The gentleman from Kentucky reprobates the system of petty mischievous

intrigue for the purpose of carrying measures through Congress. No man,

sir, despises or contemns such conduct more than I do. But on whose

side has this intrigue been? It is necessary to put the saddle on the

proper horse. Have we gone to insurance companies or corporations of

one kind or another? Have we intrigued with the people to induce them

to take sides with us? No, sir, we have been tranquil; we wanted no aid

of that kind. Have we sent persons here to intrigue with members, or

a deputy to remain here the whole of the last and present session, to

explain to Congress the effect of putting down the bank, and threaten

them with destruction and ruin to the United States if they passed

the measure? No, sir, we have had no one here. Have we stirred up the

people into town meetings to aid us by memorials? No such thing, sir.

Have we called meetings and induced honest mechanics to come here to

influence Congress by idle fears, impressed upon them by those who are

interested, to tell a tale that shall answer our purposes? No, sir, we

have pursued no such course.

Respectable merchants, I observe, form a part of the bank deputies--for

what? To represent the late fall of the price of flour as a consequence

of the danger of the bank charter not being renewed, and thereby to

alarm the minds of members. I am sorry that men of such respectable

character did permit themselves to come here on such an errand. I

think I have seen in the papers, that one of the manufacturers (now

here) on being asked to sign a petition for the renewal of the charter

for twenty years, said he would rather cut off his right hand than

sign it; he wished only a renewal for a short time to give the bank

an opportunity to wind up its affairs. If this statement be true, and

of its truth I have no cause to doubt, it shows the depth of that

intrigue which sent this gentleman here, through the instrumentality

of his excellent character, to get a renewal of the charter for a

period which he never contemplated. These are intrigues for which men

ought to blush, and from which, I thank God, we are exempt. At the

time these deputies arrived, there were three mechanics of Baltimore

here, of character inferior to none, and of wealth inferior to few in

Philadelphia, and who would have given a different view of the subject,

if they had been asked to appear before the committee. I thought

it unnecessary--I wanted no assistance of that kind--no species of

intrigue. They did, however, declare, sir, that granting this charter

would be a death-blow to the politics of the State of Maryland. They

did believe the renewal would be injurious to them, for neither

they nor many of the manufacturers of Baltimore had received much

advantage from the branch bank; they had their own banks from which

they generally received accommodation. Another species of intrigue

is carried on, to wit, by pamphleteering. The press is groaning with

pamphlets--for what? To teach the minds of members on this question,

the necessity of renewal and probability of destruction to the nation,

if their demands are not complied with. Our tables are covered with

pamphlets of that tendency. Has there been any thing of the kind on our

part?

There is scarcely an evil which has not been attributed to the embargo,

and which is not now, with as little justice, attributed to the

expected non-renewal of the bank charter. Great failures have lately

taken place at New York; bills of exchange on London, to a large

amount, have returned protested, and the drawers are not able to pay

the holders, and to the present critical situation of the bank some

gentlemen attribute the distress brought upon those who have suffered

by these failures and protests. But, Mr. President, what is the real

cause of those failures? They are confined principally to New York, and

may be attributed to the following causes: It is natural for men born

in Great Britain to entertain predilections favorable to a commerce

with that country, their connections, as well commercial as of family,

are there; their credit is there; and, from those causes, the house

which has failed, and carried so many others with it in its fall, has

probably directed the principal part of its commerce to England; they

have, no doubt, shipped cotton and tobacco, the trade in which being

in a great measure confined to Great Britain, the natural consequence

has been, that the markets of England were completely glutted; tobacco,

except the very fine Virginia, scarcely paid the charges of freight

and commission, and the loss on cotton must have been nearly fifty

per cent. The consignees, under those circumstances, refused to pay

the bills drawn upon shipments of those articles. The bills returned

protested, and ruin to the American shipper has been the consequence.

At any other time the English merchants would have accepted the bills,

and held the cargoes for a better market; but, at that time, ruin

stared every man in the face. No man in London knew who to trust, and

very few would enter into engagements which they saw any difficulty

in meeting. No censure ought to be attached to the American shipper,

for, by the usage of trade between the United States and Europe, the

American merchant is entitled to draw for two-thirds the amount of his

cargo on transmitting invoices and bills of lading with orders for

insurance. Other causes have existed to cause the present distress in

New York and elsewhere, to wit, the seizure, detention and confiscation

of property in Denmark, Prussia, and France, of ships and cargoes to

the amount of many millions, on the proceeds of which cargoes merchants

calculated to meet their engagements at home, and to meet their bills

drawn on London. For, sir, the merchants who make large shipments to

the continent, order the greatest proportion of their proceeds to be

remitted from thence to London, and, on the expectation thereof, draw

bills on their friends there. Disappointment has been the consequence

of such seizures and losses; protests of such bills and ruin has

followed. But, Mr. President, we might with as much propriety attribute

the late great failures in England and on the continent to the expected

non-renewal of the bank charter, as those which have happened in New

York, or the present distress of the merchants of the United States.

The returns of the bills protested, to so large an amount, of course

destroyed the merchant's credit at bank; he failed, and, by his fall,

has caused the ruin of others. When a great house fails, it is like a

game of nine pins; knock one down and it will probably carry with it

four or five others.

We have been told, Mr. President, in case the charter should not be

renewed, that we shall find in future great difficulty in obtaining

loans. What loans, I ask, have Government ever received from the Bank

of the United States? I recollect, when I first entered Congress, that

Government were indebted for loans made from the bank, but I also

recollect that the bank complained of her loans as an inconvenience,

and that Congress took the earliest measure in their power to pay them

off, and have, since that period, made no new loan from the bank until

that made payable the first of January last. I will not inquire whether

even that loan was necessary, but I will venture to promise, sir, and

will give any security that may be required, that the State banks will

give a similar accommodation, to wit: If the Secretary of the Treasury

will deposit with the State banks two millions five hundred thousand

dollars of the public money, (the amount of the late loan,) they will

lend Government to the same amount, and thus do as the Bank of the

United States has done, _lend you your own money_, and very kindly

receive from you an interest of six per cent. therefor. We are told

that the bank has lately lessened the discounts of individuals ten

per cent., and that the merchants are thereby greatly distressed. Is

that a fact? If it is, and great distress has ensued therefrom, what

will be the distress of the merchants if the bill now before you shall

pass; and if, agreeably to its provisions, Congress should (at any time

hereafter) call on the bank for the loan of four millions promised by

the bill? If, sir, a lessening of their discounts one-tenth per cent.

creates distress, what will be the consequence, when, by a loan of four

millions, called for from the bank, the bank shall be compelled to

lessen the discounts four-tenths?

But, sir, the promise to lend four millions from a bank of ten millions

is idle; it is worse, it is deception on the face of it. The loan,

if made, would not be from the bank but from the merchants, whose

discounts would thereby be lessened, and whose ruin would follow.

We are told that, if the charter of this bank be not renewed, and the

funds of the United States be deposited in the State banks, it will

be extremely unsafe, because it is said we can have no control over

them. And, I wish to know, sir, what control we have over the Bank of

the United States? None, but the same as we may have over the State

banks. We cannot check the operations of the Bank of the United States,

and if they obtain this charter, they will know that they can have

their charter renewed whenever they please; so that, the fear of a

non-renewal of their charter will have no operation on them in future.

You will have a much greater control over the State banks, because you

are under no obligation to put money in them, and you can change them

whenever you think proper; the danger of losing the public deposits

will always be a sufficient control over their conduct. The security

of the State banks is doubted, however; and we are told, very gravely,

indeed, that there is much more security in the mother bank, and her

nine children, than in ten independent banks. This I must deny. I

should, as a merchant, place more confidence in ten independent houses

than in one with nine branches.

MONDAY, February 18.

_Bank of the United States._

Mr. BRENT said he had not the vanity to believe, after the subject

had been so fully discussed, that he should be able to shed any new

light on it; but having been instructed, by the Legislature of the

State which he had the honor to represent, to vote on constitutional

principles against the bill under consideration, and as he was reduced

to the painful necessity of going counter to those instructions, it

seemed to him to be indispensably necessary that he should submit

to the Senate the grounds on which he acted. It is (said he) a most

painful situation in which I stand in relation to the Legislature of

Virginia, in being compelled to vote in opposition to their will, more

especially as it is a prevalent opinion with many whose opinions

are entitled to great respect, that instructions are obligatory on

a Senator. This question is one which has never been settled, or

even fully deliberated on. Instructions, when heretofore given to

Senators, have generally been in accordance with the sentiments of the

Senators, and only given to add the greater weight to their opinions.

If called upon definitely to pronounce with regard to instructions

on questions of expediency, I might be under some difficulty as to

what course to pursue; because, although there is no clause in the

constitution to that effect, I am under a strong impression that,

according to the principles of our Government, there is much reason

to believe that the respective State Legislatures should have such a

right; but on a constitutional question (whatever may be the right of

the State Legislatures in other instances) the right of instruction

may be denied, in my judgment--that is, so far as to be imperative on

the Senator. To give a vote in such a manner as in his estimation to

inflict a vital wound on the constitution, is more than the Legislature

of Virginia, or any other State Legislature in the Union, can compel

me or any other Senator in the United States to do. The resolution

of Virginia is bottomed, not on the ground of expediency, but on the

principle that the constitution prohibited Congress from granting

the bank charter in the first instance; that it now prohibited it,

and therefore, because it was unconstitutional, the Legislature have

instructed their Senators in Congress to oppose it. Now, sir, although

I shall not immediately and directly violate the constitution by

voting against the bank, yet, if I vote against it when I believe

it constitutional and necessary, it must be known that I vote in

conformity to the instructions of the Virginia Legislature; and so far

as my vote goes, it will warrant and sanction that interpretation of

the constitution which the Legislature of Virginia has given--which

interpretation, in conscience, I believe to be erroneous. Therefore,

though in ordinary cases the instructions of a Legislature may be

imperative, (I will not determine that question,) I conclude that they

cannot be so when they require of a Senator to commit either a positive

or implied breach of the constitution, or to vote in such a manner as

to warrant such interpretation of the constitution as will deprive it

of an essential attribute. Virginia has the physical force, but has

she a moral right to violate the Constitution of the United States? If

she has it not, can she give it to her Legislature? If her Legislature

possess it not, can they give it to a Senator? Can the Legislature

give me a moral right to violate the Constitution of the United

States, which I have sworn to support? I believe not, sir; and that,

in the situation in which I stand, their instructions ought to have no

operation on the vote I am to give on the subject under consideration.

