sovereign
as to all the objects for which that Government was instituted. A
sovereign power includes, by force of the term, a right to all the
means applicable to the attainment of the end for which that power is
given; and therefore Congress may, in virtue of their sovereign power,
create incorporations for attaining the ends or objects of those powers.
This argument is founded on what the logicians call _petitio
principii_, or begging the question. The proposition, that the
Government is sovereign, is assumed, to prove that it possesses the
attributes of sovereignty: or, in other words, the fact of sovereignty
is assumed, to prove that sovereignty. If the position that the
powers of this Government are sovereign as to all the objects of
them, be proved, I will concede the consequence, to wit: that we have
a right to establish corporations to attain these objects--but I
deny the fact of sovereignty. The acts of Congress, it is said, are
declared by the constitution to be the supreme law of the land: and
the power which can make the supreme law of the land, is necessarily
a sovereign power. But I deny that this is a correct definition, or
exposition of sovereignty. It is not the high nature of an act, nor
the authority of the act, that stamps the character of sovereignty on
him who performs it. The sheriff of a county who puts a man to death,
under the sentence of the law, executes an act of as high import
and authority as human power can execute; and yet the sheriff of a
county is not therefore a sovereign. His authority is a mere delegated
authority--his act is a mere ministerial, mechanical act. The idea of
sovereignty imports the exercise of discretion--of judgment--of will.
It is of the very essence of sovereign power, that you may execute
that power, or not execute it--that you may execute it when you will,
and how you will. A sovereign power, as to any object, includes a
right to any means, and all the means applicable to the attainment
of the object. But, sir, do Congress possess sovereign powers, or,
what is the same thing, discretionary means, as to the attainment
of the objects of this Government? No, sir. The constitution is not
a general authority to Congress to attain the objects for which the
Government was established; but it is an enumeration of the particular
powers, or means, by which, and by which only, certain objects are to
be accomplished. If the powers of Congress were sovereign, they would
of necessity comprehend all the means applicable to the attainment of
their objects; but inasmuch as they are specific and circumscribed,
that very circumstance proves that they are not sovereign. The people
of the United States are the true sovereigns of this country. From
them all power emanates, and on their will all the authority of this
Government depends. The powers of the Federal Government are mere
delegated chartered authorities; and in the exercise of them we are
tied down to the letter of the constitution. We have, to be sure, a
certain latitude of discretion allowed us, within the letter and pale
of the constitution; and so far we may be said to possess a sort of
limited qualified sovereignty. But the constitution is the standard
by which to measure the quantum and extent of our sovereignty. And
our sovereignty, which is the result of the powers given in the
constitution, is not the standard by which to measure the constitution.
The constitution is the true bed of Procrustes--and our sovereignty,
however unwillingly we may yield it, must be the victim.
Another argument, which is rather an argument to the favor than to
the right of this bank, is, that it is an innocent institution;
that, although its erection involves the exercise of legislative
powers within the States, it does not abridge or affect the rights
of the citizens, as secured to them by the laws of those States. A
corporation, it is said, is a fiction of the law, a mere political
transformation of a number of individuals from their natural into an
artificial character, for the purpose of enabling them to do business
to better advantage, and on a more extended scale; but, that when this
political association, this legal entity, is once formed, it becomes
subject to the laws of the State in which it happens to be placed.
I know, sir, that there is nothing formidable in the abstract idea of
a corporation. It is a mere phantom of the imagination, invisible,
intangible, and, of course, innocent. But, sir, when the legal
effects of this incorporation are to invest the individuals whom it
associates with privileges and immunities to which they were not before
entitled; when this legal fiction is interposed to shield certain
individuals from the liabilities to which they would be subject as
ordinary citizens, it then becomes a matter of important and serious
consequence. What are some of the legal effects of this incorporation?
