The question being to strike out the first section--

Mr. GILES.--Mr. President: It is with great reluctance that I find

myself compelled to enter into the discussion of the subject now under

the consideration of the Senate, but the observations which fell from

the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) were of such a

character as to impose on me an irresistible obligation to present

that view of the subject which has resulted from the best reflections

I have been enabled to bestow on it. This obligation arises from the

very high respect I entertain for the Legislature of the State I have

the honor to represent, the great respect I feel for the gentleman who

made the observations, as well as from the respect which is manifestly

due to myself. In executing this unpleasant task, I labor under

circumstances of peculiar embarrassment. This embarrassment arises from

a conviction that the views of the subject now proposed to be exhibited

will disappoint the expectations both of the opposers and the favorers

of the bill, and that they will not be acceptable to either. I shall

not, however, in this instance, depart from my invariable habit, when

urged by duty to participate in debate before this honorable body, of

disclosing in the most undisguised manner my real opinions upon the

whole subject, free of any consideration of political difficulties or

inconveniences which may consequently affect myself.

In the first place, I find myself called upon to oppose a law, on

constitutional grounds, which has been in existence for nearly

twenty years, and during that period, I am compelled to admit, has

been acquiesced in by the several State governments, as well as by

the General Government, and its republican administrations. It is

peculiarly irksome to me to question the constitutionality of a law

which has been thus and so long acquiesced in, because it tends to give

the character of instability to the laws generally, and in my judgment,

tends also to impair the sacred character of the laws, and of course,

to lessen their efficacy. In a Government like ours, where the laudable

boast of every citizen is that he lives under a government of laws,

and not of men, no subject should be touched with more caution and

delicacy than one which questions the validity of the laws, lessens

the confidence of the citizens in them, or impairs the obligation

of obedience to them. Yet, sir, the course of observations I propose

to make may have some of these tendencies, which I should extremely

regret, and this apprehension, of course, produces embarrassment.

Connected with this idea is another circumstance of embarrassment. I

cannot help observing the inordinate zeal manifested by the opposers

of this bill, evidently resulting from a belief that its rejection

will lessen the powers of the Federal Government. Although it may be

properly directed in the present instance, yet I think I have seen,

and fear I may hereafter see the same spirit directed against some

of the powers and proceedings of the Government which I have deemed

indispensable to its own preservation, and its beneficial efficacy

towards the people. It may, perhaps, be thought by some not becoming in

me to say that I have not been an inattentive observer of the progress

of this Government for twenty years, and more particularly, since the

Republican party came into power. Some of the scenes through which I

have passed, have produced an impressive influence on my mind. Such

is the nature of the Government that its administration will vibrate

from one principle to another, and it will always require great wisdom

to keep its oscillations from wandering too far. Whilst those who

preceded us in power endeavored to legislate into the constitution

an unnecessary constructive energy, leading to what has been called

consolidation, it appears to me that we have taken too much the

opposite course, leading to disunion and dissolution, by depriving it

constructively of its legitimate, necessary, and proper powers. If this

course should be unfortunately persevered in, it requires no spirit of

prophecy to foresee that the Government will fall to pieces from the

want of due energy in the administration of its legitimate powers, or

that some extraordinary means must be resorted to for its resuscitation.

The honorable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. CRAWFORD,) who reported

this bill, as the chairman of the committee, to whom the subject was

generally referred, excited not a little surprise in my mind by the

prefatory remarks which fell from him in support of it. The gentleman

prefaced his arguments by observing, "that it had latterly become

the fashion to eulogize the Constitution of the United States; and

that whenever he heard lavish encomiums applied to it, he could not

help apprehending mischief." I acknowledge I could not comprehend the

bearing of this remark upon the question under discussion. I, sir,

have long been in the habit of venerating the constitution, and have

often expressed my admiration at the wisdom of its provisions; and I

really had hoped that I might have been indulged in these sentiments

and prepossessions, and even the expression of them upon proper

occasions, without exciting in the mind of any gentleman apprehensions

of mischief; nor can I divine what species of mischief the gentleman

apprehends from that cause. Mr. President, when we look over the whole

world known to us; when we particularly cast our eyes over that part

of it with which we have the most intimate relations; when we see the

rapid strides which despotism is making over the whole human race;

when we observe the various and powerful means now in use to rivet its

immovable dominion upon mankind; when we reflect that the Constitution

of the United States now affords the only practical experiment

upon the republican principle, and the only and last hope for the

preservation and extension of the liberties of man; is it wonderful

or alarming, that we should feel and express some partiality and even

veneration for an instrument of so peculiar a character? or should even

endeavor to teach others to venerate, to cherish, to support it? An

instrument, whose provisions at least exempt us from the general scene

of despotism, and may eventually extend their blessings to the whole

human race? Or if, in dwelling upon the wisdom and importance of its

provisions, we might pass over some possible defects from scrutinizing

them with an hypercritical eye, might not the omission be indulged

without producing animadversion or censure? Sir, we all venerate the

republican principle. I know the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD)

does; nor do I pretend that my devotion to it is greater than his;

but, sir, I have given the greatest attention to the observations

of the gentleman upon the constitution; and I can now say that my

veneration for the instrument, and admiration at the wisdom of its

provisions, are not at all impaired nor diminished, notwithstanding

the gentleman's criticisms, &c. I will now, Mr. President, endeavor

to exhibit the general character of the constitution; to point out

the mode for its correct interpretation, and apply it to the subject

now under consideration. In doing so, I propose to follow the course

of observations made by the honorable chairman of the committee who

reported the bill.

The gentleman proceeded to remark, that in taking a review of the

constitution he found general as well as incidental powers enumerated

therein. I did not see the precise application the gentleman intended

to make of this remark, but I have been induced to review the

constitution in reference to this subject, and it does appear to me,

that the classification and definition of powers is as well arranged

as human wisdom could devise. I know that nothing is perfect which is

the work of man; that no language is capable of perfect definition.

But, as far as definition can be drawn from language, I conceive the

constitution exhibits as perfect an example as is in existence. In the

next place, the gentleman remarked that there was a number of cases

in which Congress had departed from the particular enumerated powers

in the constitution and had resorted to implication or construction

for the derivation of its powers. The remark is perfectly correct,

and I am very ready to admit that there is no such thing as carrying

into effect enumerated powers in any instrument whatever, without the

intervention of certain derivative and implied powers. But if the

gentleman had succeeded in showing that there had been aberrations by

the Congress of the United States from the enumerated powers of the

constitution, would he think it correct to use those aberrations as

precedents for still further aberrations? Ought they not rather to be

considered as mementoes on the part of Congress to induce them to tread

with more care, and, if they find that their former errors could not

be supported by a fair and candid construction of the constitution,

to restrain the laws within its wholesome provisions? Certainly that

is the use to which the history of errors presented by the honorable

gentleman from Georgia ought to be applied. But, before I proceed to

examine the subject with more accuracy, I cannot avoid to express

my surprise at another observation which fell from the gentleman.

The gentleman observed, that the argument drawn from the distinction

between ends and means was "incomprehensible;" and he went so far as

to call it "nonsensical jargon." It is not only comprehensible to me,

sir, as I conceive, but, in my opinion, is the only way in which a

just construction of the constitution is to be attained. This results

from the peculiar nature and organization of the instrument. Permit

me here to endeavor to illustrate my idea by a reference to the

constitution itself? The constitution is an instrument which grew out

of the situation of the United States at the time of, and preceding its

adoption; and to show that the constitution recited the great objects

of its formation, and then prescribed the means for carrying them

into effect, I beg leave to refer to a part of the instrument itself.

The preamble, like all other preambles, was designed to express the

objects of the instrument or the ends to be effected by its provisions.

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect

union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the

common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings

of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; do ordain and establish

this constitution for the United States of America." What is the plain

language of this preamble? The answer is obvious. That certain great

_ends_ or _objects_ are here proposed to be effected. In what mode, or

by what _means_ are they to be effected? The preamble tells you, sir,

"by establishing this Constitution for the United States of America."

That is the mode in which these great _ends_ are proposed to be

effected, and the body of the instrument prescribes the _means_ which

were deemed necessary and proper to the effectuation of these _ends_.

The subject will be better understood by throwing the mind back to the

period of time when this constitution originated, and reviewing the

peculiar political situation of the United States then, and for some

time antecedently thereto.

At the time, and antecedently to the establishment of the present

constitution, the existing State Governments were in possession of

all the powers of sovereignty, subject only to feeble and inefficient

articles of confederation, without the means of executing their own

will, and resting for its execution solely on requisitions upon the

respective States, which might either comply or refuse to comply with

such requisitions at their discretion. A non-compliance was almost

invariably the result of State deliberations, and hence the feebleness

of the old Confederation. The present constitution was adopted as the

remedy for this great and alarming evil. Without it, disunion and ruin

to the States would have been the inevitable consequence, because,

upon actual experiment, the States were found utterly incompetent to

the due administration of all the powers of sovereignty intrusted

to their management. The reason of this incompetency was, that some

of the most important powers of sovereignty inherently possessed a

geographical influence beyond the geographical limits of the several

States individually, and their jurisdiction could not transcend

their geographical limits. Of this description of powers is the

power to declare war, &c., to regulate commerce, &c., and all the

other enumerated powers of the constitution. In consequence of the

conflicting systems adopted by the several States in relation to some

of these powers, which were then in practical operation; particularly

in the conflicting regulations of commerce, the States were getting

into the most serious collisions, &c. The formidable evils necessarily

growing out of the state of things required a formidable and competent

remedy. The great subject for the contemplation of every reflecting

mind in America was, what that remedy should be? The wise framers of

our admirable constitution, after great deliberation, conceived and

executed the only practical expedient. It consisted in separating

the powers of sovereignty; in establishing a General Government, and

conferring on it all the powers of sovereignty whose geographical

influence was found co-extensive with the geographical limits of the

United States, and reserving to the State Governments respectively

those powers which were of a mere local character, and which possessed

no influence beyond the limits of the States respectively. And also to

confer on the General Government "all the means necessary and proper"

for executing its own laws in relation to these enumerated powers,

without any dependence upon requisitions from the respective State

Governments for this indispensable object. The idea was a grand one,

and executed with an admirable simplicity, and the most consummate

wisdom. Hence it appears that the great object of the framers of the

constitution was to establish a General or Federal Government, and

to confer on it all the powers of sovereignty, which in their nature

and character possessed an influence co-extensive with the United

States, and to reserve to the previously-existing State Governments

all the powers of sovereignty of a more local character, and whose

influence did not extend beyond the geographical limits of the States

respectively, and therefore could be rendered completely subservient

to State jurisdiction and management. These are the means prescribed

in the constitution for effecting the ends expressed in the preamble.

