CHAPTER VIII

THE LAW OF JUDICIAL POWER

96. The people of the United States, like other sovereignties, possess

not only legislative and executive functions, but also judicial.

The possession of these three powers by sovereignty is essential to

its existence and a condition of any conception of it. The judicial

power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such

inferior courts as Congress from time to time may ordain and establish.

This is a delegation of judicial power.[243] The inferior courts are

established by Congress but the power of these courts is delegated to

them by the people of the United States through the Constitution. Thus

it may be said that these inferior courts exist by act of Congress

but their authority is delegated to them by the same sovereignty that

empowers Congress to create them. The power of the Supreme Court is

defined in the word _supreme_, and that of the inferior courts in the

word _inferior_. Congress can neither increase nor decrease this

power; the sovereign alone, the people of the United States can modify

the grant. This it has done by the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1798:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or

by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.[244]

This Amendment was added in compliance with the idea,—at the time

dominant in America,—that a State, a member of the Union, is a

sovereign, and being sovereign, cannot be made defendant (that is,

cannot be sued) at the suit of a citizen or subject of another State,

or of a foreign country. The idea was,—and is,—that an American

Commonwealth may be petitioned, like any other sovereign, but can

be sued only in its own courts and with its own consent.[245] In

conformity to this idea the Constitution was so amended as to deny to

the courts of the United States any jurisdiction whatever in any case

in which an American Commonwealth is made a defendant.

97. This Amendment is a limitation of the judicial power delegated

to the government of the United States and save in some particulars

of applied judicial jurisdiction as original or appellate, is the

only limitation. On the principle that the government of the United

States “must possess all the means and have a right to resort to all

the methods of executing the powers with which it is intrusted that

are possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular

States,”[246] the judicial power vested in the federal courts must

be sufficient for all the functions and purposes of the federal

government. The judicial power of the United States extends to all

cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of

the United States, and the treaties made under its authority; to all

cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to

all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to

which the United States is a party; to controversies between two or

more States; between citizens of different States; between citizens

of the same State claiming lands under grants from different States,

and between a State, or its citizens, and foreign states, citizens, or

subjects, save and except as jurisdiction is limited by the Eleventh

Amendment.[247]

98. It will be observed that the judicial power thus delegated to

the United States includes jurisdiction over cases arising outside

the domain strictly included (as popularly understood) within the

government of the United States. That government is, of necessity and

by its nature, a distinct government, possessing powers and functions

and purposes of its own, delegated and set forth in the Constitution.

Fundamentally there is a government of the United States distinct

from the government of the States. The judicial power of the United

States includes jurisdiction over controversies to which States are a

party,—that is, to controversies to which the United States is not a

party. The jurisdiction here has no reference to the controversy but to

the status of the parties to the controversy.

99. _The Federalist_ sets forth the principle here involved:

If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of

the judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its

legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of

uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws decides the

question. Thirteen (1787; forty-eight, 1917) independent courts of

final jurisdiction over the same causes, is a hydra in government,

from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.[248]

This aspect of the judicial power of the United States concerns the

interpretation of the supreme law. One purpose of that law is “to

insure domestic tranquillity,”—that is, the peace of the Union.[249]

The Constitution imposes restrictions on the States, which of course

means restrictions on their legislatures, their governors, and their

courts. Upon principles of good government the States are prohibited

from doing many things. How shall infractions of the supreme law be

determined? Either by a congressional negative, or by the authority of

the federal courts overruling whatsoever act of the State contravenes

the Constitution.[250]

100. But the judicial power of the United States extends yet

further,—to controversies “in which the State tribunals cannot be

supposed to be impartial and unbiased.”[251] The principle here is that

the whole is greater than a part;

that the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal

of a part. “No man ought to be a judge in his own cause, or in any

cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”[252]

On the principle that every government ought to possess the means

of executing its own provisions by its own authority,

it follows that it is necessary that the construction of the

Constitution,—the supreme law,—

should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local

attachments, will be likely to be impartial between different

States and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence

to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to

the principles on which it is founded.[253]