One of its most obvious and distinguished characteristics is, that it
exempts the private property and persons of the stockholders from all
liability for the payment of the debts of the company. By the laws
of every State in the Union, every man is, I believe, liable for the
payment of his debts, to the full amount of his private fortune; and,
in case that fortune prove insufficient, his personal liberty is at
the disposal of his creditor; at least to a certain extent. Is not,
then, the exemption from these liabilities an important immunity? Is it
not an exclusive privilege secured to the stockholders of this bank?
Assuredly it is. I know it has been said that a number of individuals
may, by a private association, secure to themselves all the advantages
of an incorporated company; that, by forming a common fund or stock
upon which to do business, and issuing notes chargeable upon that
fund, they may exonerate their persons and private property from all
liability for the payment of the debts contracted in that business. I
am no lawyer, sir; but if the law be what it is said to be, and what
I believe it to be, _summa ratio_, then I pronounce this doctrine not
to be law; for nothing can be more preposterous in principle than to
say, that a man may, by his own act, avoid the force of an obligation
which the law has made universal and unqualified. If a man owes a debt,
acknowledges he owes it, and has received a consideration for it,
the law has prescribed the nature and extent of his liability to pay
it; and it is not for him to say that it shall only be paid out of a
certain fund, or particular part of his property, and no other. When
men contract a debt jointly, the legal obligation to pay it extends as
well to the persons and separate property of the individual partners,
as to their joint property.
Another feature of this incorporation is, that it authorizes the
stockholders to take usurious interest for their money. By the
provisions of the law, the bank may issue notes and make discounts to
double the amount of their capital stock; and, in addition to that,
to the amount of any moneys which may happen to be deposited in their
vaults for safe-keeping; and this, too, independent of the debts
created by these deposits. The bank, then, may, and in fact, in many
instances, does draw an interest on three or four times its capital.
Every State in the Union has laws regulating the rate of interest,
and in most of the States this rate is fixed at six per cent. a year.
By these laws it is made penal for a man to receive more than six per
cent. interest for the use of any sum of money which, by a loan, he
puts at hazard, and the use of which he deprives himself of. Now, sir,
this bank is permitted, contrary to those laws, to draw an interest
on twenty or thirty millions of dollars, when, in truth, the whole
extent of its responsibility, the whole sum which it puts at hazard,
and the use of which it foregoes, is only its original stock of ten
millions. In answer to this, it will be said that an individual may, by
issuing notes to an amount greater than his property, legally receive
an interest on a capital which he does not possess. But it must be
recollected, in case of the individual, that, although he may not at
the particular time possess a property adequate to the payment of his
debts, yet that all the property which he may subsequently acquire,
will be liable for the payment of those debts; and what is more, sir,
his personal liberty is always put in jeopardy. In this point of view,
the liability and the hazard of the individual may fairly be said to be
co-extensive with the whole amount of the capital on which he draws an
interest; and which is often the case with the bank.
This bank incorporation possesses other qualities at war with the
laws of the several States; one of which is, that it authorizes
stockholders, who may be foreigners, to hold real estate. But, sir, I
will not detain the committee any longer on this part of the argument,
for this institution cannot be said to be innocent, as regards the
rights of the States, when its effects on the rights of property
are to exonerate the stockholders from some of the most important
responsibilities which the laws of the several States have provided
for the payment of debts; and when it authorizes the taking of
usurious interest. I lay it down, then, as a position which cannot
be controverted, that the granting of this charter is not only an
interference with the municipal regulations of the several States in
relation to the rights of property; but that it is an infraction of the
rights of individuals as secured by those regulations.
But it is contended, that a right to incorporate a Bank of the United
States is delegated to Congress by the constitution: and five or six
different provisions of the constitution are referred to as giving this
right. It is said that it is implied in the power to lay and collect
taxes, in the power to borrow money, in the power to regulate trade and
intercourse between the several States, in the power to provide for
the general welfare, and in the power to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territorial and other property of the United
States. The very circumstance of referring this right to many different
heads of authority is, in itself, conclusive evidence that it has no
very direct relation to any of them. For it can scarcely be imagined,
that the single act of incorporating a bank can be at the same time
any thing like a direct execution of so many and such distinct and
independent powers. But I will examine these provisions separately.