The first question, whether the General Government, when it first came

into operation, did not possess the power of creating a National

Bank, is the primary object of investigation. In objection to this it

has been said, that to carry into effect an enumerated power is one

thing, and the right to incorporate a bank is a distinct power. Those

who take this ground say that the creation of a National Bank is an

original, independent, and substantive power. It is not sufficient,

say they, to show that it is a convenient instrument to carry into

effect an enumerated power, because it is an independent authority

of itself, and the genius of our Government prohibits the derivation

of any powers by implication with scrupulous limitation. It is true,

sir, that our Government, being an emanation from the existing State

governments, the rational construction is, that all power not given

away is retained to them or to the people. If that construction does

not result, then a positive amendment, which has been made to the

constitution, has infused this principle into it. I therefore admit in

its fullest latitude the construction that all powers not given away

are still retained; yet I still contend that even in a Government like

ours, there are some resulting powers. Or by what right do we create

a military school? We have a right to raise armies; but we can have

an army without a military school. Yet it is constitutional to create

such an institution, because every given power implies rights inferior

appertaining to the powers granted. We lay an embargo--is there any

clause in the constitution authorizing us to lay embargoes? No, sir; we

have a right to regulate trade, and we have a right to lay embargoes

to protect it. We have a right to provide for arming and disciplining

the militia. Under this authority we build armories. Is there any

provision in the constitution directing it? We have erected forges

and even purchased ore banks. These are inferior powers, necessarily

resulting from the greater powers granted. But here gentlemen find

the great difficulty. The creation of a corporation, say they, is

an act of sovereignty; it cannot be used as a mean, because it is a

sovereign act. Why, Mr. President, every law passed is _quoad hoc_ a

sovereign act. A law incorporating a military school is as much an

act of sovereignty, as to the particular subject to which it relates,

as an act incorporating, a bank. We create a military school--for

what purpose? Because the sovereign authority has power to establish

an army, and the power to create a military school is inseparably

connected with and necessarily appertains to it. We establish a

navy--we also establish a marine corps. There is no clause in the

constitution giving that power, but we take it as inseparable from the

power to create a navy, because the exercise of the greater implies

every subordinate power necessarily connected with it. The great

stumbling block, however, is, that this is one of those independent,

original, and substantive powers, which cannot be given by implication.

Blackstone says, "municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined

to be a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in

a State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."

Agreeably to this definition, every law passed by a deliberative body

is an act of sovereignty as to the subject to which it relates. The

establishment of a marine corps is as much an act of sovereignty as

an act incorporating the Bank of the United States. The only question

is, whether it be necessarily incident to the enumerated powers given

to the General Government. Those who criticise most accurately on the

constitution and most unwillingly concede resulting powers, will admit

them to a certain extent even in our Government. The only question

is the immediate and necessary connection of the means used with the

object intended to be attained.

In inquiring then, sir, whether or not, at the first promulgation of

the constitution, when it came into existence, it was intended that

Congress should possess the power of incorporating the Bank of the

United States, let us inquire whether there was any possibility of

carrying into effect with any tolerable convenience and advantage the

several provisions of the constitution, unless this power exists. It

is said that you do not possess the power, because it is attempted

to be derived by different gentlemen from so many different parts of

the constitution. Now, Mr. President, I have never before understood

that a capacity to derive a title from several different sources gives

you less title than if derived from one source alone. I derive the

power from the whole context of the constitution, although gentlemen

seem to think that the title is invalidated in proportion to the

number of sections in the constitution from whence we derive it. In

order to avoid confusion of argument in examining this question, I

will derive it from only one source at present, though I believe

others equally give it by a necessary construction. At the time the

constitution came into existence, I believe there were but three banks

in the United States; none south of Philadelphia, and all of very

limited capital. The Constitution of the United States gives the power

to levy and collect taxes. Is it possible to imagine any system so

convenient for the collection of this revenue, and sending it to the

seat of Government, as that of the agency of banks? I am not inquiring

whether the State banks can do it; but I say that the framers of the

constitution must have had under consideration the state of things

at the time when the constitution came into existence. At that time

there was not one bank south of Philadelphia, and the banks which

existed were very limited in their capital, and their paper had limited

circulation. Congress, in such a state of things, then, has the power

of levying and collecting taxes conferred on it, and yet Congress has

not the power to create banks to aid in the collection of its taxes,

notwithstanding a clause to make all laws necessary and proper for

that purpose is contained in the constitution. No gentleman will say

that the agency of banks is not necessary in some way or other in

collecting the revenue. I admit without them you could have carried

on our fiscal arrangements in an awkward and cumbrous form, but was

that the intention of the constitution? When the power to collect

taxes was given, it was intended to give all the means necessary to

carry this power into execution. It was not to execute this power in a

cumbrous form, but with the greatest facility with which the power is

susceptible of being wielded. Now, is it possible that the constitution

contemplated that the revenue should be collected and transmitted here,

subject to all the risks and accidents and inconveniences that attend

the transportation of specie? It is impossible. But all this doubt has

arisen from its being a separate and independent power, although it

is no more of that character than any other law passed to execute the

enumerated powers of Congress.

In a word, Mr. President, it is admitted by all who have spoken on this

question, whether for or against the bill under consideration, that the

agency of a bank or of banks affords the greatest facility and security

of any plan that can be devised for the collection of a revenue, and

for its transmission to your Treasury.

It is admitted that no bank or banks of a capital or of sufficient

circulating paper throughout the United States adequate to this object,

did exist when the constitution was first formed, promulgated, or

adopted. It is admitted that to levy and collect taxes is one of the

enumerated powers of Congress. It is admitted that Congress has all

power necessary and convenient to carry its enumerated powers into

execution.

It is admitted there is no express clause in the constitution

prohibiting the establishment of a National Bank.

If these principles and facts are admitted, does it not demonstrate,

beyond the possibility of doubt, this unquestionable result, to wit:

that as Congress is to levy and collect revenue; that as the agency of

banks affords the most certain, speedy, and convenient means by which

a revenue can be collected; that as neither, at the period when the

constitution was made, promulgated, or adopted, banks of sufficient

capital, or with paper of sufficient circulation, existed for the

collection of the revenue, and its transmission to your Treasury;

that as there was no positive clause prohibiting a National Bank in

the constitution; that as Congress was to have all power necessary to

carry its enumerated powers into execution; that as the convention who

framed, and the people who adopted the constitution, must have had

in view our then existing institutions, and the then general state

of society, it was the intention of the convention who formed the

constitution, and the people who adopted it, to give to Congress the

power of establishing a National Bank. If at the time of adopting the

constitution it was necessary and proper that Congress should possess

it, for the exercise of any of its enumerated powers; if the foregoing

result is undeniable, and I think it is, I would interrogate, if

Congress, on the adoption of the constitution, possessed a power to

establish a National Bank, what has since deprived that body of the

power? I, Mr. President, can discover nothing which has. One argument,

much confided in by gentlemen who have opposed the present bill, is,

not that banks are not necessary to the collection of the revenue, but

that State banks will answer. In return, I insist that no State banks

did exist when the constitution was first formed, therefore the power

to create a National Bank is necessarily given in the power to levy and

collect taxes. To this it is replied that to create a National Bank

is to legislate by implication; it is a separate, substantive, and

independent power; to levy a tax is one thing, to make a bank another.

I answer, to levy a tax is one thing, to create an officer for its

collection another. By this kind of chop-logic we may prove any thing

unconstitutional. I ask, when you levy a tax, if you do not provide

officers for collecting it. I levy a tax and create a bank through

whose instrumentality I mean to collect it; from the same authority by

which I appoint a collector, I have a right to create a bank through

whose instrumentality I mean to receive and transmit it. There is

no clause in the constitution saying you may appoint officers for

the collection of the revenue specifically; but the right to appoint

officers to collect revenue is derived from the power of levying a tax,

from which also may be derived the power of establishing a bank, if it

be the best mode of collecting the revenue. It is said you may collect

this tax by means of the State banks. Very well, sir, I say you may

collect the revenue by means of State officers, and upon the principle

that you cannot establish a bank to collect the revenue, because the

State banks can collect it, I say that the State officers can collect

our taxes, and if your argument is just, you cannot appoint any other

officers. The constitution authorizes the President to appoint persons

to fill all offices established by law, but says not a word about

appointing officers to collect the tax you levy specifically. Upon the

construction gentlemen contend for, they might say, because no power

is expressly given to appoint officers of the customs, or for your

taxes, and it is possible to collect the revenue by the agency of the

State Governments, and nothing should be done by the United States

authorities which can be done by the States, therefore these collectors

of the customs or revenue should be such as are appointed by the States

for State purposes. This kind of reasoning, sir, cannot be admissible,

and is in hostility with a most manifest principle of the constitution,

as it is evidently a prominent feature of that instrument that the

General Government should have within itself all those powers necessary

and convenient for the execution of its enumerated trusts, entirely

free and independent of the interference and agency of the States,

their officers, or ministers.

It is said that the corporation, which it is proposed to recharter,

independent of the facility it affords to Government in the collection

of the revenue, has also particular advantages given to it; that it

is a monopoly; and what right, it is asked, has Congress to grant

a monopoly? I will ask, in return, when an officer is appointed to

collect the customs, has he not a salary and emoluments? Is not every

office in law called a franchise or a particular privilege? If the

officer who has these emoluments, privileges, or franchises, (call them

what you will) receives these in consideration for his services, have

you not the power to hold out inducements to associated bodies of men

to form an institution from which the public may derive benefit, not

with a view exclusively to their monopoly and benefit but on account of

the advantages to be derived from it by the public?