101. The exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court is provided

for, in part, by the Constitution, but Congress is authorized to ordain

and establish inferior courts,—which means to define their respective

jurisdictions; to bestow upon a court so much judicial power, and to

make such restrictions, rules, and regulations as Congress itself may

deem proper. Thus Congress establishes such courts and defines their

several jurisdictions, but whatsoever judicial power a court possesses,

by act of Congress, the court derives from the Constitution in its

grant of such power. The jurisdiction of any inferior court of the

United States, thus defined by Congress, may vary, from time to time,

by act of Congress, but every case arising in the court must be shown,

by the record of the court, to be within its jurisdiction.[254] The

reason for this important rule (and seeming restriction) conforms to

the essential principle in all judicial proceeding: the principle of

authority. No court acts without authority and, as judicial examination

has for its ultimate purpose the settlement of controversy in a legal

manner, the jurisdiction of the court is of primary importance. One of

the purposes of the Union is “to establish justice,” and precision in

the whole matter of exercise of judicial power is essential.

102. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is

both original and appellate. Its original jurisdiction is defined in

the Constitution as “in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and those in which a State is a party.”[255]

The Court can have original jurisdiction in no other cases, nor can

Congress extend or diminish the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus to the words

in the Constitution conferring original jurisdiction on the Court “a

negative or exclusive sense must be given, or they have no operation

at all.”[256] The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was

conferred because of the dignity and rank of the Court, and the rank

of the parties thus privileged to appear before it at first instance.

Ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls represent sovereignties,

and a State in the Union is “for some purposes sovereign, for some

purposes subordinate.”[257] On this delegation of original jurisdiction

Chief Justice Marshall remarks: “There is, perhaps, no part of the

article under consideration so much required by national policy as

this.”[258] The rank of the parties is the reason for giving them the

right to begin their case in the Supreme Court. They are not excluded

from beginning it in some other court. But Congress, in establishing

an inferior court, may deny to it any jurisdiction in cases to which

foreign representatives are a party.[259] The right of ambassadors,

public ministers, and consuls to begin their suits in the Supreme

Court is a privilege accorded them because of their governments, and

not because of themselves. As they are accredited to the Government

of the United States and not to any State government, it is proper

that the United States courts, and of these the Supreme Court, should

have original jurisdiction in their cases.[260] In all the other

cases mentioned in the Constitution the Supreme Court has appellate

jurisdiction; that is, cases come before the Court on appeal from the

decision of some inferior federal court, or from some State court, as

provided by law. The entire procedure in an appeal to the Supreme Court

is regulated by Congress. If a party, whether private person, private

corporation, or public corporation, citizen, or State is within the

jurisdiction of the United States, then that person or corporation, if

a party to a case or controversy at law, is within the jurisdiction of

a federal court. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and

this Constitution, the acts of Congress and the treaties made by its

authority are the law of federal jurisdiction. Thus it is commonly and

truly said, that whensoever the Constitution, or a treaty, or an act of

Congress is involved in the controversy, the federal courts (as their

several jurisdictions are determined by law) have jurisdiction in the

case. The principle is one of sovereignty.

103. The State for some purposes retains its sovereignty,[261] as

in the exercise of its police power.[262] By the Constitution, the

judicial power of the United States extends “to all cases of admiralty

and maritime jurisdiction,” but the State has jurisdiction to punish

crimes committed within its territory; to regulate fisheries within

that territory, and to punish those who violate its regulations. The

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to the

high seas, to the navigable waters of the United States, to the Great

Lakes, and to rivers and lakes wholly within a State. Over its own

territory the State has jurisdiction; thus the territory which is the

scene, or area, or location of the act may be subject to both State and

federal jurisdiction, and is always within one or the other.

104. In creating inferior courts, Congress determines the jurisdiction

but not the judicial power exercisable within the jurisdiction.