Before I proceed, however, I will premise that all the arguments
in support of the right to incorporate a bank, as deducible from
the provisions of the constitution itself, are built up by the aid
of the clause of the constitution, which has been sometimes called
"the sweeping clause." I allude to the clause which declares that
Congress shall have the right to pass all laws necessary and proper
for the carrying into execution the delegated powers. All the powers
in the constitution are given for certain ends or objects. But each
power is not a _general_ authority to attain a particular object, and
comprehending, of course, _all_ the means or powers applicable to
its accomplishment; but, in most cases, it is a specific means for
effecting some particular end, and all other means or powers (for means
and powers are the same thing) conducive to the same end, are expressly
excluded by the restrictive clauses of the constitution.
The mode of reasoning adopted by General Hamilton, and the other
advocates of implied powers, is this: They first search for the end
or object for which a particular power is given; and this object will
be an immediate or ultimate one, as may best suit the purpose of the
argument. Having ascertained the end or object, they abandon the power;
or, rather, they confound the _power_ and the _object_ of it together,
and make the attainment of the object, and the execution of the power
given to accomplish it, convertible terms. Whatever, they say, attains
the object for which any power is given, is an execution of that
power. But the constitution gives to Congress a right to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the delegated powers;
and, therefore, as the execution of a power and the attainment of its
object are synonymous terms, the constitution gives to Congress a right
to make all laws necessary and proper for attaining the ends or objects
for which the various powers in the constitution are given.
I beg leave to read a passage from this pamphlet: "The relation between
the measure and the end, between the nature of the means employed
towards the execution of a power and the object, must be the criterion
of constitutionality." Here then is the axiom--now for the application
of it. The constitution gives to Congress the power to levy taxes, and
also the power to borrow money. But the establishment of a bank is
neither levying taxes nor borrowing money; nor is the law incorporating
the bank a law to levy taxes, or a law to borrow money. But the
immediate end or object for which these two powers were given, was, to
enable the Government to raise a revenue; and a bank may promote this
object. Then, sir, by a dexterous application of the argument which I
have stated, the fallacy of which consists in the sudden and unobserved
transitions which are made from the power to the object, and from the
object back again to the power, they prove that the establishment of a
bank is in execution of the powers to lay taxes and to borrow money.
I will now, sir, proceed to examine the particular provisions of the
constitution which have been relied on, and to place the subject in
some different aspects.
In the first place, then, it is contended that the right to incorporate
a Bank of the United States is included in the power to lay and
collect taxes. And what is the argument by which this position is
maintained? Why, sir, it is said that the law, by creating bank paper
and making that paper receivable in payment for taxes, increases
the circulating medium in which taxes are paid, and of course must
facilitate the payment of them. That whatever facilitates the payment
of taxes facilitates also the collection of them; and whatever aids or
facilitates the collection of taxes, is a means for their collection.
And, therefore, the incorporation of a bank is in execution of the
power to lay and collect taxes.
No man, sir, ought to complain of the weakness of a Government,
whose powers may be _reasoned up_ by logic like this. Amidst the
infinite variety of relations and connections, and dependencies and
analogies by which all human transactions are allied to each other,
he must be a weak politician who cannot, by hooking together a chain
of implication like this, justify any and every measure of political
policy or economy, as a means of executing some of the powers with
which this Government is intrusted. Take this latitude of implication
or construction, and you want no other power but the power to lay and
collect taxes. It may be tortured into a justification of every measure
which ambition itself could desire. No tyrant ever made a law without
assigning the public good as the motive of it. No man on this floor,
however wicked his designs, would venture to propose a measure (indeed
few could be proposed) in favor of which he could not adduce some
plausible argument, to show that it would tend to promote the general
prosperity of the country. And in showing this he would show its
constitutionality; for it is demonstrable that whatever would promote
the general prosperity of the country, would, and for that very reason,
facilitate, in some greater or less degree, the payment of taxes; and
might therefore be justified as a means for the collection of taxes.