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. CLAY,) with his usual

ingenuity, spoke of the enormous evil and the danger to our liberties

that is to be anticipated from giving the power to erect corporations,

which he says is an original power, and has given being to institutions

which have swelled to an enormous magnitude. The example of the

East India Company and the South Sea Company were spoken of in an

alarming, impressive, and ingenious manner. But, I ask, sir, if the

State Governments do not possess this gigantic power? I see nothing to

restrain them more than the General Government. I see that the only

supervisors as to the State Governments are the people themselves,

who are also the supervisors of Congress, who have also the invidious

jealous eyes of the State Governments constantly upon them, as is

illustrated in the conduct of some of the States on this very question,

and who combined would guard this power from abuse by the General

Government much more than the people alone will guard against abuses

by the States. It is a visionary mode of reasoning to argue against

the possession of power from the abuse of it. The gentleman may as

well tell us that we may raise armies to so monstrous an extent as to

crush our liberties; and, therefore, we ought not on any emergency

to raise an army. He may as well say the creation of a military

school, which is as much and no more a resulting power than the one in

question, is giving to Congress a great substantive independent power

to create a vast engine, under the name of a military school, which

may swell to such an immense importance as to make it an instrument

to swallow all the liberties of the country. So as respects sites for

forts and armories, and ore banks, powers exercised by implication,

the gentleman, from the unlimited indulgence he gives to a gloomy and

foreboding imagination, may say, you may purchase the territorial

rights of the States until you destroy their sovereignty. There is

no end to the extent of such reasoning. We must rely in some degree

on ourselves, on the vigilance of the State Governments, and on the

discretion of the people. When the whole body politic is so corrupt

that there are no eyes on our rulers to see when they transcend the

powers of the constitution, all is lost, and no paper reservations can

save us.

Mr. President, I am ready to admit that where a measure obtains, that

inflicts a violation on our constitution that is unquestionable,

palpable, and notorious, however frequently and however solemnly this

measure had been sanctioned, however long it had been submitted to

and endured, would not be considerations with me of any importance or

create one moment of doubt. Error, however repeated and submitted to,

is error still, and every occasion should be sought to get rid of it;

but on an occasion in the origin of which the constitutional question

was doubtful, when men of the purest integrity and most illumined

intelligence might pause and differ and doubt, I should imagine

that such case once acted on should never again be touched, unless

considerations of irresistible importance lead to such a measure;

and I imagine that every man of candor and intelligence who weighs

with due deliberation the question under consideration, will at least

admit, if the measure is not certainly constitutional, it is at least

of that description of character I have last mentioned. In such an

instance as this, will it be said that after this measure has been

sanctioned by Congress on full deliberation and debate; after the bill

establishing this bank had received the approbation of the President,

who reserved his signature to it till the last moment permitted by

the constitution, and after he had viewed the question with all

its bearings in every attitude it could be presented, after full

consultation with his Cabinet Ministers and others of high intellectual

character; after the law thus sanctioned by the Legislature and the

President has been acquiesced in and practised on for the space of

twenty years, when it has been considered inviolable, and corroborating

laws passed during the administration and legislation of different

dominant political parties; when those laws have been sanctioned by

the solemn adjudication of all our judges, both of the General and

State Governments; to suppose that all these considerations are to

have no influence as to putting to rest a constitutional question

which was doubtful in its origin, is to be skeptical and scrupulous

beyond all reasonable bound. If Congress had no right to incorporate

a bank, was it not an act of usurpation in the President and Congress

to pass laws punishing individuals for the forgery of its paper?

Nay, more, Mr. President, when we inflict death for the support of

institutions Congress had no right to create, and for the violation of

laws the constitution prohibits that body from enacting--(and under the

denomination of each of the political sects into which this country is

divided, agreeable to the principles now contended for by gentlemen,

such laws have been passed)--are not the Executive which sanctions, the

Congress which passed, and the whole body of our Judiciary, both of

the General and State Governments, which enforces such unconstitutional

measures, and under their surreptitious authority inflicts death upon

our citizens, worse than usurpers? Are they not murderers? Yes, Mr.

President, I reiterate, are they not murderers? And are we prepared to

pronounce so heavy a denunciation on our predecessors, on ourselves,

and the other great Departments of our Government? Are we ready to

inform the American people that this body and all their constituted

authorities have sported with the lives and illegally shed the blood

of our citizens? My colleague was foreman of the jury that pronounced

sentence, or that found a verdict, on the famous or rather infamous

Logwood, for forgery of the paper of the Bank of the United States.

This verdict was confirmed by the judge of the court, and the criminal

punished agreeably to the judgment. Is a measure of such weighty and

awful import, so solemnly and deliberately acted on and decided,

and multifarious other decisions of the same description, to have

no influence on the decision we are about to give respecting the

constitutionality of establishing a National Bank? If they are not,

then gentlemen view the subject through a very different medium than

that through which it is presented to my vision. Then, in my judgment,

Mr. President, our situation is alarming indeed.

To recapitulate: I derive the power to create a National Bank, when

this constitution came into existence, from the situation of society,

and our legal institutions at that time, and the difficulty, as things

existed, that the revenue could be collected with advantage in any

other way than by the agency of a bank. If this reasoning be deemed

erroneous, I insist that the constitutional power of Congress to create

a bank was in the first instance doubtful, and the principle having

been recognized, and having received every sanction the Government

could give, and practised on for more than twenty years, is not now to

be called in question. Admitting that on both these points my views are

erroneous; say that the establishment of the bank, at its commencement,

was improper, still, if it be demonstrated that the existence or

re-chartering of the bank is indispensable, or highly expedient at

present, to the due exercise of enumerated rights of Congress, that

which was improper or even perhaps unconstitutional at first, because

it was not necessary, becomes constitutional and proper, because now

expedient or essential. Congress is clothed by the constitution with a

variety of delegated rights. Now, admitting that the establishment of

a bank in the first instance was not necessary for the due exercise of

the legislative rights bestowed in any one of these enumerated powers,

if our predecessors in office, by the creation of a bank, which at best

was an improper institution, because not necessary, have placed our

fiscal concerns in such a situation that it cannot be put down without

great injury to the revenue, which Congress is bound to levy; and

collect, without injuring our commerce, without impairing our public

credit, without lessening the public welfare, all of which Congress is

bound to provide for and protect; if this can be demonstrated to be

the probable result of pulling down the bank at this period, I would

ask whether that institution, which was improper at first, because not

necessary, does not become proper, because almost indispensable at

present?

In construing the Constitution of the United States, when legislating

on the enumerated powers of Congress, I lay down this rule of

construction: that the only limitation to the power of Congress is

either some positive or implied prohibition in the constitution itself,

or the exercise of an honest and sober discretion. If, therefore, there

is any reason to believe, at the present period and existing state of

things, that by putting down the bank your revenue will be greatly

impaired, your commerce will be injured, the public credit lessened,

all of which Congress is to protect; does not such a state of things

make it proper that the bank, which ought not to have been created,

because not necessary, now ought to be continued because indispensable?

It may here be said, that I am varying the constitution if I say that a

thing is proper to-day which was not proper five and twenty years ago;

that this vibration will always keep the constitution in an uncertain

state. I say, no. My doctrine is subject to no such accusation; the

principles of the constitution are uniform and unalterable. It is an

uniform and unalterable principle, that Congress have the power to lay

and collect taxes; they have the same positive, unchangeable right

to exercise all the enumerated powers, the only rule of construction

relating to them being that the means you use have a necessary relation

to the power on which you legislate. If the means be not enumerated,

you exercise discretion as to the means, having a regard to the

existing state of things when you legislate concerning them. The same

means may be necessary and proper now, which would not have been

twenty years ago. You change the means to attain the end, but the end

itself, the enumerated power in the constitution, remains unchanged.

As long as the constitution exists, you must select the means most

proper for executing the enumerated rights at the precise moment at

which you legislate respecting them. If this be the true construction

of the constitution respecting the recharter of the bank, the question

merely resolves itself into an inquiry how far such a measure is at

present expedient. To determine at this moment whether or not it be

constitutional, or in other words expedient, to incorporate the Bank of

the United States, I am to say whether, under existing circumstances,

in the present state of society, situation of trade and revenue,

the preservation and continuance of this institution is essentially

necessary. If it be essentially necessary, we have a right to recharter

the bank. I have been precise in stating this view of the subject,

because it has not before been taken by any other gentleman.

TUESDAY, February 19.

The credentials of JOHN CONDIT, appointed a Senator by the Legislature

of the State of New Jersey, for the term of six years, commencing on

the fourth day of March next; and of WILLIAM B. GILES, appointed a

Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia, for the term of

six years, commencing on the fourth day of March next, were severally

read, and ordered to lie on file.

_Bank of the United States._

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend

and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the

subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day

of February, 1791.

Mr. TAYLOR.--Mr. President: Although much time has been consumed in the

discussion of the subject before us, and the ground completely occupied

by those who have gone before me, yet the importance of the subject,

the immense magnitude of the unhappy consequences likely to result to

the nation from the rejection of the bill on your table, compel me to

offer to it all the support in my power. Indeed, sir, to this sense of

duty to the nation is superadded a very sacred, and to me indispensable

duty--my duty to the State which I have the honor in part to represent,

as well as another duty, which from the course the debate has taken, is

not to be disregarded; I mean, sir, the duty which I owe to myself.

I cannot, as other gentlemen have boasted they can, put my hand into my

drawer and pull out the instructions by which I am to be directed on

this important subject.

The State of South Carolina is a very large stockholder in some of

her State banks, and if a selfish policy, contracted to the narrow

sphere of the unique advantage in dollars and cents of the Government

of that State--in contradiction and disregard of the great body of

her own citizens, and the citizens of the rest of the States in the

Union--could have weighed a moment with her Legislature, I too might

have been instructed. Let me not be understood, Mr. President, as

drawing any comparison between the conduct of the State of South

Carolina and the conduct of the great and leading States who have acted

otherwise; but I must and will tell of the things that I do know. I

rejoice, sir, that the State which I come from has, in this instance,

been actuated by that magnanimity and patriotism which on all former

occasions has distinguished her conduct; that neither selfishness, nor

party rage, nor a spirit of intolerance, has induced her to counteract

or embarrass the National Legislature in its pursuit of the great

object of its institution, the good of the whole.

I hope it will not be considered as savoring of egotism when I say

that my appointment to the very honorable station I now hold was

unsolicited by me. That my sentiments on the subject now under

consideration had been by me unequivocally expressed at the last

session of Congress, and were well known to those who appointed me.