To the administrators of the General Government the framers of the

constitution have said: We give to you all the powers of sovereignty of

a general character; and to the administrators of the State Governments

they have said: We reserve to you all the powers of sovereignty of a

local character. I verily believe, that if those various Governments

should be administered with the wisdom with which this separation of

powers was made in the body of the constitution, the people of the

United States will not be disappointed in the great and interesting

objects proclaimed in its preamble. From this short history of the

origin of the constitution, and the causes which produced it, it

evidently appears, that the General or Federal Government is in its

nature and character a Government of enumerated powers, taken from

previously existing State Governments, enumerated and conferred on it,

reserving all unenumerated powers to the State Governments, or to the

people in their individual capacities. But if any doubts had existed

upon this subject, two amendments to the constitution, growing out

of some jealousies lest a contrary interpretation should be given to

the constitution, have been adopted, which ought to put this question

to rest forever. The 9th and 10th articles of amendments to the

constitution are as follow:

"The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not

be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution,

nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people." Now, sir, can language be more

explicit than this, in declaring that this charter contains certain

enumerated powers, and that all not enumerated are reserved to the

States or to the people? There is one article reserving rights to the

people, and afterwards another article reserving them to the States

and to the people. While on this subject, I beg leave to read a clause

in the constitution, which I find among the enumerated powers, and

which has been construed by some, as intended to convey a general grant

of powers among the enumerated powers: "Congress shall have power to

lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts

and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United

States." The words "and to provide for the common defence and general

welfare," have by some been considered as conveying a general grant of

power. Nothing is necessary to show that this is not a fair and correct

construction of the constitution, but reading it with attention. These

terms contain no grant of power whatever, but are used to express the

ends or objects for which particular grants of power were given. Paying

the debts and providing for the common defence and general welfare are

great objects, intimately connected with the particular grants of power

which are given for their effectuation; and without these particular

grants of power, it would not have been possible for Congress to effect

them. The framers of the constitution have simply selected some of the

objects expressed in the preamble, and declared that to effect them,

and to pay the debts of the United States, were the considerations

which induced them to give to Congress the power "to lay and collect

taxes," &c. Thus taxes are to be laid, &c. "to pay the debts, and to

provide for the common defence and general welfare." Could they have

chosen a more appropriate phraseology? The plain language to Congress

is: "You shall have power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts,"

&c., and to provide for the common defence and general welfare, or,

in other words, for the purpose of paying the debts, &c., and of

providing for the common defence and general welfare. These words do

not contain a general grant of powers, but express the objects of a

particular grant of powers. The framers of the constitution could not

have done an act so absurd as to make a general grant of powers, among

an enumeration of specified powers.

I will now, Mr. President, proceed to examine those instances which the

gentleman has presented of the supposed aberrations of the Congress

of the United States from the enumerated powers, and I think it will

not be difficult to show that there is not a single instance quoted,

but which is deducible from a fair and correct interpretation of

the express words of the constitution, giving them their common and

appropriate meaning.

The first instance presented to our consideration by the honorable

gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) of the exercise of a power by

Congress not enumerated in the constitution, was the erection of

light-houses. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD,) to whose

dispassionate observations I listened with great pleasure, superadded

the instance of the erection of custom-houses. On these, both of the

gentlemen seemed to place great reliance, as cases in point with the

one under consideration. Both these powers I conceive are given to

Congress by the express words of the constitution; but if I should be

mistaken in this idea, they are certainly comprehended as incidental

and subservient to, or in other words, "necessary and proper" for

carrying into effect some of the enumerated powers.

The express words of the constitution give to Congress the power

"to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," &c.; "to

regulate commerce with foreign nations among the several States, and

with the Indian tribes;" "to exercise exclusive legislation in all

cases whatever, &c., over all places purchased by consent of the

Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection

of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings."

From these clauses of the constitution, taken in connection with each

other, I think Congress possesses the power to erect light-houses and

custom-houses by the express words of the constitution; for both of

these descriptions of houses must necessarily be included within the

term "needful buildings," or the only construction which is at all

applicable to these cases is, that needful buildings is the general

term, and light-houses and custom-houses are particular instances

or examples under the general term; or, if I may be so allowed to

express my ideas, needful buildings may be considered as the genus,

of which light-houses and custom-houses are particular species. The

reason with the framers of the constitution for using this general

term is obvious. It was, because it was impossible for them to foresee

all the particular species of needful buildings which might become

necessary to the salutary operations of this Government in the course

of its complicated and due administration; they therefore wisely left

that subject to the discussion of Congress, restrained and limited,

nevertheless, by the requisition of the consent of the Legislatures

of the States respectively, in every case proposed for the exercise

of this discretion. That this is a plain and correct interpretation

of the constitution is evinced by the concurrent opinions of every

Legislature of every State, which has heretofore ceded lands for any

of these objects; and it is to be remarked, that Congress has never

attempted to erect any of these buildings without the constitutional

requisition of the consent of the States respectively. But if this

term "needful buildings" had not been expressed in the constitution, I

should not hesitate to admit with these gentlemen that the erection of

light-houses and custom-houses might properly be deduced from the power

to lay and collect taxes, duties, &c., which are particular grants

of power enumerated in the constitution. Because custom-houses are

appropriately necessary to the collection of duties, and have always

been deemed indispensable for that object, as are light-houses to the

due regulation of commerce.

These two powers are indispensably connected with, and subservient

to, particular enumerated powers, and are therefore among the means

which are necessary and proper for their effectuation; and as such

are given to Congress by the express words of the constitution, which

are: Congress shall have power "to make all laws which shall be

necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,

and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government

of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

From this course of interpretation, the gentlemen, reasoning from a

supposed analogy, have asked, if Congress can derive the right to

erect light-houses and custom-houses from their necessary agency

in effectuating the particular powers to which they are said to be

appendant or appurtenant, why may it not in the same way derive the

right of granting charters of incorporation for the same objects? Or,

in other words, if Congress can constitutionally erect custom-houses

for the purpose, or as the necessary means of collecting duties; why

may it not establish a bank for the same object, &c.? The question

is admitted to be a fair one; and if a clear distinction cannot be

made in the two cases, it will be admitted either that Congress

may constitutionally establish a bank, or that it has heretofore

transcended its powers in erecting custom-houses, &c. A clear and most

obvious distinction appears to me to exist in the cases suggested by

the gentlemen to be analogous, arising from the striking difference

in the nature and essential character of these powers. A custom-house

is in its nature incidental and subservient to the collection of

duties. It is one of the common, necessary, and proper means to

effect that end. It is believed that in no commercial country in the

world are duties collected without them. Besides, the erection of

custom-houses does not involve in it the exercise of any other higher

or consequential powers. The same remarks will apply to light-houses,

as among the common, necessary, and proper means for the regulation of

commerce, &c.

Is the incorporation of a bank of this character? It is not among

the common, necessary, and proper means of effecting either of the

foregoing enumerated powers, nor of any other enumerated in the

constitution; still less is it incidental or subservient to any of

the enumerated powers. It wants that connection, affiliation, and

subserviency, to some enumerated power, which are clearly pointed

out in relation to the two powers, to which it has been said to be

analogous. Besides, does granting a charter of incorporation to a bank

involve no other higher or consequential power than merely erecting

a needful building for collecting duties, &c.? It certainly does. It

involves the power to grant charters of incorporation generally; and in

this respect, principally, its character is essentially different from

both of the powers cited by the gentleman. The power to grant charters

of incorporation is not an incidental, subordinate, subservient power;

it is a distinct, original, substantive power. It is also susceptible

of the clearest definition; and not being among the enumerated powers,

it seems to me that Congress can have no fair claim to its exercise in

any case. If Congress had been expressly authorized to grant charters

of incorporation generally, then granting a charter of incorporation

to a bank would have been an instance, or among the means, of carrying

into effect that enumerated power, and would have been as much

connected and affiliated with it as is the erection of custom-houses

with the collection of duties; but the power to grant charters of

incorporation generally not being expressly given in the constitution,

no particular instance involving the exercise of that power can be

inferred by a fair and candid interpretation of the instrument. I do

not mean to exaggerate the consequences which might result from an

assumption of the power to grant charters of incorporation, &c. It is

sufficient for me to say that it is a power of primary importance;

that it involves as many incidental powers in its exercise as any one

of the enumerated powers; that it is equal, if not paramount, to any;

and, therefore, in my judgment, cannot be assumed by fair construction

as incidental and subservient to any; and, of course, not as among

the necessary and proper means for carrying any into effect. In fact,

in its nature it does not in the smallest degree partake of the

derivative, incidental character. It is original, substantive, distinct

in itself, and susceptible of the plainest definition. Hence, whilst

I am willing to admit that a power, which is in its nature incidental

and subservient to any enumerated power, and also among the necessary

and proper means for carrying it into effect, may be exercised by

Congress without the express words of the constitution, I should be

very unwilling to admit that Congress should also exercise a power

neither incidental nor subservient to any of the enumerated powers,

nor among the necessary and proper means for carrying any into effect;

still less should I be inclined to this admission, when the power thus

proposed to be derived, incidentally or constructively, involves in it

the exercise of almost unlimited powers. To illustrate my idea still

further in this respect, I would observe, that the power to regulate

descents, and to regulate the distribution of intestates, I conceive to

be original, distinct, substantive powers; and, being among the powers

which could in all respects be limited by the geographical boundaries

of the individual States, and were therefore among the powers reserved

to the management of the States, might as easily be assumed by Congress

as incidental to some one of the enumerated powers, as the assumption

of the power to grant charters of incorporation, which I conceive

was, for the same reason, left to the management of the States. I

believe no gentleman will contend that Congress can, under any candid

construction, go so far in relation to those powers; nor do I see how

it can in relation to the power of granting charters of incorporation.