But, sir, the constitution, as I have said before, and I must repeat
it again, for this is the radical source of all the error on this
subject--the Constitution of the United States is not, as such
reasoning supposes it to be, a mere general designation of the ends or
objects for which the Federal Government was established, and leaving
to Congress a discretion as to the means or powers by which those
ends shall be brought about. But the constitution is a specification
of the powers or means themselves by which certain objects are to be
accomplished. The powers of the constitution, carried into execution
according to the strict terms and import of them, are the appropriate
means, and the only means within the reach of this Government, for
the attainment of its ends. It is true, as the constitution declares,
and it would be equally true if the constitution did not declare it,
that Congress have a right to pass all laws necessary and proper
for executing the delegated powers; but this gives no latitude or
discretion in the selection of means or powers. A power given to
Congress in its legislative capacity, without the right to pass laws to
execute it, would be nugatory; would be no power at all. It would be
a solecism in language to call it a power. A power to lay and collect
taxes, carries with it a right to make laws for that purpose; but they
must be laws to lay and collect taxes, and not laws to incorporate
banks. If you undertake to justify a law under a particular power, you
must show the incidentality and applicability of the law to the power
itself, and not merely its relation to any supposed end which is to be
accomplished by its exercise. You must show that the plain, direct,
ostensible, primary object and tendency of your law is to execute
the power, and not that it will tend to facilitate the execution of
it. It is not less absurd than it is dangerous, first to assume some
great, distinct and independent power, unknown to the constitution, and
violating the rights of the States; and, then, to attempt to justify
it by a reference to some remote, indirect, collateral tendency, which
the exercise of it may have towards facilitating the execution of some
known and acknowledged power. This word _facilitate_ has become a very
fashionable word in the construction of powers; but, sir, it is a
dangerous one; it means more than we are aware of. To do a thing and to
facilitate the doing of it, are distinct operations; they are distinct
means; they are distinct powers. The constitution has expressly given
to Congress the power to do certain things; and it has as explicitly
withheld from them the power to do every other thing. The power to
lay and collect taxes is one thing; and the power to establish banks,
involving in its exercise the regulation of the internal domestic
economy of the States, is another and totally distinct thing; and the
one is, therefore, not included in the other.
Again, sir, it is contended that the right to incorporate a bank is
implied in the power to regulate trade and intercourse between the
several States. It is said to be so, inasmuch as it creates a paper
currency, which furnishes a convenient and common circulating medium of
trade between the several States. Money, sir, has nothing more to do
with trade, than that it furnishes a medium or representative of the
value of the articles employed in trade. The only office of bank bills
is to represent money. Now, if it be a regulation of trade, to create
the representative articles or subjects of trade _a fortiori_, will it
be a regulation of trade to create the articles or subjects themselves.
By this reasoning then you may justify the right of Congress to
establish manufacturing and agricultural companies within the several
States; because the direct object and effect of these would be, to
increase manufactures and agricultural products, which are the known
and common subjects of trade. You might, with more propriety say, that
under the power to regulate trade between the States, we have a right
to incorporate canal companies; because canals would tend directly
to open, facilitate and encourage trade and intercourse between the
several States; and, in my humble opinion, sir, canals would furnish
a much more salutary, direct and efficacious means, for enabling the
great body of the people to pay their taxes, than is furnished by
banks. But, sir, these various powers have never been claimed by the
Federal Government; and, much as I am known to favor that particular
species of internal improvement, I would never vote to incorporate a
company for the purpose of opening a canal through any State, without
first obtaining the consent of that State whose territorial rights
would be affected by it. There can be no question but canal companies,
and agricultural companies, and manufacturing companies, and banking
companies, may all tend, more or less, to facilitate the operations of
trade; but they have nothing to do with the political regulations of
trade; and such only come within the scope of the powers of Congress.