Nay, further, after my venerable and respected predecessor had resigned

his seat here, and had declined, also, his appointment for the ensuing

six years, pending the election of a successor to him, and when my

name was held in nomination, a resolution was offered, similar to

those which we have heard so much talk about, proposing to instruct

the Senators of that State to oppose the renewal of the charter of the

Bank of the United States. This resolution, as I am informed, lay on

the Speaker's table when the election was gone into. I was elected,

and the proposers of the resolution had not power nor influence enough

to raise it from the table on which it lay, and it died stillborn at

the end of the session; and if I were to make an inference at all on

these transactions, I should suppose I was tacitly instructed to vote

for the renewal of the bank charter. But I seek not the avoidance of

responsibility. It is here, sir, in my own bosom, I have instructions

paramount to all others. My beloved country has rested the matter

here, and my gratitude is superadded to all other moral obligations

operating on me to perform this trust, and to execute this duty with

faithfulness. I find the authority of Congress to grant this charter

in the same sections of the constitution which the gentlemen who have

gone before me have pointed out to you. In section seven, clause first,

power is given to Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,

and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and

general welfare of the United States; but all duties shall be uniform

throughout the United States."

Clause second gives power "to borrow money on the credit of the United

States." And, in the last clause of said section, power is also given

to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into

execution the foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the

Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof.

Let us understand the meaning of the words _necessary_ and _proper_,

to the last-quoted clause, for upon a correct knowledge of these

depends, in my opinion, the correctness of our conclusions on this

subject. The word _necessary_, in its technical and legal sense, in

the meaning affixed to it in common parlance, established by usage,

custom, reason, and the common law of the land, is different and

distinct from the signification of the same adjective derived from

the substantive _necessity_, as used by Hobbes, Hutchinson, Hume, and

the other metaphysicians of the last century. It is well known that

they used the substantive _necessity_ as synonymous with the word

_fate_, and which necessity, according to the opinions of one party,

controlled omnipotence itself. This necessity was supposed by them

co-existent with the Deity itself, not prospective nor discretionary,

bending in one way, and in one way only, all substance, all matter, and

all spirit. This meaning of the word is only to be found with these

metaphysicians and philosophers; but in our law books, in the daily

and hourly use of the word in common conversation, it has no such

meaning. When the old Congress passed the conditional charter--which I

admit they had not a delegated power to grant, but which is fully in

point, both as to the signification of the word, and, also, of their

opinion of the necessity, and even indispensableness of a bank for the

administering the fiscal concerns of the nation--in the conclusion of

the preamble they say that the exigencies of the United States render

it indispensably necessary to pass the act, &c.; and in the laws

passed during that period, when this Government was in the habit of

following the English custom of beginning the laws by a preamble, you

find the word _necessary_ used as synonymous to _expediency_--practical

expediency, (see _Laws of the United States_, vol. 1, page 247; _idem_,

page 276,) in fact, among frail mortals with fallible judgments like

ours. With any beings endued with less than omniscience, the word

_necessary_ must be only applicable to the honest judgment we can make

up concerning the subject to which we apply it; in other words, it is

resolvable into that sound discretion with which, as moral agents, we

are in the first instance intrusted by our Maker, and in the instance

now before us, we are intrusted with by the constitution and by the

citizens who have sent us here to transact their business. But the

rigid _necessity_ which our opponents wish to enforce on us, this

metaphysical necessity, must, from its very nature, be immutable; it

must be unique, and could not exist in a greater or less degree; and,

therefore, the word joined to it in the constitution (_proper_) could

have no meaning at all. The laws, to be passed, must be necessary, is

the only one way given under heaven by which you are to effect the end

desired; in other words, the law must be imposed by Fate. It is perfect

nonsense to say that there is a latitude left with us to judge whether

such a law is proper or improper. I have, I think, brought the meaning

of the word _necessary_ to the level and within the comprehension

of frail human intellect. The signification of the word _proper_ I

take to contain the description of the measure or law to which it is

applied, in the following respects: whether the law is in conformity to

the letter, the spirit, and the meaning of the constitution; whether

it will produce the good end desired in the most ready, easy, and

convenient mode, that we are acquainted with.

Great stress is laid on that amendment of the constitution which says,

that all power not expressly granted shall be retained, &c. Either the

general clause I have relied on gives power or it does not; if it did

not give power, why was this amendment made? And if it did, and this

power was offensive, why was it not stricken out when the amendment

was made? But if it expressly gave power, which I contend, its being

suffered to remain is proof that it was not the design of the amendment

to take away the power given. Could not the Territory of Columbia have

been governed without erecting a single corporation in it? I don't mean

well governed. But was there that fatal necessity; that command from

Jove,

"Ye fates fulfil it, and ye powers approve,"

to erect corporations? This legislation to erect corporations being,

according to our opponents, _sui generis_, not of the ordinary kind,

and only to be exercised where the express authority is given by the

constitution, I ask gentlemen to show the clause in the constitution

which expressly gives us the power to perform this sublimated act of

legislation in this Territory any more than in any other part of the

United States; and yet at this very session we have sent an armful of

these high acts. The shelves of the office of the Secretary groan under

the pile of charters we have granted.

I said it was easy to prove that the broad grant given to Congress to

legislate for this Territory in all cases whatsoever, was restricted

and paled in by the constitution. Congress cannot make the duties here

on imports less or greater than elsewhere in the United States--imports

and taxes must be equal, &c.--nor deprive the citizens thereof of

the right to a trial by jury, nor grant them titles of nobility; and

yet the incidents here alluded to would come under the description

in the clause "of all cases whatsoever." In truth, sir, there is

not a scintilla of the spirit, nor a single word or letter of the

constitution, that loses its power and sanction upon our conduct in

legislating in this particular. There is no more a power given us to

legislate _ad libitum_ on this Territory, nor to derive therefor powers

by implication, than is given us in the laws we pass for the whole

nation; and if this power, _sui generis_, of creating corporations, is

properly defined by our opponents, they ought to go back to the works

of yesterday, as well as to those of twenty years' standing, in order

to introduce their new order of things. I might here draw a comparison

of the tried scheme of using the United States' Bank, and the untried

scheme of using State banks in aid of the operations of the National

Treasury; but I should only be saying with less force what has been

so fully and so conclusively said by the gentlemen who have preceded

me. Suffice it to say, that for safe-keeping, for transmission and

payment of the funds to any part of the nation, and for enforcing the

punctual payment by the debtors to the customs, by addressing to those

debtors the arguments to the sense of honor and shame, and also to

their interest, to wit: by denying them credit in the bank on failure

in punctuality--all these have been afforded to the Government without

its incurring therefor one cent's expense. Are we sure the State banks

can or will do this? I beg pardon of the Senate for detaining them

on topics not new. As this is made a case of conscience, I deemed it

necessary to be thus particular. I have no hesitation in saying, we

have the right to act on this subject, inasmuch as I think the bank is

both necessary and proper for the purposes above referred to.

To me it appears that this power is expressly granted; we derive it

not by implication; but our opponents, in fact, are pressed to the

necessity of using implication to come at the denial they set up

against the exercise by Congress of this power.

I say, further, that this institution is necessary and proper for

carrying into effect another general power, viz: The power to borrow

money on the credit of the United States.

It is acknowledged on all hands that there is not specie enough in

the nation, if applied solely to that purpose, to pay our annual

impost. The operations of the Bank of Columbia in transferring the

revenue derived from a part of Virginia (and of the land funds from

the westward,) and of the Manhattan Bank in performing the same office

in respect to the collections in Connecticut, have been dwelt upon

by the honorable Senator from Maryland, (Mr. SMITH.) His arguments

drawn from the facts would have been more conclusive if he could have

instanced the same facilities afforded to the Government between banks

disconnected by the effect of that neighborhood circulation and of that

course of trade very apparent in the instances he has produced. But

it is not conclusive at any rate. There is a neighborhood medium of

circulation, (the State bank paper,) and there is a national medium,

(the United States paper.) The latter, under the present state of

things, corrects the operations of distant banks and renders their

transfers easy; but, deprived of this, would any of them, situated

at four and five hundred miles, or at one thousand miles' distance,

agree to make these transfers for the Government free of expense?

Could they, for instance, transfer the solid bullion belonging to the

United States from Orleans to Boston or Philadelphia, without our

affording compensation for freight, insurance, &c.? I have witnessed

the advantages of this national medium in the State I live in; and

in the months of autumn, when strangers are fearful of venturing to

Charleston, our western friends, rather than carry the hard dollars,

are in the habit of giving two or three per cent. for bills of the Bank

of the United States. Destroy this national medium, you insulate the

State banks, which are so far asunder as not to be within the influence

of the neighborhood medium of circulation. The stroke of our dreadful

wand disconnects the ligament by which they are bound together in their

distant operations.

Mr. PICKERING.--I will now, Mr. President, make some observations on

the main question under consideration. Whether Congress have the power

by the constitution to renew the charter of the Bank of the United

States?

It has been said that the power to incorporate a bank for the United

States is a substantive and original, and not a derivative or implied

power. This has been repeated, but I have heard no arguments in support

of the position; it is naked assertion.

It has also been called "act of sovereignty;" as if to alarm and deter

us by its awful magnitude. But, sir, the sovereign power of Congress

is sometimes exercised on subjects of comparatively little moment.

A few days since we passed a bill to authorize the erection of a

bridge; and another, to change the name of an individual, to enable

him to inherit an estate. The power of Congress is sovereign to all

the purposes of the constitution. They can lay and collect taxes,

duties, imposts, and excises; borrow money, regulate commerce, and

make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and

other property of the United States. And they have the power to make

all laws necessary and proper to carry the foregoing and all other

constitutional powers into execution. When proposing to exercise this

general power, in any case not expressly mentioned, we have to consider

whether it be "necessary and proper." It has been said that "necessary"

here means indispensable; something without which a particular power

expressly granted cannot be carried into execution. But, sir, I see no

ground for this interpretation. In the affairs of a nation, or other

community, whatever the public good requires to be done, is necessary

and proper to be done. It is a moral, not an absolute necessity. It is

necessary for me to be here in my place, because it is my duty to be

here. Necessary and proper are opposed to unnecessary and improper.

Congress should do no act unnecessary and improper; but, like State

Legislatures, do whatever is necessary and proper to attain the objects

for which they are respectively constituted.