FRIDAY, February 15.

_Bank of the United States._

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend

and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the

subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day

of February, 1791.

Mr. CLAY.--Mr. President: When the subject involved in the motion

now under consideration was depending before the other branch of the

Legislature, a disposition to acquiesce in their decision was evinced.

For although the committee who reported this bill had been raised many

weeks prior to the determination of that House on the proposition to

recharter the bank, except the occasional reference to it of memorials

and petitions, we scarcely ever heard of it. The rejection, it is

true, of a measure brought before either branch of Congress, does not

absolutely preclude the other from taking up the same proposition;

but the economy of our time, and a just deference for the opinion of

others, would seem to recommend a delicate and cautious exercise of

this power. As this subject, at the memorable period when the charter

was granted, called forth the best talents of the nation--as it has,

on various occasions, undergone the most thorough investigation,

and as we can hardly expect that it is susceptible of receiving any

further elucidation, it was to have been hoped that we should have been

spared a useless debate. This was the more desirable because there

are, I conceive, much superior claims upon us for every hour of the

small portion of the session yet remaining to us. Under the operation

of these motives, I had resolved to give a silent vote, until I felt

myself bound, by the defying manner of the arguments advanced in

support of the renewal, to obey the paramount duties I owe my country

and its constitution; to make one effort, however feeble, to avert

the passage of what appears to me a most unjustifiable law. After my

honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) had instructed and amused

us with the very able and ingenious argument which he delivered on

yesterday, I should have still forborne to trespass on the Senate,

but for the extraordinary character of his speech. He discussed both

sides of the question, with great ability and eloquence, and certainly

demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who heard him, both that it

was constitutional and unconstitutional, highly proper and improper to

prolong the charter of the bank. The honorable gentleman appeared to me

in the predicament in which the celebrated orator of Virginia, Patrick

Henry, is said to have been once placed. Engaged in a most extensive

and lucrative practice of the law, he mistook in one instance the side

of the cause on which he was retained, and addressed the court and jury

in a very splendid and convincing speech in behalf of his antagonist.

His distracted client came up to him whilst he was progressing, and

interrupting him, bitterly exclaimed, "you have undone me! you have

ruined me!"--"Never mind, give yourself no concern," said the adroit

advocate; and turning to the court and jury, continued his argument by

observing, "May it please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury,

I have been stating to you what I presume my adversary may urge on his

side. I will now show you how fallacious his reasoning and groundless

his pretensions are." The skilful orator proceeded, satisfactorily

refuted every argument he had advanced, and gained his cause! A success

with which I trust the exertion of my honorable friend will on this

occasion be crowned.

It has been said by the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr.

CRAWFORD) that this has been made a party question, although the law

incorporating the bank was passed prior to the formation of parties,

and when Congress was not biased by party prejudices. [Mr. CRAWFORD

explained. He did not mean that it had been made a party question in

the Senate. His allusion was elsewhere.] I do not think it altogether

fair to refer to the discussions in the House of Representatives, as

gentlemen belonging to that body have no opportunity of defending

themselves here. It is true that this law was not the effect, but it is

no less true that it was one of the causes of the political divisions

of this country. And if, during the agitation of the present question,

the renewal has, on one side, been opposed on party principles, let me

ask if, on the other, it has not been advocated on similar principles?

Where is the Macedonian phalanx, the opposition in Congress? I believe,

sir, I shall not incur the charge of presumptuous prophecy, when I

predict that we shall not pick up from its ranks one single straggler!

And if, on this occasion, my worthy friend from Georgia has gone over

into the camp of the enemy, is it kind in him to look back upon his

former friends, and rebuke them for the fidelity with which they adhere

to their old principles?

I shall not stop to examine how far a representative is bound by the

instructions of his constituents. This is a question between the giver

and receiver of the instructions. But I must be permitted to express

my surprise at the pointed difference which has been made between the

opinions and instructions of State Legislatures, and the opinions and

details of the deputations with which we have been surrounded from

Philadelphia. Whilst the resolutions of those Legislatures--known,

legitimate, constitutional and deliberative bodies--have been thrown

into the back ground, and their interference regarded as officious,

these delegations from self-created societies, composed of whom

nobody knows, have been received by the committee with the utmost

complaisance. Their communications have been treasured up with the

greatest diligence. Never did the Delphic priests collect with more

holy care the frantic expressions of the agitated Pythia, or expound

them with more solemnity to the astonished Grecians, than has the

committee gathered the opinions and testimony of these deputies, and

through the gentleman from Massachusetts, pompously detailed them to

the Senate! Philadelphia has her immediate representatives, capable

of expressing her wishes upon the floor of the other House. If it be

improper for States to obtrude upon Congress their sentiments, it

is much more highly so for the unauthorized deputies of fortuitous

congregations.

The first singular feature that attracts attention in this bill

is the new and unconstitutional veto which it establishes. The

constitution has required only, that after bills have passed the

House of Representatives and the Senate, they shall be presented to

the President for his approval or rejection, and his determination

is to be made known in ten days. But this bill provides, that when

all the constitutional sanctions are obtained, and when according to

the usual routine of legislation it ought to be considered as a law,

it is to be submitted to a new branch of the Legislature, consisting

of the President and twenty-four Directors of the Bank of the United

States, holding their sessions in Philadelphia, and if they please

to approve it, why then it is to become a law! And three months (the

term allowed by our law of May last, to one of the great belligerents

for revoking his edicts, after the other shall have repealed his) are

granted them to decide whether an act of Congress shall be the law of

the land or not! An act which is said to be indispensably necessary to

our salvation, and without the passage of which, universal distress

and bankruptcy are to pervade the country. Remember, sir, that the

honorable gentleman from Georgia has contended that this charter is no

contract. Does it, then, become the representatives of the nation to

leave the nation at the mercy of a corporation? Ought the impending

calamities to be left to the hazard of a contingent remedy?

This vagrant power to erect a bank, after having wandered throughout

the whole constitution in quest of some congenial spot whereupon to

fasten, has been at length located by the gentleman from Georgia on

that provision, which authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes, &c.

In 1791, the power is referred to one part of the instrument; in 1811,

to another. Sometimes it is alleged to be deducible from the power to

regulate commerce. Hard pressed here, it disappears, and shows itself

under the grant to coin money. The sagacious Secretary of the Treasury

in 1791 pursued the wisest course--he has taken shelter behind general,

high-sounding, and imposing terms. He has declared in the preamble

to the act establishing the bank, that it will be very conducive to

the successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to

give facility to the obtaining of loans, and will be productive of

considerable advantage to trade and industry in general. No allusion is

made to the collection of taxes. What is the nature of this Government?

It is emphatically federal, vested with an aggregate of specified

powers for general purposes, conceded by existing sovereignties, who

have themselves retained what is not so conceded. It is said that

there are cases in which it must act on implied powers. This is not

controverted, but the implication must be necessary, and obviously flow

from the enumerated power with which it is allied. The power to charter

companies is not specified in the grant, and I contend is of a nature

not transferable by mere implication. It is one of the most exalted

attributes of sovereignty. In the exercise of this gigantic power we

have seen an East India Company created, which has carried dismay,

desolation, and death throughout one of the largest portions of the

habitable world. A company which is, in itself, a sovereignty--which

has subverted empires and set up new dynasties--and has not only made

war, but war against its legitimate sovereign! Under the influence of

this power, we have seen arise a South Sea Company, and a Mississippi

Company, that distracted and convulsed all Europe, and menaced a total

overthrow of all credit and confidence, and universal bankruptcy. Is it

to be imagined that a power so vast would have been left by the wisdom

of the constitution to doubtful inference? It has been alleged that

there are many instances, in the constitution, where powers, in their

nature incidental, and which would have necessarily vested along with

the principal power, are nevertheless expressly enumerated; and the

power "to make rules and regulations for the government of the land

and naval forces," which, it is said, is incidental to the power to

raise armies and provide a navy, is given as an example. What does this

prove? How extremely cautious the convention were to leave as little as

possible to implication. In all cases where incidental powers are acted

upon, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with each

other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be

strictly subordinate and limited to the end proposed to be attained by

the specified power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing

one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made

to embrace other objects which are not specified in the constitution.

If then you could establish a bank to collect and distribute the

revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such

collection and distribution. It is a mockery, worse than usurpation, to

establish it for a lawful object, and then extend it to other objects

which are not lawful. In deducing the power to create corporations,

such as I have described it, from the power to collect taxes, the

relation and condition of principal and incident are prostrated and

destroyed. The accessory is exalted above the principal. As well might

it be said that the great luminary of day is an accessory, a satellite

to the humblest star that twinkles forth its feeble light in the

firmament of heaven!

Suppose the constitution had been silent as to an individual department

of this Government, could you, under the power to lay and collect

taxes, establish a judiciary? I presume not; but if you could derive

the power by mere implication, could you vest it with any other

authority than to enforce the collection of the revenue? A bank is made

for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the revenue,

and while it is engaged in this, the most inferior and subordinate

of all its functions, it is made to diffuse itself through society,

and to influence all the great operations of credit, circulation, and

commerce. Like the Virginia justice, you tell the man, whose turkey had

been stolen, that your book of precedents furnishes no form for his

case, but then you will grant him a precept to search for a cow, and

when looking for that he may possibly find his turkey! You say to this

corporation, we cannot authorize you to discount--to emit paper--to

regulate commerce, &c. No! Our book has no precedents of that kind. But

then we can authorize you to collect the revenue, and, while occupied

with that, you may do whatever else you please!

What is a corporation such as the bill contemplates? It is a splendid

association of favored individuals, taken from the mass of society, and

invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and privileges.