But, it is again said, that the right to grant this charter is
included in the power to borrow money. The right is attempted to be
deduced by a train of reasoning similar to that employed in relation
to the provisions which I have already noticed--by forming a string
of implications, by which you prove that a power to act in certain
cases, and in relation to certain subjects, implies the power to create
those cases and subjects to act upon. The Government, it is said, may
want and must have money, in any great national crisis. A National
Bank with an extensive capital will furnish ample means for loans,
will facilitate the exercise of the power to borrow; and, therefore,
the right to establish such a bank is implied in the power to borrow.
No one, but a logician, sir, would imagine that a power to lend and
a power to borrow had any relation to each other, much less could he
conjecture that a power to borrow, and a power to create the ability
to lend, mean the same thing. A plain unsophisticated man, on reading
the constitution, would say, that the power to borrow necessarily,
and by force of the term, pre-supposed the existence of the ability
and disposition to lend; and that it could not be exercised unless
such ability and disposition should actually exist. But the favorite
doctrine is, that all powers are given for particular ends, and include
all the means applicable to their attainment. Here the end is to borrow
money; to borrow honestly if we can, but--to borrow. The ability to
lend is a necessary means or ingredient toward perfecting the execution
of the power to borrow. But, sir, let me ask, whether the disposition
to lend be not as necessary a means towards accomplishing a loan as the
ability? It unquestionably is. And, of course, by the doctrine that the
end justifies the means, you may coerce the will to lend--and this too
equally, in cases where the ability is created by Congress, and where
it is derived from any other quarter. A loan obtained by bringing into
fair operation all the implications of this power would be borrowing in
an off-handed style. Such a loan, if effected by Bonaparte, we should
call robbery; but in this mild Republic, it would be nothing more than
the fair exercise of an implied constitutional power.
I have pursued this argument thus far, merely for the purpose of
showing the absurdities into which this doctrine of implication will
lead us. But suppose, sir, that the argument of the gentleman on the
other side of the question be correct, to wit: that the power to borrow
implies a right to furnish the ability to lend. What, I would ask, is
the probable fact, as to the facilities which this bank will afford the
Government in borrowing?
It will be conceded that we shall have no occasion for borrowing,
except in case of war; and if we have a war, the probability is, that
that war will be with Great Britain--I say this, not as a party man,
sir, but because the interests of that nation, from her situation, and
her rival pursuits, will be much more likely to come in collision with
ours, than those of any other power. Now it is a fact, in evidence
before the committee, that more than one-half of the stock of this
bank belongs to British subjects: and although, as foreigners, they
can have no direct agency in the affairs of the bank, yet we well know
that through the instrumentality of their friends and agents, of whom
there are unfortunately too many in this country, they may completely
control its operations. Now I would ask, whether it is probable, that
the British subjects would be willing to lend us money to carry on war
against their sovereign? Would they not, on the contrary, exert the
influence which they are said to possess over the moneyed interest of
this country, for the purpose of depressing the credit of the country;
for the purpose of crippling the operations of the State banks; and for
the purpose of drying up the sources from which the Government might
otherwise calculate to derive supplies? But, sir, this has little to do
with the question of constitutionality, to which I will again return.
Another ground upon which the constitutionality of this institution
has been attempted to be supported, is, that it is necessary to the
regular and successful administration of the finances. There is no
question, but the bank and its branches afford convenient places for
the deposit and safe keeping of the public revenue. It is not to be
controverted that they also furnish a safe, convenient, expeditious and
cheap means for the transmission of moneys from one part of the United
States to another, as they may be wanted by the Government; and if
these facilities were not to be attained in any other way, I should say
it would afford an argument in favor of a bank. Not a bank infringing
and violating the rights of the States; but, a bank upon principles
consistent with those rights.
