President is authorized to occupy the territories ceded to us by France
in the April preceding. The other empowers the President to establish
a provisional government there. The first section is unlimited in
its duration; the other is restricted to the expiration of the then
session of Congress. The act, therefore, of March, 1804, declaring
that the previous act of October should continue in force until the
first of October, 1804, is applicable to the second and not the first
section, and was intended to continue the provisional government of
the President. By the act of the 24th of February, 1804, for laying
duties on goods imported into the ceded territories, the President is
empowered, _whenever he deems it expedient_, to erect the bay and river
Mobile, &c., into a separate district, and to establish therein a port
of entry and delivery. By this same act the Orleans Territory is laid
off, and its boundaries are so defined as to comprehend West Florida.
By other acts the President is authorized to remove by force, under
certain circumstances, persons settling or taking possession of lands
ceded to the United States.
These laws furnish a legislative construction of the treaty,
correspondent with that given by the Executive, and they vest in this
branch of the Government indisputably a power to take possession
of the country, whenever it might be proper in his discretion. The
President has not, therefore, violated the constitution, and usurped
the war-making power, but he would have violated that provision
which requires him to see that the laws are faithfully executed,
if he had longer forborne to act. It is urged that he has assumed
powers belonging to Congress in undertaking to annex the portion of
West Florida between the Mississippi and the Perdido to the Orleans
Territory. But Congress, as has been shown, has already made this
annexation the limits of the Orleans Territory, as prescribed by
Congress, comprehending the country in question. The President, by his
proclamation, has not made law, but has merely declared to the people
of West Florida what the law is. This is the office of a proclamation,
and it was highly proper that the people of that Territory should be
thus notified. By the act of occupying the country, the Government
_de facto_, whether of Spain, or the revolutionists, ceased to exist;
and the laws of the Orleans Territory, applicable to the country, by
operation and force of law, attached to it. But this was a state of
things which the people might not know, and every dictate of justice
and humanity required, therefore, should be proclaimed. I consider the
bill before us merely in the light of a declaratory law.
Never could a more propitious moment present itself for the exercise
of the discretionary power placed in the President of the United
States, and, had he failed to embrace it, he would have been criminally
inattentive to the dearest interests of this country. It cannot be
too often repeated, that if Cuba on the one hand, and Florida on
the other, are in the possession of a foreign maritime power, the
immense country belonging to the United States, watered by streams
discharging themselves into the Gulf of Mexico--that is, one-third, nay
more than two-thirds of the United States, comprehending Louisiana,
is placed at the mercy of that power. The possession of Florida is
a guarantee absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the navigation
of those streams. The gentleman from Delaware anticipates the most
direful consequences from the occupation of the country. He supposes
a sally from a Spanish garrison upon the American forces, and asks
what is to be done? We attempt a peaceful possession of the country,
to which we are fairly entitled. If the wrongful occupants under the
authority of Spain assail our troops, I trust they will retrieve the
lost honor of the nation in the case of the Chesapeake. Suppose an
attack upon any portion of the American army within the acknowledged
limits of the United States by a Spanish force? In such event there
would exist but a single honorable and manly course. The gentleman
conceives it ungenerous that we should at this moment, when Spain is
encompassed and pressed on all sides by the immense power of her enemy,
occupy West Florida. Shall we sit by, passive spectators, and witness
the interesting transactions in that country--transactions which
tend to jeopardize, in the most imminent degree, our rights, without
interference? Are you prepared to see a foreign power seize what
belongs to us? I have heard in the most credible manner that, about
the period when the President took his measures in relation to that
country, the agents of a foreign power were intriguing with the people
there to induce them to come under his dominion.
Whether this be the fact or not, it cannot be doubted, that if you
neglect the present auspicious moment--if you reject the proffered
boon, some other nation, profiting by your errors, will seize the
occasion to get a fatal footing in your southern frontier. I have no
hesitation in saying, that if a parent country will not or cannot
maintain its authority in a colony adjacent to us, and there exists in
it a state of misrule and disorder, menacing our peace, and if moreover
such colony, by passing into the hands of any other power, would become
dangerous to the integrity of the Union, and manifestly tend to the
subversion of our laws; we have a right, upon eternal principles of
self-preservation, to lay hold of it. This principle alone, independent
of any title, would warrant our occupation of West Florida. But it
is not necessary to resort to it, our title being in my judgment
incontestably good.
MONDAY, December 31.
JOHN TAYLOR, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of
South Carolina, in place of Thomas Sumter, resigned, produced his
credentials which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having been
administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.
WEDNESDAY, January 2, 1811.
ANDREW GREGG, from the State of Pennsylvania, took his seat in the
Senate.
MONDAY, January 7.
JAMES A. BAYARD, from the State of Delaware, took his seat in the
Senate.
TUESDAY, January 8.
THOMAS WORTHINGTON, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State
of Ohio, in place of RETURN JONATHAN MEIGS, resigned, produced his
credentials, which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having
been administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.
MONDAY, January 14.
JAMES TURNER, from the State of North Carolina, took his seat in the
Senate.
TUESDAY, January 29.
_Mississippi Territory._
Mr. ANDERSON presented the memorial of the Legislative Council and
House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory, praying that
the said Territory may be admitted as a State into the Union, upon
the footing of the original States, and the memorial was read, and
referred to a select committee to consider and report thereon by bill
or otherwise; and Messrs. ANDERSON, BAYARD, and DANA, were appointed
the committee.
The memorial is as follows:
_To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States in Congress assembled_: The memorial
unanimously adopted, of the Legislative Council and House of
Representatives of Mississippi Territory, in General Assembly
convened, respectfully states, That by the articles of
agreement and cession between the United States and the State
of Georgia, an act for the amicable settlement of limits with
the State of Georgia, &c., and an act supplemental thereto,
the Government of the Mississippi Territory was organized and
established, and "all and singular the rights, privileges,
and advantages, granted to the people of the United States,
northwest of the river Ohio, by an ordinance of the 13th day
of July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, were
extended to the people of the Mississippi Territory:" And by
the said articles of agreement and cession, it is provided
"That the Territory thus ceded shall form a State, and be
admitted as such into the Union as soon as it shall contain
sixty thousand free inhabitants, or at an earlier period, if
Congress shall think it expedient."