In determining whether any proposed measure be necessary and proper to

carry into execution any power expressly given to Congress, we have

to consider whether that measure has a just or useful relation to

the end. For instance, the constitution having prescribed no mode of

collecting the revenues, it rested in the discretion of Congress to

adopt such a mode or such modes as should appear to them best adapted

to that object. Instead of appointing custom-house officers in the

large commercial cities and towns, where a banking establishment could

be supported, Congress might there have erected banks, as the most

certain, punctual, and cheap mode of collection. Suitable officers of

a bank might have performed all the duties of entering and clearing

vessels, and all other duties pertaining to the custom-house, without

any charge to the public; the deposits of the public moneys so

collected in those banks, upon which the usual banking operations might

be carried on, yielding an adequate compensation for all the services

so performed.

The public revenues, when collected, must also be safely kept. An

experience has demonstrated that, of all depositaries, banks are the

safest. And the same experience has shown that, as the public moneys

are required to be frequently transferred, for the public expenditures,

from one State to another, the Bank of the United States, with its

branches, has furnished the best mode of transfer; it being effected

with despatch, with certainty, and without any risk or expense to the

United States.

The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CLAY) asked, if banks are necessary

for collecting the public revenues, why give them any other power? The

answer is, that it is the essential nature of banks, which renders them

so peculiarly fit to collect the revenues. The merchants, whose bonds

are lodged in the banks for collection, are also borrowers of money

from the banks; and if they fail of paying their bonds, as they become

due, their credit will fail; they can obtain no more loans until their

bonds are paid. This has just been presented to our view, in the most

striking manner, by my colleague.

"To borrow money," is another of the great powers expressly vested

in Congress. And in this, as in the power first considered, no mode

of borrowing being prescribed in the constitution, Congress are to

devise and provide the means in their judgment most sure, expeditious,

and ample, to obtain loans. And this was one of the great objects

for which the Bank of the United States was originally incorporated.

The gentleman from Virginia, near me, (Mr. BRENT,) and the gentleman

from South Carolina, (Mr. TAYLOR,) have, in very forcible language,

displayed the impolicy of depending on State banks or individuals

for loans, in public emergencies. At such times, these banks and

individuals may be most hardly pressed by their usual customers. To

suffer the Bank of the United States to dissolve, and to have recourse

to State banks, will be so far going back to the condition of the

United States under the articles of Confederation, when our Union was

but a rope of sand. When the pressure of the Revolutionary war was

over, indeed, while that pressure remained, Congress in vain made

requisitions on the individual States; no money, or none in any measure

adequate to the public exigencies, could be obtained. After the war,

when the public treasury was empty, Congress importuned--implored

the States, individually, to grant the power to raise a revenue from

commerce, to defray the current expenses of the General Government, and

to fulfil the public obligations, but the power could not be obtained.

States, deriving large revenues from commerce, chose to retain them for

their own treasuries.

It was this helpless, forlorn condition of our country, which forcibly

convinced the nation of the necessity of forming a new system of

Government; and our present Government was the fruit of that necessity.

"To regulate commerce" is a third great power vested in Congress. And

it is conceived that the exercise of any power well adapted to give

safety, facility, and prosperity to commerce, must be comprised in

the power to regulate it. Hence the erecting of light-houses has been

mentioned as an instance in which an implied power, incidental to the

regulating of commerce, has been exercised. But it has been said that

this power is expressly given in another part of the constitution;

that by which Congress is vested with exclusive legislation over the

district which is the seat of Government, and over places ceded to

the United States "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,

dockyards, and other needful buildings." But if we had no commerce,

no navigation, light-houses would not be "needful buildings," they

would be of no use whatever. Hence it is clear that they have a direct

relation to commerce and to nothing else; and, therefore, the erecting

of them is properly adduced as an instance of the exercise of a power

implied in the general express power to regulate commerce.

The safety and facility of commercial operations was also greatly to be

promoted by means of a general currency which should have equal credit

throughout the Union. This has been accomplished by the notes issued

from the Bank of the United States, under the authority of Congress,

exercising the power incidental to that of regulating commerce.

A fourth great power, which I mentioned to have been vested in

Congress, is that of "making all needful rules and regulations

respecting the territory and other property of the United States."

This "other property" consists partly of money. And, as Congress have

power to make any regulations concerning it which are needful, that is,

which may, in their opinion, best promote the general welfare, this

money may be (as some of it has been) vested in bank stock; and with

the truest regard to its safety and good management, in the stock of a

bank erected by Congress, of which they may have a suitable inspection;

and where it may safely deposit the public revenues, there to await

the public demand; and, in the mean time, usefully aid those banking

operations which give facility to commerce and to public loans.

But as an evidence that the constitutionality of the act to incorporate

the Bank of the United States was at least doubtful, we have been told

by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. SMITH,) that President Washington

doubted; that his mind was in suspense to the last moment, when the

act was to be approved or disapproved. That while the then Secretary

of the Treasury, (Mr. Hamilton,) a very great man, maintained the

constitutional power of Congress to erect that bank, another man,

(Mr. Jefferson,) equally great, then Secretary of State, and the

Attorney-General, (Mr. Randolph,) a distinguished lawyer, maintained

the contrary doctrine--that Congress had not that power. It is true,

sir, that Washington, cautious and circumspect beyond any man I ever

knew, did suspend his decision to the last day allowed him by the

constitution. The confidence with which the Secretary of State and

the Attorney-General supported their opinions on this question, was

sufficient to excite in the President the greatest caution. Both were

lawyers, and they raised many legal objections. The written opinions

of these gentlemen were (as I have been well informed) put into the

hands of the Secretary of the Treasury two days before it was necessary

for the President to decide. And the reasoning of Mr. Hamilton, in his

written argument, enabled the President to decide with satisfaction;

with a full conviction of the constitutionality of the act.

The following are some of the objections offered by the Secretary

of State: He said--"that the proposed incorporation (of the bank)

undertakes to create certain capacities, properties, or attributes,

which are against the laws of alienage, descents, escheat, and

forfeiture, distribution, and monopoly. And that nothing but a

necessity, invincible by other means, can justify such a prostration of

laws which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence,

and are the foundation laws of the State governments. "Washington, sir,

was not a lawyer, and who can wonder that his fair mind was alarmed

by such a solemn declaration? That it was kept in suspense by the

assertion, that the act for establishing the bank would overturn the

pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence, and the foundation laws

of the State governments? But, sir, it required only the knowledge of a

lawyer at once to overturn these objections. The following are some of

the remarks of the Secretary of the Treasury: "If these are truly the

foundation laws of the several States, then have most of them subverted

their own foundations. For there is scarcely one of them which has

not, since the establishment of its particular constitution, made

material alterations in some of those branches of its jurisprudence,

especially the law of descents. But it is not conceived how any

thing can be called the fundamental law of a State government which

is not established in its constitution, unalterable by its ordinary

legislature."

"To erect a corporation, is to substitute a legal or artificial for

a natural person; and, where a number are concerned, to give them

individuality. To that legal or artificial person, once created, the

common law of every State, of itself, annexes all those incidents and

attributes which are represented as a prostration of the main pillars

of their jurisprudence. It is certainly not accurate to say, that the

erection of a corporation is against those different heads of the State

laws; because it is rather to create a kind of person, or entity, to

which they are inapplicable, and to which the general rule of those

laws assigns a different regimen. The laws of alienage cannot apply to

an artificial person, because it can have no country. Those of descent

cannot apply to it, because it can have no heirs. Those of escheat are

foreign from it, for the same reason. Those of forfeiture, because

it cannot commit a crime. Those of distribution, because, though

it may be dissolved, it cannot die." Sir, I beg leave to add a few

explanations. By the laws of most, perhaps of all the States, aliens

are not permitted to hold real estate; but in all they are free to

hold personal property of every kind, and particularly bank stock. The

law of escheat relates to the property of a citizen who dies without

heirs, near or remote, and without a will. In such case his property

falls to the State. But instances of escheat do not occur perhaps

twice in a century in any State, and, consequently, is of trifling

moment. Although a corporation cannot commit a crime, it may violate

the rules prescribed in the law for its establishment, and thus incur

an immediate forfeiture of its charter. Or, if for such a violation

of its fundamental law, or any mismanagement of the institution to

the public injury, its charter be not forthwith taken away, the State

may refuse to renew it. As to the law of distribution, that operates

when a person dies intestate. But though a corporation cannot die, yet

the individuals to whom its property belongs will die; and their bank

property, equally with their other property, becomes liable to the law

of distribution.

One of the injurious consequences of destroying the Bank of the United

States has been stated to be, the withdrawing of seven millions of

dollars from the active capital of the United States, and transmitting

it to Europe, where that portion of the bank stock is owned. To this

it has been answered, by the opposers of the bank, that these millions

will not be withdrawn, but transferred from the United States' Bank to

banks of the several States. How then, sir, shall we get rid of that

dangerous influence of foreign stockholders which the same gentlemen

urge as a reason for not renewing the charter of the Bank of the United

States? Sir, it is well known that money in Europe is less valuable

than in the United States. That moneyed men there are glad to loan

their money at an interest of five per cent, or less, while in these

States the legal interest is six per cent. And a multitude of our

citizens find their account in employing that foreign capital, paying

an interest of six per cent., by which, in the course of trade, they

gain ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent.; that foreign capital, in the

hands of our merchants, has resembled the five and the ten talents,

wherewith they have gained other five and other ten talents.

The distresses which will follow the dissolution of the Bank of the

United States, especially in the great commercial cities, have been

forcibly described in the plain testimonies of the committee of

mechanics and manufacturers from Philadelphia--a committee selected

wholly from the democratic party; distresses which were sufficient to

move a heart of stone. And why should this bank be dissolved? It has

been said that the State banks are competent to all the necessary

operations of the general bank. If the contrary had not been shown, it

might be answered, that the Bank of the United States was incorporated

when there were only three banks in the United States; one in

Philadelphia, one in New York, and one in Boston. These were inadequate

to the necessities and accommodation of the General Government and of

the citizens. To supply this deficiency, it was necessary to erect

the National Bank; and the dignity, honor, good faith, and credit

of the United States stand pledged for the renewal of its charter.