But, sir, is there not, in every State in which there is a branch
of the United States' Bank, also one or more State banks, of equal
respectability, and of equal security--at least to the extent of any
sum for which they are willing to undertake? These State banks may be
used as depositaries for the public moneys, and they will be equally
safe and convenient. And if you will give to these State banks the
advantages of these deposits, as you have hitherto given them to the
United States' Bank, they will furnish means for the transmission
of moneys from place to place, equally safe, convenient, cheap and
expeditious. This object will be attained by connections which will be
formed between the banks of the different States. Such connections have
already in many instances been formed. But they have not been carried
to the extent they otherwise would have been, on account of the United
States' Bank and its branches; between which there is so intimate and
so necessary a connection.
But, in answer to this, it is said that if the Bank of the United
States would be constitutional without the existence of the State
banks, it is equally so with. That a power which is once constitutional
is equally so at all times, and under all circumstances. That a
right which must depend for its existence on the will of the State
Legislatures, over whom we have no control, is incomplete, and indeed,
as to us, is no right all. This argument is founded on the supposition
that the Federal Government is a complete Government, containing in
itself all the principles and powers necessary for its own operations,
which supposition is wholly false. The Federal Government does not
profess to be complete in itself. It is expressly predicated on
the existence of the State Governments; and most of the facilities
for its exercise are derived from the State governments. It cannot
perform even its own peculiar powers and functions, without the aid
and co-operation of the State authorities. How, let me ask you, sir,
is your Government constituted? Your Senate is appointed directly by
the State Legislatures. Your President and House of Representatives,
indirectly, by the same authority. Suppose they should neglect or
refuse to make these appointments, can you compel them to do it? No,
sir. Can you punish them for not doing it? Not in the least. They may
appoint or not, as they think proper; and if they should neglect or
refuse to do it, your boasted complete Government would die a natural
death, by its own imbecility. It is not fair, then, to say that a
power is constitutional, because the Government would be incomplete
without it. It is not fair to say, that what would be constitutional
without the existence of the State Governments and their appendages,
is equally so with. This would prove that you have a right to appoint
your own President, Senate and House of Representatives. It would go
to usurp all the powers of the State Governments; for the Government
could not be said to be complete without possessing the powers of both
Governments combined. Indeed, this Federal Government cannot be said
to be complete as to a single power, without all the auxiliary powers
of the State Governments; for there is not a single act which it can
perform without their assistance, directly or indirectly. The very bank
law now under consideration is an illustration of this--for how are
the provisions of this law to be enforced; how are the debts which it
authorizes to be contracted to be collected, but through the medium of
the State courts? The doctrine of perfect rights, then, if it prove
any thing, proves too much. If it proves that, in order to manage
your revenues, you may establish banks within the States; it equally
proves, that, in order to carry the provisions of your bank laws into
execution, you may establish courts and offices within the States for
that purpose. I think then, sir, I may fairly conclude, that so long
as the State Governments furnish you with all the facilities which
you can reasonably require for conducting your revenues by means of
their State banks; so long it will be unnecessary--so long it will be
improper--and, therefore, so long it will be unconstitutional to invade
the jurisdiction of the States, to establish national banks.
But, sir, I will conclude by again cautioning my Republican friends,
and my worthy colleague in particular, to beware how they familiarize
themselves with this doctrine of constructive power. It is a creed at
war with the vital principles of political liberty. The pride and the
boast of the American Governments is, that they are the governments
of the laws and not of men--that they are the regular and necessary
operations and results of principles and powers, established in the
moments of cool and deliberate reflection, by the combined wisdom of
the nation; and that they are not the effects of the momentary passion,
pride, interest, whim, or caprice of a few individuals collected on
this floor.