Your memorialists state, that although they do not pretend to
have the number required by the said articles of agreement
and cession, and the ordinance to entitle our Territory as a
matter of right into the Union, upon the footing of one of the
original States; yet, we hope that our numbers (as will appear
by the census now taken under a law of the United States) are
sufficiently respectable to induce your honorable body to
admit the Mississippi Territory into the Union, as a matter of
expediency.
Your memorialists conceive it unnecessary to detail the many
reasons which might be adduced in support of their petition,
but think it sufficient to say, that, as the people of this
Territory are able to bear the expenses of a State Government
with convenience to themselves, and at the same time will
relieve the Government of the United States from the cares
and expenses incident to the Territorial form of government;
and that whatever views the form of government (under which
they have, perhaps, not very patiently lived) for about
twelve years, was formed, it is found from experience, to
be unfriendly to republicanism; and is such a one as every
American in heart is solicitous to be relieved from. We,
therefore, pray your honorable body to pass a law authorizing
a convention to be called, for the purpose of forming a
constitution and State Government in the Mississippi Territory,
to be admitted into the Union upon the footing of the original
States.
Your memorialists, from a knowledge of your indulgence to the
people of the Territories northwest of the river Ohio, when
in a situation similar to their own, are sanguine in their
expectations, that your honorable body will grant to them the
prayer of their petition.
And they will ever pray, &c.
F. L. CLAIBORNE,
_Speaker of the House._
ALEX. MONTGOMERY,
_President of Legislative Council._
Attest: WM. C. WINSTON,
_Clerk House of Reps. M. T._
WEDNESDAY, January 30.
_Territory of Orleans._
The Senate took into consideration the amendment proposed yesterday,
by Mr. DANA, to the bill, entitled "An act to enable the people of the
Territory of New Orleans to form a constitution and State Government,
and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, and for other purposes:" and, on motion, by
Mr. CLAY, it was agreed to divide the question; and, on the question to
agree to the first division of the amendment, to wit:
_Provided_, That this act shall not be understood to admit such
State into the Union, as aforesaid, unless each of the States
shall consent to the same:
It was determined in the negative--yeas 10, nays 18, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman,
Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, and Reed.
NAYS.--Messrs. Campbell, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard,
Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Pope, Robinson, Smith of
Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside,
and Worthington.
On the question to agree to the second division of the amendment, to
wit:
_Provided_, That this act shall not be understood to admit such
State into the Union as aforesaid, unless there shall be a
constitutional amendment empowering the Congress to admit into
the Union new States formed beyond the boundaries of the United
States, as known and understood at the time of establishing the
Constitution for the United States:
It was determined in the negative--yeas 8, nays 17, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Lloyd,
Pickering, and Reed.
NAYS.--Messrs. Campbell, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard,
Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Robinson, Smith of Maryland,
Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside, and
Worthington.
On motion, by Mr. BRADLEY, to postpone the further consideration of the
bill to the second Monday in February next, it was determined in the
negative.
On the question, Shall the bill be read a third time as amended? it was
determined in the affirmative--yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Brent, Clay, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard, Gregg,
Lambert, Mathewson, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of
New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Whiteside, and Worthington.
NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Dana, German, Gilman,
Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, and Reed.
FRIDAY, February 1.
The credentials of JAMES A. BAYARD, appointed a Senator by the
Legislature of the State of Delaware, for the term of six years from
the third day of March next: and of WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD, appointed a
Senator by the Legislature of the State of Georgia, for the term of
six years from the third day of March next, were severally read, and
ordered to lie on file.
WEDNESDAY, February 6.
Mr. BRADLEY presented the petition of Charlotte Hazen, relict of the
late Brigadier General Moses Hazen, praying a grant of land may be
made to her, as a Canadian refugee, or that a small addition, in lieu
thereof, may be added to her present pension from Congress, for reasons
stated at large in the petition; which was read, and referred to a
select committee, to consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise;
and Messrs. BRADLEY, FRANKLIN, and GERMAN, were appointed the committee.
MONDAY, February 11.
_Bank of the United States._
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend
and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the
subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day
of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.
Mr. ANDERSON said that having been a member of the committee who
reported the bill before the Senate, and not feeling himself at liberty
to oppose the introduction of the report, yet, thinking it might be
advisable to try the principle before they proceeded to discuss the
details, he should move to strike out the first section of the bill. He
would barely observe that, was this not a question which was generally
understood, on which not only every member of this House, but every
citizen of the United States had made up his mind, he should feel
himself bound to offer reasons in support of the motion; but, inasmuch
as it was a question which every gentleman had doubtless decided in his
own mind, he felt unwilling to take up any more of the attention of
the Senate, especially so late in the session, when there was so much
business of importance before them which required to be acted on.
Mr. CRAWFORD said that he should proceed, though reluctantly, to
explain the reasons of the committee for reporting the bill, which
is now under consideration. After the most minute examination of
the constitution, the majority of that committee were decidedly of
opinion that the Congress of the United States were clearly invested
with power to pass such a bill. The object of the constitution was
twofold: 1st, the delegation of certain general powers, of a national
nature, to the Government of the United States; and 2d, the limitation
or restriction of the State sovereignties. Upon the most thorough
examination of this instrument, I am induced to believe, that many of
the various constructions given to it are the result of a belief that
it is absolutely perfect. It has become so extremely fashionable to
eulogize this constitution, whether the object of the eulogist is
the extension or contraction of the powers of the Government, that
whenever its eulogium is pronounced, I feel an involuntary apprehension
of mischief. Upon the faith of this imputed perfection, it has been
declared to be inconsistent with the entire spirit and character of
this instrument, to suppose that after it has given a general power
it should afterwards delegate a specific power fairly comprehended
within the general power. A rational analysis of the constitution will
refute in the most demonstrative manner this idea of its perfection.