The institution having been well conducted, and found in the highest

degree useful and beneficial to Government, and to the citizens at

large, it ought to be continued. Individual citizens and foreigners

became stockholders on a well-grounded expectation of the stability

of the Government. It was in this just expectation that foreigners,

Englishmen, purchased of our Government, itself, its remaining shares

of the public stock in the Bank of the United States, and at an advance

of forty-five per cent.; so that, for every hundred dollars laid out

by the Government in the purchase of bank shares, the United States

received of these foreigners one hundred and forty-five dollars. And

how was it possible for these foreigners to conceive the Government

capable of destroying the work of its own hands, and of reducing their

property to one hundred dollars a share, for which, but eight years

before, they had paid the same Government one hundred and forty-five

dollars?

WEDNESDAY, February 20.

_Bank of the United States._

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend

and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the

subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day

of February, 1791.

Mr. CRAWFORD said he regretted extremely, that at so late an hour,

he was constrained to throw himself upon the indulgence of the

Senate, especially as the subject was so much exhausted by the able

and animated discussions which had for so many days attracted their

attention. Before I enter upon the few remarks which I feel it my duty

to make in reply to the numerous comments which have been made upon the

observations which I had the honor to submit to the consideration of

the Senate, at the commencement of this discussion, permit me, sir, to

acknowledge the liberality and indulgence with which those observations

have been generally treated. In the course of the few observations to

which I intend to confine myself, it shall be my endeavor to exercise

that indulgence towards others which has been extended to me. The

gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CLAY) complains of the committee, because

they have listened to the representations of two delegations from

the city of Philadelphia who presented memorials to the Senate, who

referred them to the committee; and because the committee have, in his

opinion, given an adventitious importance to their representations, by

the minuteness and by the pomp and parade with which they have been

detailed to the Senate. It will be recollected that the committee did

not seek the post which has been assigned them by the Senate, nor did

they desert it after it was assigned to them. The object of referring

petitions to committees is to collect that information which the Senate

ought to have before it acts, and which in its collective capacity

it cannot obtain. It has always been the practice of committees to

permit the petitioners to be present at their meetings, to make such

explanations, and to give such information touching the subject of

their petition, as they think connected with it. It is the duty of

committees to detail to the Senate the information which they collect,

to enable the members to take a full view of the subject upon which

they are called upon to act. The committee in the present case has done

all this, and it has done nothing more. Had it pursued a different

course it would have justly subjected itself to the animadversions of

the Senate. To the information collected by the committee from these

delegations, and laid before the Senate, my friend from Maryland (Mr.

SMITH) has opposed a statement of facts, and his opinion founded upon

those facts. As the situation and talents of that gentleman entitle his

statements and opinions to great weight; as it is more than probable

that the votes of several members will ultimately rest upon the weight

of his authority, my honorable friend from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) will

pardon me if I should examine his observations rather according to the

rules of evidence, than those of logic. In making this declaration I

wish to be explicitly understood, as excluding every idea of charging

that gentleman with having made statements which he did not believe,

or with having given opinions he did not entertain. I have no doubt

but that he sincerely believes in the correctness of his statements,

and in the accuracy of his opinions; but if, in the course of my

observations, I shall prove incontestably that he is mistaken in some

of his statements and opinions, it will teach the Senate the necessity

of weighing the remainder of them with great circumspection. If I shall

be able to show that he is mistaken in a case, the evidence of which

is matter of record, that circumstance alone will induce the Senate to

reject all idea of receiving his statements and opinions with implicit

confidence.

The gentleman from Maryland has stated several cases in which the State

banks, and the banks of this Territory have accommodated the Government

where the United States had refused. The cases stated prove nothing,

and ought to have no influence with this Government in establishing a

permanent system of revenue. If the State and Territorial banks have

upon several occasions received the bills of other State banks to

accommodate the Government, it was because it suited their convenience

at the time. It was a mere temporary transaction, and forms an

exception to the general rule. The charter of no bank in the United

States compels them to take the paper of other banks, and whether they

do receive them or not will depend upon contingent circumstances, or

upon whim and caprice. No reliance, therefore, ought to be placed upon

the duration of any regulation which is not enforced by their charters.

The gentleman from Maryland thinks that the United States will have the

same influence over the State banks that it has had, and will have over

that of the United States. If he is correct as to the extent of that

influence, his conclusion may be correctly drawn. But, sir, is it true

that the National Government has no other influence over this bank than

that which can be produced by withdrawing of its deposits? If it is

so, then it must be admitted that the United States will have the same

influence over the State banks that they will have over one of their

own creation, because they can as easily withdraw their deposits from

the one as the other. But, sir, the United States have an influence

over the Bank of the United States, which is wholly independent of,

and unconnected with, the right of withdrawing their deposits from its

vaults. The bank is dependent on them for its existence. By renewing

the charter for short periods of time you create a state of dependency

upon the Government, which will at all times make the bank completely

subservient to all the legitimate objects for which it was created.

How, sir, is it with the State banks? Upon whom are they dependent for

legal existence and for length of days? Upon the State Governments.

Suppose the authority from which they derive their existence should

place itself in opposition to the Government of the United States;

and suppose that this state of hostility should happen a year, or two

before the time at which their charters were to expire, and the State

Legislature should direct them to hold the deposit of public moneys

against the demand of the National Government, what course would they

pursue under such circumstances? Sir, the case which I have stated

is not a mere possible case. The history of several of the large

influential States proves that this state of hostility, which I have

supposed, is not an imaginary one. Make yourselves dependent upon

the State banks for the collection and transmission of your revenue,

and that opposition, which has but seldom happened, will become more

frequent. Their disposition to control the operations of the National

Government will increase with every increase of the means of annoyance,

which the folly and improvidence of Congress may throw into their

hands. For whose benefit, sir, is the Government to strip itself of

this right, so essential for the due administration of its finances?

Is it for the benefit of the great mass of the American people? No;

not one in a hundred of them have any interest in the State banks.

They feel no interest in the question; their true interest is more

effectually subserved by the operations of the Bank of the United

States than it can possibly be by the State banks. This bank affords

them a portable currency which is of equal value in every part of the

United States, while the credit and currency of the State banks is

local.

It is impossible to resist the conviction that the prompt and secure

collection of our revenue is principally owing to the influence of

the bank. But, sir, the bank has another direct influence upon the

collection of your revenue. By the rules established in the bank at

Philadelphia, every person whose bond to the Government is deposited

there, has a right, upon getting an additional endorser, to claim a

discount for half of the amount of his bond, and the part so discounted

is immediately carried to the credit of the United States, and the

bank takes upon itself the risk of the ultimate collection. In this

way, sir, one-half of the bond is collected at the sole risk of the

bank, without any possibility of loss on the part of Government. And

yet, sir, it is contended that the bank has nothing to do with the

collection of the public revenue. The gentleman from Maryland says that

the scarcity of money, and the alarm and dismay which the delegation

of mechanics had represented as existing in Philadelphia, could not be

the effect of the contraction of discounts by the Bank of the United

States, because that bank, as well as the State banks, are going on

with their ordinary discounts. This is true, but the gentleman from

Maryland has forgotten that this delegation stated that the bank, upon

the rejection of their memorial by the House of Representatives, had

contracted their discounts, and that a correspondent contraction had

taken place in the discounts of the State banks which had produced the

pressure; and that the pressure had spread alarm and dismay through

the city. That before they left the city, the directors of the Bank

of the United States had come to an understanding with the directors

of the State banks, all of whom had determined to resume and continue

their ordinary discounts until the last hour. Notwithstanding the banks

had resumed their discounts, the panic which had been produced did not

cease, and the scarcity of money, and the distrust which had taken

place, still continue to exist in Philadelphia.

The gentleman from Maryland admits expressly that the transmission of

your public money for the payment of the Army and Navy must be effected

through the agency of banks, but contends that that object can be

effected as well by the State banks as by a Bank of the United States.

My friend from Kentucky (Mr. POPE) said, that the great characteristic

difference between the present Government and that which existed under

the old articles of confederation, is, that the present Government has

within itself the means of executing its own measures, without relying

upon the State governments; whereas the old Congress had to rely upon

the States for the execution of the measures which it had previously

devised and adopted.

The gentleman from Maryland, in speaking of the means which had been

resorted to, to procure the renewal of the charter, says that we have

not procured memorials to be presented to Congress praying that the

charter might not be renewed--we have not procured pamphlets to be

written, published, and laid upon the tables of members, proving the

unconstitutionality and inutility of the bank--we have not imposed upon

the credulity of honest mechanics and manufacturers, and by that means

procured delegations to be sent to pray for the rejection of the bank

memorial. Surely, sir, the gentleman did not by these declarations mean

to insinuate that any one of those gentlemen who support the bill upon

your table, have had any agency in procuring any application to be made

in favor of the bank. I know that gentleman's respect for himself;

his respect for the Senate; his respect for the individual members of

this body, as well as his respect for the general rules of propriety,

exclude the possibility of his making such an insinuation. [Mr. SMITH

explained, by saying, I exclude every idea of such an insinuation.]

Sir, I will tell the honorable gentleman from Maryland, what has been

done by those who are opposed to the renewal of the charter. I do not

mean the members of the Senate who are opposed to it, but those who

have attempted to inflame public opinion upon this question. Letters,

sir, have been written from this place to induce the State Legislatures

to instruct their members to oppose the renewal of the charter of the

bank. I will ask the honorable gentleman from Maryland whether he does

not know that letters have been written for that purpose?

The gentleman from Maryland has said, and I am extremely sorry that

he has, that the Bank of the United States had their agents in this

city for two sessions, intriguing with members of Congress to obtain a

renewal of their charter. I can assure that gentleman that I have had

as little to do with the agents of the bank as he has had. If, sir, I

was disposed to retort upon those who are opposed to the renewal of the

charter, I would ask, if they have not seen published in the democratic

papers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, extracts of letters

said to be written in the City of Washington, charging the members of

Congress who are in favor of it with being bribed and corrupted, and

with being disposed to sell the sovereignty of the nation to British

capitalists? Have they not seen, in the same papers, conversations

detailed with great minuteness, which it is pretended have passed

between members of Congress, calculated to excite public odium and

indignation against the friends of the bill now under consideration?