Congress does not control the judges in their execution of their

office. Judicial power, of whatever extent, is conferred by the

Constitution; it is power of a judicial nature delegated by the people

of the United States. The inferior courts of the United States sit

in the several States, but the right to determine the jurisdiction

of these courts is placed not in the State Legislatures (though

these Legislatures have by delegated authority, jurisdiction of this

territory), but in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation,—that

is, in the Supreme Court of the United States.[263] This means that the

Supreme Court “says what the law is.” This is the peculiar office of

courts of law. This is another way of saying that the sovereign, the

people of the United States, has delegated to the Supreme Court and

to inferior courts of the United States not legislative or executive

but judicial powers. The courts of law exercise judicial powers as the

President exercises executive and the Congress exercises legislative

powers,—in order to accomplish the purposes set forth in the Preamble

of the Constitution. The courts are empowered to accomplish this

purpose only in a judicial way.

105. The inferior courts, established by Congress, have such

jurisdiction as Congress in its wisdom sees fit to give them save that

the jurisdiction belonging to the Supreme Court cannot be given to an

inferior court; there can be but one Supreme Court. The relation of the

State courts to the courts of the United States is partly determined by

the Constitution, partly by act of Congress. The circumstances under

which a case in or from a State court may be transferred, or appealed,

to a federal court are various, but the essential reason for such

transfer is that the jurisdiction of the United States as defined by

the Constitution, a treaty, or an act of Congress, is involved. A case

or controversy not involving that jurisdiction cannot arise in any

federal court. The possible relations of the Constitution, treaties,

and acts of Congress to individuals (persons natural), to corporations

(persons artificial, as private corporations), and to States (public

corporations), are beyond calculation. The line of demarcation between

the jurisdiction of State courts and that of federal courts cannot

be fixed by any brief definition or survey. In some instances the

jurisdiction is a matter of choice by parties, the court that first

takes jurisdiction having it, as it were, by first instance, but in

such cases there exists by law a concurrent jurisdiction, judicial

procedure being open to parties in either the State or the federal

court. In practice, a court restricts itself to its own jurisdiction.

106. It has been said that one test of demarcation between the two

jurisdictions is the common law; that each State has the common law but

the United States has statute law only. This difference (if true) would

restrict federal courts to an exercise of judicial power delegated by

the Constitution and set forth in laws made by its authority, while the

State courts would administer justice in accord with the law of the

States which are both common law and statutory. It must be remembered,

however, that federal courts sit in the several States and administer

whatsoever law is the local (State) law, taking judicial notice of

State statutes, of decisions of State courts, of usages, of the common

law as existing in the State, and, therefore, exercising a jurisdiction

essentially the same as the State courts. Emphasis may well be placed

on the custom of federal courts to follow closely the decisions of

State courts,—the result being that State decisions become final in

federal courts as do federal decisions in State courts. But the States

cannot increase or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts, nor

can Congress increase or diminish the jurisdiction of State courts.

Although both courts may have jurisdiction in certain cases, collisions

of authority are prevented by good sense and comity among State and

federal judges.

107. The essential power of any federal court is to exercise federal

judicial jurisdiction. This means, practically, that a federal court

does not and cannot exercise State powers. The converse also is true:

no State court can exercise federal powers, unless granted those

powers by the Constitution, a treaty, or an act of Congress; but a

State court exercising any federal powers, is thereby a federal court.

The Constitution provides that the judges in every State shall be

bound by the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or

laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This solemn oath

of State judges to support the Constitution as the supreme law gives

them jurisdiction “to say what the law is,”[264] and howsoever rarely

they may exercise the power vested in them to do so, State judges may

take judicial notice of any law, State or federal, as harmonizing or

conflicting with the Constitution; this means that a State court may

pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional, but the decision of

that court is not final: there is but one Supreme Court of the United

States.[265]

108. Territorial courts are to be distinguished from courts of the

United States. They are not federal courts as are the Supreme Court and

the inferior courts, namely, the Circuit Courts, the District Courts,

or the Court of Claims. Neither are they State courts.