This analysis may excite unpleasant sensations; it may assail honest
prejudices; for there can be no doubt that honest prejudices frequently
exist, and are many times perfectly innocent. But when these prejudices
tend to destroy even the object of their affection, it is essentially
necessary that they should be eradicated. In the present case if there
be any who, under the conviction that the constitution is perfect, are
disposed to give it a construction that will render it wholly imbecile,
the public welfare requires that the veil should be rent, and that its
imperfection should be disclosed to public view. By this disclosure it
will cease to be the object of adoration, but it will nevertheless be
entitled to our warmest attachment.
The 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution contains among
others the following grant of powers, viz: to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights
and measures; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a
navy; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes; to establish post-offices and post
roads. This selection contains five grants of general power. Under the
power to coin money it is conceived that Congress would have a right
to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the money after it was
coined, and that this power is fairly incidental to, and comprehended
in, the general power. The power to raise armies and provide and
maintain a navy comprehends, beyond the possibility of doubt, the right
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces; and yet in these three cases, the constitution, after making
the grant of general power, delegates specifically the powers which
are fairly comprehended within the general power. If this, however,
should be denied, the construction which has been uniformly given to
the remaining powers which have been selected, will establish the
fact beyond the power of contradiction. Under the power to regulate
commerce, Congress has exercised the power of erecting light-houses, as
incident to that power, and fairly comprehended within it. Under the
power to establish post-offices, and post roads, Congress has provided
for the punishment of offences against the Post-Office Department.
If the Congress can exercise an incidental power not granted in one
case, it can in all cases of a similar kind. But it is said, that
the enumeration of certain powers excludes all other powers not
enumerated. This is true so far as original substantive grants of power
are concerned, but it is not true when applied to express grants of
power, which are strictly incidental to some original and substantive
grant of power. If it were true in relation to them, Congress could not
pass a law to punish offences against the Post-Office Establishment,
because the constitution has expressly given the power to punish
offences against the current coin, and as it has given the power to
punish offences committed against that grant of general power, and has
withheld it in relation to the power to establish post-offices and
post roads. Congress cannot, according to this rule of construction,
so warmly contended for, pass any law to provide for the punishment
of such offences. The power to make rules for the regulation and
government of the land and naval forces, I have shown to be strictly
incidental to the power to raise armies, and provide and maintain
navies; but, according to this rule of construction, all incidental
powers are excluded except the few which are enumerated, which would
exclude from all claim to constitutionality, nearly one-half of your
laws, and, what is still more to be deprecated, would render your
constitution equally imbecile with the old articles of confederation.
When we come to examine the 4th article, the absurdity of this rule
of construction, and also of the idea of perfection which has been
attributed to the constitution, will be equally manifest. This article
appears to be of a miscellaneous character and very similar to the
codicil of a will. The first article provides for the organization of
Congress; defines its powers; prescribes limitations upon the powers
previously granted; and sets metes and bounds to the authority of the
State Governments. The second article provides for the organization
of the Executive Department, and defines its power and duty. The 3d
article defines the tenure by which the persons in whom the judicial
power may be vested shall hold their offices, and prescribes the extent
of their power and jurisdiction. These three articles provide for the
three great departments of Government called into existence by the
constitution, but some other provisions just then occur, which ought to
have been included in one or the other of the preceding articles, and
these provisions are incorporated and compose the 4th article. The 1st
section of it declares, that "full faith and credit shall be given in
each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof." In the second section it declares, that a
person, charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on
demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the
crime. A similar provision is contained in the same section, relative
to fugitives who are bound to labor, by the laws of any State. In the
first case which has been selected, express authority has been given to
Congress, to prescribe the manner in which the records, &c., should be
proved, and also the effect thereof, but in the other two, no authority
is given to Congress, and yet the bare inspection of the three cases
will prove that the interference of Congress is less necessary in
the first than in the two remaining cases. A record must always be
proved by itself, because it is the highest evidence of which the case
admits. The effect of a record ought to depend upon the laws of the
State of which it is a record, and, therefore, the power to prescribe
the effect of a record was wholly unnecessary, and has been so held
by Congress--no law having been passed to prescribe the effect of a
record. In the second case there seems to be some apparent reason for
passing a law to ascertain the officer upon whom the demand is to be
made; what evidence of the identity of the person demanded and of the
guilt of the party charged must be produced before the obligation to
deliver shall be complete. The same apparent reason exists for the
passage of a law relative to fugitives from labor. According, however,
to the rule of construction contended for, Congress cannot pass any law
to carry the constitution into effect, in the two last cases selected,
because express power has been given in the first and is withheld in
the two last. Congress has nevertheless passed laws to carry those
provisions into effect, and this exercise of power has never been
complained of by the people or the States.
Mr. President, it is contended by those who are opposed to the passage
of this bill, that Congress can exercise no power by application, and
yet it is admitted, nay, even asserted, that Congress would have power
to pass all laws necessary to carry the constitution into effect,
whether it had given or withheld the power which is contained in the
following paragraph of the 8th section of the 1st article: "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitution
in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer
thereof." If this part of the constitution really confers no power, it
at least, according to this opinion, strips it of that attribute of
perfection which has by these gentlemen been ascribed to it. But, sir,
this is not the fact. It does confer power of the most substantial and
salutary nature. Let us, sir, take a view of the constitution upon the
supposition that no power is vested in the Government by this clause,
and see how the exclusion of power by implication can be reconciled
to the most important acts of the Government. The constitution has
expressly given Congress power "to constitute tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court," but it has nowhere expressly given the power to
constitute a supreme court. In the 3d article it is said, "the judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." The discretion, which is here given to Congress, is
confined to the inferior courts, which it may from time to time ordain
and establish, and not to the Supreme Court. In the discussion which
took place upon the bill to repeal the judicial system of the United
States in the year 1802, this distinction is strongly insisted upon
by the advocates for the repeal. The Supreme Court was said to be the
creature of the constitution, and, therefore, intangible, but that
Congress, possessing a discretionary power to create or not to create
inferior tribunals, had the same discretionary power to abolish them
whenever it was expedient. But if even the discretionary power here
vested does extend to the Supreme Court, yet the power of Congress to
establish that court must rest upon implication, and upon implication
alone. Under the authority to establish tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court, the power to establish a Supreme Court would, according
to my ideas, be vested in Congress by implication. And, sir, it is only
vested by implication, even if the declaration, that Congress shall
have power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect
the power vested in any department or officer of the Government should
be held to be an operative grant. Under this grant, Congress can pass
laws to carry into effect the powers vested in the judicial department?