Sir, I will not for a moment indulge an idea that these letters have

been written or these conversations detailed by any member of this

body. The idea that such has been the fact is too humiliating, too

degrading, not only to this honorable body, but to human nature

itself; to be entertained but for a moment. And yet, sir, the author

of a charge, as base as it is false, against my honorable friend from

Kentucky, (Mr. POPE,) has, day after day, occupied a seat in a gallery

of the Senate, to which no person has a right of access, but by an

introduction of one of the members of this body. Sir, the highway

robber, when compared with the infamous fabricator of this base attempt

to assassinate the reputation of this honorable member, becomes a

virtuous and estimable character. Such, sir, has been the warfare which

has been waged against the renewal of the charter. Denunciations and

charges of political apostacy are the measures by which we have been

assailed from without and from within. Sir, I have shown that the bank

question was no party question in its origin--that it was a question

upon which an honest difference of opinion always has existed, and does

now exist. And, shall I be charged with deserting the standard of the

people, while I am treading in the footsteps of the great Father of his

Country?

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) has said that he understood

that a proposition was made in the Federal Convention to vest Congress

with power to create corporations generally and without limitation. Had

I been a member of that convention, I should most certainly have voted

against the proposition, because it would have been unreasonable. Why

should such a power have been delegated? Not certainly as necessary

to execute the delegated powers, because they are very limited--a

general power to create corporations would have enabled Congress to

have created them _ad libitum_ where there was no possible relation

between them and any one of the delegated powers. The vote upon the

incorporating the bank proves that if such a proposition had been

submitted, it must have been rejected under a conviction that the

power to create corporations is incident to such of the general powers

as might require an act of incorporation completely to execute them,

and fairly vested by the constitution in Congress; because ten of

the members of that convention were in Congress, and voted for that

bill--because General WASHINGTON signed that bill, because the only

member of that convention now in Congress voted for the bill and is

now in favor of renewing the charter; and because there were but eight

members of that convention in Congress who voted against it.

Mr. President, I will now proceed to examine the objections which have

been offered to the construction which I have given to several clauses

of the constitution. In the observations which I made upon this part

of the question when I was up before, I endeavored to prove that every

construction that had been given to this instrument, upon the idea of

its being perfect, was likely to be erroneous. The gentleman from

Virginia (Mr. GILES) and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. WHITESIDE)

still view it as a model of perfection. They are certainly at liberty

still to entertain that opinion. Every man has a right to erect his

idol in this land of liberty, and to fall down and worship it according

to the dictates of his own conscience. I endeavored also to prove,

that if we applied the same rule of construction to that clause of the

constitution from which we endeavor to derive the right to create a

bank, which has been applied to that from which the power to erect a

light-house has been derived, the constitutional difficulty at once

disappears. Until my friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES) and my friend

from Tennessee (Mr. ANDERSON) had otherwise declared, I had always

understood the right to erect light-houses had been exercised as

incidental to the power to regulate commerce. It seems, however, that

I am mistaken, and that this right is incidental to that clause which

gives Congress the right to exercise exclusive legislation in certain

places. The clause reads in the following words:

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,

over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by

cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress,

become the seat of the Government of the United States, and

to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the

consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall

be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,

and other needful buildings," &c.

Now, says my friend from Tennessee, this clause gives the right to

erect dockyards; and as dockyards must be on the seacoast, therefore

Congress has the right to erect light-houses, because they must

also be on the seacoast. This argument is extremely logical, nay,

syllogistical, in form, but it is extremely illogical in substance.

The conclusion drawn from the premises, is as necessary, as though I

were to say, that because two and two makes four, therefore five and

five makes twelve. The conclusion in the latter case is as necessary

as in the former. But my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. GILES)

derives it from the authority given in this clause, to erect other

needful buildings. But the question recurs, needful for what? Why,

certainly, for the purposes before specified. What are they? Forts,

magazines, arsenals, and dockyards. If this clause gives any authority

to erect forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, the other needful

buildings spoken of must be needful for the specified purposes. I

should suppose that no man, who spends only a few days in this city,

can be at a loss to determine what is comprehended under the term

"other needful buildings." Let him go to the dockyard, nicknamed a

navy-yard in this city, and he will there find a little town of "other

needful buildings" in the words of the constitution. But, sir, I deny

that this clause of the constitution expressly gives any right, but

that of exercising exclusive legislation in the places to be accepted

or purchased for the purpose therein specified. The right to erect

forts, magazines, and arsenals, is fairly incidental to the right of

declaring war, and of raising armies; and the right to erect dockyards

is fairly incidental to the right of providing and maintaining a

navy. But if for the sake of argument I should admit that the right

to erect forts, &c., is given in this clause, how can it be proved

that the right to erect a light-house is also given? Forts, magazines,

arsenals, and dockyards, are enumerated, and as the constitution says

that all powers not expressly given are retained, if the right to

erect forts, magazines, &c., is given in this clause, most clearly

the right to erect light-houses is retained by the States, because

it is not to be found in the enumeration contained in the clause.

When I had the honor of addressing the Senate before I questioned the

authority of the State governments to create banks; I then stated, and

I again explicitly state, that it is with reluctance that I have felt

it my duty to make any inquiry into the constitutional right of the

State governments to incorporate banks. The State Legislatures ought

to have recollected the Spanish proverb, which says that those who

live in glass-houses ought not to throw stones. Before they undertook

to question the constitutional authority of Congress, they ought to

have thoroughly examined the foundation upon which their own right

rested. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) says that

the construction which I have given to that part of the constitution

which prohibits the States from emitting bills of credit, would apply

equally to promissory notes given by one individual to another under

the laws of a State, as to a bank bill. Permit me to inquire of that

gentleman whether he ever saw a law authorizing one man to give

another his promissory note? He may search the pandects of Justinian;

he may turn over the leaves of the musty volumes written upon the

common law, from the days of Bracton and Fleta down to the present

day, and his search will be in vain. For the right to make contracts,

the right to give promissory notes, is antecedent to, and independent

of all municipal law. The gentleman will find laws and decisions in

abundance, regulating the effect of endorsements and other collateral

circumstances, and prescribing the manner of enforcing the payment of

promissory notes, but he will never find a law giving the right to

execute the promissory note. But it is said that the bills of credit,

which the States are prohibited from emitting, must be bills of credit

emitted on the credit of the State. If this distinction should be well

founded, many of the State banks are still subject to the charge of

unconstitutionality, because in many of them the States are directly

interested, and wherever that is the case, their bank bills are bills

of credit emitted on the credit of the State. But the correctness

of this distinction may well be denied, because the restriction is

as general as it could possibly be made. But it is said that this

restriction applies only to bills of credit which are made a legal

tender in the payment of debts; that bills of credit, designated in the

constitution, are _ex vi termini_ a legal tender. For the correctness

of this exposition, an appeal is made to the restriction which

immediately follows it, which restrains the right of the States to make

anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. It

appears to me that the latter restriction excludes most emphatically

the construction contended for. If the States are prohibited from

emitting bills of credit, it would have been, to say the least of it,

wholly nugatory to say they should not make them a legal tender. If the

bills are not emitted, it is impossible that they can be made a legal

tender. To suppose that the restriction upon the right of the States to

make any thing but gold and silver legal tender has any connection with

or influence upon the restriction to emit bills of credit, is as absurd

as to suppose that the Decalogue, after having declared that "thou

shalt do no murder," should have added, but, if you will murder, you

shall not rob and strike the dead. The construction of the restraint

upon the right to make any thing but gold or silver a tender, is that

they shall not make specific articles, as tobacco or cotton, a tender,

as was the case in some of the States.

But it is said that the history of the States will show that the bills

of credit specified in the constitution were those only which were

a legal tender in the payment of debts. Let us examine this point,

according to the rule of construction applied to another clause in the

constitution by a large majority of both Houses of Congress during the

present session. Another clause in the constitution gives Congress

the power to admit new States into the Union under two limitations:

1st. That no new State shall be formed within the limits of any State

without the consent of the State; and, 2d. That no new State should be

formed by the junction of two or more States without the consent of

such States, and also of Congress. These limitations prove that the

formation of new States, within the limits of the United States, was in

view of the convention at the time that this clause was adopted; and

the subsequent clause, which gives Congress the power to make rules

for the government of its Territories, proves that these Territories

were at that moment under consideration. In addition to these reasons

for believing that the framers of the constitution had no idea of

forming new States, beyond the limits of the United States, those who

were opposed to the admission of Orleans as a State contended that

the history of the United States proves that the power to erect new

States and admit them into the Union was intended to be confined to

new States within the limits of the United States at the formation of

the constitution, and that a different construction would disparage

the rights of the original States, and, of course, be a violation of

the constitution. What reply did the majority of Congress give to this

train of reasoning? They said that the right to admit new States cannot

be subject to any other limitations or restrictions than those which

are contained in the clause which gives the right, and as there is no

restriction upon the right to erect new States without the then limits

of the United States, Congress have an unlimited right to erect and

admit them into the Union. Let us apply the same rule of construction

to the restriction of the right of the States to emit bills of credit.

The restriction is a general one; it has no exceptions; and every

attempt to make exceptions ought to be repelled by the answer which

was given to those who opposed the right of Congress to admit the

Territory of Orleans into the Union as a State. The construction I have

contended for gains additional weight when we consider the restriction

which immediately precedes that under consideration. No State shall

coin money, emit bills of credit, &c. Bills of credit are but the

representatives of money. The constitution gives Congress the right

to coin money, and to regulate its value. It takes from the States

the right to coin money and to emit bills of credit. Why give to

Congress the right to coin money and regulate its value? Because the

interest of the nation requires that the current coin of the nation

should be uniform both as to its species and value. If this is the

true reason why the right of coining money and fixing its value was

given to Congress, does not the right to issue that which is to be the

representative of this coin; which, in fact, is to usurp its place;

which is to be the real currency of the nation, necessarily belong to

Congress? Does not the right to create a bank, which shall issue this

representative of money, come within the same reason? I think it does.

To the fervid imagination of my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. CLAY,)

this power to create a bank appears to be more terrific than was the

lever of Archimedes to the frightened imagination of the Romans, when

they beheld their galleys suddenly lifted up and whirled about in the

air, and in a moment plunged into the bosom of the ocean. Are these

apprehensions founded in reason, or are they the chimeras of a fervid

and perturbed imagination? What limitation does the constitution

contain upon the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and

excises? None but that they shall be uniform; which is no limitation

of the amount which they can lay and collect. What limitation does it

contain upon the power to raise and support armies? None other than

that appropriations shall not be made for a longer term than two years.