The Constitution being made only for the people of the United

States,—that is, for the people of the United States inhabiting

States,[266] does not apply or extend to the territories unless

extended by act of Congress. The courts in a territory are created by

Congress and have such powers (or jurisdiction) as the act creating

them provides. But in creating them, Congress is limited by the

Constitution.[267] Congress also creates courts martial, but the

jurisdiction of these courts is always subject to inquiry by civil

courts. Fundamentally, the reason here is the supremacy of the civil

over the military authority in the American system of government.

109. A problem not infrequently arising in courts of law is the

solution of some political question involved. All political questions

are questions for the political department of the government to settle;

they lie wholly outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus the

courts never decide as to the wisdom or folly of an executive or

legislative act,—and in one form or another, every act of Congress or

President is politically wise or unwise according to the political

belief of the critic. Nor do the debates over an act fix the meaning

of the act, with the court. Where the court was asked to refer to the

debates in Congress to determine the meaning of the act, it was said:

All that can be determined from the debates and reports is that

various members had various views, and we are left to determine

the meaning of this act, as we determine the meaning of other

acts, from the language used therein. There is, too, a general

acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not

appropriate sources of information from which to discover the

meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body.[268]

The reason, [continues the court], is that it is impossible to

determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by

the members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to

the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak

may not have agreed with those who did, and those who spoke might

differ from each other, the result being that the only proper way

to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act,

and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it

passed.

110. In 1828 the Supreme Court sustained as a constitutional exercise

of the war power the right of the United States to acquire territory

by conquest or treaty.[269] The issue in the case was “the relation in

which Florida (at the time a Territory) stands to the United States.”

It was an issue in law, not in politics. Whether A or B is the lawful

governor of a State is an issue, when legally drawn, for the State

courts; but whether a community calling itself a State, is a member of

the Union, or should be admitted into it, under the Fourth Article of

the Constitution is a political question and is for Congress to decide.

It rests with Congress to decide what government is the established

one in a State. For as the United States guarantees to each

State a republican form of government, Congress must necessarily

decide what government is established in the State before it can

determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators

and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of

the Union, the authority of the government under which they are

appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by

the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding

on every other department of the government, and could not be

questioned in a judicial tribunal.[270]

The right to decide such a political question is in Congress and not in

the courts.[271]

111. The final authority of American courts of law to construe

statutes and constitutions is distinctive. The court pronounces a law

unconstitutional and thus expounds the constitution. “This results,”

says Cooley, “from the nature of its jurisdiction.” Chief Justice

Marshall, in 1803, first applied this principle in a Federal court:

The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a

government of laws and not of men.

The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.

_It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is._[272]

In these words is stated the essential doctrine of judicial supremacy.

As the doctrine is fundamental, the reason for it is essential to a

proper understanding of its vast import:

That the people have an original right to establish for their

future government such principles as in their opinion shall most

conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole

American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original

right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be

frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established

are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they

proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to

be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the

government, and assigns to different departments their respective

powers. It may either stop here or establish certain limits not

to be transcended by those departments.... It is a proposition

too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any

legislative act repugnant to it; or that the Legislature may alter

the Constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives

there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior,

paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level

with ordinary legislative acts and, like other acts, is alterable

when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part

of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the

Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written

constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to

limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those

who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming

a fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently

the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the

Legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.... It is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to

say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases

must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws

conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation

of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if

both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so

that the court must either decide the case conformably to the law

disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution

disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these

conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of

judicial duty.... Those, then, who controvert the principle that

the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law,

are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close

their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine

would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.