What are the powers vested in this department. That it shall exercise
jurisdiction in all cases in law and equity arising under this
constitution, &c., in all cases affecting ambassadors, &c., but the
power to create the department and to carry into effect the powers
given to or vested in that department, are very different things.
The power to create the Supreme Court cannot be expressly granted in
the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect
the powers vested in that court, but must, as I have endeavored to
prove, be derived from implication. Let me explain my understanding
of a power which exists by implication, by an example which will be
comprehended by all who hear me. In a devise, an estate is granted
to A, after the death of B, and no express disposition is made of
the estate during the life of A; in that case A is said to have an
estate for life, by implication, in the property so devised. So when
the constitution gives the right to create tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court, the right to create the Supreme is vested in Congress
by implication. Shall we after this be told that Congress cannot
constitutionally exercise any right by implication? By the exercise
of a right derived only from implication, Congress has organized a
Supreme Court, and then, as incidental to power, existing only by
implication, it has passed laws to punish offences against the law by
which the court has been created and organized. Sir, the right of
the Government to accept of the District of Columbia, exists only by
implication. The right of the Government to purchase or accept of
places for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards,
exists only by implication, and yet no man in the nation, so far as
my knowledge extends, has complained of the exercise of those implied
powers, as an unconstitutional usurpation of power. The right to
purchase or except of places for the erection of light-houses, as
well as the right to erect and support light-houses, must be derived
by implication alone, if any such right exists. The clause in the
constitution which gives Congress the power "to exercise exclusive
legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding
ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of Government of the United
States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by
the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and
other needful buildings," certainly gives no express power to accept or
purchase any of the places, destined for the uses therein specified.
The only power expressly given in this clause is that of exercising
exclusive legislation in such places; the right to accept or purchase
must be derived by implication from this clause, or it must be shown
to be comprehended in or incidental to some other power expressly
delegated by the constitution. I shall now attempt to show, that
according to the construction which has been given to other parts of
this constitution, Congress has the right to incorporate a bank to
enable it to manage the fiscal concerns of the nation. If this can
be done, and if it can also be shown that the correctness of such
construction has never excited murmur or complaint--that it has not
even been questioned, I shall have accomplished every thing which it
will be incumbent on me to prove, to justify the passage of the bill
upon your table. The power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, together with the power to pass all laws which may be
necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing powers,
when tested by the same rule of construction which has been applied
to other parts of the constitution, fairly invests Congress with
the power to create a bank. Under the power to regulate commerce,
Congress exercises the right of building and supporting light-houses.
What do we understand by regulating commerce? Where do you expect to
find regulations of commerce? Will any man look for them any where
else than in your treaties with foreign nations, and in your statutes
regulating your custom-houses and custom-house officers? What are the
reasons for vesting Congress with the right to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States? The commerce of a nation
is a matter of the greatest importance in all civilized countries.
It depends upon compacts with other nations, and whether they are
beneficial or prejudicial depends not so much on the reciprocal
interest of nations as upon their capacity to defend their rights and
redress their wrongs. It was therefore highly important that the right
to regulate commerce with foreign nations should be vested in the
National Government. If the regulation of commerce among the several
States had been left with the States, a multiplicity of conflicting
regulations would have been the consequence. Endless collisions
would have been created, and that harmony and good neighborhood, so
essential between the members of a Federal Republic, would have been
wholly unattainable. The best interest of the community, therefore,
imperiously required, that this power should be delegated to Congress.
Not so of light-houses. The interest of the States would have induced
them to erect light-houses, where they were necessary, and when
erected they would have been equally beneficial to their own vessels,
the vessels of their sister States, and of foreign nations. The
performance of this duty could have been most safely confided to the
States. They were better informed of the situations in which they
ought to be erected than Congress could possibly be, and could enforce
the execution of such regulations as might be necessary to make them
useful. How then has it happened that Congress has taken upon itself
the right to erect light-houses, under their general power to regulate
commerce? I have heard and seen in the public prints a great deal of
unintelligible jargon about the incidentality of a law to the power
delegated and intended to be executed by it, and of its relation to the
end which is to be accomplished by its exercise, which I acknowledge I
do not clearly and distinctly comprehend, and must therefore be excused
from answering. I speak now of the public newspapers, to which I am
compelled to resort to ascertain the objections which are made to this
measure, as gentlemen have persevered in refusing to assign the reasons
which have induced them to oppose the passage of the bill. But, sir,
I can clearly comprehend that the right to erect light-houses is not
incidental to the power of regulating commerce, unless every thing is
incidental to that power which tends to facilitate and promote the
prosperity of commerce. It is contended that under the power to lay and
collect taxes, imposts, and duties, you can pass all laws necessary
for that purpose, but they must be laws to lay and collect taxes,
imposts, and duties, and not laws which tend to promote the collection
of taxes. A law to erect light-houses is no more a law to regulate
commerce, than a law creating a bank is a law to collect taxes, imposts
and duties. But the erection of light-houses tends to facilitate and
promote the security and prosperity of commerce, and in an equal degree
the erection of a bank tends to facilitate and insure the collection,
safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue. If, by this rule of
construction, which is applied to light-houses, but denied to the
bank, Congress can, as incidental to the power to regulate commerce,
erect light-houses, it will be easy to show that the same right may be
exercised, as incidental to the power of laying and collecting duties
and imposts. Duties cannot be collected, unless vessels importing
dutiable merchandise arrive in port; whatever, therefore, tends to
secure their safe arrival may be exercised under the general power; the
erection of light-houses does facilitate the safe arrival of vessels in
port, and Congress therefore can exercise this right as incidental to
the power to lay imposts and duties.