The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. LLOYD) has said that

the original law, establishing the bank, was justly liable to the

objection of vesting in that institution an exclusive privilege, the

faith of the Government being pledged that no other bank should be

authorized during its existence. This objection he supposes is obviated

by the bill under consideration; but all corporations enjoy exclusive

privileges--that is, the corporators have privileges which no others

possess; and if you create fifty corporations instead of one, you have

only fifty privileged bodies instead of one.

I contend that the States have the exclusive power to regulate

contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract,

and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of debtors to their

creditors. If Congress have the power to erect an artificial body

and say it shall be endowed with the attributes of an individual--if

you can bestow on this object of your own creation the ability to

contract, may you not, in contravention of State rights, confer upon

slaves, infants, and femes covert, the ability to contract? And if

you have the power to say that an association of individuals shall be

responsible for their debts only in a certain limited degree, what

is to prevent an extension of a similar exemption to individuals?

Where is the limitation upon this power to set up corporations? You

establish one, in the heart of a State, the basis of whose capital

is money. You may erect others whose capital shall consist of land,

slaves, and personal estate, and thus the whole property within the

jurisdiction of a State might be absorbed by these political bodies.

The existing bank contends that it is beyond the power of a State to

tax it, and if this pretension be well founded, it is in the power

of Congress, by chartering companies, to dry up the whole of the

sources of State revenue. Georgia has undertaken, it is true, to levy

a tax on the branch within her jurisdiction, but this law, now under

a course of litigation, is considered as invalid. The United States

own a great deal of land in the State of Ohio; can this Government,

for the purpose of creating an ability to purchase it, charter a

company? Aliens are forbidden, I believe, in that State, to hold

real estate--could you, in order to multiply purchasers, confer upon

them the capacity to hold land, in derogation of the local law? I

imagine this will hardly be insisted upon; and yet there exists a more

obvious connection between the undoubted power, which is possessed by

this Government, to sell its land, and the means of executing that

power, by increasing the demand in the market, than there is between

this bank and the collection of a tax. This Government has the power

to levy taxes--to raise armies--provide a navy--make war--regulate

commerce--coin money, &c. It would not be difficult to show as intimate

a connection between a corporation, established for any purpose

whatever, and some one or other of those great powers, as there is

between the revenue and the bank of the United States.

Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the

collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800,

requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the

principal bank or any of its offices are situated, to deposit with

them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the

collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the period to

which the existence of this institution was limited, it was noways

instrumental in the collection of that revenue, to which it is now

become indispensable! The collection, previous to 1800, was made

entirely by the collectors; and even at present, where there is one

port of entry, at which this bank is employed, there are eight or

ten at which the collection is made as it was before 1800. And, sir,

what does this bank or its branches when resort is had to it? It does

not adjust with the merchant the amount of the duty, nor take his

bond; nor, if the bond is not paid, coerce the payment by distress or

otherwise. In fact, it has no active agency whatever in the collection.

Its operation is merely passive; that is, if the obligor, after his

bond is placed in the bank, discharges it, all is very well. Such

is the mighty aid afforded by this tax-gatherer, without which the

Government cannot get along! Again, it is not pretended that the

very limited assistance which this institution does in truth render,

extends to any other than a single species of tax, that is, duties.

In the collection of the excise, the direct and other internal taxes,

no aid was derived from any bank. It is true, in the collection of

those taxes, the farmer did not obtain the same indulgence which the

merchant receives in paying duties. But what obliges Congress to give

credit at all? Could it not demand prompt payment of the duties? And

in fact does it not so demand in many instances? Whether credit is

given or not, is a matter merely of discretion. If it be a facility

to mercantile operations (as I presume it is) it ought to be granted.

But I deny the right to ingraft upon it a bank, which you would not

otherwise have the power to erect. You cannot create the necessity of

a bank, and then plead that necessity for its establishment. In the

administration of the finances, the bank acts simply as a payer and

receiver. The Secretary of the Treasury has money in New York and wants

it in Charleston; the bank will furnish him with a check, or bill, to

make the remittance, which any merchant would do just as well.

I will now proceed to show by fact, actual experience, not theoretic

reasoning, but by the records themselves of the Treasury, that the

operations of that department may be as well conducted without as

with this bank. The delusion has consisted in the use of certain

high-sounding phrases, dexterously used on the occasion. "The

collection of the revenue"--"The administration of the finance"--"The

conducting the fiscal affairs of the Government," the usual language

of the advocates of the bank, extort express assent, or awe into

acquiescence, without inquiry or examination into its necessity. About

the commencement of this year there appears, by the report of the

Secretary of the Treasury of the 7th of January, to have been a little

upwards of two millions four hundred thousand dollars in the Treasury

of the United States; and more than one-third of this whole sum was in

the vaults of local banks. In several instances, where an opportunity

existed of selecting the bank, a preference has been given to the State

bank, or at least a portion of the deposits has been made with it. In

New York, for example, there was deposited with the Manhattan Bank

$188,670, although a branch bank is in that city. In this District,

$115,080 were deposited with the bank of Columbia, although here also

is a branch bank, and yet the State banks are utterly unsafe to be

trusted! If the money, after the bonds are collected, is thus placed

with these banks, I presume there can be no difficulty in placing the

bonds themselves there, if they must be deposited with some bank for

collection, which I deny.

Again, one of the most important and complicated branches of the

Treasury Department is the management of our landed system. The sales

have some years amounted to upwards of half a million of dollars,

are generally made upon credit, and yet no bank whatever is made use

of to facilitate the collection. After it is made, the amount in

some instances has been deposited with banks, and according to the

Secretary's report, which I have before adverted to, the amount so

deposited was in January upwards of three hundred thousand dollars, not

one cent of which was in the vaults of the Bank of the United States,

or in any of its branches, but in the Bank of Pennsylvania, its branch

at Pittsburg, the Marietta Bank, and the Kentucky Bank. Upon the point

of responsibility, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the Secretary

of the Treasury, if it is meant that the ability to pay the amount

of any deposits which the Government may make under any exigency,

is greater than that of the State banks; that the accountability of

a ramified institution, whose affairs are managed by a single head,

responsible for all its members, is more simple than that of a number

of independent and unconnected establishments, I shall not deny; but,

with regard to safety, I am strongly inclined to think it is on the

side of the local banks. The corruption or misconduct of the parent,

or any of its branches, may bankrupt or destroy the whole system, and

the loss of the Government in that event will be of the deposits made

with each; whereas in the failure of one State bank the loss will be

confined to the deposit in the vaults of that bank. It is said to have

been a part of Burr's plan to seize on the branch bank at New Orleans.

At that period large sums, imported from La Vera Cruz, are alleged to

have been deposited with it, and if the traitor had accomplished his

design, the Bank of the United States, if not actually bankrupt, might

have been constrained to stop payment.

It is urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD,) that

as this nation progresses in commerce, wealth, and population, new

energies will be unfolded, new wants and exigencies will arise, and

hence he infers that powers must be implied from the constitution. But,

sir, the question is, shall we stretch the instrument to embrace cases

not fairly within its scope, or shall we resort to that remedy, by

amendment, which the constitution prescribes?

Gentlemen contend that the construction which they give to the

constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties, and under all

administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in

1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans, and another act, of 1807,

for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank.

With regard to the first law, passed no doubt upon the recommendation

of the Treasury Department, I would remark, that it was the extension

of a branch to a Territory, over which Congress possesses power of

legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional

impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other

act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than the

bank--to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper,

purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are

claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence, let

me inquire what they would have had those to have done who believed

the establishment of the bank an encroachment upon State rights? Were

they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties,

in 1800, it must be well recollected that the greatest calamities were

predicted as consequences of that event. Intentions were ascribed

to the new occupants of power of violating the public faith and

prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they

should act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in

full operation a bank, chartered by a Congress who had as much right

to judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they

revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in

all probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding.

The Judiciary would have been appealed to; and, from the known

opinions and predilections of the judges then composing it, they

would have pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a

contract, beyond the repealing power of any succeeding Legislature.

And, sir, what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have

presented--an act of Congress, which was law in the statute book, and a

nullity on the judicial records! Was it not wisest to wait the natural

dissolution of the corporation, rather than accelerate that event by a

repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?

When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure, upon the ground

of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in

Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniformity of

decision exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his

predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this

practice is wise and proper; and without it, every thing depending upon

the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest

rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation.

Here no rule exists but the constitution; and to legislate upon the

ground merely that our predecessors thought themselves authorized,

under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and

perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of

precedents, I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions

under which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an

established rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect,

the mind of the judge who pronounced must have been awakened to the

subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full

argument. In technical language, it must not have been _sub silentio_.

Now, the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the

re-chartering this company, passed not only without any discussions

whatever, of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a bank,

but I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention

drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the Senate when

the latter law passed; probably voted for it; and I declare, with the

utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point; and I appeal

confidently to every honorable member who was then present to say if

that was not his situation.

This doctrine of precedents, applied to the Legislature, appears to

me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great

advantage of our system of government over all others is, that we

have a written constitution defining its limits and prescribing its

authorities; and that, however for a time faction may convulse the

nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the

season of reflection will recur, when calmly retracing their deeds,

and all aberrations from fundamental principle will be corrected.

But once substitute practice for principle, the expositions of the

constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall

we look for the instrument in the instrument itself. It will be as

diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and

it must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals

of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. What

would be our condition if we were to take the interpretations given to

that sacred book, which is or ought to be the criterion of our faith,

for the book itself? We should find the Holy Bible buried beneath the

interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned

divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects,

partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin than of a

vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other. They ought to afford

us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to

support, our invariable guide.

I conceive, then, sir, that we are not empowered by the constitution

nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank

and I might here rest the argument. But, as there are strong objections

to the renewal upon the score of expediency, and as the distresses

which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly

exaggerated, I will ask your indulgence for a few moments longer. That

some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most

groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to

the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that

cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool.

The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestration in France, the Danish

captures--in fine, the belligerent edicts, are the obvious sources

of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon

London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments.

Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New

York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.

The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse.

Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse,

for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie

circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at

ten millions of dollars; and if it be no more, one moiety is in the

vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of

such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the

hands of any corporation will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom

is this immense power wielded? By a body who, in derogation of the

great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people,

is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners.

Suppose an attempt to subvert this Government, would not the traitor

first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this

company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven-tenths of its capital

are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English

subjects. We are possibly upon the eve of a rupture with that nation.

Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English Premier

would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of

this institution? Republics, above all other nations, ought most

studiously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that

the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the

downfall of almost every free Government that has hitherto existed; and

yet gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this

foreign capital. If we could have its use, without its attending abuse,

I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without

the other. Wealth is power, and under whatsoever form it exists, its

proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic,

will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession

of this English capital gives us a certain influence over the British

Government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the

interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to

engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had

better at once exchange the condition of independent proprietors for

that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations,

according to the arguments of gentlemen on the other side. But let us

put aside this theory, and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go

to the other side of the Atlantic, and see what has been achieved for

us there by Englishmen holding seven-tenths of the capital of this

bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary

American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the

unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or

has it abrogated the Orders in Council--those orders which have given

birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effects,

are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite

sure that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable

to British interests. It has often been stated, and, although I do not

know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact,

that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty; and

may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyze

the efforts of this nation against British aggression?

The Duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable

stockholder in the Bank of the United States. A late Lord Chancellor

of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose

the Prince of Essling, the Duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries

owned seven-eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the

same exertions (I allude not to any made in the Senate) to recharter

it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be

resounded throughout the nation?

I shall give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the

first section of the bill.

Mr. POPE.--Mr. President, in rising on this occasion, I never more

entirely obeyed both my feelings and my judgment. The principle

involved in the decision about to be given, is in my view of more

magnitude than any which has been presented for our consideration

since I had the honor of a seat here. It is no less than whether we

shall surrender to the State Governments the power of collecting our

revenue and rely upon the old system of requisitions. We are called

upon to return to that state of imbecility and chaos from which this

political fabric was reared by the wisdom and patriotism of the first

statesmen of which any age or nation can boast. For twenty years

we have collected our revenue, borrowed money, paid our debts, and

managed our fiscal concerns through the agency of a national bank.

That it has answered the most sanguine expectations of its authors;

that it has been well managed, is admitted by the most decided

opponents to the renewal of the charter. Although in public debate,

in newspapers, court-yards, muster-fields, &c., we have heard much of

dangerous powers, violations of the constitution, British influence,

and poisonous vipers, &c., &c., which were to sting to death the

liberties of the people, yet we find ourselves as free almost as the

air we breathe, and hardly subservient to the mildest code of laws by

which any nation was ever governed. In the city of Philadelphia, and

the State of Pennsylvania generally, where these animals called banks

have grown to the most enormous size, we find as sound morals, and as

much real practical republicanism, as in those parts of the Union where

the rattling of this viper's tail has never been heard, and in point

of solid wealth and internal improvements, mark the contrast. We are

required to disregard the lessons of that best teacher, experience,

and to try some new scheme. However captivating new theories and

abstract propositions were a few years since, I believe the thinking

men of all parties in the nation are perfectly convinced that one ounce

of experience and common matter-of-fact sense is worth more for the

purposes of legislation than a ship-load of theory and speculation. We

are told that we must force into the vaults of the bank a large portion

of the circulating medium, and thereby depress the price of every thing

in the market; we must give a shock to credit of every kind, check and

embarrass every branch of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing

industry; give up the young mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants

with small capitals a prey to the cupidity of moneyed men, who will be

tempted to withdraw their funds from trade to speculate on the wrecks

of the unfortunate. This is not mere matter of calculation. I only

state facts proved to us by the most unquestionable evidence. We are

not only, sir, to ruin many innocent and unoffending individuals, but

to derange the national finances; and for what is all this to be done?

To promote the public good or advance the national prosperity? No, sir,

it is not pretended. We are gravely told, that we, the Representatives

of the people, must sacrifice the people to save the constitution of

the people, whose happiness and welfare it was intended to secure. If

this be true, it is indeed a strange Government under which we live. I

advance the opinion with confidence, that no principle which, in its

practical effects, outrages the common sense and feelings of mankind,

can be a sound one, and we ought to examine it well, and hesitate much

before we give our assent. To bring distress on the country, not to

prevent a violation of any positive provision of the constitution; but

to correct what we suppose to have been an erroneous construction of it

by our predecessors, of which neither the States nor the people have

ever complained, appears to be more nice than wise.

Disguise this question as you will, sir, and still it will clearly

appear to be a contest between a few importing States and the people

of the United States. Resolutions have been already laid on our table

by gentlemen from the two large States; from which instructions have

been received in substance, requiring Congress to give up to the State

banks the collection of the national revenue. I am, Mr. President, on

the side of the people of the United States. This is indeed a question

of party, but of a very different character from that which will be

attempted to be palmed on the people. It is a contest between the

friends and enemies of the Federal Constitution revived; for, if I am

not mistaken, the power of laying and collecting imposts and duties was

strongly objected to by some of the large States having advantageous

seaports, before the constitution was adopted. I am for preserving both

the States and the Union. I consider the safety and independence of the

several States, and the liberties of the people, inseparably connected

with and dependent on the efficiency of the National Government, and

it is to me unaccountable that gentlemen in favor of strong measures

against foreign nations should be so solicitous to strip the General

Government of this very essential part of its power. We were told, a

few days since, that our army was so insignificant and contemptible,

that it would require a constable, with a search warrant, to find

it. I have heard another gentleman of very high standing suggest

the propriety of retroceding the ten miles square to the States of

Virginia and Maryland. Our gunboats are almost rotten. We have not

more frigates and other armed vessels than sufficient to carry our

Ministers and diplomatic despatches to foreign courts, and if we yield

to the States the collection of our revenue, what will remain of the

Federal Government with which the people can identify their feelings

or affections? In what will this Government consist? It will be a mere

creature of the imagination--a political fiction. And, analogous to

the fiction in the action of ejectment, we shall have to suppose its

existence, and then bottom our proceedings upon that supposition. If

I was hostile to our Federal Union, or wanted to prepare the public

mind for a surrender of this happy system of Government, I would

join in the hue and cry against this institution; I would support

every measure calculated to destroy all confidence in and respect

for this Government, both at home and abroad; I would endeavor to

produce throughout the country, confusion and disorder, and a state of

glorious uncertainty; then persuade the people to seek security and

tranquillity under some other form of Government. The transition from

a wild, factious democracy, to despotism, is often easy, and generally

sudden. The extremes are very nearly allied. A Republican Government,

guided by the virtue and intelligence of a nation, is the first of

human blessings, but when directed by the angry, vindictive passions

of party, the worst of which the imagination can conceive. A republic,

to be durable, must inspire confidence and respect. Such instability,

such variable, unsettled policy as now appears to be the order of

the day, could not have been anticipated by any man blessed with a

tolerable degree of faith in the success of this great republican

experiment. Mr. President, I have ever been opposed to yielding to

the commercial interest an undue influence in this Government, but

I am unwilling to make an unnecessary and wanton attack upon them.

Coming from an agricultural State, I am not disposed to increase the

jealousies which unfortunately exist, and thereby weaken the ties by

which these States are held together. I am sensible, too, how much the

prosperity of the State I represent depends on a prosperous state of

trade, and although the shock from the dissolution of this bank will

be first felt in the commercial cities, it must immediately react

to the extremes of the empire. I know many are under an impression

that Federalists and British agents are to be the victims; but very

different will be the result. I refer to the evidence detailed by

the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. LLOYD.) But is it

possible that an intolerant spirit of party has prepared us for this?

Are gentlemen ready to injure their country, weaken our Federal Union,

the sheet-anchor of our political safety, to reach their political

opponents? I will not believe it. When I see around me some of the

soldiers of the Revolution, actuated I am sure by nobler views; when I

see the professors of a religion which teaches us to love our neighbors

as ourselves, I cannot persuade myself that Christian charity, and

all the noble, generous feelings of the human heart, are extinguished

by this demon, party spirit. If there be a man in the nation who can

witness with unfeeling apathy the distresses of his fellow-citizens, he

would have figured in Smithfield in the bloody reign of Queen Mary of

England, in binding heretics to the stake; or in the sanguinary time of

Robespierre, in adding victims to the guillotine; but he is unworthy

the blessings of a free Government.

Sir, I address the Senate under circumstances discouraging indeed.

I have been told, and on this floor, that debate is useless; that

no man's opinion is to be changed; that I shall find verified in

the decision of this question the sentiment contained in two lines

of Hudibras--"He that is convinced against his will, is of the same

opinion still." I cannot admit this. I know there are gentlemen fully

sensible of the evils about to befall their country, without any

obstinate pride to conquer, who would rejoice at being convinced it is

in their power to avert them. Let me entreat them to pause and reflect,

before they inflict a wound on their country's interest, under the

influence of constitutional doubt; and if they err, I would ask them,

would it not be more safe and patriotic to err in favor of the people?

Permit me now, sir, to redeem this subject from the constitutional

difficulties with which it has been encumbered.

To form a correct opinion, we must retrospect the defects of the

old Government, and ascertain the remedy which was anticipated in

the present constitution. I believe it will be conceded that the

great cause of the inefficiency of the former, was not because their

principal field of legislation was too limited, but was owing to

its dependence on the States for the means to carry their powers

into effect. For the truth of this position, I appeal to the history

of that day--to the candor of gentlemen who hear me. The present

constitution was framed for national purposes, with ample authority to

pass all laws necessary and proper for the attainment of its objects,

independent of State authority, except so far as expressly made

dependent by the constitution. The erroneous impressions with regard

to this bank have arisen from ignorance of facts, relative to the

practical fiscal operations of the Government, and from confounding

an original, independent power, to establish banks and corporations,

with a necessary auxiliary to the execution of the powers given. By the

constitution it is expressly declared, that Congress shall have power

to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers

previously enumerated, and all other powers vested in the Government of

the United States, or any department or officer thereof. Our power to

create a bank is not derived by implication. No, sir. If this express

delegation of power had not been inserted, we must have implied the

authority to provide the means necessary and proper, &c.