Little did the framers of this constitution, when they were so nicely
adjusting and balancing its various provisions--when they were so
carefully erecting guards and barriers against the encroachments of
power and ambition--little, I say, sir, did they imagine, that there
lay concealed under the provisions of this constitution, a secret and
sleeping power, which could, in a moment, prostrate all their labors
with the dust. Still less, sir, did the people when they adopted this
constitution, with even more caution and scruple than that with which
it was formed, conjecture that they were signing the death-warrant
of all their State rights. But, once adopt the doctrine that you may
travel out of the letter of this constitution, and assume powers,
merely on the ground that they will tend to facilitate the execution
of powers which are here given; and you compass, at a single sweep,
all the rights of the States; and form the basis of a consolidated
Government.
Let the principle of constructive or implied powers be once
established, in the extent to which it must be carried in order to pass
this bill, and you will have planted in the bosom of this constitution
a viper which, one day or another, will sting the liberties of this
country to the heart.
When Mr. PORTER had concluded his speech, the question was taken on
striking out the first section, and carried--59 to 46.
The committee rose, and reported to the House, who adjourned without
taking a question on the report.
SATURDAY, January 19.
Another member, to wit, from New York, BARENT GARDENIER, appeared, and
took his seat.
_Bank of the United States._
Mr. SAWYER called for the order of the day on the unfinished business
of yesterday--the bill continuing the charter of the Bank of the United
States.
[The first section had been struck out in Committee of the
Whole, and the bill reported to the House, and the question
now was upon concurrence with that vote in committee. On
that question the debate was renewed in the House, and, of
necessity, the same ground gone over which had been trod in
committee, and still more extensively. Finally the vote was
taken, and the concurrence carried by one vote! so close was
the contest in both Houses--in the Senate the question decided
by the casting vote of the Vice-President--in the House, by one
vote. The following were the yeas and nays:]
YEAS.--Lemuel J. Alston, William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon,
David Bard, William T. Barry, Burwell Bassett, William W.
Bibb, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun,
Langdon Cheves, Matthew Clay, James Cochran, William Crawford,
Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes,
Meshack Franklin, Barzillai Gannet, Gideon Gardner, Thomas
Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, James Holland, Richard
M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, William Kennedy, John
Love, Aaron Lyle, Nathaniel Macon, Alexander McKim, William
McKinley, Samuel L. Mitchill, John Montgomery, Nicholas R.
Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas
Newton, John Porter, Peter B. Porter, John Rea of Penn.,
John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, Samuel Ringgold,
John Roane, Ebenezer Sage, Lemuel Sawyer, Ebenezer Seaver,
Adam Seybert, John Smilie, George Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry
Southard, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Archibald Van
Horne, Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehill, Robert Witherspoon,
Richard Wynn, and Robert Wright.
NAYS.--Joseph Allen, Willis Alston, jun., Abijah Bigelow,
Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, John Campbell, John C.
Chamberlain, Wm. Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin
Chittenden, John Davenport, junior, William Ely, James Emott,
William Findlay, Jonathan Fisk, Barent Gardenier, David S.
Garland, Charles Goldsborough, Thomas R. Gold, William Hale,
Nathaniel A. Haven, Daniel Heister, William Helms, Jonathan H.
Hubbard, Jacob Hufty, Ebenezer Huntington, Richard Jackson,
jun., Robert Jenkins, Philip B. Key, Herman Knickerbacker,
Joseph Lewis, jun., Robert Le Roy Livingston, Vincent Matthews
Archibald McBryde, Samuel McKee, Pleasant M. Miller, William
Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Thomas Newbold, John Nicholson,
Joseph Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, junior, Timothy Pitkin, jr.,
Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, Thomas Sammons,
John A. Scudder, Samuel Shaw, Daniel Sheffey, Dennis Smelt,
John Smith, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, James Stephenson,
Lewis B. Sturges, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin
Tallmadge, John Thompson, Nicholas Van Dyke, Killian K. Van
Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, and James Wilson.[11]
And then the House adjourned until to-morrow morning eleven o'clock.
SATURDAY, January 26.
Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, EDWARD ST. LOE LIVERMORE,
appeared, and took his seat.
TUESDAY, January 29.
_Removal of Federal Judges on address of
Congress._