But it is said the advocates of the bank differ among themselves in
fixing upon the general power to which the right to create a bank
is incidental, and that this difference proves that there is no
incidentality, to use a favorite expression, between that and any
one of the enumerated general powers. The same reason can be urged,
with equal force, against the constitutionality of every law for the
erection of light-houses. Let the advocates for this doctrine lay their
finger upon the power to which the right of erecting light-houses is
incidental. It can be derived with as much apparent plausibility and
reason from the right to lay duties, as from the right to regulate
commerce. Who is there, now, in this body who has not voted for the
erection of a light-house? And no man who reads one of these will
believe it to be a regulation of commerce. And no man in the nation,
so far as my knowledge extends, has ever complained of the exercise
of this power. The right to erect light-houses is exercised, because
the commerce of the nation, or the collection of duties, is greatly
facilitated by that means; and, sir, the right to create a bank is
exercised because the collection of your revenue, and the safe-keeping
and easy and speedy transmission of your public money is not simply
facilitated, but because these important objects are more perfectly
secured by the erection of a bank than they can be by any other means
in the power of human imagination to devise. We say, therefore, in the
words of the constitution, that a bank is necessary and proper, to
enable the Government to carry into complete effect the right to lay
and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises. We do not say that
the existence of the Government absolutely depends upon the operations
of a bank, but that a national bank enables the Government to manage
its fiscal concerns more advantageously than it could do by any other
means. The terms necessary and proper, according to the construction
given to every part of the constitution, imposes no limitation upon the
powers previously delegated. If these words had been omitted in the
clause giving authority to pass laws to carry into execution the powers
vested by the constitution in the National Government, still Congress
would have been bound to pass laws which were necessary and proper,
and not such as were unnecessary and improper. Every legislative
body, every person invested with power of any kind, is morally bound
to use only those means which are necessary and proper for the correct
execution of the powers delegated to them. But it is contended, that
if a bank is necessary and proper for the management of the fiscal
concerns of the nation, yet Congress has no power to incorporate one,
because there are State banks which may be resorted to. No person who
has undertaken to discuss this question has, as far as my knowledge
extends, ventured to declare that a bank is not necessary. Every man
admits, directly or indirectly, the necessity of resorting to banks of
some kind. This admission is at least an apparent abandonment of the
constitutional objection; for, if a bank is necessary and proper, then
have Congress the constitutional right to erect a bank. But this is
denied. It is contended that this idea rests alone upon the presumption
that the Government of the United States is wholly independent of
the State governments, which is not the fact; that this very law is
dependent upon the State courts for its execution. This is certainly
not the fact. The courts of the United States have decided, in the
most solemn manner, that they have cognizance of all cases affecting
the Bank of the United States. Sir, it is true that the Government
of the United States is dependent upon the State governments for its
organization. Members of both Houses of Congress, and the President
of the United States, are chosen by the State governments, or under
the authority of their laws. But it is equally true, that wherever the
constitution confides to the State governments the right to perform
any act in relation to the Federal Government, it imposes the most
solemn obligation upon them to perform the act. The Constitution of
the United States, as to these particular acts, is the constitution
of the several States, and their functionaries are accordingly sworn
to support it. Can it, then, be seriously contended, that because
the constitution has in some cases made the Government of the United
States dependent upon the State governments, in all which cases it has
imposed the most solemn obligations upon them to act, that it will
be necessary and proper for Congress to make itself dependent upon
them in cases where no such obligation is imposed? The constitution
has defined all the cases where this Government ought to be dependent
upon that of the States; and it would be unwise and improvident for
us to multiply these cases by legislative acts, especially where we
have no power to compel them to perform the act, for which we have
made ourselves their dependents. In forming a permanent system of
revenue, it would be unwise in Congress to rely, for its collection
and transmission from one extreme of this extensive empire to the
other, upon any accidental circumstance, wholly beyond their power or
control. There are State banks in almost every State in the Union, but
their existence is wholly independent of this Government, and their
dissolution is equally so. The Secretary of the Treasury has informed
you that he conceives a bank is necessary to the legitimate exercise of
the powers vested by the constitution in the Government. I know, sir,
that the testimony of this officer will not be very highly estimated by
several honorable members of this body. I am aware that this opinion
has subjected him, and the committee also, to the most invidious
aspersions; but, sir, the situation of that officer, independent of
his immense talents, enables him to form a more correct opinion than
any other man in the nation of the degree of necessity which exists
at the present time for a national bank, to enable the Government to
manage its fiscal operations. He has been ten years at the head of
your Treasury; he is thoroughly acquainted with the influence of the
bank upon your revenue system; and he has, when called upon, declared
that a bank is necessary to the proper exercise of the legitimate
powers of the Government. His testimony is entitled to great weight in
the decision of this question, at least with those gentlemen who have
no knowledge of the practical effects of the operations of the bank
in the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue.
In the selection of means to carry any of your constitutional powers
into effect, you must exercise a sound discretion; acting under its
influence, you will discover that what is proper at one time may be
extremely unfit and improper at another. The original powers granted to
the Government by the constitution can never change with the varying
circumstances of the country, but the means by which those powers are
to be carried into effect must necessarily vary with the varying state
and circumstances of the nation. We are, when acting to-day, not to
inquire what means were necessary and proper twenty years ago, not what
were necessary and proper at the organization of the Government, but
our inquiry must be, what means are necessary and proper this day. The
constitution, in relation to the means by which its powers are to be
executed, is one eternal _now_. The state of things now, the precise
point of time when we are called upon to act, must determine our choice
in the selection of means to execute the delegated powers.
Mr. LLOYD.--Mr. President: This is indeed, sir, an up-hill, wind-mill
sort of warfare--a novel mode of legislative proceeding. That a bill
should be brought in on a very important subject which has been long
under consideration, and that a gentleman should move to strike out the
first section of the bill, which comprises all its vitality, (for it
is the first section which provides for the continuance of the bank,)
and should be supported in it, without deigning to assign any other
reasons than may be derived from newspaper publications, which are so
crude and voluminous that not one man out of ten will so far misspend
his time as to take the trouble to read them, is indeed extraordinary.
Still, if gentlemen choose to adopt this dumb sort of legislation, and
are determined to take the question without offering any arguments in
support of their opinions, I certainly should not have interfered with
their wishes, had I not been a member of the committee who had reported
the bill, who had heard the testimony offered by two very respectable
delegations from Philadelphia; one from the master manufacturers and
mechanics of the city, and the other from the merchants; and had I not
taken minutes of this testimony, which I find it is expected from me
that I should relate to the Senate.