But the Convention, with a full knowledge of the defects of the old

Confederation, and deeply impressed with the necessity of an efficient

national Government, determined to exclude all doubt by granting to the

new Government, in express and unequivocal language, ample authority

to use all means necessary and proper for the attainment of the ends

for which it was instituted. If a man was requested to look at the

constitution and decide whether power is given to Congress to create a

bank, or corporations generally, he would answer in the negative. This

would very naturally be the answer of most men upon the first blush

of the constitution. It is not pretended that Congress have power to

create corporations as an independent proposition. The authority to

establish a bank or corporations is only contended for so far as it

can be fairly considered as a necessary and proper auxiliary to the

execution of the powers granted by the constitution. The question

of constitutionality depends upon facts, dehors the instrument, of

which we must be informed before we decide, and which could not be

ascertained before the attempt was made to give motion and energy to

this political machinery. If the fact be ascertained, by the best

evidence the nature of the subject affords, that a bank is necessary

and proper to effectuate the legitimate powers of Government, then our

power is express, and we need not resort to implication. To prove to

the satisfaction of the Senate and the world, this material fact, will

be my business before I request their assent to the position assumed,

that Congress have an express power to incorporate a bank. To do this

it is indispensable that we should understand the practical financial

concerns of the Government, or have the information of those who do.

We appropriate money for fortifications on the report of our engineer,

Colonel Williams, and for the Capitol, &c., upon the report of Mr.

Latrobe. To know how much timber or other materials are necessary

for a ship or a house, you must understand the subject yourself, or

have the information of those who do. For myself, I am ready to admit

that I rely much upon the information and experience of others. To

ignorant men, and those who do not profess to be fully acquainted with

the nature and management of the national finances, the following

evidence is presented. The first, and with many, perhaps the best, not

heretofore particularly noticed, which I shall offer, is the Congress

of 1781, which established a national bank, called the Bank of North

America, during our revolutionary struggle, the utility and necessity

of which were ascertained by the experience of that day.

It is worthy of remark, that they created a bank under powers much more

limited than ours. That act was not passed precipitately, but was the

result of the most mature and deliberate consideration. I beg leave

to read the preamble of the law which contains the opinions of that

Congress with regard to the utility and necessity of a National Bank.

"Whereas Congress, on the 26th day of May last, did, from a conviction

of the support which the finances of the United States would receive

from the establishment of a National Bank, approve a plan for such

an institution, submitted to their consideration by Robert Morris,

Esq., and now lodged among the archives of Congress, and did engage

to promote the same by the most effectual means; and whereas the

subscription thereto is now filled, from an expectation of a charter of

incorporation from Congress, the directors and president are appointed,

and application has been made to Congress by the said president and

directors, for an act of incorporation: and whereas the exigencies of

the United States render it indispensably necessary that such an act

be immediately passed--Be it therefore ordained," &c. This act passed

on the 31st day of December, 1781. And here permit me to observe, that

this National Bank, styled the Bank of North America, was not produced

by British influence or party spirit. No, sir, the little, slandering,

intriguing partyism of the present moment was unknown to the patriots

of that awful period. They had no party but their country--liberty and

independence were their objects. Their souls were fired with a noble,

a generous enthusiasm, on which Heaven looked down with pleasure. It

appears from the journals of the Congress of 1781, that the members

from every State were unanimous in favor of a National Bank, except

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia--the two members from

Massachusetts voted against it, the two members from Pennsylvania were

divided--of the four from Virginia, Mr. Madison alone voted against it.

Here it is evident that, in the very infancy of our Republic, before

indeed it could with propriety be said to be born, when every bosom

glowed with enthusiasm for liberty and a pure disinterested patriotism,

a National Bank was not thought that dangerous, dreadful monster,

which the very wise and exclusive patriots of 1811 are endeavoring to

represent it to the American people. And the construction given to

the grant of powers in the Articles of Confederation by the Congress

of 1781, is strong evidence of our right to establish a bank under a

grant of powers much more ample, and with money concerns vastly more

extensive and complicated.

The next evidence I shall adduce for the consideration of the Senate,

is the opinion of the late General Hamilton, appointed by President

Washington, the first Secretary of the Treasury; whose province and

duty it was to superintend the national finances. His attention was

therefore particularly directed to the subject, and, in a very able

report to the first Congress, assembled under the new constitution,

he recommended a National Bank. Although opinions have been imputed

to this gentleman very foreign to my feelings and notions about

Government, yet he has ever been acknowledged, by the candid and

liberal of all parties, one of the first American statesmen. For

reasons, which it is unnecessary for me to assign, I will not press

his opinion upon the attention of the Senate, but will introduce other

and perhaps less exceptionable testimony. The Congress of 1791, which

incorporated the present bank, merits the highest regard. It was

composed of the most enlightened and distinguished men in America, many

of whom had been members of the convention, and were fully apprised of

the defects of the old and the objects of the new Government. A large

majority of both branches voted in favor of the bank. They were not

divided on the question by party. Many who have continued with the

Republican party under every Administration voted in favor of this

bank. Although different speculative or abstract political opinions

were then entertained, yet the spirit and passion of party had not

diffused itself so generally through the nation as at a subsequent

period. The next authority in favor of this bank, and one which must

at all times and on all occasions command the highest respect, is no

less than our immortal Washington. He was President of the United

States in 1791, when this bank law passed. After it had received the

sanction of both branches of the Legislature, with that circumspection

and prudence which regulated his conduct through life, he consulted

the able men who composed his Cabinet Council on the constitutional

question; they differed in opinion; he heard their arguments for and

against the measure; and, after full consideration, approved the law.

I cannot yet, sir, take leave of this very important testimony in

favor of the bank. The opinion of our Washington has the strongest

claim to our confidence. Let us pause before we disregard his solemn

advice. This is the hero who led our armies to victory; this is the

Washington, who, at the close of our Revolutionary war, disbanded

a disciplined army in the bosom of the Republic, and voluntarily

exchanged the splendid robes and ensigns of military power for the

plain, humble garb of a private citizen. This Washington, who continued

an American, a Republican in heart and in sentiment, until summoned to

the mansions of bliss; yes, sir, this illustrious departed hero, this

practical statesman, has solemnly declared to the American people that

a National Bank is a necessary and proper auxiliary to the execution of

the national powers. The last authority I shall particularly notice in

support of this institution, is the opinion of the present Secretary

of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin. If this gentleman cannot boast of the

military laurels which have adorned the brows of the patriots I have

mentioned; as a statesman and faithful public servant, he stands

inferior to none. Mr. Gallatin, from his first appearance on the

theatre of public life, has been considered by all parties an able

financier. At a very early period the finances of the United States

became the subject of his particular attention and inquiry; the result

of which was a treatise, published in 1796, called "Gallatin, on the

finances of the United States," in which he gives a decided opinion

in favor of this bank. I rely much on his opinion at that period,

because it must have been the result of conviction, and not of any

party feeling or consideration, as he was then in the minority, and

continued in it until the Administration changed. His report to the

Senate during the last session of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, and

his letter to the committee, show, that time and experience, so far

from changing, have confirmed him in the opinion he first formed on the

subject; to which I might add every Administration and almost every

man practically acquainted with our money concerns. Is not this mass

of evidence sufficient to substantiate the facts upon the existence or

non-existence of which the constitutionality of this measure depends?

I put the question to the candor and good sense of gentlemen, whether

they are not satisfied, in the language of the constitution, that a

National Bank is necessary and proper to effectuate the legitimate

powers of the National Government? If they answer in the negative, I

can only say, he who will neither regard the suggestions of experience,

nor believe the report of the great political disciples who have gone

before us, would not believe though one were to rise from the dead.

And what is the answer to all this out of doors? Why, that we are not

to be governed by the information or opinion of others, however well

acquainted with the subject; we are so self-sufficient as to disregard

the best lights which can be presented to us. The cry is up to the

hub, down with the bank, huzza for the party! So long, Mr. President,

as I shall be honored with a seat in the Senate of the Union, I am

determined to respect my station and my own feelings and character too

much to be driven along by any such idle, ridiculous clamor.

As I heard much said about absolute, indispensable necessity, I may

be pardoned for giving what I consider the sound interpretation of

the words "necessary and proper" in the constitution. This idea of

absolute, indispensable, &c., must have originated in an excessive

jealousy of power or a decided hostility to the Federal Union. This

instrument was framed by and for the people of the United States,

and, in the language used, was certainly intended to be understood in

that sense in which it is used and understood by them generally. If

you ask a plain man what are the necessaries of life, he will answer,

something below luxury and extravagance, what is calculated to afford

him reasonable comfort. Neither a house nor a bed is absolutely or

indispensably necessary to a man's existence; he could live in a camp

and sleep on boards, or on the ground, yet, the common sense of mankind

would respond, they are necessary and proper. If a man had a journey

to make, either to Richmond, in Virginia, or Lexington, in Kentucky,

although every person would pronounce a coach and six superfluous and

unnecessary, all reasonable men would say, he ought to have a horse

or a hack, but it will not be pretended that either are indispensable,

because he could perform it on foot. If a gentleman from Baltimore

gives his agent instructions to provide every thing necessary for an

East India voyage, what would he expect? Certainly that he should avoid

unnecessary expense, but would consider him acting within the pale of

his authority if he procured only what was reasonably necessary and

proper, or, in other words, what was fairly suited to the master and

crew, and well calculated to enable the vessel to reach her port of

destination. That interpretation is correct which best accords with

the common sense and understanding of mankind. It must, therefore, be

evident that the only question as regards the constitutionality of the

measure to be decided is a question of fact, and that is, whether a

National Bank is reasonably necessary and proper, or fairly suited to,

and calculated for, the collection of our revenue and the management

of our money concerns. And this fact appears to be admitted by the

gentlemen opposed to the bill, for their arguments are predicated upon

the probability that the State banks will answer the national purposes.