It would declare that an act, which according to the principles

and theory of our government is entirely void, is yet in practice

completely obligatory.... It would be giving the Legislature a

practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes

to restrict their powers within narrow limits. That it thus

reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on

political institutions,—a written constitution,—would of itself

be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been

viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But

the peculiar expressions of the Constitution of the United States

furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection.[273]

The conclusion of the whole matter is:

Thus the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United

States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be

essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant

to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other

departments, are bound by that instrument.[274]

112. The federal (or the State) judiciary, while final judge of

what the law is, is not the judge of what the law should be: such

action would be a violation of judicial functions and an assumption

of legislative functions.[275] The court in saying what the law is,

that is, what it means, does not attempt to say what the law should

be, that is, to make the law. Therefore it is perilous, as likely to

embarrass the court, for the court to be subject to the call of the

executive, or the legislative, to give an opinion “upon important

questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.”[276] The peril lies

in possible confusion of governmental functions, or, to use the

constitutional term, “offices.” The American people have delegated

judicial power to the courts: the people of the several States to

their State courts; the people of the United States, to the federal

courts; and “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is.”

113. This province the American judiciary occupies, this duty it

performs, with the result that it holds a unique place in political

history. At no other time, among no other people, in no other form of

government has the judiciary executed the office it executes in the

American system of government.

It is the consciousness of the American people that law must

rest upon justice and reason, that the constitution is a more

ultimate formulation of the fundamental principles of justice

and reason than mere legislative acts, and that the judiciary

is a better interpreter of these fundamental principles than

the Legislature,—it is this consciousness which has given such

authority to the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme

Court.[277]

Yet,—so remarks the Supreme Court itself,—

The slightest consideration of the nature, the character, the

organization, and the powers of (federal) courts will dispel any

fear of serious injury to the government at their hands. While by

the Constitution the judicial department is recognized as one of

the three great branches among which all the powers and functions

of the government are distributed, it is inherently the weakest of

them all. Dependent as its courts are for the enforcement of their

judgments upon officers appointed by the executive and removable

at pleasure, with no patronage and no control of the purse or the

sword, their power and influence rest solely upon the public sense

of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to which all may

appeal for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the

Constitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence

reposed in the soundness of their decisions and the purity of their

motives.[278]

114. To the question, “What is constitutional law in the United

States?” the answer is, “Law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.”

In other countries, and, generally speaking, in all countries at all

times, until the institution of the political system of the United

States,—the American system of government,—the supreme law of the

land was the will of the executive (as in absolute monarchies), or

the supreme will of the legislative (as in Great Britain). So long

as the Supreme Court of the United States retains the confidence of

the American people, the decisions of that Court will remain the

authoritative exposition of American constitutional law.

It follows that the normal execution of the judicial office in America

determines the meaning of American constitutional law; or stated in

other words, in the decisions of the Supreme Court there are found

the formulation of the principles on which law in America is founded,

and the application of these principles in testing, as issues arise,

the acts of the legislative and the services of the administrative.

Therefore it is to the interpretation thus given by the judiciary that

we turn for an understanding of the exercise of offices,—legislative,

executive, or judicial, delegated as powers by the sovereign, the

people of the United States. Whatsoever is done, by either (so-called)

department of government in conformity with this delegation of powers

is constitutional; and whatsoever is done by either department in

conflict with this delegation of powers is unconstitutional. Whether

constitutional or unconstitutional it is the exalted and unique

office of the Supreme Court to determine. This Court therefore

touches American life at every point. Exhaustive examination of its

interpretation principles, laws, judicial decisions, arguments of

counsel, opinions of experts, writings of jurists, and the history of

society,—and such examination alone, answers the question, “What is

constitutional law in America?”

In attempting, then, to summarize, the essentials of American

constitutional law, it is from the decisions of the Supreme Court, as

from no other source, one must derive any authoritative interpretation.

115. The three departments of government are distinct.

The legislative shall never exercise the executive and judicial

powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the

legislative or judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial

shall never exercise the executive or legislative powers, or either

of them; to the end it may be a government of laws and not of

men.[279]

This principle of separation of powers, or offices, of government, is,

for many purposes, not merely fundamental, but primary, in American

constitutional law. A department of government can execute only the

offices, or powers, delegated to it,[280] but the Legislature cannot

impose other than judicial duties upon courts of law, or judicial

duties upon other than the judiciary.[281]

It follows from this principle that acts done by the legislative, or

the judiciary, or the executive, in due course,—that is, according to

rules of procedure and in the mode required by law, are official acts

and are to be accredited as such.[282] Thus laws which appear on the

face of them to be attested by the proper officials of the two Houses,

duly signed by the Executive (or, passed over his vote as provided by

the Constitution), and published by the official authorized to publish

them are legislative acts, (laws) in a constitutional sense. So the

records of courts of law made and kept in due procedure, and officially

authenticated, are judicial records in a constitutional sense.

116. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is co-extensive

with the judicial power delegated by the Constitution.[283] Congress

has power to give the inferior courts of the United States “original

jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction

extends.”[284]

In all cases in which the Constitution, or a treaty, or an act of

Congress is involved, the United States through some one of its courts

has jurisdiction.[285]

The exemption of an ambassador, public minister, or consul from suits

in particular courts “is the privilege, not of the person who happens

to fill the office, but of the State or government he represents.”[286]

Consuls are oftentimes citizens, not aliens; any exemptions or

privileges claimed by such a person accrue to him as consul being an

alien, not as consul being also a citizen, of the United States.

The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends over all

water on which commerce is carried on between different States, or

nations.[287] The principle of national commercial jurisdiction is

essentially that of national political jurisdiction, a jurisdiction

thus declared:

We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the Government

of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised

through its official agents, execute on every foot of American

soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily

involves the power to command obedience to its laws....[288]

It is a fundamental of our constitutional law that no suit can be

maintained against the United States, in any court, without express

authority of Congress; and the United States cannot be sued in the

courts of any State in any case.[289] It is the sovereign right of the

United States not to be sued. To the extent that a State is sovereign

it has the same right, and “These States are constituent parts of the

United States. They are members of one great empire—for some purposes

sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.”[290] The physical boundaries

of a State, constituting a political, not a judicial question, must

be determined by legislative authority, yet if the United States is a

party to a case involving the issue of territorial boundary, the case

falls within the judicial power,—that is, within the jurisdiction of

the courts of the Union.

The States of the Union have agreed in the Constitution that

the judicial power of the United States shall extend to _all_

cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the

United States, without regard to the character of the parties

(excluding of course, suits against a State by its own citizens,

or by citizens or subjects of foreign states), and equally to

controversies to which the United States shall be a party, without

regard to the subject of such controversies, and that (the Supreme

Court) may exercise original jurisdiction in all such cases [in

which a State shall be a party] without excluding those in which

the United States may be the opposite party.[291]

In other words, the United States possesses adequate governmental

authority and jurisdiction to secure the large purposes outlined in

the Preamble to the Constitution. The United States has judicial

jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, the laws and

the treaties of the United States “whoever may be the parties.”[292]

This principle is of far-reaching effect; no party can be exempt.

117. A corporation created by a State is a citizen of that State

for many purposes, but cannot be a citizen of another State because

created by the former State. Outside of the State of its creation

it is a foreign corporation and possesses only such privileges as

are granted to it. This means that rights, privileges, judgments

accruing to or possessed by a corporation, say created by Pennsylvania

and in Pennsylvania, do not accrue to and are not possessed by that

corporation, say in Ohio, unless conferred by Ohio and possessed by

the corporation within Ohio, under laws of Ohio, and by decision of

Ohio courts. The principle here is the familiar one of jurisdiction.

No State has power beyond its own jurisdiction and “the courts of no

country execute the penal laws of another.”[293]

The suability of a State involves its sovereignty and its honor and

good faith. The constitutional law of America is that a State in the

Union cannot be compelled to perform its contracts, although attempts

on its part to avoid them may be judicially resisted, and State laws

impairing the obligation of contracts are void. Yet the legislative

department of a State represents its polity and its will and by

every principle of justice is called upon to hold public obligations

inviolate.