Sir, I consider the motion to strike out, now under consideration, as
going to the entire destruction of the bill, without any reference to
its details or modifications; it therefore appears to me in order, to
take into consideration only the material principle of the bill; that
is, whether it be proper that the charter of the bank should be renewed
on any terms whatever, let those terms be what they may.
Sir, it is admitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, in his
communications to Congress, that the concerns of this bank have
been "skilfully and wisely managed," that the bank has made a very
limited and moderate use of the public moneys deposited with it; and
that it has greatly facilitated the operations of Government by the
safe-keeping and transmission of the public moneys. It has at all
times met the wishes of the Government in making loans. It has done
this even at six per cent., while the Government have been obliged,
in one instance, for a considerable amount to pay eight per cent.
to other persons for the loans obtained from them. It is admitted,
sir, that the bank, at the request of the Treasury Department, has
established branches for the purpose of facilitating the operations of
the Government at places where such establishments could not but be
inconvenient to them in point of management, and disadvantageous in
point of profit. I allude more particularly, sir, to the branches of
the bank which has been established at New Orleans and at Washington.
We have been told this session, sir, by a gentleman from Maryland,
(Mr. SMITH,) that the Territory of Orleans is a very wealthy one,
that it probably contains a greater number of rich inhabitants, for
its population, than any other district in the Union. Sir, if this be
the fact, of whom does this wealthy population consist? Not of the
inhabitants, but of the planters; men who are not borrowers of the
bank, who, when they realize the sales of their produce, invest the
surplus proceeds of it beyond their expenditure in the funds, or in the
acquisition of new lands, or in the purchase of an additional number
of negroes. Sir, it is notorious, that from the recent possession by
the United States of Louisiana, and the certainty that New Orleans must
soon be the emporium of an immense western commerce, that city has
become more the resort of the young, the adventurous, the enterprising
and the rash among the mercantile men of our country, than any other
city in the Union; and it is obvious, sir, in proportion as the
borrowers from a bank consist of persons of this description, in the
same proportion must the circumstances of such bank be unsound; and
without possessing any particular knowledge whatever on the state of
this bank, if the collections of its debts are speedily made, I would
not make the purchase at a discount of twenty-five per cent. from the
nominal amount of them.
Sir, we can judge with more accuracy when we come nearer home. What is
the state of the bank in this city? What the ability of its debtors to
meet their engagements? It is stated the branch has a loan out here
of four hundred thousand dollars. Where is the navigation?--where the
wealthy merchants?--where are the opulent tradesmen?--the extensive
manufacturers, to refund this money, when they are called on to do it?
Sir, they are not to be found; they do not exist here; there are but
very few opulent men in the city, and those are either not borrowers
of the bank, or not borrowers to an amount of any importance. Where,
then, is the money to be found, or what has been done with it? It has
probably been taken out of the Bank of the United States to build up
the five or six District banks which you have chartered the present
session; to furnish the means of erecting the fifty or sixty brick
houses which we are told have made their appearance during the last
Summer; to encourage speculations in city lots, and to enable the
proprietors to progress with the half-finished canal which nearly
adjoins us. Well, sir, if the bank promptly calls in its loan of
four hundred thousand dollars, will the debtors be enabled to meet
their payments? Can they sell these lots, these brick houses, these
canal shares? No, sir, in such a state of things they could find no
purchasers, they could nearly as well create a world as to furnish the
money; and if the bank is to stop, and the payment of this debt be
speedily coerced, I would not give two hundred thousand dollars for the
whole of it.
In addition to this, I shall show presently, from testimony which
cannot be controverted, that the conduct of the Bank of the United
States, or its directors, or rather the stockholders, whose agents
they are, in addition to being wise and skilful, and moderate, as the
Secretary of the Treasury states them to have been, that they have
also been honorable, and liberal, and impartial; and if, in addition
to this, it be proved that the bank has, in every instance where it
had the ability to do it, met the wishes of the Government, and to
facilitate its views in the security and collection of the revenue, it
has also established branches where it must have been obviously and
palpably to the disadvantage of the bank to do it--if it has furnished
capitals for the extension of our commerce, if it has provided means
for the establishment of important manufactories, if it has had a
tendency to raise the price of our domestic produce, and has thus
encouraged industry, and improved and embellished the interior of
the country--it would seem pretty strongly to follow, that if it be
expedient to preserve the existence of an institution similar to this,
then these gentlemen, on the score of merit, added to the experience of
twenty years' successful operation, have a fair claim on the Government
for a preference in favor of that which is already in operation.
I am aware, sir, that it may be stated in opposition to this claim,
that these stockholders have enjoyed a boon for twenty years from which
others of their fellow-citizens have been deprived, except on such
terms as the sellers of shares chose to prescribe; that the charter
expires by its own limitation, and that beyond this period they have
no right to expect any thing which may not arise from the interest and
convenience of the Government. I admit, sir, there is considerable
strength in these objections. The exclusive right contained in the
charter ever appeared to me as furnishing the most solid constitutional
objection against the bank. The creation of monopolies; the granting
of exclusive privileges, except so far as to secure to the authors
of useful inventions the benefit of their discoveries; the tying up
of the hands of the Legislature, and depriving itself of the power
of according to a set of citizens, who may come into legal existence
to-morrow, or ten years hence, what it had given to another; ever
appeared to me hostile to the genius and spirit of the people of the
United States, and of all their institutions. Highly then, sir, as I am
induced to think of the conduct of this bank, from the best evidence I
can obtain, still, from the considerations I have just mentioned, did
the question now before us simply affect the stockholders, I should
certainly not trouble the Senate with any remarks in reference to it,
and should sit down in entire acquiescence, whether the prayer of their
petition for the renewal of the charter of the bank were granted or
rejected.
Sir, before quitting this idea of constitutional objection, permit me
to make one or two brief remarks in regard to it. It is impossible for
the ingenuity of man to devise any written system of government, which,
after a lapse of time, extension of empire, or change of circumstances,
shall be able to carry its own provisions into operation--hence, sir,
the indispensable necessity of implied or resulting powers, and hence
the provision in the constitution that the Government should exercise
such additional powers as were necessary to carry those that had
been delegated into effect. Sir, if this country goes on increasing
and extending, in the ratio it has done, it is not impossible that
hereafter, to provide for all the new cases that may rise under this
new state of things, the defined powers may prove only a text, and the
implied or resulting powers may furnish the sermon to it.