This is a complete surrender of the constitutional objection; for, if

banks be necessary and proper, it follows that we have a constitutional

power to create them, and it will be a mere question of expediency

whether we will use State banks or a National Bank. My colleague (Mr.

CLAY) has asked for the congeniality between a bank and the collection

of our revenue? The argument in favor of using State banks shows it,

but let the use hitherto made of the bank answer the question. Is not

a bank a proper place for the deposit and safe-keeping of money--more

so than the custom-house? Is it not a convenient agent for paying and

receiving money? Through the agency of this bank our revenue, or the

greater part of it, has been collected, our financial transactions

done, and public money transmitted to such places as the necessities of

the Government required. The revenue collected at Boston, Baltimore,

or any other port, is paid, if required, at New Orleans, Natchez, St.

Louis, or any other place without risk or expense. The money in the

bank and its branches is payable at such of them as the convenience of

the Government may require, and, by this arrangement, we can command

the whole of the public money in any quarter of the Union without risk

or expense. The operations of this institution have been confined to

the seaboard. The principal bank is at Philadelphia, with a branch

at New York, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston,

Savannah, and New Orleans. At all which places, the Government has

considerable revenue to collect. No branches have been extended into

the interior. It has been connected with our fiscal arrangements at

all the places to which it has been extended, and may be fairly deemed

a convenient, necessary, and appropriate auxiliary to the management

of the national concerns. It is said that the revenue is collected at

many ports where none of these branches are placed. This is true; the

bank and branches are fixed only at the principal seaports, where a

large amount of revenue is collected. Every one draws into its vaults,

subject to the demands of Government, the revenue collected at the less

important ports in the same quarter of the country. Boston being the

commercial emporium of New England, the Government, by the agency of

the branch bank there, is enabled to draw to that point most of the

revenue received at the numerous ports in that quarter of the Union.

The repeated sanctions this bank has received from the different

Administrations, and especially from Mr. Jefferson and the Republican

party, by authorizing the extension of a branch to New Orleans, and

selling one million of the stock, the property of the United States,

to British subjects, for four hundred thousand dollars more than

the nominal amount, is indeed strangely accounted for; gentlemen

say the Government were bound to fulfil their engagements, and that

the charter, being in the nature of a contract, was sacred. I had

thought the fashionable doctrine was, that an unconstitutional law was

wholly null and void. It has been held by some of the States. However

plausible the answer to the argument of acquiescence, it furnishes no

apology for a positive confirmation. Permit me to assimilate a common

case between individuals to the case before us: a man in Washington

executes a joint power to five trustees in Kentucky to collect his

debts, settle his land business, &c., and authorizes them to take all

steps necessary and proper to effectuate the trust or power; in the

progress of the business a measure is suggested as necessary, about

which there is a diversity of opinion among the trustees. A majority,

however, decide that it is within their authority; the principal is

informed of it, does not complain or disavow, but positively and by the

strongest implication assents to the construction given by his agents.

In such a case there would be but one opinion. In 1791 a National Bank

is proposed to Congress; they differ as to the constitutionality, a

large majority decide in favor of it, the people and the States are

informed of the measure, the States do not protest, nor do the people

complain; many of the States pass laws to protect the institution, it

receives the confirmation of three or four different Administrations,

and particularly of the one composed of men originally opposed to it;

it violates no positive provision of the constitution; no mischiefs

have been produced, but great convenience and advantage have been

experienced by the Government and community. I ask whether, under such

circumstances, the question ought not to be considered settled? Is

no respect due to the opinions of our predecessors? Is a question of

construction never to be at rest? Why is a judge, sworn to support the

laws and constitution of the country, bound by a train of decisions

contrary to his own opinions? Because the good, the peace, the

tranquillity of society require it. The conduct of a court, as well as

every department of Government, must be regulated in its course in some

measure by a regard for the public weal. It is worthy of remark that,

notwithstanding all the fuss about implied and incidental powers--if

you except the sedition law, which was supposed to violate a positive

provision of the constitution--the same practical construction has been

given to this instrument by every Administration of the Government.

Indeed, the sphere of national legislation has been more enlarged under

Mr. Jefferson's than any other Administration. All parties have found

that the national vessel could not be navigated without sails, rigging,

and every thing necessary and proper. Whence was derived a power to

pass a law laying an embargo without limitation? There is nothing in

the constitution about embargoes. Whence did we derive a power to

purchase Louisiana, and incorporate it with the good old United States?

There is no express delegation of power to purchase new territory.

On these subjects the constitution is silent. I have approved both.

No State can lay an embargo, or acquire new territory. Our power to

perform these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty

created by this constitution. The Republican Administrations have no

pretensions to the approbation of the people on the ground of having

restrained any latitude or liberality of construction. Their claim to

the public confidence is founded on very different considerations.

They have repealed the internal taxes, paid a large part of the public

debt, purchased Louisiana, and preserved to the nation the blessings of

peace. For these acts, they have, I believe, the thanks of the nation.

They have mine, most sincerely.

Great stress is placed on the twelfth article of the amendments to the

constitution, which declares the powers not delegated to the United

States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. I must confess

that I cannot discover what influence this can have on the bill under

consideration, or any other measure which may be proposed. It appears

to me to have been adopted rather to quiet State jealousies and popular

fears than with a view to produce any positive effect, for the inquiry

must ever be, Is the power given? And if granted, it is not retained.

The supporters of this bill do not pretend to usurp any power retained

by the States or the people, but contend that the power to pass the

bill is expressly delegated, if the facts assumed are true.

It is not pretended that our fiscal concerns can be managed with gold

and silver. If our territory was of no greater extent than Rhode

Island, Delaware, or the city of Philadelphia, gold and silver would

answer the purposes of the Government, but it would require a number

of pack horses and wagons to transport the public money in gold and

silver, over this immense country, to the different places where

it is wanting. Our extensive commerce, and the great extent of this

empire, renders a paper medium necessary. Is the power to create this

paper medium, or national currency, an attribute of State or national

sovereignty? I put the question to the candor of gentlemen, and solicit

a serious answer! The argument of my honorable friend from Georgia

against the power of the States to authorize the emission of bank

paper, founded on that part of the constitution which declares that "No

State shall emit bills of credit," acquires great additional force,

when these bills of credit are made to assume the character of money,

for national purposes. In the same article the power to coin money is

expressly prohibited to the States, and in the catalogue of cardinal

powers granted to this Government, is that to coin money. It will,

perhaps, be contended that this only applies to gold and silver, but

if that be admitted to be the literal meaning of the words, still it

is evident that what shall be the national currency, whether specie or

paper, is a proper subject of national legislation. No gentleman will

be so absurd as to insist that any State or States ought to coin the

current money of the United States. That the power of the States to

establish banks may be questioned with at least great plausibility, is

perfectly clear, but as this banking power has been so long exercised,

as the National and State banks have conducted their operations very

harmoniously, as no serious evils call for national interference, I am

not for disturbing the existing state of things; it is better, perhaps,

that the banking power should be divided between the States and the

United States. That bank paper, if good, is in fact money, although not

made a legal tender, cannot be denied. The currency of this bank paper

of the United States, although made by law receivable in payment of

revenue, rests upon a much better foundation than an act of Congress.

Its national character, the extended operations of this bank from

Boston to New Orleans, have given it credit with the people of every

part of the empire, more than the bank paper of any particular State

can be expected to have; so that, by common consent, this money coined

by the national bank has become the current money of the United States.

I hope we shall never be driven to the necessity of compelling our

citizens by law to receive our paper. We should so guard and regulate

our banking operations as to make the national paper at least equal to

gold and silver, in every quarter of the Union.

If this bank is removed, the Secretary of the Treasury must nationalize

the bank paper of the great importing States; for, I presume, Congress

will never decide what State paper shall be used by the officers of

the General Government. Most of the public money is now collected and

deposited in the Bank of the United States; if that is destroyed, the

Secretary of the Treasury is to deposit in the State banks, and with

him is the power of selection--a power and patronage greater than

any ever exercised by any officer in this nation. The deposits of the

public money are sought after with great avidity, by all the State

institutions. He can deposit the whole in one, or divide it between

two, or three, or all the banks in any one place. He can change them

at pleasure. He may, with great apparent fairness and propriety, make

it a condition with every bank where deposits are made that they

shall appoint a certain portion of the directors of his nomination,

and through them he can reach the credit of any man who may have

accommodations in it. It is true we have now a man at the head of

the Treasury who may not be disposed to abuse this power, but we may

not always have such an officer. This immense power and influence

may be exercised in an invisible manner, and, of course, without

responsibility. Is this republican? It was not a few years ago. I have

always understood that one of the strongest and most popular objections

to the Federal Administration was their disposition to increase

Executive patronage.

Although this subject has received much false coloring through the

country, by charges of British influence, &c., I did not expect to hear

it from an honorable senator of the United States--it has not indeed

been positively asserted, but hinted in such a manner as to make an

impression on the community. Some stale circumstances connected with

the British treaty have been very unnecessarily lugged in to increase

the prejudices against this bill. It has been insinuated, that British

influence, operating through this institution, has prevented the

Government from taking strong measures against Great Britain; but in

what manner this has been effected, gentlemen have not been good enough

to explain. Did it prevent Mr. Jefferson from taking a war course? For

I believe it is generally understood that he was opposed to a war. Has

it operated upon the present Executive? Such a suggestion will not

be made. I have, during my service here, given a fair and faithful

support to the Administration, and I have certainly voted for stronger

measures than they were willing to accept. It is due to the 10th and

11th Congresses, who have been so much abused, to state that their

course, as regards the question of peace or war, has been in perfect

unison with the views of the late and present Presidents. Let it not be

inferred that I am disposed to find fault; I believe when we consider

the very extraordinary state of the foreign world, and retrospect

the embarrassing circumstances which have surrounded us, the course

pursued by them ought to be deemed substantially correct, certainly so

as respects their leading object, which has been to avoid making this

country a party in the present war. If I was disposed to censure, it

would be for not making an effort to chastise some of the British armed

vessels which lay in our waters after the affair of the Chesapeake,

in open contempt of the President's proclamation; if a single vessel

had been driven out or compelled to strike her colors, it would have

healed the wound inflicted on the national pride and feeling, committed

by the Leopard.