Any departure from this rule, except for reasons most cogent (of

which the Legislature and not the courts, is the judge) never fails

in the end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting

injury upon the State itself. But to deprive the Legislature of

the power of judging what the honor and safety of the State may

require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge

the public debts, would be attended with greater evils than such

failure can cause.[294]

118. The judicial power of the United States extends, under the

Constitution to controversies between _citizens of different States_

and the Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction strictly within the meaning

of the term.[295]

_States_, as the word is used in the Constitution, means only members

of the Union; a Territory is not a State; the citizen of a Territory is

not a citizen of a State and any controversy at law which he may have

with another person is not “a controversy between citizens of different

States,” and therefore does not come within the judicial jurisdiction

of the United States. Of course the limitation applies to artificial

persons,—corporations created by a State.

A corporation is not a citizen of the State and it cannot maintain

a suit in a court of the United States against the citizen of a

different State from that by which it was chartered, unless the

persons who compose the corporate body are all citizens of that

State.[296]

The jurisdiction of American courts is co-extensive with the power that

creates them. Thus the jurisdiction of federal courts depends in no way

upon the State, and State judges “possess an absolute independence of

the United States.”

The Constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given

or withheld powers according to the judgment of the American

people, by whom it was adopted. We (_i. e._ the Supreme Court)

can only construe its powers, and cannot inquire into the policy

or principles which induced the grant of them. The Constitution

has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that

State attachments, State prejudices, State jealousies, and State

interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed

to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.

Hence, in controversies between States; between citizens of

different States; between citizens claiming grants under different

States; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners, and

between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the

authority of Congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and

determined before the national tribunals. No other reason than

that which has been stated can be assigned, why some, at least,

of these cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the

State courts. In respect to the other enumerated cases—the cases

arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United

States, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers,

and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—reasons of a

higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace, and

sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive

legislation.[297]

From the principle here given it may be deduced that cases or

controversies in State courts are removable from them into federal

courts if the case or controversy involves the Constitution, a treaty

or an act of Congress.[298]

But a prisoner in custody under the authority of a State should

not, except in a case of peculiar urgency, be discharged by a court

or judge of the United States upon a writ of _habeas corpus_, in

advance of any proceedings in the courts of the State to test the

validity of his arrest or detention.[299]

119. A federal court sitting within a State is a court of that State

within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the Union, “and as

such, has an equal right with the State courts to fix the construction

of the local law.”[300] A State tribunal’s decision must conform to

that of the Supreme Court of the United States, but a federal court

sitting within a State follows the highest State tribunal unless the

decision of that tribunal has been set aside by the Supreme Court. Such

procedure “tends to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial

power, in the State and federal tribunals.” This means that the statute

law of a State,—and a fixed and received construction by a State in its

own courts, makes a part of the statute law,—is accepted by the federal

courts sitting in the State. But the federal court there is not bound

to follow such State precedents and authorities; the court possesses

a jurisdiction independent of that conferred by State authority.[301]

Thus it may be stated as accepted American constitutional law that

where there are two co-ordinate jurisdictions, and especially “with

regard to the law of real estate and the construction of State

constitutions and statutes” and where are concerned “the doctrines of

commercial law and general jurisprudence” the federal courts sitting

in a State exercise their own judgment, “but even in such cases, for

the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, the federal courts will

lean towards an agreement of views with the State courts, if the

question seems to them balanced with doubt.”[302]

To the extent that a federal court sitting within a State follows State

laws and decisions, to that extent is there a common law of the United

States. There is, however, no national common or customary law of the

United States; its law is statutory. But the interpretation of the

Constitution by the judicial power of the United States

is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are

framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be

read in the light of its history. The code of constitutional and

statutory construction which, therefore, is gradually formed by

the judgments of (the Supreme) Court, in the application of the

Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof,

has for its basis so much of the common law as may be implied in

the subject, and constitutes a common law resting on national

authority.[303]

NOTE: For an account of acts of Congress declared unconstitutional

by the Supreme Court see _The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional

Legislation_, B. F. Moore, Columbia University Studies, vol. liv.,

No. 2, 1913.

The Essentials of American Constitutional Law · 第 8 / 13 章