Permit me, sir, to put one question on this head, in addition to those
so ably, and to my view, unanswerably put yesterday by the honorable
gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. CRAWFORD.) Whence, sir, do you get the
right, whence do you derive the powers to erect custom-houses in
the maritime districts of the United States? To attach to them ten,
fifteen, or twenty custom-house officers; and clothe these men with
authority to invade the domicile, to break into the dwelling-house of
perhaps an innocent citizen? Whence do you get it, sir, except as an
implied power resulting from the authority given in the constitution
"to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises?" If, under
this authority, you can erect these custom-houses and create this
municipal, fiscal, inquisitorial _gens d'armerie_, with liberty
to violate the rights of the citizen, to break into his castle at
midnight, without even a form of warrant, on a plausible appearance of
probability, or probable cause of suspicion of his secreting smuggled
goods, which the event may prove to be unfounded--and it will be
recollected that a majority of Congress voted for the grant of this
power in its most offensive form, when two years since they voted
for the act enforcing the embargo--I say, sir, if under this general
power to collect duties, you can erect the establishment and give the
offensive power just mentioned, can you not, with the concurrence even
of the citizens, adopt another more mild and useful mode, and create an
establishment for the collection and safe-keeping of the revenue, and
place it under the direction of ten or twelve directors, and christen
it an office of discount and deposit, or of collection and payment, as
you like best? And can you not, when you have thus created it, give
to the directors a power, which perhaps they would have without your
grant, to receive and keep the cash of those who choose to place it
with them and to loan them money at the legal rate of interest, and
in some places, as at New York, at nearly fifteen per cent. above the
legal rate of interest? If you can do this, then you have your bank
established, sir--and, most assuredly, if you can do one of these
things you can do the other.
Sir, the constitutional objection to this bank, on the ground that
Congress had not the power to grant an act of incorporation, has ever
appeared to me the most unsound and untenable. Still gentlemen of
intelligence and integrity, who have thought long and deeply on the
subject, think differently from me: and I feel bound to respect their
opinions, however opposed they may be to my own. Yet, sir, I will
venture to predict, without feeling any anxiety for the fate of the
prophecy, that should this bank be suffered to run down, such will be
the state of things before this time twelve months, that there are
other gentlemen, who at present have constitutional objections, but who
have not thought so long and deeply upon them, who will, before that
time, receive such a flood of intelligence, as on this head perfectly
to dispel their doubts, and quiet their consciences.
Sir, I shall now proceed as briefly as may be in my power to state
the situation of this bank on the expiration of its charter, and the
effects on the community consequent on it. There is now due to the bank
from individuals fifteen millions of dollars. These fifteen millions
of dollars must be collected--the power of the bank to grant discounts
will have ceased, and the duty of the directors must require them to
make the collection. Sir, how is this to be done? Whence can the money
be obtained? I shall demonstrate to you presently, that already, from
an apprehension of a non-renewal of the charter of the bank, business
is nearly at a stand--that navigation, real estate, and merchandise are
unsalable; and that a man worth one hundred thousand dollars, at the
recently rated value of property, and owing ten thousand dollars, must
still be utterly unable to meet his engagements. Suppose, sir, this
property consists in houses or shipping; suppose his warehouse is full
of goods, and he has a large sum placed at his credit in England? If,
sir, he can neither sell his ships nor his goods--if he cannot sell
his real estate nor scarcely give away his exchange, which hitherto,
to men who had money in England, has been a never-failing source of
supply in case of need; I say under these circumstances, sir, whatever
may be his property, he cannot meet his engagements. Sir, can men thus
situated, solvent as they ought to be ten times over, find relief from
the State banks? Certainly not, sir. These banks have already gone to
the extreme length of their ability; they have always discounted to an
amount in proportion to their capital exceeding that of the Bank of the
United States, which is incontrovertibly proved by the dividends they
have declared, which have at most universally equalled and frequently
exceeded those of the Bank of the United States, notwithstanding the
advantage enjoyed by the latter from the deposit of public moneys. Sir,
so far from having it in their power, in the case of the dissolution
of the Bank of the United States, to assist the debtors to that bank
in meeting their engagements to it--I affirm the fact, on which I have
myself a perfect reliance, that, take the State banks from Boston to
Washington, and after paying their debts to the Bank of the United
States, they have not, nor do I believe they have had, for six months
back, specie enough to pay the debts due to their depositors, and the
amount of their bills in circulation. And here I beg it to be observed,
that bank bills and bank deposits, or credits, are precisely the same
thing--with this difference, that the latter, from the residence in the
neighborhood of the banks, and the vigilance of the proprietors, would
be the first called for. How idle is it then to expect to obtain relief
from banks which have already extended themselves beyond the bounds
of prudence, and have not even at present the ability to meet their
existing engagements? It might nearly as well be expected, that a man
who was already a bankrupt should prop and support his failing neighbor.
Sir, much has been recently said of the amount of specie in the United
States. Theoretical men have made many and vague conjectures about it,
for after all it must rest upon conjecture; some have estimated it at
ten millions of dollars--some twelve, some twenty, and some newspaper
scribblers at forty millions of dollars. Sir, I do not believe that for
the last ten years the United States have at any time been more bare
of specie than at the present moment. A few years since, specie flowed
in upon us in abundance. This resulted principally from an operation
of a very singular and peculiar nature. The Spanish Government, as
it was then understood, agreed to pay to France a very large sum of
money--many millions of dollars, the precise number I am unable to
state, from her possessions in South America. France contracted with a
celebrated English banking house, as was said at the time, with either
the concurrence or connivance of the English Government, that this
money should be obtained through the United States. These bankers,
by their agent, contracted with certain American houses, principally
I believe in Baltimore, for the importation of this specie from La
Vera Cruz into the United States, from whence it was not transmitted
in coin to Europe, but invested in adventures in the shipments of
produce, the proceeds of which ultimately go into the hands of these
bankers in London, or of their friends on the continent, from whom
it was finally realized by the French Government, either by drafts
from Paris, or remittances to that city. This operation had a trebly
favorable effect on the United States--it made fortunes for some of the
merchants, it furnished the means of shipments to Europe, and it also
provided the funds for adventures to the East Indies and to China. But
this contract has now been finished some years; and since that time
there has been a constant drain of specie from the country. Where it
is in future to be procured from, I know not. Not from South America.