That this Government should have an influence with foreign Governments

proportioned to the interest their subjects have in our funds, is

probable, but how this interest gives them an influence here I am at

a loss to perceive: foreigners cannot even vote in the appointment of

directors. If there is any reality in this idea of foreign influence

through this institution, why did gentlemen permit the present

stockholders to be incorporated into the bill introduced last year? And

why was not a provision inserted to prevent foreigners from purchasing

additional stock?

Gentlemen say the embarrassments in Philadelphia could not have been

occasioned by the Bank of the United States, because they continue

to discount as usual. If I recollect the evidence--and I hope to be

corrected if I mistake it--it was this: that the calling in of ten

per cent. on their debts occasioned such a pressure, that they were

prevailed upon to extend their discounts until the ultimate decision

of Congress should be known. I have heard it seriously urged that the

evils and inconveniences to be experienced from its dissolution, prove

it to be a dangerous institution; the same argument would prove that

the Government ought to be destroyed. Nothing, indeed, seems too absurd

for the human mind to seize upon, when under the influence of passion

or misguided zeal.

My honorable friend from Georgia has been reminded of the Macedonian

phalanx. I trust, sir, we shall ever be found associated with a phalanx

American, Republican, in heart and sentiment. I will not sacrifice the

interest of my constituents for fear of being called hard names. The

epithets of quidism, quadroonism, or any other ism which malice or

policy may suggest, shall not drive me from the course called for by

the public good. I am proud that I represent a people just, generous,

and independent, not to be carried away by unmeaning clamor. Before

they discard a public servant, they will view him both on a political

theatre, and in the walks of private life. They know, too well, that

those are not always the best Christians who sing hallelujahs on the

house top, nor have they forgotten the celebrated Sempronius, who, on

the approach of Cæsar, thundered war in the Roman Senate, and at the

same time was secretly co-operating with the traitor to overthrow the

liberties of the Roman people.

Deeply impressed, Mr. President, with the opinion, that the rejection

of this bill will give at least a temporary check to the prosperity

of the rising State from which I come, I shall give my negative to

the motion to strike out the first section. Yes, sir, not only the

interest, but importance of that State in the Union is about to be

sacrificed. When I look beyond the mountains, and remember that

Kentucky has nurtured me almost from my cradle, that she has bestowed

on me her choicest honors, my bosom is filled with emotions of

gratitude, which impel me to say on this, as on all other occasions,

Kentucky I am only thine!

SATURDAY, February 16.

_Bank of the United States._

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend

and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the

subscribers to the Bank of the United States, passed on the 25th day of

April, 1791;" the motion to strike out the first section being under

consideration.

Mr. SMITH of Maryland said, that in seconding the motion to strike

out the first section of the bill, he had pursued a course which,

in his opinion, was the most correct. When I first took a seat in

Congress (said he) the course of proceeding was to fix the principle by

resolution, and, that once fixed, to send it to a committee to report a

bill. By a motion to strike out the first section the principle will be

tried, and the Senate, if the motion fails, will go into a discussion

of the provisions of the bill. This I conceive a better course, than,

for the Senate to go into discussion of the details of a subject

which would probably be ultimately rejected on the general ground of

principle.

The gentleman who introduced this subject spoke with great animation

and with great feeling against the press or presses which have

undertaken to give their opinions upon this great and important

question. He spoke with much warmth, and said that whoever knew him

would not believe that he would permit himself to be driven out of

his opinion by any man or set of men. There is no man, sir, the least

acquainted with the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. CRAWFORD) but will

believe his declaration. But another result may be apprehended, that

those who feel so great an offence at the freedom the press has taken,

may be driven into the opposite course by the irritation of their

feelings. Certainly those feelings must have been extremely strong

with the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. POPE) to have induced him to

terminate his speech with an oration hostile to the press. Are the

gentlemen from Georgia and Kentucky the only Senators who have had

their feelings wounded by the conduct of the press upon this subject?

Sir, if the gentleman's opinions and sentiments have been censured by

one description of presses, he may find consolation in having been

greatly eulogized in others. For more than a year those on the same

side of this question with myself have had their opinions tortured

into every shape to destroy them in the estimation of the people, not

only in this session but during the last. Sir, there are some presses

in the Union which could not exist, whose papers would not be read,

but for the discussion of individual character. Is any advantage to

be derived from complaining of this? It results from the nature and

temper of our Government, and the best way I have ever found to treat

it is with silent contempt. He who does otherwise engages in the

contest at a great disadvantage, and will seldom come out the victor.

In the same presses of which those gentlemen complain, I have seen them

both eulogized, and properly, for their conduct on the subject of the

embargo and West Florida questions.

If the press be an evil in this respect, we must submit to it; those

gentlemen who take a high and prominent stand must expect to be

noticed. Sometimes gentlemen will be put down by the press, but their

conduct being correct will more frequently be written up by its abuse.

It has been objected that this question is discussed on the ground of

party; and the gentleman from Georgia, as I understood him, said, that

this had been made a party question elsewhere, and might be so here.

[Mr. CRAWFORD said he had mentioned no place, but had said that this

might be made a party question.] I understood the gentleman to say,

said Mr. S., that this may again be made a party question. But for

this observation of the gentleman the subject of party would probably

not have been introduced at all; and we must indeed shut our eyes or

we cannot avoid seeing that this is made a party question, at least

on one side. Do you see one gentleman, one solitary gentleman of one

party, discriminated generally as a Federal, who does not vote for this

measure throughout? Do you see one public body in Philadelphia or New

York which has a majority of Federal directors or agents, which has not

come before you with memorials drawn up with the ingenuity of lawyers,

to impose on your judgments? Have not the same party prepared memorials

and got the subscription of every one of their caste, bringing forward

nearly the same number of petitioners as they have of Federal voters?

Have they not done so in Baltimore? Of that city I would say as

little as may be, for being a manufacturing as well as a commercial

city, it has stirred up an animosity in some gentlemen against it not

easily accounted for. In Baltimore, on a warmly-contested election,

the Federal party mustered eight hundred and fourteen votes, all

they could parade with their every exertion. To the petition for the

renewal of the charter of the bank, there are eight hundred and forty

odd signatures! They have gained some few since the latest contest.

Is this coincidence of members, this exclusively Federal petitioning,

no mark of party? They have also got one public body in Baltimore to

memorialize in favor of the bank; the rest were not to be intimidated

by the threats of the Bank of the United States. What, sir, have the

other party done? Have they disturbed the quiet of either House? Have

they brought forward the mass of their voters as signers to petitions?

No, sir, they have trusted the subject to their Representatives,

confiding in their disposition and ability to speak their sentiments.

The representation of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk,

and Charleston, in the other House, have opposed the renewal of the

charter. Every city high in estimation as a commercial city is opposed

to the renewal of the charter, except Boston. This speaks with a strong

voice what are the feelings of the people; stronger evidence cannot be

presented to the human mind. Far be it from me, sir, to endeavor to

work up the feelings of party spirit on this occasion; but the thing

itself was one of the first causes which created the present parties,

and separated man from man and brother from brother. This measure

was originally brought forward and adopted when the representation

in Congress was not bottomed on an actual supposed census of the

United States. Sixty-five members composed Congress then, which was a

representation taken by accident. If a proportionate representation

had been given to the States according to their population, the law

probably would not have passed. The States of North Carolina and South

Carolina had each five Representatives, being thus placed on an exact

equality. Now, North Carolina has twelve, South Carolina only eight.

What was the vote then? Out of sixty-five members thirty-nine voted for

the bill. It was not, as my friend from Kentucky said, a subject fully

discussed, or carried by a tremendous majority.

The bank having been formed, it may not be improper for me to take some

view of its beginning and its operation. At first its operations were

confined to Philadelphia; it extended its branches some time afterwards

to Boston, New York, Baltimore and Charleston. Wherever it extended

its influence, dissension commenced; wherever it placed its foot it

became absolutely necessary for the States to erect another bank to

counterbalance its pecuniary and political influence. In Philadelphia

it began to oppose certain people and turn down their paper. The State

of Pennsylvania, in defence of its own citizens, created the Bank

of Pennsylvania. Here was a check upon its pecuniary and political

operations. I believe I am not mistaken when I say that soon after

it commenced in Boston a new bank was established there, from what

cause I know not. In Baltimore, sir, it soon taught us a lesson, and

we met the lesson as other States had done. Charleston and New York

acted in a similar way. Operating as the bank did on the politics of

the country before its effects were neutralized by competition, man

being man, place him where you will, those concerned in the direction

of the bank felt power and exercised it. When the British treaty was

pending before Congress, the president and directors (as I am informed)

themselves carried about a memorial to Congress in its favor, with what

view and with what effect may easily be conceived. In Baltimore (until

we were able to check them by other banks) its political influence was

great. Prior to the great struggle between the parties, in 1798, they

did permit one democrat to be within the walls of the sanctuary (as a

director), a gentleman of as much respectability and independence of

character, as any one of the direction. He was, however, (immediately

after daring to give his vote in favor of a democratic candidate,)

put out, and since that time no man of democratic principles has been

permitted to enter its walls as a director. Men must shut their eyes

to the fact of this being a party institution, when they see that no

democrat has been admitted to the direction of the bank but in this

city and New York, where the collector was admitted a director for the

purpose of protecting the public money at the instance (it is said) of

the Secretary of the Treasury. Can we shut our eyes so as not to see

that men hostile to the democratic party, and of course to the success

of the administration of the Government, are not the most proper

persons to have charge of its pecuniary concerns? I would have been

very unwilling to have gone into this part of the subject; but when the

gentleman from Kentucky, scarcely able to restrain his rage, cried out,

party! party! I was bound to show that it was not those with whom I act

who had any agency in pressing the subject of party into the present

discussion.