What restriction is to be found in it upon the right to provide and

maintain a navy? None. What upon the right to declare war and make

peace? None, none. Thus the constitution gives to the Government of

the United States unlimited power over your purses--unlimited power

to raise armies and provide navies--unlimited power to make war and

peace, and you are alarmed; you are terrified at the power to create a

bank to aid it in the management of its fiscal operations. Sir, nothing

short of my most profound respect for honorable gentlemen, who have

frightened themselves with this bugbear, could induce me to treat the

subject seriously. Gentlemen have said that they are alarmed at the

exercise of this power, and I am bound to believe them. Sir, after

giving Congress the right to make war and peace; the right to impose

taxes, imposts, duties, and excises, _ad libitum_; the right to raise

and support armies without restriction as to number or term of service;

the right to provide and maintain a navy without a limitation, I cannot

bring myself to tremble at the exercise of a power incidental to only

one of these tremendous grants of power. The gentleman from Kentucky

(Mr. CLAY) contends that we have attempted to give a degree of weight

and force to what we are pleased to call precedents, to which they

would not be entitled in those tribunals from which we derive all our

ideas of precedents. I am happy to find that my friend from Virginia

(Mr. GILES) agrees with me in opinion upon this subject. Indeed the

principal difference between that gentleman and myself is confined to

the question of expedience. He thinks that the construction which has

been given to the constitution ought to be considered as conclusive;

and that great inconvenience will be produced by unsettling what ought

to be considered as finally settled and adjudged.

Sir, I have closed the observations which I thought it my duty to make

in reply to the comments which have been made upon the remarks which

I had previously submitted to the consideration of this honorable

body. If, sir, I preferred my political standing in the State which I

have the honor to represent (and, sir, I do not profess to have any

out of it) to the public welfare, I should rejoice at the success

of the motion which has been made by the honorable gentleman from

Tennessee, (Mr. ANDERSON.) But, sir, as I believe the public welfare

infinitely more important than any fleeting popularity which an

individual like myself can expect to enjoy, I shall most sincerely

regret the success of that motion. Sir, I have said but little about

the degree of distress which will flow from the dissolution of the

bank, because I have not that kind of evidence which would enable

me to judge of it with any degree of accuracy. The convulsed state

of the European nations; the immense losses which our commerce has

sustained by the operation of the decrees and orders of the tyrants of

the land and the ocean, imperiously admonish us to beware of making

untried and dangerous experiments. By supporting this institution,

the tottering credit of the commercial class of your citizens may be

upheld, until the storm shall have passed over. By overturning this

great moneyed institution at the present crisis, you may draw down

to undistinguished ruin thousands of your unfortunate and unoffending

fellow-citizens.

The question was then taken on striking out the first section of the

bill, (equivalent to a rejection,) when it appeared that there were for

the motion 17, against it 17, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Campbell, Clay, Cutts, Franklin,

Gaillard, German, Giles, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Reed,

Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Whiteside, and Worthington.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bayard, Bradley, Brent, Champlin, Condit,

Crawford, Dana, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering,

Pope, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Turner.

The Senate being equally divided, it became the duty of the VICE

PRESIDENT to decide the question by his vote; previously to which he

made the following observations:

GENTLEMEN: As the subject on which I am called upon to decide

has excited great sensibility, I must solicit the indulgence of

the Senate while I briefly state the reasons which influence my

judgment.

Permit me to observe, that the question to be decided does not

depend simply upon the right of Congress to establish under

any modification a bank, but upon their power to establish a

National Bank, as contemplated by this bill. In other words,

can they create a body politic and corporate, not constituting

a part of the Government, nor otherwise responsible to it but

by forfeiture of charter, and bestow on its members privileges,

immunities, and exemptions not recognized by the laws of the

States, nor enjoyed by the citizens generally? It cannot be

doubted but that Congress may pass all necessary and proper

laws for carrying into execution the powers specifically

granted to the Government, or to any department or officer

thereof; but, in doing so, the means must be suited and

subordinate to the end. The power to create corporations is not

expressly granted; it is a high attribute of sovereignty, and

in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication, but

primary and independent.

I cannot believe that this interpretation of the constitution

will, in any degree, defeat the purposes for which it

was formed. On the contrary, it does appear to me, that

the opposite exposition has an inevitable tendency to

consolidation, and affords just and serious cause of alarm.

In the course of a long life I have found that Government is

not to be strengthened by an assumption of doubtful powers,

but by a wise and energetic execution of those which are

incontestible; the former never fails to produce suspicion and

distrust, while the latter inspires respect and confidence.

If, however, after a fair experiment, the powers vested in the

Government shall be found incompetent to the attainment of the

objects for which it was instituted, the constitution happily

furnishes the means for remedying the evil by amendment, and I

have no doubt that in such event on an appeal to the patriotism

and good sense of the community it will be wisely applied.

I will not trespass upon the patience of the Senate any longer

than to say, from the best examination I have been able to give

the subject, I am constrained by a sense of duty to decide in

the affirmative--that is, that the first section of the bill be

stricken out.

SATURDAY, March 2.

_Bank of the United States._

Mr. CLAY, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 25th

February, the memorial of the stockholders of the Bank of the United

States, praying that an act of Congress might be passed to continue

the corporate powers of the bank for a further period, to enable it to

settle such of its concerns as may be depending on the 3d of March,

1811, made the following report:

That your committee have duly weighed the contents of the

memorial, and deliberately attended to such explanations of

the views of the memorialists as they have thought proper to

present through their agents. That, holding the opinion (as a

majority of the committee do) that the constitution did not

authorize Congress originally to grant the charter, it follows,

as a necessary consequence of that opinion, that an extension

of it, even under the restrictions contemplated by the

stockholders, is equally repugnant to the constitution. But,

if it were possible to surmount this fundamental objection,

and if that rule which forbids, during the same session of the

Senate, the re-agitation of a proposition once decided, were

disregarded, your committee would still be at a loss to find

any sufficient reasons for prolonging the political existence

of the corporation for the purpose of winding up its affairs.

For, as it respects the body itself, it is believed that the

existing laws, through the instrumentality of a trust properly

constituted, afford as ample means as a qualified continuance

of the charter would, for the liquidation of its accounts,

and the collection and final distribution of its funds. But

should any inconvenience be experienced on this subject, the

committee are persuaded it will be very partial, and such as

the State authorities, upon proper application, would not fail

to provide a competent remedy for. And, in relation to the

community, if the corporation, stripped of its banking powers,

were to fulfil _bona fide_ the duty of closing its affairs,

your committee cannot see that any material advantage would be

derived. Whilst, on the contrary, if it should not so act, but

should avail itself of the temporary prolongation, in order to

effect a more durable extension of its charter, it might in its

operations become a serious scourge.

Your committee are happy to say that they learn, from a

satisfactory source, that the apprehensions which were

indulged, as to the distress resulting from a non-renewal of

the charter, are far from being realized in Philadelphia, to

which their information has been confined. It was long since

obvious that the vacuum, in the circulation of the country,

which was to be produced by the withdrawal of the paper of the

Bank of the United States, would be filled by paper issuing

from other banks. This operation is now actually going on. The

paper of the Bank of the United States is rapidly returning,

and that of other banks is taking its place. The ability to

enlarge their accommodations is proportionately enhanced;

and when it shall be further increased by a removal into

their vaults of those deposits which are in the possession

of the Bank of the United States, the injurious effects of a

dissolution of the corporation will be found to consist in

an accelerated disclosure of the actual condition of those

who have been supported by the credit of others, but whose

insolvent or tottering situation, known to the bank, has been

concealed from the public at large.

Your committee beg leave to present the following resolution:

_Resolved_, That the prayer of the memorialists ought not to be

granted.

The report was ordered to lie on the table.

_Claim of General Wilkinson._

Mr. BRADLEY, from the committee to whom was referred the memorial of

General James Wilkinson, praying to be remunerated for moneys disbursed

in the service of the United States, made the following report:

That the said Wilkinson has exhibited to them claims against

the United States, to the amount of eleven thousand eight

hundred dollars and ninety-six cents. It appears to your

committee, from the documents and proofs produced by the

petitioner to explain and support his claim against the

public, that, of the above sum, $6,719.73 are claimed for his

disbursements and expenses incurred pending Burr's conspiracy;

$2,560 paid for a tract of land for the public service, now

occupied by the troops on the Missouri river, near its mouth;

$450, the amount of his passage from Baltimore to Charleston,

when ordered on extra duty by the President; and $2,131.23,

for losses of property sustained by his sudden transfer from

St. Louis, where he was exercising the functions of a civil

magistrate, to the Sabine, for the purpose of directing the

arms of the nation against an invading force of the Spaniards.

Your committee have no hesitancy in saying that many of the

charges appear to be legal and founded in justice, and may

furnish a proper set off against the balance opposed to him

by the War Department, and that the residue are entitled

to equitable consideration; but, from the shortness of the

time, and the pressure of business before the expiration of

the session, your committee cannot find leisure to form that

deliberate and clear judgment on the merits of the several

items which justice to the petitioner and to the public

require; they, therefore, beg leave to offer the following

resolution:

_Resolved_, That the further consideration of the petition

of General James Wilkinson, together with the accompanying

documents, be postponed to the next meeting of Congress.

The report and accompanying documents were ordered to lie on the table.

The Senate adjourned to 6 o'clock this evening.

SUNDAY EVENING, 6 o'clock, March 3.

_Adjournment._

_Resolved_, That Messrs. TURNER and CONDIT be a committee on the part

of the Senate, with such committee as the House of Representatives may

join, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him,

that, unless he may have any further communications to make to the two

Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives

therewith, and request the appointment of a committee on their part.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that

the House concur in the resolution for the appointment of a joint

committee to wait upon the President of the United States, and notify

him of the intended recess, and have appointed a committee on their

part.

Mr. TURNER, from the joint committee, reported that they had waited

upon the President of the United States, who informed them that he had

no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.

_Ordered_, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that

the Senate, having finished the business before them, are about to

adjourn. Whereupon, the PRESIDENT adjourned the Senate without day.