Specie is, I believe, protected from exportation there, except to
Spain. From Spain we cannot get it--to a great part of what was Spain
we have now scarcely any trade. From France it cannot be obtained, for
if we can get it there even by license, we are obliged to bring back
her produce or manufactures. From England it cannot be imported--it is
now made highly penal to attempt to send it out of the kingdom. With
South America we have but little trade--hitherto we furnished them with
smuggled or licensed European and India goods; but now the markets
are flooded with these goods by importations direct from England, and
which have been attended with great loss to the shippers. For these
reasons, it is difficult to find a vessel sailing from the United
States to the Spanish ports in South America. These are among the
reasons why the amount of specie now in the country is small, and has
for some time past been gradually lessening. Sir, without indulging in
vague conjectures, what are the best data we have to form an estimate
of the amount of specie in the country? The Bank of the United States
has five millions of dollars in its vaults. In Boston there are three
State banks--in New York I believe four, Philadelphia four, and
Baltimore eight--call these nineteen twenty, and allow on an average
one hundred and fifty thousand dollars specie, which probably is as
much as they generally possess, and this will make three millions of
dollars; this amount, united to the sum in the vaults of the Bank of
the United States, gives eight millions of dollars--to which, if you
allow two millions of dollars for a loose circulation of specie, you
get an aggregate of ten millions of dollars. We are sometimes told of
the large sums of money hoarded in our country by individuals--probably
there may be some among the German farmers in Pennsylvania--perhaps
more in that State than in any other, or all the others in the Union;
but still of no great amount--the reputation of a little money
possessed in this way easily swells into a large sum. At any rate, let
the amount be what it may, in time of distress and mistrust, it would
afford no addition to your circulating medium; for it is precisely
in times like these, that men who hoard money will lock it up most
securely.
Sir, the circulation of our country is at present emphatically a
paper circulation--very little specie passes in exchange between
individuals--it is a circulation bottomed on bank paper and bank
credits, amounting perhaps to fifty millions of dollars. And on what,
sir, does this circulation rest? It rests upon the ten millions of
dollars, if that be the amount of specie in the country, and upon
public confidence.
The Bank of the United States has fifteen millions of dollars to
collect--call it ten, sir--nobody will dispute this--no one will
pretend that this bank is not solvent--the remnant of its surplus
dividends, and the interest it will have earned, will be sufficient to
cover its losses at New Orleans, at Washington, and perhaps elsewhere.
In what are these ten millions of dollars to be collected? In bank
bills, the credit of which is at least doubtful? No, sir, in specie;
and when this is entirely withdrawn from the State banks, and the banks
are unable to pay the money for their bills, who does not see that this
confidence is instantly destroyed--that the bubble bursts--that floods
of paper bills will be poured in upon them, which they will be unable
to meet, and which will for a time be as worthless as oak leaves--that
the banks themselves must, at least temporarily, become bankrupts, and
that a prostration of credit, and all those habits of punctuality which
for twenty years, we have been striving so successfully to establish,
will inevitably ensue, and, with them, also, there must be suspended
the commerce, the industry and manufactures of the country; and a
scene of embarrassment and derangement be produced, which has been
unexampled in our history.
I will now make a very few remarks on the effects which the dissolution
of the bank will have on the revenue and fiscal concerns of the
country. Can it be supposed, sir, that the source to which will be
imputed the distress that will have flowed from this event, will be
the first to be thought of to be guarded against a participation of
the evils that will result from it, in preference to the claims of
the most intimate friends and connections? No, sir, the bonds due to
the United States will be collected only at the tail of an execution.
But I mean not to press this consideration. Admit, for a moment,
that they will all be equally well collected--that they will be paid
as usual, although it is palpable that for a considerable time the
merchants will be unable to find the means to pay them: yet, admit,
sir, that the money is collected in the State banks, how is it to be
transmitted? It must come to the centre of the seat of Government; very
little of the public money is expended in the Northern section of the
Union. Will it come from the Eastward, in bills of the State banks?
Penobscot bank bills sometimes will not pass in Boston; Boston bills
pass with difficulty in New York or Philadelphia; and the bills of New
York State banks probably would not be readily current in Washington.
You must, then, sir, if Boston gives you a revenue of two millions of
dollars, transmit the greater part of it to the seat of Government, or
wherever it may be wanted in specie. Can this be done? We have not two
millions of dollars of specie in our town, and, I may almost venture
to say, never had. Suppose you make this transmission once, can you
do it a second time? No, sir, the thing is utterly impracticable. You
must adopt some other mode. Exchange between the different cities will
not reach the case; frequently it cannot be purchased even for an
insignificant amount.
Sir, will your money, when collected, be safe in the State banks? Of
this I am extremely doubtful. Solicitations will undoubtedly be made
for it from all quarters. They have already been made. In one instance,
I am told, sir, the agent of a bank, even during the few past weeks,
has been here for the purpose--that suddenly the agent was gone, and in
a few days it was discovered that, owing to the failure of one of the
debtors to the bank which he represented, (a great broker,) the stock
had fallen in one day near 20 per cent. What was this the evidence of,
but that those who were most interested in this bank, the stockholders
who were on the spot, and best acquainted with its solidity, were
willing to wash their hands of their concern in it, at almost any rate
of sacrifice? Sir, I only state this, as it was here reported. I have
no personal knowledge on the subject. But will you trust your funds
with an institution thus precarious, and whose solidity is distrusted
even by its best friends?
WEDNESDAY, February 13.
The credentials of NICHOLAS GILMAN, appointed a Senator by the
Legislature of the State of New Hampshire, for the term of six years,
commencing on the 4th day of March next, were read, and ordered to lie
on file.
THURSDAY, February 14.
_Bank of the United States._
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend
and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the
subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th of
February, 1791.